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Increasing environmental degradation in much of the developing world is often linked
with rapid economic development and the loss of indigenous knowledge systems and tradi-
tional resource management institutions. There are however very few detailed studies on
enduring indigenous or traditional resource management institutions. In response to this gap
in knowledge the International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management ICLARM-
The World Fish Center embarked on a study of the SASI Laut (an indigenous fisheries re-
source conservation and management tradition) in Maluku, Indonesia. The study was part of
a larger global project on fisheries co-management funded by the Danish International De-
velopment Assistance (DANIDA). The International Development Research Centre of Canada
provided a grant to undertake this specific study in Indonesia. Indonesia has the largest
number of and longest enduring traditional community-based coastal resource management
systems in Southeast Asia. Although many of these systems are disappearing, the basis of
these systems and resource management approaches used in these systems hold some prom-
ise of providing directions for crafting new institutions for managing natural resources. Such
knowledge could be a basis for improved policy choices resulting in sustainable economic
growth, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. These are important goals of
ICLARM. ICLARM as a member of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR) works toward generating the knowledge base for improved management
of aquatic resources leading to improved socio-economic conditions for the millions of poor
who depend on these resources.
This study provides a better understanding of the extent and functioning of community
based coastal resource management systems in Maluku province, Indonesia and suggests
recommendations for national, provincial and village government to support, maintain and
develop effective traditional and indigenous resource management institutions. The study
has shown that the SASI Laut has benefits that can be used as a basis for building local level
management institutions.
Although large-scale changes have taken place in Maluku since the time this study was
completed, the changes provide new opportunities for the development of innovative ar-
rangements for  state and community cooperation for managing aquatic resources. It is hoped
the detailed study of the SASI Laut system provided in this report will form an important
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Section A – Introduction and Methodology
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Project Overview and Objectives
With funding from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), a five-year
collaborative research project involving the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources
Management (ICLARM), Philippines, the Institute of Fisheries Management (IFM) at the North
Sea Center, Denmark, and the National Aquatic Research Systems (NARS), was initiated in
1994. The collaboration between ICLARM, IFM and NARS is based on a mutual interest to
gain practical experience in research in fisheries co-management, to demonstrate its
applicability as a sustainable, equitable and efficient management strategy, and to develop
models for use and adoption by governments, fishing communities, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and others. The overall purpose of the Fisheries Co-management
Research Project is to determine the prospects for successful implementation of fisheries co-
management strategies.
As part of the Fisheries Co-management Research Project, ICLARM staff, with funding
assistance from IDRC (the International Development Research Centre of Canada) and the
Netherlands government (NEDA) have collaborated with researchers in Indonesia to study
the community-based institution called sasi in the province of Maluku (Figure 1).  Although
this project focuses on a long-standing institution rather than a time-limited project, the overall
objective is the same as for other projects, that is, to evaluate community level management
in order to develop better models for the future (Pomeroy and Simanjuntak 1997).
Sasi encompasses fishery-related rights and rules, and is, therefore, commonly referred to as
a traditional resource management institution, even though it also has other functions and its
focus has changed through time (Zerner 1994a). As a village level, community-based resource
management (CBRM) system, sasi varies from locality to locality while maintaining the same
intention of managing resource utilization.  While land sasi controls and manages agro-forestry,
marine sasi deals mostly with elements of the fishery, i.e., sedentary marine organisms and
pelagic fish found in the waters close to shore.  Sasi regulations usually apply to coastal waters
facing a village, a bay, a coral reef ecosystem, or other areas having easily recognized
boundaries.  In some parts of Maluku, sasi regulates estuary fisheries.
The government of Maluku realizes that in some parts of the province, village people are
more likely to comply with this traditional management system than with formal (national or
provincial) regulations.  However, while in some areas of Maluku, sasi is still functioning, in
others, sasi is said to be growing weaker or has disappeared entirely. As has been pointed out
by Zerner (1994b), the current extent of sasi, and how quickly, where and why weakening of
the institution is taking place, are not clear.  To allow discussion of the future of sasi, we need
to first understand its current condition, rate of change, and the forces behind that change.
Zerner (1994b) also identified the need for an objective evaluation of sasi, especially in terms
of biological sustainability and social equity. In his view, the institution has historically served
to protect the interests of elites. Recent re-invention of the sasi institution has, he argues,2        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
moved in two essential directions. Some practitioners are re-inventing sasi as an institution
for resource conservation while others see it as a tool for collecting resource rents which, in
some cases, may be controlled for the benefit of social elites.  To gain an overall picture of the
range and variety of sasi systems is the initial step in understanding the institution. Based on
this inventory, and on an understanding of the social and biological impacts of the institution,
we can develop strategies for maintaining and revitalizing the system or, where sasi no longer
exists, for establishing a new community-based resource management (CBRM) system.
Sasi offers an important research opportunity because it is one of the few (if not the only) long-
enduring CBRM systems in Asia.  From the perspective of an analyst seeking insights into the
elements of a successful CBRM system, sasi has additional value because, unlike CBRM projects
(or more recently, co-management projects), sasi has a long history and has undergone
transformation through time.  Thus, sasi provides us with not one case study site, but a rich
array of outcomes in villages that differ from one another in many ways.  We can perform a
comparative analysis of these outcomes and ask: What different forms does sasi take today and
which are the most common? What contributes to sasi’s resilience, i.e., why has sasi become
extinct in some villages but survived in others? Why is it being revitalized in some villages?
Are there documentable benefits from sasi in terms of equity, efficiency and sustainability? This
project will go beyond the descriptive studies that have already been carried out on sasi, to
undertake a quantitative performance analysis. We hope to discover principles or elements that
can contribute to culturally appropriate and effective forms of community-level management.
In Indonesia, one obstacle to the maintenance and development of effective community-based
resource management institutions is that the government does not fully recognize or support
such institutions. Local institutions and customs are not reflected in national and provincial
resource management laws and policies. Without government support, fishing communities
are not able to defend their institutional arrangements (rights and rules), or hold off the slow
demise of their traditional management systems. While government policy makers know that
CBRM systems exist, they lack information on how well these systems perform. Before they
are willing to reshape government policy away from centralized management and towards
CBRM, they want to know that CBRM systems perform more equitably, efficiently and
sustainably than centralized management systems. Quantitative information on CBRM is
needed to support decision-making to change policy.
Sasi, being a village level institution, is not, by itself, a co-management structure. Co-management
requires at least two parties: a local institution working together with one or more higher levels
of government.  In this report, we focus on the function and impact of sasi as a local institution
but also look at linkages with the government in order to gauge whether or not sasi is a good
model or basis for a local institution in some future co-management structure.
Research on sasi will help us to understand how CBRM systems change and adapt over time,
providing insight that is critical for the design of new CBRM systems. The results should be
of use to both the government and fishers of Indonesia. Information about the performance
of sasi can form the basis for changes in policy to support, maintain and develop CBRM
systems. The results should also be useful to a worldwide audience interested in the design
and implementation of CBRM systems, particularly regarding the resilience, equity, efficiency
and sustainability of these systems.
The goals of the project are:
1. To better understand the extent and functioning of traditional community-based coastal
resource management systems in Indonesia, specifically the sasi system in the MalukuIntroduction        3
province.
2. To develop policy recommendations for national, provincial and village governments
to support, maintain and develop effective community-based coastal resource
management institutions in the Maluku province and throughout Indonesia.
The specific objectives of the project are:
1. To identify the extent of operating sasi systems and practices in the central Maluku
province.
2. To measure the performance (i.e., impacts in terms of equity, efficiency, social and
biological sustainabilities) and investigate the resilience of the sasi system.
3. To undertake descriptive and comparative case study analyses of the sasi system and
its resilience in the Maluku province using the institutional analysis research
framework.
4. To make policy recommendations to the government to support, maintain, and develop
community-based coastal resource management institutions.
1.2 Research Framework
The Fisheries Co-management Research Project has developed an analytical framework which,
when applied in various research projects, will enable comparisons to be made among case
studies, country research and pilot-tested co-management models (ICLARM-NSC 1996). The
model allows data to be analyzed in a systematic way so that conditions that facilitate
successful co-management may be discovered. In conducting research on fisheries co-
management, we are essentially interested in understanding how rules affect the behavior of
fishers, and what outcomes fishers achieve when using fisheries resources.
Institutional analysis focuses on the rights and rules that make up the management institution.
These rights and rules may be formal (written down) or informal (unwritten code of conduct).
The purpose of institutional analysis is to separate these rules from the incentives and strategies
of the various players (individuals and organizations) involved in the institution.  Once there
is a clear appreciation of what is cause and what is effect, we can start to understand how
different management structures affect behavior of resource users and subsequent outcomes
(Figure 1.1).
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The institutional analysis framework acknowledges that the success of a management
institution does not depend only on structure (i.e., the sum of constitutional, collective choice
and operational rules governing resource access and withdrawal) but is also affected by the
wide range of local, regional, national and even international contextual variables.
There are three interrelated parts to institutional analysis: analysis of institutional
arrangements, analysis of performance and identification of the key factors affecting
performance. The first aspect – institutional arrangement analysis – describes what is occurring
in real life and uncovers the relationships between the institution and related organizations.
Links that exist between the local management system and the sets of contextual variables
are also explored.  Contextual variables include the biological, physical and technological
attributes, the market attributes, stakeholder and community characteristics, community
institutional and decision-making arrangements, the external institutional and organizational
arrangements, and exogenous attributes. Contextual variables provide incentives and
disincentives which in turn affect patterns of interaction among stakeholders, i.e., how resource
users participate in, support or comply with management institutions.
The second level of institutional analysis – institutional and organizational performance –
evaluates the outcomes of the co-management institutional arrangements according to the
measures of sustainability, efficiency and equity.  The measuring instruments are applied to
the impact of co-management arrangements on human as well as ecological systems that
operate and affect the resource.
The final level of analysis determines the characteristics of, and underlying factors for,
successful co-management.
The degree and type of interactions among resource users and managers both at local and
higher levels determine where an institution lies along the continuum of potential co-
management arrangements (Figure 1.2 adapted from McCay 1993 and Berkes 1994).
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1.3 Overview of Methodological Approach
To complete an institutional analysis of sasi that fulfilled the objectives stated above, the
research team developed a data-gathering program that comprised a number of component
studies.  Details on the objectives of each component and the methods used to gather and
analyze data can be found in Chapter 2.
1) Inventory of sasi
In 63 villages in central Maluku, key informants were interviewed to record the present and
past occurrence and type of sasi present in the region. The results were also used to study
institutional resilience. Results can be found in Chapters 7 and 17.
2) Performance analysis of sasi at the district level
Over 500 fishers from 28 villages were interviewed to document and compare outcomes in
sasi and non-sasi villages. In addition, limited marine surveys were conducted on coral reef
habitats, including open-access sites as well as areas managed under sasi.  Results are presented
in Chapters 8 and 9.
3a) Institutional analysis case studies
Six villages were selected for case studies: two with sasi, two without sasi, and two that are in
the process of revitalizing the institution.  For each case study site, we collected information
on the local context (technological, biological, social and economic) and institutional and
organizational arrangements, following the institutional analysis framework (see Section 1.2).
Results are provided in Chapters 10-16.
3b) Resilience of marine sasi institutions
In the six villages, 157 interviews were taken with key respondents to study changes in the
institution, the process of decline and revival where sasi was lost, and to identify the
mechanisms behind a well-functioning management institution (see Chapter 17).
3c) Data gathering to characterize contextual variables for institutional analysis
Data on the history and regional level context for fisheries management in Maluku were
obtained through the analysis of existing literature. More detailed first-hand information on
the political and social context of Maluku coastal villages came from case study sites.  In
addition, fish traders and government staff at regional and provincial levels were interviewed
to discover the market forces and the structure of formal fisheries management that could
affect local management. This regional and village-level contextual information is presented
in Chapters 3-6.
4) Policy recommendations
Results of the performance and resilience studies, together with the information on government
structures and functioning gathered in component 3c, were used to develop policy
recommendations for the government of Indonesia (Sopacua et al. 1998).6        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
1.4 Outputs
The research has produced the following results:
• This project report, documenting the various components of the institutional analysis
i.e., contextual information, inventory, performance study, case studies, resilience study
and lessons learned.
• A number of academic publications on sasi and the inshore fishery.
• A report provided to all villages where the inventory was carried out.
• A report for each case study village.
• A policy document that will be sent to the national government of Indonesia.  In it, we
provide our findings together with recommendations from the village/district
government, academic and NGO colleagues regarding steps that could be taken in
support of co-management of marine resources in Indonesia.
1.5 Report Summary
The marine resources of central Maluku are very rich but are under severe pressure, particularly
from destructive fishing techniques.  After a period of rapid increase in fishing pressure and
catches, there is now a need for more cautious management. Nevertheless, economic pressures
provide a strong incentive for further expansion of fisheries.
The central Maluku fishery is numerically dominated by artisanal fisher-farmers having low-
technology boats, fishing gears and limited formal education. Younger fishers include increasing
numbers of Muslims and they are more focused on deep-water pelagic resources.  Fishers are
also moving from the artisanal to the small-scale sector and onto larger commercial vessels as
crew.  Both artisanal fishers and commercial crew earn marginal incomes, have no control over
fish prices, and are unorganized. Profit-sharing systems that are in place provide incentives to
fishers to maximize catch, if necessary, through use of destructive gears such as very fine mesh
nets.  At the same time, enforcement of national fisheries regulations is lax and there are serious
deficiencies in government management agencies in terms of motivation, coordination,
knowledge, infrastructure, and funding support.  Local village institutions (sasi), while generally
well respected, have less credence with the younger, commercially-oriented fishers.
The majority of rural, coastal villagers are still directly or indirectly dependent on fishery.
Fishers clearly recognize that inshore and pelagic fisheries resources in Maluku are in decline.
Few encourage their children to enter the fishery even though they themselves find it to be a
fulfilling occupation.  In the study area, there is an overall decline in social interaction,
cooperation, and compliance with fisheries rules. Collapsing inshore fish catches have driven
subsistence fishers ever farther out to sea and future conflict with commercial sectors is
inevitable if management and conflict resolution arrangements are not set in place. However,
fishers in general do not perceive that management options are available to redress the
situation.  They also still consider ocean resources to be unlimited, even though local resources
may be depleted.  They see the solution to declining catches as being an increase in their
fishing power (bigger boats and motors). NGO and academic researchers, noting these trends,
have begun to push the government to look for ways to revive or establish local management
with sasi, the traditional resource management institution, as the basis.
Coastal villages typically claim de facto rights of access and withdrawal over fairly extensive areas
of both land and sea.  Sasi, the local institution under which some fishing activities are regulated,
is nested in traditional culture, called adat, which lays down the basic ethics and codes of conduct.Introduction        7
The constitutional rules of sasi thus form an intrinsic part of the Maluku culture.  As an institution,
sasi has never been static but has changed with the times.  Sasi, and the underlying adat culture,
have waxed and waned, absorbing and reflecting the impacts of colonialism, war, economic
development and social change.  Despite past predictions of imminent demise, both sasi and adat
persist and in 1998, sasi was still widely supported and believed to be a good thing, even in
villages where the institution no longer functioned.  The spiritual aspects of sasi, its cultural
legitimacy, ceremonies, and the relationship to indigenous tenure rights, all encourage support
by the community.  Modern village leaders are attracted to sasi as a culturally acceptable basis for
collection of resource rents to support the local government.
Social and political structures in the villages of central Maluku are a reflection of centralized
and hierarchical national structures. Decision-making processes involving higher government
levels are not open for local input, nor are local decision-making processes participatory. The
leaders have little confidence in the abilities of common villagers. Environmental groups,
which are outside of the government and church hierarchies, are rare. Indonesian citizens are
trained to identify with the state rather than with local groups.  Although organizational
structures in the villages are very similar, they vary in terms of the relative role of traditional
(adat) leaders in village society and government.  Villages in the study area range from
relatively isolated, highly traditional rural communities where adat leadership is paramount,
to more modern urban satellite villages where adat leaders lack significant influence.
The spread and functionality of village organizations, whether church, government or adat,
are dependent on
1) the provision of economic benefits,
2) the broad support by the villagers,
3) stable leadership, and
4) the ability to stay at arm’s length from political turmoil.
Church organizations are most stable but as their spiritual aim is more important than
economic benefits, membership is limited.  Government groups are often dominated by upper
classes and are most vulnerable to political instability. Adat organizations may either be
supported or outcompeted by church and government powers, depending on the situation.
The function of government and adat groups is highly dependent on the presence of a culturally
legitimate and strong village leader.  Because village government leaders are used to taking
orders from above rather than initiating action, future local management institutions must be
supported at higher government levels. Village leaders will need assistance and incentives to
be proactive and creative in developing new, local level, management arrangements. The
organization must be meaningful to ordinary villagers, provide economic benefits (preferably
direct), and for stability should be linked to the Tiga Tungku (three hearthstones, i.e., church,
state and adat) but at the same time buffered from direct impacts of political strife and changing
village leadership.
The majority of central Maluku villages still retain some form of the local sasi institution but
only a quarter have rules pertaining to marine management. Sasi practices vary from village
to village.  The governing and enforcing authorities may be adat, church, local government
and/or private individuals holding harvest rights. The character and legitimacy of the village
head (kepala desa) are the key to the successful function of the institution. Kewang, an adat
organization, plays a central role in village resource management in the more traditional
villages with an active sasi institution.  The kewang members patrol sasi areas and enforce the
rules. In villages where sasi has evolved into an almost purely commercial transaction, these
kewang members are no longer traditional leaders. Collective choice rules, a mixture of tradition8        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
and modern innovation, define how the players in sasi work together. The operational rules
of marine sasi regulate day-to-day activities in the marine territory and/or sasi area. These
operational rules may be indigenous or may mimic national legislation, and are subject to
revision.  This adaptivity is important to the resilience of the institution but has also led to
the development of a patchwork of marine management efforts lacking a unified purpose
and also lacking a set of minimum standards.
Marine sasi is most prevalent in mid-sized villages distant from the urban center of Ambon.
In no case is management under sasi comprehensive.  Only small areas of shallow waters and
few species are regulated.  Nevertheless, the existence of sasi means that certain important
management concepts are widely known and valued as part of local culture. Using sasi as the
basis for the development of a modern management institution can, therefore, be considered
to be efficient as it reduces potential costs of public education and enforcement.
Many government staff agreed that local institutions are useful and hold a strategic position
close to the resource and to fishers. Also, younger fishers especially tend to see the community
as having responsibility for management.  However, sasi and kewang lack formal legal status
and they are effectively isolated from regional, provincial and national management structures.
The kewang, as a group, has no role in the process of planning for fisheries development nor
in the process of developing provincial fisheries policy and regulations.
Resource users are motivated to comply or cooperate with the sasi institution according to
the incentives and options inherent in their situation. The outcome of the interaction between
the management institution and resource users was assessed in terms of social and biological
sustainability, and the efficiency and equitability of management.
Equity in terms of access to resources is not a major issue because sasi covers few species and
small areas.  Sasi has also no effect on the distribution of fishing gears or on economic
disparities.  However, fishers are not neutral about equity issues in cases where harvest rights
in a sasi-controlled area are sold or auctioned.  If benefits are distributed unfairly or if they
accrue to outsiders, this can lead to non-compliance with sasi rules.  In contrast, where the
decision-makers are respected and use proceeds for community development, this
arrangement can be very efficient and also reasonably equitable. Where marine resources
under sasi are harvested as a communal crop and distributed equitably among the population,
fishers do not complain.
Control over resource management is perceived by fishers to be tighter in sasi villages, and
compliance to fisheries rules is greater.  A communal decision-making process is also stronger
and more stable.  Although decisions are said to be made “by the community”, this often
means “by a person acceptable to the community”.  The voices of fishers may or may not be
heeded, and women are excluded.  Sasi is, therefore, not equitable in this sense. Common
fishers in sasi villages feel no more involved in decision-making than fishers in non-sasi villages.
However, the hierarchical structure is very efficient and culturally acceptable as long as
leadership is strong and legitimate.
Sasi has no impact on the economic status of individual artisanal fishers, probably because the
resources managed under sasi constitute a relatively small proportion of family income. The
major difference between sasi and non-sasi villages is in terms of social sustainability.  Generally,
there are lesser trends of deterioration through time in sasi villages. Sasi fishers feel that there is
a strong tradition of collective action, greater discussion of village issues and greater harmony.
Social sustainability, especially family well-being and income, is positively influenced by whetherIntroduction        9
fishers are members of village organizations and satisfied with their jobs.
There is no evidence that sasi has any impact on the health of the fishery in general, doubtless
because sasi pertains only to small, inshore areas and most fish are caught in the deep sea.
Both sasi and non-sasi villages suffer from blast fishing. Sasi areas are also vulnerable to damage
caused by external forces such as mining exploration. At a local level, guarded sasi areas
suffer less damage than adjacent unguarded areas. On a regional level, however, the coral
reef condition is more closely related to population density and fishing pressure than to the
presence or absence of the sasi institution. More research into the condition of a larger number
of guarded sasi areas would be useful.
The practice of sasi has demonstrable benefits in protecting the valuable top shells (Trochus
niloticus) and sea cucumbers.  Although there are suitable habitats and a history of exploitation
in non-sasi villages, the presence of top shells and sea cucumbers has been extremely rare.
This suggests that these species may now be largely confined to sasi areas that are subject to
harvest restrictions and guarded.
Socio-economic variables correlated with performance of sasi (see Table 2.6) included the style
of village decision-making, job satisfaction of fishers, belief in the importance of sasi, attitudes
towards changing and bending rules and selling harvest rights, the type of gears owned,
external sources of income, economic score, and whether fishers are part of village groups
and/or are involved in communal fishing. Interestingly, perceptions of resource health are
not correlated with a desire to change fisheries rules. Fishers with more expensive gears feel
they have more say in decision-making.
For optimal collaboration between the kewang and the police in enforcement, a clear definition
of rights and mandates should be developed. In many villages, sasi regulations are considered
more legitimate than “government rules”.  Compliance also increases if the villagers profit
directly from the management of the resource.
Fishers, in general, find it important that all stakeholders are represented in decision-making.
When fishers feel that village decision-making is based on consensus or majority agreement,
they have more positive scores on all performance indicators. For a management system, it is
thus important that the decision-making process is perceived to be inclusive. Insulation of
the management institution from political turmoil is also important. Where formal and
traditional leaders collaborate closely, and where leadership is highly legitimate, sasi thrives.
What makes the sasi institution strong (and thus resilient) is it links the various players and
components i.e., legitimacy, trust, collaboration, and transparency. A shared notion of the
relevance of the institution is also needed to stimulate a common objective to maintain sasi in
spite of external influences.
The practice of sasi in central Maluku proves that rules pertaining to gear types, access, closed
areas and seasons can be successfully developed and applied at the local level by villagers
who have relatively low levels of formal education as well as only a hazy concept of resource
management.  In the place of a science-based rationale for management, we find an ethic of
working together for the benefit of the community, attachment to a cultural tradition and the
tendency to comply with sanctions based on religious beliefs. These have combined to form
the basis of a resilient and, within its narrow scope of application, demonstrably effective
institution.  Sasi also provides an alternative to the western idea that local management must
be highly democratic. The paternalistic model is potentially very efficient and cost-effective,
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acceptable.  What is important is not to further entrench current elites by allowing the system
to become inflexible, non-transparent and corrupt.  Should democratic ideals one day become
the norm, the management institution must be able to evolve to accommodate increased need
for direct participation.
Various contextual realities are at work toward the revitalization of sasi as a management
institution.  The national ethic of non-questioning obedience to central authority prompts
village leaders to do nothing, but the potential to collect resource rents through sasi makes
reviving the institution very attractive. For fishers themselves, the incentives are more linked
to culture than to a consciousness of the need for management. Strong market demand coupled
with high dependence on the fishery make villagers wary of management that might restrict
access or impose catch limits. On the other hand, competition among sectors may push artisanal
fishers to organize themselves and demand clear access and withdrawal rights on pelagic
fishing grounds.
Factors that contribute positively to the resilience of sasi as a local institution should be
considered during the process of modernizing local management.  For instance, the legitimacy
of a village head who descends from the raja line contributes positively to the execution of his
authority with regard to sasi.  A large overlap between the traditional and formal authorities
in the village government is also beneficial.  Acknowledgment of the traditional village
authorities within the formal government is vital to the revitalization of sasi.  Where traditional
institutions are acknowledged, enforcement of sasi regulations is more effective. Formal and
traditional institutions should also collaborate closely with religious authorities. Where there
are strong bonds among these institutions, sasi is highly resilient.  On the other hand, political
instability and weak leadership seriously hamper sasi as well as any revitalization process.
The perpetuation of sasi – as opposed to the introduction of a totally new institution, especially
if it includes religious leaders – would be an asset in that compliance would be encouraged.
With the existence of a local institution involving respected traditional and religious leaders,
resource users would feel secure. While revamping the institution to increase functionality in
resource management, it will be useful to retain traditional titles and structures, as well as
elements of ceremony, to provide a strong spiritual and cultural basis. Collaboration requires
a shared value system, in this case, adat.  However, where through modernization the younger
generation develops new values, the institution must adapt. The loss of interest among the
younger generations and the subsequent loss of sasi knowledge linked to adat are a threat to
sasi as a cultural institution and can, therefore, undermine its effectiveness as a resource
management structure. It is important to ascertain how important traditional language and
ritual are, and how much needs to be incorporated into a revitalized institution so that the
cultural strength of the traditional institution can benefit all without alienating younger fishers.
Collaboration, trust and legitimacy that support sasi are a function of a village size and
homogeneity. In larger, more heterogeneous villages, traditional sasi does not appear to be a
viable option. A logical alternative would be a modern village institution that provides a
transparent, inclusive decision-making process, mechanisms to change rules, mechanisms to
enforce rules and direct benefits for the fisher-managers.  Also needed are a funding base (part
of which could be generated by village organizations) and a stable management structure that
includes, but is not dependent upon, the village government. Whether or not the institution is
modeled on sasi, the needs and aspirations of the various proponents (fishers, local governments,
fisheries managers, adat leaders, and environmentalists) must be successfully accommodated.
Local institutions need to be involved not only in local monitoring and enforcement but also as
partners in development planning and implementation, stock assessment and allocation,Introduction        11
licensing etc.  In addition, to ensure a place in negotiating access and withdrawal rights for
artisanal fishers in offshore waters, local institutions will need to engage or be nested in a larger
institution operating on regional, provincial and higher levels.  Presently, there is no identifiable
lead agency dedicated to coastal and fisheries management in Maluku.  It is necessary to define
the sasi structures, powers and responsibilities within the framework of provincial and national
legislation, to provide local institutions with more capacity to deal with external threats and
become involved in development planning, execution and evaluation.
According to the pattern of loss of the institution, the 1990s appear to be a critical decade, i.e.,
sasi must adapt to modern society and gain formal legal status or it may, at the operational
level, cease to function. There are various options for providing a legal basis for local
management bodies, including decrees by the provincial governor, the district head or the
sub-district head, and promulgation of a provincial law.  Another option, previously discussed
by Bailey and Zerner (1992), is through the amendment of the national Fisheries Act No. 9,
1985, together with amendment of Law No. 5, 1979 on the local government.
Fisheries co-management can be defined as a partnership arrangement in which the
government, the community of local resource users, external change agents, and other fisheries
and coastal resource stakeholders share the responsibility and authority for the management
of the fishery. Co-management involves various degrees of delegation of management
responsibility and authority between the local level (resource user/community) and the state
level (national, provincial and municipal governments).  It can serve as a mechanism for both
fisheries management and for community economic development by promoting the
participation of fishers and community members in solving management problems and in
addressing other needs. In Maluku, the sasi institution provides a useful model and basis for
the development of modern institutions that could be integrated with provincial and national
agencies in fisheries co-management.
The report is divided into five sections. After the introduction and the methodology chapters
(Section A), Section B describes the general regional context of Maluku, e.g., the socio-political
background, biological aspects, and the development of sasi through time.  Market structures
and the role of the government in fisheries management are also discussed in this section.
Section C presents the research results of the inventory and the performance study. Section D
goes more in-depth with a presentation of the six case study villages and a comparative
analysis. Finally, Section E answers the question – what makes sasi a resilient management
institution? The last chapter in this section summarizes the results and concludes with policy
recommendations for the acknowledgment or revitalization of sasi and the development of
co-management systems in central Maluku.12        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Chapter 2
Methods
The following chapter describes the methods used to collect the data for the research
components described in Chapter 1. First, it will be explained how the study sites were selected
and the informants chosen. Then the methods used to gather and analyze the data will be
discussed for each component, i.e., the inventory of sasi in central Maluku, the performance
analysis of sasi, the institutional analysis of the case study villages, institutional resilience
and contextual information including market and government structures.
2.1 Study Site Selection and Sampling
The Maluku province in eastern Indonesia is known as the province of a thousand islands.  In
fact, there are 1,027 islands, covering about 10% of the entire area of the province and occupied
by about 1.8 million people (1990 census). Many of these islands are very small and surrounded
by productive coral reefs.  The majority of families living in the small Maluku coastal
communities gain at least a portion of their living from exploitation of marine resources such
as reef fish, pelagic fish, shellfish and sea cucumbers.
Research was focused on central Maluku because sasi is known to occur here. In the provincial
capital, Ambon, appropriate working facilities and university-trained field staff were available,
and there was easy access to government offices and major fish markets.  In Ambon, we were
also able to confer with other academic and NGO researchers knowledgeable about the
institution and involved in coastal management.
The research area, central Maluku, includes two administrative districts, Kabupaten Maluku
Tengah and Kotamadya Ambon. It is located at 2°50’-3°50’ South Latitude and 126°55’-128°45’
East Longitude.  The total area of central Maluku is 284,308 km2, consisting of 255,090 km2 of
sea and 29,218 km2 of land.  The major islands of the area are Seram, Buru, Ambon, the Lease
Islands (Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut) and the Bandas. Research was focused primarily
on the Lease Islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut.  To determine the extent and activity
of sasi, every village on these three islands has been included in the inventory (Figure 1).
The official administrative unit equivalent to a village in Maluku may be either a desa or a
dusun. A dusun is part of a desa but may be geographically distant from the larger village
where the local government resides. Ambon Island has a total of 61 desas (Anonymous 1992,
1995). Of these, 23 are suburbs of the city of Ambon, where the sasi institution has virtually
disappeared (Evans et al. 1996).  Excluding the urban satellite villages around Ambon’s inner
harbor, there are 38 coastal desas on the island, of which we have documented 50%. The large
island of Seram has 136 rural coastal villages. On this island, seven villages, i.e., those who
are closest to Ambon (5% of the total), were surveyed.
Villages in Ambon and Seram were not selected randomly. They were selected using the
following criteria:
• Local information from Ambonese researchers strongly suggested that either there
was marine sasi or a complete absence of sasi.
• The village was within easy access of Ambon.Methods        13
The reason a number of villages on Ambon Island and Seram was selected is that for the
performance analysis, we wanted to sample at least 10 villages having sasi on marine resources,
and 10 villages with no sasi at all. The inventory, however, revealed that most villages on the
Lease Islands lie along a continuum, with relatively few having either fully functional sasi or
none at all. In order to get the required number of villages, we extended the inventory survey
to selected coastal villages on Ambon Island and southern Seram.  Based on the results of this
extended inventory, two groups of 11 villages could be identified as performance study sites.
From the inventory, six case study villages were selected for the institutional analysis. First, all
villages were ranked with respect to the degree of activity of sasi. Then, two sasi villages were
identified that appeared to have strong marine management components, and two villages that
either never had marine sasi or had lost all memory of it. These two non-sasi villages could be
found only on Ambon Island. Finally, in order to study the process of breakdown and renewal,
two villages were selected where sasi had been recently lost and was being revived.  The six
case study sites (Table 2.8) were on the islands of Ambon, Haruku and Saparua.
To collect contextual information on fish markets, the main fish markets and landing areas were
selected as sampling sites. These included those in the city of Ambon, Masohi and Tulehu.  Smaller
markets investigated were in Saparua town and Passo. Local traders and commercial fishers were
interviewed in each of the six case study sites as well as at Hitu and Waai on Ambon Island.
Several large fish storage and export companies on Ambon and Seram were also approached.
Interviews at the various government bureaus involved in fisheries control, management and
enforcement, took place in Ambon (provincial capital), Masohi (district capital), and on Haruku
and Saparua (sub-district offices).
2.2 Inventory of the Sasi Institution
2.2.1 Objectives
The inventory was designed to document the sasi institution in every village of the Lease
Islands. It was extended to a number of other villages on Ambon and Seram to provide
information to facilitate site selection for the performance analysis (see Section 2.3). Specific
objectives of the inventory were:
• To determine the frequency of occurrence of various forms of sasi and, in particular, of
sasi applied to marine resources.
• To measure the strength of the sasi institution using quantitative indicators.
• To test the hypotheses that attributes of sasi vary with religion, geographic location
and village population.
• To document the types of marine management rules developed under sasi.
• To document non-sasi marine management rules at the village level and determine the
degree of impact sasi has on marine management in general.
2.2.2 Inventory method
Structured interviews on the presence and activity of sasi were conducted with key informants
in 63 villages.  In all cases, at least one of the informants was a local government official
(preferably the village head or kepala desa) or traditional (adat) authority figure because they
are expected to have detailed knowledge on village-related issues.  Church leaders, women
active in village affairs, elders and fishers were also sought out as informants (Table 2.1).14        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Table 2.1.  Informants interviewed in each phase of the institutional analysis of sasi.
Project objective and Methods Geographic area Type of informant Number
research component
1. Inventory of sasi Structured 63 villages on Nusa Village official 83
institution in central interviews Laut, Saparua, Adat leader 24
Maluku Haruku,Ambon and Church minister 6
Seram Islands Fisher, elder 48
Teacher, researcher 2
Total 165 (7 women)
2a. Performance analysis Structured 22 villages on Fishers 332
of sasi at the district interviews and Saparua, Haruku,
level ladder survey Ambon, and Seram Total 332 (73 women)
2b. Performance analysis Biological Saparua (Nolloth, Village officials 5
of sasi: biological aspects survey Itawaka, Ihamahu), Fishers 2
(direct survey, Haruku (Haruku) and Adat leaders 1
informal  Ambon (Toisapu, Women 1
interviews) Hutumuri, Seri, Airlow) Total 9 (1 woman)
3a. Institutional analysis Structured Nolloth, Haruku, Fishers 176
of six villages: contextual interviews and Tuhaha, Hulaliu, Seri,
variables and outcomes ladder survey Hutumuri-Toisapu Total 176 (8 women)
3b. Institutional analysis: Semi- Nolloth, Haruku, Village officials 25
resilience of local structured Tuhaha, Hulaliu, Seri, Adat leaders 7








Total 157 (45 women)
3c. Fisheries and Structured Major and minor fish Pole and line fishery 1
market study and semi- landing areas and Bait fishery 9
structured markets on Ambon, Small-scale fishers 9
interviews Seram, Saparua, Fish retailers 16
Haruku Fish traders 4
Fish factory staff 2
KUD managers 1
Total 42 (16 women)
3d. Government Semi- The city of Ambon BAPPEDA (Planning) 4
management structure at structured (provincial capital), Dept. of Forestry 2
provincial, district and interviews Masohi (district Dept.  of Fisheries
sub-district levels capital), Saparua Provincial 1
Island, Haruku Island (district/sub-district) 8





Total 26 ( 0 women)
Total number of 907 ( 150
interviews women)Methods        15
The interview consisted of a standard list of inventory questions. We documented the different
types of sasi currently operating for both land and marine resource management. First, we
asked whether or not there was sasi of any kind, and then asked respondents to say whether
sasi rules applied to the village (sasi negeri), land (sasi darat), river or sea (sasi laut). The existence
of sasi ceremonies, written rules and sanctions, the level and consistency of activity over time,
reasons for the loss of sasi where it was no longer present, and types of other fisheries
management rules were also documented.
It was known from the literature that sasi may be characterized as church or adat sasi, according
to the dominant power in the institution. We asked respondents to tell us whether they
considered their sasi to be adat sasi, church sasi, mosque sasi or some other form of sasi (also
see Imron 1995).  This question identifies the individuals who are seen as the authority figures:
traditional (adat) leaders, the minister (church), the imam (mosque) or other group (e.g.,
commercial harvesters). The various categories are not mutually exclusive.  In theory, all of
the above categories of sasi could co-exist in a village. We quantified the frequency and
distribution of different sasi arrangements and determined whether the dominant power could
influence the attributes of the institution as well.
2.2.3 Analysis of inventory data
It was expected that the villages surveyed would not be homogeneous.  Because of the role of
religious leaders in sasi, we wanted to test whether differences might be evident between
predominantly Christian and Muslim villages.  Also, it was hypothesized that as villages grew
past a certain size, local management institutions might break down (Berkes and Folke 1998).
Finally, contextual variables could vary from island to island and this might have an impact on
the structure and functioning of the sasi institution. Therefore, to display the information, the
villages have been grouped by three different features: dominant religion, population size and
island.  The limits of four population size classes were chosen in such a way that each of the
four groups would contain about a quarter of the villages sampled (Table 2.2).
A breakdown of the 63 villages included in the study by island, religion and population (Table
2.2) shows that two-thirds were predominantly Christian. Muslim villages tended to be larger
and half of these were located on Ambon Island.  Roughly a quarter of the villages fell into
each of four size classes.
Table 2.2.  Villages included in the study broken down by island, religion and size of population.
Island No. Religion  Population Size Class Avg. no.
of (M=Muslim 1=<1,000;2=1,001-2,000;  people/
sites C=Christian) 3=2,001-3,000; 4=>3,000 village
M C 1234
Ambon 22 12 10 4 2 4 12 3,451
Haruku 11 4 7 1 4 5 1 2,252
Saparua 16 3 13 2 7 4 3 2,116
Seram 8 1 6 0 2 4 1 2,231
Nusa Laut 70 7 5 2 0 08 6 4
Total 63 20 43 12 17 18 17
(2 M (2 M (9 M (7 M
10 C) 15 C) 8 C) 10 C)16        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The activity of the sasi institution (as applied to both land and marine resources) was
quantified by adding the number of positive indicators for presence, closed seasons,
consistency of application and local effort (Table 2.3). Initially, a score was also given if
sanctions were imposed on offenders.  However, it became clear that whereas physical
sanctions were always imposed in Muslim villages, Christian villages with strong and active
church sasi often used not fines but the threat of punishment by God as a deterrent. As it
could not be quantified for all villages, the presence or absence of sanctions was dropped as
an indicator.
The activity of marine sasi was quantified by combining indicators for the presence of sasi fisheries
rules, periodic closure of a marine sasi area to local harvesters that affected one or more species,
and the existence of written rules and active enforcement of access restrictions (Table 2.4).
In both sasi and non-sasi villages, rules that seek to restrict or control fisheries access and
withdrawal can be found outside the institution of sasi.  The strength of marine management in
both sasi and non-sasi villages was quantified by combining indicators for gear restrictions, local
fisheries rules other than the national restriction on blast fishing and the use of poisons, area
closures, the number of species affected by management rules, and active enforcement (Table 2.5).
Table 2.3. Attributes considered in assigning a score for presence and activity of sasi in a village.
Attributes are weighted so as to be equal in value.
Attribute Indicator Response Score
Presence Is there sasi in the village? no 0
Score 0-3 village sasi only 1
two or more types 3
Closure Does sasi involve the opening and closing no 0
Score 0-3 of harvest seasons? yes 3
Consistency Was there a ceremony to open/close sasi no 0
Score 0-3 this year? yes 1
Did sasi open/close last year? no 0
yes 1
Did sasi open/close in years before that? no 0
yes 1
Local effort When sasi is closed, are special signs no 0
Score 0-3 hand-made and installed? yes 3
Maximum possible score 12
Table 2.4.  Attributes used in assigning a score for activity of marine sasi in each village.  Attributes are
weighted so as to be equal in value.
Attribute Indicator Response Score
Presence Is there marine sasi ?n o 0
Score 0-3 yes 3
Closure Is the sasi area ever closed to village no 0
Score 0-3 residents ? yes 3
Written rules Are there written sasi rules that apply to no 0
Score 0-3 the fishery ? yes 3
Enforcement Does a kewang or other group of villagers no 0
Score 0-3 guard the sasi area and/or village territory ? yes 3
Maximum possible score 12Methods        17
The differences in average marine management score for villages, grouped by presence or
absence of sasi, geographical location, population size and religion were determined
statistically using analysis of variance (SPSS 1997).
2.3 Performance Analysis of Sasi
2.3.1 Objectives
The purpose of this survey was to evaluate performance of the sasi institution over the entire
research area in terms of four standard criteria: equity, efficiency, social sustainability and
biological sustainability. Some socio-economic data were recorded to assess the average
economic status of each fishing community.
Part of the survey questionnaire dealt with the ethnic background of respondents. Cultural
homogeneity may be important to the success of traditional management systems. Therefore
the material was useful to test the hypothesis that sasi would be more effective in relatively
homogeneous villages.
The objective of direct biological surveys was to determine whether there were quantifiable
differences in the coral reef cover and the incidence of selected species between areas managed
sasi and areas with no access restriction. Biological surveys were carried out in and beside
the marine territories of four of the case study villages.
Table 2.5. Attributes used to quantify the level of marine resource management rules existing
(but not necessarily effectively enforced) in both sasi and non-sasi villages.
Attribute Indicator Reply Score Notes
Gear Is there any type of No 0 Usually a local rule
restriction fishing gear that is (written or unwritten)
forbidden in the Yes 1 supporting the national
village territory? ban on blast fishing and the
use of  poisons existed.
Other Is there any other No 0
fisheries rule restriction on where,
when and how people Yes 1
can fish?
Access Is there an area where  No 0
restrictions access is formally
restricted for local Yes 1
residents?
Species How many types of None 0 corals=1
affected resources are holothurians=1
managed or conserved Yes 1-7 mangroves=1




Enforcement Is restricted access No 0
area guarded by a
kewang or group? Yes 1
Maximum score possible score 1118        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
2.3.2 Methods
a) Performance analysis survey at the district level
The villages studied were on the islands of Seram, Ambon, Haruku and Saparua.  Interviews
took place in the period of July-September 1997. In each of the 22 villages in the performance
study, 15 heads of fishing households were interviewed. The data collected from 30 heads of
fishing households in each of the six case study villages were also included. Questions in the
performance study were designed to elicit numerical values for indicators of efficiency, equity
and sustainability (Table 2.6).
The values for each indicator are based on the perceptions of fishers using a self-anchored
ladder scale (Pomeroy et al. 1996). This standard tool provides ordinal data, which allows
statistical analysis.  Fishers were asked to answer questions using a picture of a ladder with
ten rungs as a visual aid. The lowest rung represented the worst possible condition; the tenth
rung represented the best. Fishers pointed to the rung that in their opinion represented past
(15 years ago), present and future (15 years ahead) conditions.  The aim was to record fishers’
perceptions of current conditions, change through time and the degree of optimism for the
future. There were 15 questions in all. In addition, base-line data were gathered from each
respondent, i.e., name, age, religion, etc. Also, the people’s economic status was recorded by
noting what type of boat, fishing gear and house he or she owned.
Assessment of equity and efficiency of marine resource management
In terms of fisheries management, equity may be equated with the democratic process, i.e., the
level of involvement of fishers in decision-making. Equity is also a matter of fair access to marine
resources and the means of production (capital, fishing gear, etc.). We therefore measured the
perceptions of fishers towards their role in decision-making, their access to fisheries resources,
distribution of the means of production as well as economic equality in their village.
Partnership in designing fisheries rules, i.e., the degree to which people are able to make a
decision together, is one indicator for an efficient fisheries management system. The degree
of control over the fishery, either directly, or indirectly through the village government, is
another. It is difficult to discuss equity in management without also dealing with efficiency.
This is because efficiency is in some ways the opposite of equity. Highly inclusive, democratic
processes can be very inefficient in terms of time and money.
The ease of access to resources in terms of costs and compliance to fisheries rules are indicators
that define efficiency from the resource user’s point of view. In an efficient management system,
there is a high level of compliance without exorbitant costs either to fishers or managers.
Compliance may result from active participation in management or may be related to the
legitimacy or actual power of authority figures.
Access control and an effort to share resource benefits can support production systems that
are less efficient in terms of profitability (although arguably more sustainable) than centralized,
large-scale systems. In modern management circles, the balance between maximizing short-
term profits and maximizing employment (fair access) in a fishery is a classic example of the
tension between efficiency and equity. In seeking a balance, the legitimacy of decision-makers
in the eyes of the stakeholders is a key factor.Methods        19
Assessment of social sustainability
Social sustainability refers to the level of stability and cohesion in the village in political,
social, and economic terms. When the village economy or political structure is under stress, it
may affect local management institutions. On the other hand, the existence of a healthy and
legitimate local institution may minimize negative social impacts of economic and political
stress. Indicators of social cohesion e.g., community harmony and the level of collective action,
were used as indicators for social sustainability. Family well-being and income of villagers
were measured as indicators of economy-related well-being or stress. The level of public
Table 2.6. Performance indicators.
Equity 1. Role of fishers in management ➾ The degree of influence that fishers
have in decision-making processes
regarding fisheries management
2. Access to marine resources ➾ The individual access that fishers have
to marine resources
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears ➾ The division of (expensive) fishing gears
among the fishers in the villages
4. Economic equality ➾ The distribution of income (disparities)
among the villagers
Efficiency 5. Communal decision-making ➾ The degree to which villagers are able
to make decisions (on the fishery)
communally
6. Ease of entry into the fishery ➾ The costs and/or fees that need to be
paid before people can start fishing
7. Control over access to fishery ➾ The ability of people to define who is
entering the water and which resources
are used
8. Compliance with fisheries rules ➾ The degree to which people adhere to
the fisheries rules
Social 9. Family well-being ➾ Degree of well-being in terms of
Sustainability housing, food, and health
10. Income ➾ The rise or decline in income
11. Tradition of collective action ➾ The occurrence of communal activities
in the village (e.g., construction of roads
and houses)
12. Discussion of village issues ➾ The degree to which village issues are
openly discussed in the village
13. Community harmony ➾ The lack or occurrence of conflicts in the
village
Biological 14. Marine resource health ➾ The state of resources in terms of coral
Sustainability health, numbers of fish, water clarity, etc.
15. Fish catch ➾ The amount and size of fish caught20        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
participation in discussing village issues was also measured. This indicator is also related to
equity because it indicates the level of awareness of, and transparency in, village government.
Assessment of biological sustainability
The indicators measured were the level of fish catches and the fisher’s perceptions of the health
of the marine environment. The questions related both to village territories and the wider fishing
grounds, thus not specifically confined to the sasi area. The perceptions of fishers were compared
with the results of actual biological surveys conducted in sasi and non-sasi areas (see below).
b) Performance analysis survey of biological aspects
The coral reef habitats in the case study villages of Nolloth, Haruku, Seri and Hutumuri were
surveyed as these represented sasi and non-sasi sites. In addition, more limited data were
collected from immediately adjacent marine areas (Ihamahu, Itawaka, Lapaut, Airlow).
Ihamahu and Itawaka are sasi villages; Airlow and Lapaut are non-sasi. Data were collected
separately inside the specific coral reef areas protected under sasi (Table 2.7).
In each sampling site, one or all of the following indicators were measured (Table 2.7):
1. The percentage cover of live coral on the coral reef habitat (% living coral/total area)
was measured by an observer during 2-minute manta tows along the reef crest (also
see English et al. 1994).  In each case, the entire length of the village’s marine territory
was surveyed. Any visible bomb damage or bleaching of corals was documented for
each sample.
2. The number of species of butterfly fish present on any reef flat, crest and slope as
counted within 30-minute inspections using a standard photographic fish identification
guide.
3. The number of top shells (Trochus niloticus) within random, 50 m x 1 m belt quadrates
at 3-5 m depth on reef flats measured with a 50 m fiberglass tape measure.
4. The number of sea cucumbers (all species) found within random, 50 m x 1 m belt
quadrates at 3-5 m depth on reef flats measured with a 50 m fiberglass tape measure.
5. The number of top shells and sea cucumbers collected by experienced local harvesters
within 5-minute searches in 3-5 m deep reef flat areas.
In every case, the same researcher, either I. Novaczek or P. Manihin SP, collected each specific
data type.
The average percentage cover of living corals and number of blasting scars per tow were
calculated for each site. The species of butterfly fish were tabulated and total numbers
compared. Average numbers of sea cucumbers and top shells in the coral reef habitats were
calculated and compared in sasi and non-sasi areas.
2.3.3 Analysis of performance study
All data analysis was performed using the SPSS statistical package (1997 version). Data were
divided into two groups: from sasi villages and from non-sasi villages. Within each group,
the average values for current conditions for each of the indicators were calculated. The results
were compared between groups using chi square tests.Methods        21
The within-group differences between past and present, and present and future scores were
calculated and the statistical significance of each change through time was determined using
paired t-tests.
The homogeneity of variances in changes through time was examined using the Levene
Statistic.  To test whether there were differences between sasi and non-sasi villages in terms
of the changes through time, we used the analysis of variance and Duncan’s multiple range
test (homogeneous variances) or Tamhane’s statistic (non-homogeneous variances). For all
analyses, p values less than 0.05 were considered statistically significant.
Table 2.7. Surveys conducted in marine territories of villages in study area.
Village Km surveyed Indicator # Notes
(n samples)
Nolloth, Saparua Island 2.5 km 1 (17) Wave-exposed rocky shore. Southern part of
(guarded sasi area) 2 (1) large village territory on the northeast  coast
3 (8) of Saparua Island.
4 (8)
5 (18)
Nolloth, Saparua Island 1 km 1 (4) Wave-exposed rocky shore. Immediately
(non-sasi) north of Nolloth’s sasi area.
Nolloth, Saparua Island 0.2 km 1 (1) In front of Nolloth village inside Tuhaha Bay.
(non-sasi)
Itawaka, Saparua Island 1.5 km 1 (2) Exposed rocky shore north and west of the
(sasi area) large Nolloth village territory.
Ihamahu and Iha 1.5 km 1 (2) In front of villages, inside Tuhaha Bay.
(non-sasi)
Ihamahu, Saparua Island 0.2 km 1 (3) Wave-exposed rocky shore.  Immediately




Haruku, Haruku Island 5 km 1 (13) Moderately wave-exposed shore, rocky and
(non-sasi area) 2 (1) sandy. Sasi area is sea grass bed, not coral reef.
Toisapu, Ambon Island 3 km 1 (4) Wave-exposed rocky shore south of the
(non-sasi) dusun of Hutumuri 2 (1) village.
3 (2)
4 (2)
Lapaut, Ambon Island 3 km 1 (4) Wave-exposed rocky shore. In between
(non-sasi), dusun of Hutumuri Toisapu and Hutumuri.




Seri, Ambon Island 5 km 1 (13) Wave-exposed rocky shore.
(non-sasi) dusun of 2 (1)
Urimessing 3 (3)
4 (3)
Airlow, Ambon Island (non-sasi) 3 km 1 (6) Wave-exposed rocky shore in front of Wemi,
dusun of Nusaniwe 2 (1)  a hamlet of fishers southwest of Seri.22        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
2.4 Institutional Analysis of Sasi: Village Case Studies, Resilience, and
Contextual Attributes
2.4.1 Objectives
A central component of our study was an institutional analysis of case studies in six villages
(Table 2.8). Following the institutional analysis framework (see Section 1.2), data from each
village were gathered on contextual variables and the structure and function of institutional
arrangements and management outcomes.
The key objective of this component was to analyze how local institutional arrangements,
interacting with the contextual variables, affect the actions of the resource users by shaping the
incentives and disincentives they face or comply with, resulting in the adaptation to, and
enforcement of, local management rules.  The patterns of interaction result in outcomes (i.e.,
equity, efficiency, social and biological sustainability) that we measured through the performance
study, but also by using direct observations of biological indicators (see Section 2.3).
A second objective of the case studies was to test a hypothesis concerning the resilience of the
sasi institution. Resilience is the ability of the system to absorb and deal with changes and
shocks. The study was designed to provide data on changes in institutional arrangements and
patterns of change of the sasi system as a whole through time, i.e., objectives, boundaries, rules
and regulations, enforcement, etc. By examining why sasi has endured or why it has been being
lost, mechanisms that enhance institutional resilience can be identified. This knowledge will
help in maintaining existing or in developing new fisheries management systems.
A third objective was to supply contextual information on market mechanisms and external
political attributes related to fisheries management.
The market structures (demand, supply, fish prices, marketing options, relations between buyers
and sellers etc.) are important contextual variables that influence incentives and institutional
arrangements.  Players on different levels, i.e., large-scale fish traders operating on the international
market, wholesalers, traders on local and island levels and their inter-relationships were investigated.
External political factors include relationships among government agencies on provincial,
district, sub-district and local levels. We sought to elucidate their division of tasks and
responsibilities, and how the resulting structure and function shape the incentives and
disincentives to cooperate in resource governance, management and use.  Acknowledgment
of local management structures, enforcement, law distribution, and support to fishers on the
local level are some of the aspects that need to be taken into account when studying possibilities
for co-management arrangements.
Table 2.8.  Status of case study villages in 1997.
Village Island Status of sasi institution Dominant Religion Population
Haruku Haruku Active Christian 2132
Nolloth Saparua Active Christian 2426
Tuhaha Saparua Lost, but being revitalized Christian 1470
Hulaliu Haruku Lost, but being revitalized Christian 1600
Seri Ambon No sasi Christian 1991
Hutumuri-Toisapu Ambon No sasi Christian 3254Methods        23
2.4.2 Methods
a) Institutional analysis of case study villages
The general method used is the institutional analysis research framework (IAF) developed in
the ICLARM-IFM Fisheries Co-management Project. A socio-economic survey, in combination
with a performance study and semi-structured interviews, was performed in each of the six
case study villages. Structured interviews (surveys) were used to gather information on the
attributes of the community and stakeholders. The socio-economic survey contained questions
on types of employment, family history, ethnicity, and sources of income.  Respondents were
also asked their opinions on, among other things, job satisfaction, sasi, village decision-making,
the need to change fisheries rules, the position of women in society and the sale of resource
harvesting rights. Additional semi-structured interviews were used to gather information on
the contextual attributes (i.e., biological, physical and technological attributes, economic
attributes, market structures), exogenous factors, the institutional and organizational
arrangements, and the attributes of the sasi institution and process of institutional decline.
Just as in the other villages where performance was measured, the present outcomes of the
management system were measured using the ladder survey (see Section 2.3.2). These surveys
were applied to 30 heads of fishing households in each village. The objective of combining
the performance survey with in-depth socio-economic assessment was to examine the
relationships between socio-economic factors and perceptions regarding resource health,
community harmony, equity, etc.
Data were collected from a variety of informants (Table 2.1) over two periods: July-August
1997 and December 1997-February 1998.
b) Institutional resilience of sasi
The resilience study is based on information from the inventory and the comparative case
study including demographic information and the contextual attributes (political, economic
and socio-cultural). In addition, key informant interviews in case study villages covered
questions on 1) the objective of sasi, 2) the rules and regulations, 3) the role of the village
government and traditional authorities, 4) leadership, 5) boundaries, 6) compliance and
enforcement, and 7) external factors having an impact on the management institution (based
on Ostrom 1990; Lubis 1992; Ruddle 1993; von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995). Detailed
information on each of these aspects is described in the individual case studies. The data
from the inventory show the process of decline. The additional information was used to explain
the mechanism behind this process.
c) Market structures and government role in fisheries management
Available government statistics and research documents were reviewed to develop the account
of the historical context for Maluku that is presented in Chapter 3. Market structures and
government management studies were carried out using structured and semi-structured
interviews of key informants (Table 2.1).  For the market study, personal observations were
made during field visits to local and regional markets (February 1998).
For both studies, interview notes were compiled and analyzed, results written and conclusions
checked with knowledgeable persons during a workshop serving this purpose (February 1998).
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officials at a second workshop (July 1998). The conclusions were included in a policy brief
that defines the favorable political context for strengthening or revitalization of local fisheries
management institutions in the context of co-management in Indonesia (Sopacua et al. 1998).
2.4.3 IAF data analysis
The results of the structured interviews were put in a database and analyzed using SPSS.
Some of the attributes were grouped in order to construct comparable indicators for the six
villages. For example, responses to questions on ownership of land and material goods were
coded so that the lowest value represented the poorest condition and the highest value the
richest. An economic indicator for each respondent was then calculated by adding together
the coded responses for boat, gear and land ownership and type of housing (Table 2.9).  For
case study sites, information on television ownership was collected and this was added to the
score for analysis of the six-village database only.
Averages (with standard error) and frequencies for socio-economic data were calculated
separately for each village.  The significance of differences among villages was determined
using one-way analysis of variance and Duncan’s Multiple Range tests.
The data from the performance survey were analyzed separately for each village using the
same procedure as that used on the larger data set of sasi and non-sasi villages (see Section
2.3). To examine the relationships between ladder survey responses and socio-economic
characteristics, the two sets of variables were entered into correlation analysis using the SPSS
Pearson’s Correlation Procedure.
The results of the semi-structured interviews conducted in each village were analyzed
according to the methods used in social science for qualitative data and compared with the
results of the performance study.  The material was used to show and explain the similarities
and differences among study sites.  The material was also used to explore the (social)
Table 2.9. Indicators used to quantify economic status of survey respondents.
Attribute Indicator Reply Score Notes
Land owner Do you own land? no 0
yes 1
Fishing gear What type of none 0
fishing gear do you own? hand line or spear 1
fish trap 2
set net 3
FAD or lift net 4
Fishing boat Do you own a boat and neither 0 Perahu is a small canoe
motor? perahu 1 with paddle or sail.
motorboat 2
Housing What type of housing? non-permanent 1 1=sago walls, thatch roof
simple 2 2=plank walls and thatch
semi-permanent 3 3=cement and plank walls
permanent 4 4=full cement walls and tin roof
Television Do you own a TV? no 0
yes 1
Maximum possible score 12Methods        25
mechanisms behind the process of decline of sasi: What makes sasi strong or weak, and why
do some villages want to revitalize sasi?  For all the villages, every aspect of sasi is described,
to a large extent, in the respondents’ terms.
2.5 Comments on the Methods: Gaps and Limitations
The inventory provides 100% coverage of villages on the three Lease Islands (Saparua, Haruku,
Nusa Laut).  However, villages in Seram and Ambon were not randomly selected; therefore
the data from these islands cannot be assumed to reflect the average condition of the sasi
institution there.  In fact, we know that, because we sought out villages with marine sasi on
Ambon, the percentage of villages in the Ambon data having sasi over-represents the actual
occurrence of sasi on this island.  The number of villages sampled on Seram (5% of all coastal
desas) is too small to provide a picture of sasi on that large island.
Because knowledge about sasi varies greatly among village respondents, we tried to interview
at least three key informants in each village when doing the inventory. In a few cases, the
desired key informants were not available and information came from only one or two persons.
Also, information from different respondents was sometimes contradictory or incomplete. In
developing the database, a weight of evidence approach was used to assign variable values
in such cases. Sources of additional information included Ambon-based researchers and NGO
field workers as well as the surveys and interviews conducted in 28 of the villages in the
course of this project.
Since each village institution is different, the “institution” being evaluated is really a broad
range of institutional arrangements.  This makes the results more variable and difficult to
interpret than results from one single project site.
In order to reduce some of the complexity we found in the field, all case studies were performed
in Christian villages. The subsequent analysis of sasi is, therefore, most relevant to those
forms of sasi practiced in Christian-dominated areas. We have noted certain differences
between Christian and Muslim institutional arrangements in the course of our inventory. The
analysis of Muslim-style sasi is a topic for future research.
Interviews of fishers as well as interviews in the case study sites were conducted with the
consent and under the guidance of the village head of each village. Because of this, the samples
were not random, although, for the case study sites, efforts were made to engage people in
the street in informal discussions and interviews. For performance survey interviews in
particular, the village head selected fishing families to participate in the survey. It is, therefore,
possible that respondents represented a middle-class range of fishing families rather than the
entire spectrum available in each village.
The ladder survey instrument was adapted from the methodology used to evaluate CBRM projects
in the Philippines. When used to evaluate the impact of a project, time lines are short and distinct.
Respondents indicate their perception of conditions before and after a project is carried out.
However, with sasi, there is no “before” or “after”. We used 15 years as a time boundary because
it was roughly 15 years ago that village governments were re-organized, leaving traditional
management institutions without legal status.  With such a long time line, perceptions of trends
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Interviewers found that the ladder as a visual aid was effective. However, the questions,
especially those pertaining to access to resources, the concept of resource management and
participation in decision-making, were difficult for some fishers to understand. Interviewers
sometimes spent up to several hours with a respondent as each question was explained and
discussed.
Sasi as an institution applies only to inshore resources, whereas most fishers gain their living
from the offshore pelagic fishery. Answers to questions were, therefore, often relevant to the
larger fishery but not to resources managed under sasi.
Marine survey methods were “quick and dirty”, gathering limited data on a few indicators.
They were also carried out only in a few areas; therefore conclusions drawn from the marine
survey data must be viewed as preliminary.
Finally, all interviews were performed and recorded in Bahasa Indonesia, partially analyzed
by Indonesian staff, then translated into English before final analysis.  Where interpretation
of translated information was unclear, the information was not used unless it could be verified
from other sources.Regional and Village Level Context        27
Section B –  Contextual Variables
Chapter 3
Regional and Village Level Context
The islands of central Maluku came into being over a million years ago.  The oldest of the
islands in geological terms is Seram, called Nusa Ina, or the Mother Island. The Lease Islands
are rich in biodiversity. Mangroves, coral reefs, and vast sea grass beds support an array of
marine biota including dugongs and turtles (Hualopu 1996). The productive base on the islands
is limited by geomorphologic factors (steep slopes) and most settlements and farming activities
are concentrated along the strip of relatively flat coastal land. The communities have easy
access to marine resources, and fisheries contribute significantly to the village economy
(Hualopu 1996). Fisheries resources are exploited throughout the islands, but exploitation
may be regulated through sasi, a traditional resource management system.
3.1 Socio-Political History of Central Maluku
The first trace of human occupation dates back to the Holocene period (4,000-10,000 years ago).
Cave dwellers from this time were of mixed Caucasoid, Mongoloid and Papuan ancestry. Villages
organized under the local government are believed to have formed in the Neolithic Age (1,500-
3,000 years ago). From this period, anthropologists have determined that canoes, gardening
tools and simple stone axes were in use.  Evidence of the building of a Baileo, the traditional
community house, familiar in adat culture, dates back to the first century A.D. (Figure 3.1) (also
see Cooley 1962).  At this time there was already trade between central Maluku and China and
other areas of Southeast Asia. The local religion was animist (Holleman 1923).
The political structure of central Maluku over the period of 1000-1500 A.D. has been
characterized as “patrician republican” with an aristocratic ruling class. The original
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inhabitants generally referred to as Alifuru lived in mountain villages (hena or aman).
Organized in tribal groups (uku) consisting of clans (lumah tau or soa), the most important
leaders were the chieftain or king (latu), the heads of the uku, and the mauwin, shaman, a
magical religious expert mediating between the people, nature and the world of ancestors
and spirits (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995). Each village was occupied by a number of
clans. The descent system was patrilineal. The village-based clusters of clans (rumahtua) related
by geographical proximity or kinship, were grouped together as soa under a leader called the
kepala soa (also see Holleman 1923).  The soa were in turn organized into small kingdoms
(negeri lama) led by a great leader (tamaela umi haha).
In Maluku, the periods between the 15th and 17th century was full of turmoil and dramatic political,
economic and religious change (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995). Around 1500, the traditional
economy of Maluku was based on subsistence agriculture and fishing. Sago was important both
as food and as a trade item (Knaap 1981). The clove trade in Maluku was mainly in hands of the
Javanese Majapahit kingdom, but soon, Maluku was to be the battlefield where foreign powers
struggled for control over the region’s natural resources, particularly spices (Knaap 1981).
At this time, Muslim Arab traders arrived in north Maluku.  Their influence led to the
establishment of Islamic kingdoms in the 15th century. Islamic laws were incorporated into
adat law and Arabic words were incorporated into the local language. As the Majapahit
hegemony declined, four powerful Islamic kingdoms emerged in north Maluku.  Islam moved
south into central Maluku, in particular to Hitu, a seaport on the north of Ambon Island. On
Ambon, a union of nine negeri (patasiwa) dominated the Leitimur peninsula, while a union of
five negeri (patalima) was established in the Leihitu section of the island.  On Haruku Island,
Saparua and Nusa Laut, powerful negeri also emerged to dominate island life and establish
kingdoms that competed with one another.
In the course of the expansion of clove production from
Ternate, via Hoamoal on Seram to the central Maluku
islands in the early 16th century, immigrant groups, coming
from the northern Maluku islands and Java settled along
the coast (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995), (Figure 3.2).
The 16th century saw Portuguese traders entering Maluku
and engaging in the political rivalries of the native
kingdoms.  They built a fortress at Hitu on Ambon in 1515.
During this period, Catholic missionaries made Ambon
the center of Catholic evangelical activity.  The Portuguese
were followed by the Dutch, who dominated and
eventually defeated the Ambonese kingdoms.
By the 17th century, the Dutch were firmly established as
a trading power in Maluku, with their Dutch East Indies
Company (VOC) backed by naval fleets. After the Dutch
defeated the Portuguese, a period followed of warfare
among Dutch, British and the Maluku population,
wherein the Dutch ultimately prevailed. Yet, the “spice
wars” punctuated by local uprisings continued off and
on into the 20th century. With the defeat of the Portuguese,
Roman Catholicism disappeared and the settlements and
villages in the central Moluccas eventually became either
Islamic or Protestant (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995).
Figure 3.2.  Cloves drying on the
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The Dutch colonial rule led to poverty and social disruption, and when in 1796 the British
reappeared, complete lack of local support forced the Dutch to give up their ruling power
(Riedel 1886). The early 1800s was a period of relative isolation for Maluku, and inter-island
contact was mostly via Buginese and Makassar traders from Sulawesi and Java (Fox 1996).
At this time, the Chinese also began to play a major role in local trade. However, in 1817 the
British were again defeated and the Dutch re-established their capital in Ambon.
The creation of an economic monopoly on clove production in Maluku entailed enforced
production quotas, the imposition of population relocations, and radical interventions into
existing patterns of the social and political structures. Villagers were forcibly relocated on the
coast and settled within newly created territorial units managed by individuals occupying
Dutch-created administrative roles, the bapak raja and kepala soa (Chauvel 1990 in Zerner 1994b).
There was serious local resistance led by Thomas Matualesi, better known as Pattimura, of
Saparua Island, in 1817, which ended in defeat for the local troops in 1823. Under subsequent
Dutch rule, Maluku children were schooled in the Dutch language and advances were made
in converting the local population to Protestantism.  The Christians then came to be favored
by the Dutch, rising to occupy administrative positions in the government.
It was not until 1920 that “Sarekat Ambon”, the first indigenous political party, was formed
to advance the welfare of Ambonese people. Its leader, A.J. Patty, promoted independence.
Although he himself was subsequently exiled from Maluku, his work resulted in the opening
up of the government to include traditional leaders in the governmental council, the
“Ambonraad”.  The Sarekat Ambon party was finally banned by the Dutch in 1939.
During World War II (1942-1945), Maluku was occupied by Japanese forces and ruled by a military
governor based in Ambon.  People lived in fear of the brutality of Japanese occupying forces.  All
political parties were banned and the function of traditional (adat) government discouraged.  Maluku
was cut off from the outside world and the period is remembered as one of extreme hardship.
On 17 August 1945, the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence from the Dutch
colonial rule.  The Dutch, with a degree of local support, attempted to retain control over Maluku
but this uprising was finally defeated by Indonesia’s military, after a period of struggle that
lasted until 1952.  In 1952, central Maluku was granted official status as an autonomous
administrative regency of Indonesia, and in 1957, Maluku gained the status of a province with
its own parliament. 1955-65 were years of political unrest at the national level that involved a
number of prominent Maluku politicians.  It was also a period of rapid development and poverty
alleviation as the First Long-Term Development Plan, covering 25 years, was implemented.
The coup d’état of 1965 resulted in the takeover by Major General Suharto, whose leadership
remained intact until 1998.  The Suharto era was characterized by tight control over politics and
a highly centralized form of administration, both of which had a powerful influence on the
political life and economic development in Maluku. The influence and power of the governing
party came to be felt at all levels, right down to the smallest villages (Dauvergne 1997).
Law No. 5, 1974 was passed defining the regional government structure.  This was followed
by Law No. 5, 1979 which decreed that all village governments had to be redesigned to follow
a defined structure which did not accommodate traditional (adat) institutions such as sasi
and the kewang (traditional law enforcers).  The indigenous people of Maluku were thrown
into confusion over whether to uphold their traditional laws and institutions, conform to the
new edict or seek some compromise between the two. That confusion, and the wide array of
responses at the village level, are still evident in Maluku today.30        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The 1970s were a time of particularly rapid economic change. Maluku experienced an average
economic growth of 12.8% a year, compared to an average of 8.94% in 1983-88 and 6.67% in
1988-93 (Anonymous 1994).  Per capita annual incomes rose from Rp24,383 in 1970 to
Rp1,050,176 in 1993.  Much of this economic progress was the result of direct government
assistance. Also, from a predominantly agricultural economy, Maluku gradually shifted to an
economy where industry was important.  In 1970, 71% of the gross domestic production (GDP)
were from agriculture and fisheries, 1.6% from industry. In 1993, agriculture and fisheries
provided 32% of the gross domestic production (GDP) and industry, 19%.
3.2 History of Sasi in Maluku
In some Maluku communities, control over the land and marine territories (petuanan) and
their resources is vested in a social institution that has a code of conduct, rules and regulations.
This institution is known as sasi (Volker 1925, Ellen 1978, Kriekhoff 1991). Sasi is not simply
an institution designed to regulate resource use; sasi also has a significant cultural role.  “It is
an encompassing body of meaningful relations between people, the natural environment and
gods, ancestors and spirits” (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995).  Although the origins of sasi
are lost in the mists of time, local legend speaks of sasi being in practice in the 14th century
and perhaps earlier (Topatimasang 1997).  Others maintain that sasi developed in the 16th
century in response to the needs of clove traders (Kissya 1994), but it was almost certainly
based on older adat tradition that aimed to protect and control exploitation of natural resources
(von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995).
The “spice wars” of the 1600-1900s had the effect of stimulating militancy as well as mobility
in the Maluku people, and fostered fierce attachment of the people to their territories (Chauvel
1981).  This could have been positive in terms of reinforcing adat.  On the other hand, however,
the battles were ultimately lost, many of the bravest killed, and the sovereignty of local leaders
abolished.  In some cases, wholesale slaughter (as happened in Banda) and forced removals
alienated people from their territories.  In general, adat culture is believed to have reached its
zenith in the mid-1600s and the pattern since then has been one of decline, although with
periods of resurgence (Cooley 1962).
The introduction of Islam and Christianity and the establishment of a trade monopoly in
cloves were of decisive influence for the further development of sasi. During the occupation
and Christianization of Maluku by the Dutch, sasi was at first discouraged along with other
“pagan superstitions and rituals” (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995).  However, the institution
was subsequently revived and revised by the Dutch to control and maximize harvests of
valuable spice crops, regulate land tenure and provide a means of social control (von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1995).  In the revised form, the emphasis on spiritual aspects declined, while
the economic aspects of sasi came to the fore.  During this period and into the 1900s, native
Mollucans were often resentful rather than supportive of the Dutch style of sasi, as it
represented the imposition of Dutch ethics and was often a burden on poorer members of
society (Zerner 1994a).  Under Dutch influence, what had been purely an adat institution
became integrated to some extent with the village leadership supported by the colonial
government.  At a later point, the church also came to have a role in sasi, changing the
institution further into one in which religious, government and adat leaders worked together.
In the period 1880-1893, Dutch Resident J.G.F.Riedel attempted to abolish sasi. He wanted to
break the power of kewang leaders over the spice trade and abolish the kewang’s rights to
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efforts, the sasi institution continued to survive and evolve in many villages, and in 1921, the
Dutch actually supported sasi once more by formalizing the institution with the decree called
“Het recht van Sasi in de Molukken” (the rights of sasi in Maluku).
During World War II, the period of occupation by the Japanese represented an extreme threat
to all adat institutions.  Lack of appropriate ceremonial cloth and other goods meant that adat
rituals could not be performed according to tradition, so that in this period, many substitutions
were made (Cooley 1962).  Indonesian independence involved civil war in Maluku, a time
when many leaders were lost and clans scattered.  Integration into the new nation of Indonesia
meant a further blow to the local indigenous language and culture because Indonesian Malay
became the language of compulsory schooling.   Subsequent decades of civil strife and political
turmoil at local and national levels doubtless continued to challenge the strength of local
culture.  In more recent decades, cultural change has intensified as economic development
proceeded.  By the 1960s, there was a confident prediction (Cooley 1962) that sasi was doomed
to disappear “in the very near future”.  But although weakened over time, sasi never
disappeared.  Sasi rules, developed at the community level, are still used by communities to
control and maximize harvests as well as to regulate aspects of social behavior.
The aim of sasi and its function in resource management and conservation have been debated.
Zerner (1994a) argues that, although there may be spin-off benefits in terms of resource
sustainability, sasi is essentially an institution for managing social interactions, mediating
tenure disputes and maximizing economic returns, rather than a resource conservation and
management institution per se. On the other hand, sasi clearly was performing a conservation
function in the 1920s, when the use of poisons in the fishery was banned under sasi rules
(Volker 1925).  Today, sasi is again undergoing change, with a renewed emphasis on
conservation aspects (Zerner 1994a).
The application of sasi to marine resources may have never been as widespread as sasi on land
crops.  Zerner and Thorburn (forthcoming) have speculated that in its original form, marine sasi
was applied only to pelagic fish, with the objective of protecting migratory fish from disturbance
so as to maximize harvests for local consumption.  In the decades following the 1930s, the
emerging international markets for top shells and sea cucumbers appeared to have prompted
the development of additional types of marine access prohibitions and related ceremonies in
places such as the Kei Islands in southern Maluku (Zerner and Thorburn, forthcoming).  Similar
rules are evident in central Maluku today and appear to date back at least to the 1960s.
There is another adat institution linked to sasi, the Latupati, which is a venue for meetings of
traditional leaders at the island-wide level. The Latupati in the Lease Islands (i.e., Saparua,
Nusa Laut and Haruku) has been effectively dormant since the passage of the legislation on
village governments in 1979. However, a revitalized Latupati may have potential as a regional
resource management body.  In 1996, the first Haruku Island Latupati meeting in 20 years was
held as a consequence of the efforts of NGOs interested in developing the marine resource
management capacity at the island and regional levels.  Subsequently, NGO interventions
have also led to the revival of the Latupati on Nusa Laut Island in 1998.  On Saparua, there is
also a Latupati but it is currently used only as a venue for the planning of annual social events.
3.3 Historical and Current State of Inshore Fisheries Habitat
Sir Alfred Wallace, on his expedition to Ambon Bay in the 1850s, marveled at the incredible
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global center for coral reef biodiversity.  Endangered species inhabiting this area include
dolphins and whales, turtles, giant clams (Tridacna spp.), other types of molluscs such as the
Triton’s trumpet (Charonsa tritonis), giant helmet shells (Cassis cornuta), chambered nautilus
(Nautilus pompilus), top shells (Trochus niloticus) and the green snail (Turbo marmoratus).
A recent marine resources potential survey (PSL Unpatti in LIPI 1996) revealed diverse
biological communities in the intertidal, inshore reef flats and reef slopes.  Among others,
mangrove, sea grass and coral reef habitats have been found.
Except for some sheltered estuaries where mangrove forests are quite extensive, mangroves
are mostly confined to narrow coastal strips.  Saparua Island mangrove areas boast up to 22
different species.  On Haruku, mangroves are much more limited in extent (Wouthuyzen et
al. in LIPI 1994a, 1994b). Conversion of coastal land, including mangroves for shrimp pond
development, is just beginning in central Maluku (northern Seram) but conversion for housing
development is already widespread.
Extensive sea grass beds are common in central Maluku (Wouthuyzen in LIPI 1996; PSL Unpatti
in LIPI 1994).  Fishes sighted in sea grass beds around Saparua Island number 62 species
(Wouthuyzen et al. in LIPI 1994).  Surveyors in 1991 (de Iongh et al. 1994) found dugong-
feeding tracks in sea grass beds in the Lease Island villages of Ameth, Nalahia, Ihamahu,
Paperu, Rohumoni, Kabau, and Haruku. These sea grass beds are also a feeding ground for
the hawksbill turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) and green turtle (Chelonia mydas).
Coral species diversity in the Lease Island region is described as high; researchers found 110
species at Pulau Pombo (PSL-UNPATTI 1994) and 85 at Ihamahu (Antariksa et al. 1993).
Surveys documenting the hard coral cover (LIPI 1996) in central Maluku locations on Seram,
Ambon and the Lease Islands show that healthy corals are already rare.  The survey further
indicates that the absence of good coral reefs is closely related to the use of bombs and other
destructive fishing methods.  The details are as follows:
• An average cover of live corals greater than 76% was not found on any reef surveyed.
• A cover of live corals in the range of 51-75% was found on 16% of the reef area.
• A cover of live corals in the range of 26-50% was found on 32% of the reef area.
• A live coral cover in the range of 0-25% was most common, being present on 47% of
the reef area surveyed.
Leonardo (1996) reported on the condition of coral communities in the coastal waters of
Saparua Island and described four areas of the island, all of which had suffered damage from
blast fishing as well as from infestation by crowns of thorn starfish.
• The north coast had a 23.8% live hard coral cover and 36.6% soft coral cover.
• The east coast had a 42% live hard coral cover and 26.1% soft coral cover.
• The south coast had a 27.3% live hard coral cover and 32.4% soft coral cover.
• The west coast had a 31.4% live hard coral cover and 33.2% soft coral cover.
3.4 Characteristics of the Fishery
In central Maluku, agricultural capacity is limited and the fisheries sector is regarded as
theopportunity for economic development. Over recent years, fishing efforts have been
escalating.  The prediction is that fishing efforts will increase by 50% in the next five years.
At the same time, stock assessments and data on catches are inadequate.  If this continues,
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3.4.1 The artisanal finfishery
The fishery of Maluku mirrors that of Indonesia as a whole in that the labor force is dominated
numerically by the artisanal sector.  In 1991, for example, it was estimated that out of 142,510
fishing units (boats) operating in Indonesia, 132,884 or 93.2% were tiny canoes powered by paddle
and/or sail.  Another 6% of boats employed outboard motors and the rest were large, motorized
ships (Agriculture Statistics 1993, Dept. of Agriculture, Jakarta).  In the Maluku province, with a
population of about two million people, 104,600 are considered to be fishers (CBS 1995). Many
more are fisher-farmers who are actually listed in the government statistics as farmers.
Artisanal fishers using fishing lines, spears, traps, hand nets and set nets target a mixture of
reef and pelagic species (Appendix 3). Women in fishing families supplement catches by
harvesting octopus and shellfish from intertidal and upper subtidal areas.  Utilization of coastal
resources in the nearshore areas is intensive.  For instance in Ameth on Nusa Laut, fishers
using 21 types of fishing gears collect 73 different species of fish and shellfish from the reef
flat, reef slope and inshore waters.  An additional 19 species are harvested from the intertidal
zone (Yayasan Hualopu 1996).
The tiny Lease Islands hold 12.5% of the population of Maluku province and are 9-10 times
more densely populated than the rest of Maluku.  In general, the settlements and farming
activities are concentrated along the narrow strip of relatively flat coastal land.  Artisanal and
small-scale commercial fisheries contribute significantly to village economies in terms of
employment and income but villagers are also active in the agriculture sector.  Because good
farmland is limited and the population relatively dense, the fisheries sector is seen as an
opportunity for economic development.  The sea is a source of income as well as a source of
family food (Ruhunlela et al. 1994a, 1994b; PSL Unpatti in LIPI 1996).  On an average, income
from fisheries in a typical village ranges from about 12-28% of the total income.
3.4.2 The commercial finfishery in central Maluku
Upwelling in the Banda Sea, which occurs in the months of June, July and August, makes the
central Maluku fishery a highly productive one.  The resources of central Maluku are exploited
not only by the local population, but also by boats based in the city of Ambon as well as boats
from Sulawesi and Java and foreign fishing vessels.  Key commercial species include tuna, skipjack
and a variety of small pelagic fish (anchovies, mackerel, sardines).  The commercial lift nets (bagan)
and seiners target the small pelagic fish, especially anchovies (puri), sardines (make and lompa)
and mackerel (momar and komu) whereas pole and line boats typically harvest skipjack (cakalang).
Other commercial operators employ long liners and various sizes of gill nets and drift nets.  Live
reef fish harvesters commonly employ divers who use potassium cyanide.
In terms of potential economic growth supporting the national development, the fishery is ranked
second after tourism in Maluku.  Following the 1997-98 monetary crisis in Indonesia, the national
government looked to the fishery of eastern Indonesia to absorb displaced Javanese workers and
perhaps another thousand large-scale commercial fishing vessels (V. Nikijuluw, pers. comm. 1998).
Fisheries production figures over the past decades show a steadily increasing level of
exploitation.  In 1974, the fisheries production of Maluku province was only 59,485 tonnes.
By 1993, 35,000 fishing units (32,000 of which were small, non-motorized crafts) were landing
189,081 tonnes of fish, a level 5% higher than the 1992 landings and still, according to federal
government statisticians, only a fraction of the potential MSY for the province.  In 1997, total
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1993, 1994, and 1995).  In addition, a great deal of fish catch goes unrecorded because it is
trans-shipped at sea and taken directly to distant markets.
Actual records of landings and local research results are at odds with the official federal optimism
regarding potential for further development.  Coral reef fish are believed to be already over-
fished throughout Indonesia (Anonymous 1993, 1994, 1995). Also, landings of shrimp in Maluku
are in decline, and landings of small pelagic fish are uncertain.  A 1995 assessment estimated
that small pelagic (baitfish) catches in central Maluku were already at 80-90% of MSY
(Pulitbangkan 1995).  The most recent information from the government research facility (LIPI)
is that both shrimp and baitfish are now over-fished throughout the Maluku province (M.S.
Latukonsina, Governor of Maluku, pers. comm. November 1998).  The estimated potential yield
of small pelagic fish was recently reduced from 816,200 tonnes to 682,000 tonnes per year.  Because
of a shortage of baitfish, pole and line catches of larger pelagic fish, such as skipjack, have been
static or declining in recent years (Nikijuluw 1995).  Even at the reduced catch rates, skipjack
are now considered to have been over-fished as well (M.S. Latukonsina, Governor of Maluku,
pers. comm. November 1998).  Policy-makers are looking to expand fish and shellfish aquaculture
in an attempt to compensate for declining wild stocks.
Despite warning signs, expansion and modernization of the fishing fleet continue.   The new
fishing units have unprecedented fishing power.  In the district of central Maluku, a 2% increase
in the number of fishing units over the years 1993-95 resulted in an increase in catches of
almost 30% (Table 3.1).  At the same time, fishing units increased by 3% in the district of
Kotamadya Ambon, and production increased by 55%.
3.4.3 Top shell fishery
The commercial trade in top shells (Trochus niloticus) has been carried on since at least the
1960s (Zerner and Thorburn, forthcoming) and is a trade that expanded rapidly.  For example,
recorded shell exports from the Maluku province increased from under 80,000 kg in 1987 to
over 256,000 kg in 1988. Because rapid exploitation led to a crash in wild stocks, this species
has subsequently been declared protected and it is, therefore, illegal to harvest the shells
outside aquaculture areas.  However, harvesting and trade in wild shells continue.
3.4.4 Sea cucumber fishery
Sea cucumbers have been a trade commodity for centuries, ever since Chinese, Makassar,
Buginese and other wandering traders first came to Maluku (Fox 1996).  Older fishers can
remember when inshore sandy bottoms were thick with sea cucumbers.  Today, however, the
traders rarely bother to visit many of their traditional harvesting areas because the stocks
have been largely exhausted.
Table 3.1. Increase in fishing units and fisheries production in the districts of central Maluku and
Kotamadya Ambon in 1993-1995. Source: Buku Tahunan Statistik Perikanan Tahun 1993, 1994 dan 1995
(Book of Annual Fisheries Statistics, Anonymous 1993, 1994, and 1995).
Region Fishing Units Catch (Tonnes)
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995
Central Maluku District 21,887 22,085 22,250 40,892 49,982 52,978
Kotamadya Ambon 3,773 3,779 3,885 56,973 84,910 88,241Regional and Village Level Context        35
3.4.5 Other commercial species
Most lucrative of the other species fished in Maluku are shrimp and pearl oysters, both of
which are mostly caught in southern, not central Maluku.  Various other shellfish, seaweeds,
sharks, octopus and squid, and ornamental fish, are also caught for commercial markets.
Ornamental fish harvesters commonly employ divers who use potassium cyanide.
3.5 Impact of Destructive Fishing Methods
Decreasing catches of baitfish in the Saparua waters (Siahainenia and Tubalawony 1993) have
been blamed on both increased fishing activity and the use of non-selective fishing methods.
For instance, very small mesh (under 5 mm) is used in lift nets (bagan) and beach seines.
Where lift net fishers report increasing catches, it is often because of the use of smaller and
smaller mesh sizes.  Conflict over access to pelagic fish is common between the lift net fishers
with their fine mesh nets and the hand line sector on Ambon Island  (J. Sohouwat, Hutumuri
village, pers. comm. 1996).
The high price offered for grouper (Ephinephelus spp.), ornamental fish and lobster have
encouraged the use of potassium cyanide as a fishing method.  The use of potassium cyanide
is very common in central Maluku waters (Abrahamsz and Hetarie 1994; Geser, Gorom and
Watubela 1997). Blast fishing is also common, both for reef and pelagic fish, and causes
widespread damage to coral habitats (I. Novaczek pers. obs.).
The trap net is a simple fishing gear designed by local communities that is often destructive
because people use hard corals as an anchor for the net.  Traditional woven fish traps called
bubu are also destructive if set out on top of living corals or if coral branches are used to
camouflage the trap.  A third artisanal activity that destroys corals is bameti – the practice of
walking out over the living reef at low tide to harvest shellfish and octopus.  During bameti,
iron bars are often used to break up coral heads or dig large clams out of the reef.  Even more
destructive is the technique called muro-ami, in which fishers use rocks to smash corals and
chase the reef fish out into a net.
3.6 Seasonality
Fishing activity and catch rates vary seasonally.  In central Maluku, there are two distinct
seasonal monsoons.  The westerly monsoon blows from the east and southeast from around
November through April.  Strong winds from the west and northwest and carrying rain prevail
during June-September. October and May are transitional and unpredictable.  Because of the
risk of loss, lift nets either get pulled to shore during the height of the windy season or are
moved to the leeward side of an island.  Although some larger operators have the ability to
move their boats and lift nets about, or have vessels capable of weathering high waves, the
artisanal sector is much more vulnerable to seasonal change. Typically, smaller fishers are
literally “blown off the water” for almost half of the year.  The season of limited catches
varies, depending on when local fishing grounds are subject to onshore winds.
In addition to seasonal cycles, fishers are also affected by lunar cycles.  For instance, hand
liners targeting reef fish report that their catches are large during full moon high tides.  In
contrast, fishers working on floating lift nets or beside fish aggregating devices, as well as
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time for fishing.  Modern lights are brighter than the older kerosene lamps, allowing the
wealthier light fishers to continue operating throughout the month.  Artisanal fishers believe
that this change contributes to stock depletion.  Fishers interviewed also sketched out monthly
calendars that suggest that there are monthly cycles in tides and waves that affect catches.
Artisanal fishers use this traditional knowledge to plan their work schedules.
Because weather has such a strong influence on catches, fish traders in smaller centers
sometimes use sea conditions as a guide for predicting prices in the central markets.  If the
sea is calm and oily, fish are likely to be scarce and the price high.  When the tide is very high
(hitting the foundation of houses along the shore), i.e., at full moon, prices for pelagic fish are
very high.  If there are (moderate) wind and waves, fish are usually more abundant and prices
low (Cali Kiat, fish trader at Tulehu, pers. comm. February 1998).
3.7 Control over the Commercial Fishery
Although there is a small minority of commercial gears in the hands of village fishers, the
majority of capital-intensive gears, i.e., lift nets, FADs, pole and line vessels, long liners and
seiners, are in the hands of urban businessmen and large companies.  For example, the fish
processing company, P.T. Sumber Aneka Tata Bahari, owns a fleet of 12 pole and line boats
and three long liners, as well as five deep-sea FADs.  They export 250-700 tonnes of fish a
month (M. Siahay, boat captain, pers. comm. 1998).  Owners of these industrial enterprises are
rarely native Mollucans.  Most are urban Chinese Indonesians, some are from the western
islands of Sulawesi or Java, and a few are foreign (e.g., Filipino, Japanese etc.). More
information on large-scale fisheries and market structures can be found in Chapter 5.
3.8 Conclusions
The marine resources of central Maluku are very rich but not unlimited.  Coral reefs, for
example, are under severe pressure, particularly from destructive fishing techniques employed
by both commercial and artisanal fishers.  After a period of rapid increase in fishing pressure
and catches, even the optimistic government resource assessments now indicate a need for
more cautious management because several key stocks appear to be over-fished and harvest
potential is declining.  Nevertheless, economic pressures mean that there is still a strong push
for further expansion of fisheries.
Sasi, the local resource management institution, has a long history.  The application of sasi to
marine resources, however, has always been limited in scope and some modern forms of
marine management date back only a few decades.  As an institution, sasi has never been
static but has changed with the times and been used by different proponents for different
economic and social reasons, not simply for resource management.  Sasi and the underlying
adat culture have waxed and waned over time, absorbing and reflecting the impacts of
colonialism, war, economic development and social change. However, despite past predictions
of imminent demise, sasi and adat persist and are, therefore, resilient.  In the following chapters,
we will explore how these regional contextual factors, as well as local conditions, influence
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Chapter 4
Village Level Socio-Political Context
4.1 Introduction
The following general overview of the socio-political context in rural, coastal villages of central
Maluku is based on the results of six case studies carried out on Saparua, Haruku and Ambon
Islands.  All study sites are Christian villages.  Therefore some of the findings, especially the
role of the church in society, do not pertain to the social structure in Muslim villages.
Although a dominant force, the formal village government is only one of three key elements
generally recognized in Maluku villages. These three key institutions are called the Tiga Tungku,
or three hearthstones: the government, the church (or in Muslim villages, the mosque) and
adat or traditional authorities. In some villages, teachers are also important and may displace
adat leaders in the Tiga Tungku.
4.2 Traditional Village Government Structure
Prior to the enactment of the local government law (Law No. 5, 1979), villages in Maluku were
led by a hereditary chief or raja.  Although now considered part of the “traditional” structure,
the position of raja was in fact not part of the indigenous adat social structure, but a construction
of the Dutch colonial leaders. When the Dutch consolidated their power in Maluku and forced
the hill-dwelling people to settle in coastal villages, they appointed the village leader, i.e., the
raja.  Previous to this, the clan groups living in the hills were led by warrior chiefs (kapitan).
The raja governed together with administrative and legislative councils (saniri) whose members
were the clan leaders. The raja’s powers under this system were not absolute.  He (or occasionally,
she) was obliged to consult with the village council. Other hereditary functionaries included a war
leader (kapitan), persons responsible for communicating government decisions to the people (marinyo),
keepers of sacred knowledge (tuan negeri) and the major land owners (tuan tanah).  There were also
the hereditary leaders (kepala kewang) of groups responsible for enforcing social and resource
management regulations.  These enforcers, or traditional forest police, were called the kewang and
the management institution was, and still is, called sasi. The kewang applied sasi rules on both land
and sea, within the village territory. Some villages had separate kewangs for land and sea resources.
4.3 Modern Village Government Structure
The Indonesian national government is situated in Jakarta, on Java Island, over 2,250 km
west of Maluku. Each of Indonesia’s 27 provinces is administered by a provincial government,
which in turn is divided into districts either called Kabupatan or, if urban, Kotamadya.  Below
the districts are the sub-district government offices or Kecamatan. Government decrees,
guidelines and programs are passed down through this structure to the local administrative
units which are called desa or, for larger land units attached to urban centers, kelurahan. Each
desa is governed by a kepala desa or village head, together with his staff, and may comprise
one or several villages. Villages that are smaller than 2,000 inhabitants are usually not
independent but have the status of dusun under the larger unit (desa).  The village head and38        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
his government office may, therefore, be many
kilometers away.  Dusuns are represented in the desa
government through their local leaders (kepala dusun).
Through the issuing of Law No. 5, 1974, provincial
government structures throughout Indonesia were
redesigned following the above national model.  The
same was done for village governments under Law No.
5, 1979.  In the implementation of the latter law,
traditional political structures in the villages were
abolished. The country was thereby divided into uniform
hierarchical units which, at a local level, reflected social
structures in Java, but did not accommodate the
traditional structures in other parts of the country. The
new, uniform structures would, in theory, encourage
similar development of the outer regions of Indonesia.
Through the 1979 law, the hereditary raja was replaced by
an elected village head, the kepala desa.  Smaller villages
lost their independent status and became dusuns of larger
desas. The village councils were replaced by bodies known
as the LMD and LKMD (see below).  There was no place
in the new structure for the kewang, nor was any
replacement developed to take over the function of resource management. The clan system also
became dysfunctional when, instead of being divided along clan lines, the village territory was
geographically divided into dusuns (hamlets). Dusuns were further divided into RWs (rukun warga:
rukun is a harmonious unit, warga is a society member), and subsequently into RTs (rukun tetangga:
tetangga is neighbor). The RT is the smallest political unit in the village (see Figure 4.1). A small
village like Nolloth, for example, with approximately 2,500 inhabitants, has 16 RTs.
The LMD (Lembaga Masyarakat Desa) is the formal village legislative body occupied with
decision-making and the development of regulations. It has 10 to 15 members presided over
by the village head and the village secretary and is divided into sections, i.e., village
development, government administration and community affairs, each of which has a chief.
The LMD reports to the sub-district government level. The decisions and regulations of the
LMD are executed by the LKMD, which is the administrative body of the village government.
At village meetings, the LKMD members and other government officials make the decisions.
The women sit behind the men and are not involved.
Officially, the villagers elect the LMD members, but as we found out from our interviews, in
many cases LMD members are selected from among traditional authorities (i.e., adat and clan
leaders). Only in a few villages are “commoners” allowed into the LMD. Thus, membership
is more likely to be defined by descent and traditional authority than by local elections. The
extent to which the current government overlaps with the previous, traditional village council
varies, but there was no village where traditional authorities were not represented at all.
Heads of the dusun are usually appointed by the village head (kepala desa) and are acknowledged
through a decree from the sub-district office. The dusun level has no LMD of its own, but dusun
representatives hold positions in the LMD of the desa. The dusun head supervises and coordinates
social organizations and carries out the development programs for the dusun. People are not formally
consulted about these programs, so the dusun head has to know the village priorities very well.
Figure 4.1. (Photo) The village
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An RT group, the lowest level in the government structure, consists of a cluster of neighboring
households.  The head of an RT is a non-governmental official. His duty is to take care of his
group, organize government-sponsored activities and act as the mediator between the
government and the people.  In Toisapu, for example, the RTs comprise 43 households. There
is an RT level savings program and the leaders also motivate people to cultivate animals or
productive plants (e.g., bananas) in their yards. Another activity is to clean up public facilities.
According to law, a head of an RT holds the position for three years.
Fishery problems, such as blast fishing, are usually reported by the RT leader to the police (in
particular, the Water Police Squad), either directly or via the village head. Extension programs
from the Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan) are provided through village and dusun
governments, but may be carried out at the RT level.
The village income, as well as the subsidies meant for the various government organizations,
is allocated through the national, district and sub-district levels. Every village carries out
development programs, working within guidelines set at the national level. Village programs
are controlled and have to be approved by higher government levels. The village government
arranges the program, chooses the leaders and presents a list of potential members for approval
to the district government. After approval, the participants are informed of their membership
and tasks. This paternalistic approach is accepted as normal in the current state structure.
Many programs aim to improve the livelihoods of the village population. Other programs
aim to unite village groups and carry out activities that underline the principles of the state
ideology, Pancasila, such as care for the less able and poor in the village. There is little room
for local initiatives or creativity in development programming.
4.4 Government-Related Organizations
4.4.1  PKK
The PKK is a women’s organization initiated in the 1980s to complement the new government
structure. The PKK is an abbreviation for Pendidikan Kesejahteran Keluarga which means literally
“Education for the Prosperity of the Household”. It is a vehicle for the wives of the village
(government) leaders to improve the welfare of Indonesian families. The group operates under
the leadership of the wife of the village head. A vice-chairlady, a secretary and a treasurer assist
her. The village head selects all these officials. Each village PKK is divided into dusun-level
groups. The aim is to improve family life in the spheres of economy and peace. Membership is
open but generally includes mainly teachers and civil servants; common village women often
have no time, or feel inferior to the wealthy women in the village, and are not welcome.
The PKK is subsidized by the sub-district via the village government. The aim of PKK is to
build prosperous families through 1) saving money (ARISAN), 2) skills training (baking,
cooking, sewing), 3) growing medicinal plants, 4) chicken breeding, 5) cultivation of vegetables,
6) dried fish and fruit trade, 7) child care, and 8) the promotion of the state ideology (Pancasila).
The national government dictates programs that are then passed down through provincial,
district and sub-district levels to the villages. The villages can select activities from the program
and submit a proposal (Figure 4.2).  After approval, a budget will be allocated and if necessary,
an expert will be sent to assist with the activities. There is no room for local initiatives and
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4.4.2 TAKESRA
The TAKESRA groups are small savings groups (± 10 people) that particularly target low
income women. It is an initiative of the National Coordinating Agency for Family Planning
(BKKBN) and is usually carried out by the village head. He draws up a list of participants
and sends it to the district office in Masohi for approval. Each TAKESRA has a chair, a secretary
and a treasurer. The members have to save a weekly amount of Rp250 (Toisapu) to Rp1,000
(Nolloth). The money is put in a bank until a certain amount is reached. Then the group can
get an additional government loan (Rp200,000 to Rp2 million in a later phase1) to start small
businesses (chicken breeding, restaurant, etc.). Decisions are made in membership meetings.
4.4.3 ARISAN
ARISAN is an informal savings program initiated by villagers from the lower social classes.
It started in the 1990s as a government program but now many groups function separately. In
Nolloth, for instance, the ARISAN group claimed to be independent and informal. They feel
disconnected from the mainstream and do not expect the government to take care of their
problems. Therefore they use a revolving fund system to provide the members with some
capital. Everyday, they deposit Rp1,000, and on Sundays, one of the members is given the
total of Rp49,000 to use for small-scale enterprises such as sago processing or bread baking.
4.4.4 Social Service Department groups
The Social Service Department of the government has set up various economic development
groups including IDT and KEP. Farmers, fishers and other small business people may be
assisted through the IDT, which is a national program aimed at alleviating poverty. Each
qualifying village receives a Rp20 million loan from the government to subsidize small-scale
development. The money is divided among four groups. They again divide it amongst their
1 The rate of the Rupiah to the US dollar has changed as a result of the economic crisis in Indonesia. Rates used in
this report are: USD1 to Rp2,300 in 1996; USD1 to Rp2,500 in the first half of 1997; USD1 to Rp2,800 over 1997;
and USD1 to Rp10,000 in early 1998. For a complete overview see Appendix 8.
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members. Each member has to pay back the amount borrowed to the government or to the
group’s treasury within a year. In some villages, the money is then made available to another
group, while in others (e.g., Toisapu), the money is put in the bank to serve as capital for
larger enterprises. Decisions are made in membership meetings.
The objective of the KEP is to improve the productivity of fishermen. In Hulaliu, for example,
a Rp3 million fund was divided amongst the members to buy boats or fishing gears. Some
was saved for operating capital. There are three officials and seven members who each received
Rp200,000 and training. Participants are the poor fishermen who cannot afford fishing gears.
The government chooses the members. The fishermen can decide among themselves how to
spend their money. Many people have not as yet participated in the fund.  This was a pilot
program in 1997 with the prospect of involving more groups over the years to come.
Individual villages may have additional programs. For instance, Seri has an organization
called Young Rock (Karang Taruna) that was initiated by the dusun head as part of a program
of the Department of Social Services.  Members, both Moslems and Christians, are involved
in a local program that includes sports, voluntary service, and apprenticeships in fisheries,
agriculture and animal husbandry. The group reports back to the provincial Social Service
office through the head of the dusun, village and district levels.
4.5 KUD
KUD stands for Kooperasi Unit Desa or village cooperative (see Figure 4.3).  Village KUDs are
established according to a uniform structure designed by an Ambonese branch in the 1970s.
The KUD operates independently from the village government, but is under the supervision
of a head office in Ambon, which in turn operates below a national government department.
There are three types of KUD depending on their activities and level of autonomy, ranging
from those that are externally controlled to some that are totally self-supporting.  The KUD’s
executive consists of a manager, a chair, a vice-chair, one or two secretaries and a treasurer.
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Although separate from the local government, the KUD is influenced by village politics. The
general objective of the KUD is to improve the prosperity of its members and the village. The
main trade products of many KUDs are cloves, and to a lesser extent, nutmegs.  Other
enterprises such as the operation of speedboats, minibuses and small shops are also often in
the hands of the KUD. The shops are open to all villagers and provide primary goods, such as
rice, sugar and cooking oil, at reduced prices.  In some villages, the KUD takes care of the
billing for the Electricity Company or is involved in gasoline retail. For its members, the KUD
has a savings and credit system and may provide access to machinery such as coconut grinders.
The income derived from the activities is used for salaries, production costs, village
development, and the development of the KUD itself.
Occasionally, the KUD is involved in fisheries-related activities. In Nolloth, for example, the
KUD plays an important role in organizing top shell harvests and selling the yields. In
Hutumuri, the KUD is developing a fisheries unit.
Membership in the KUD is high compared to that of other village organizations.  In Nolloth,
for instance, there are 500 members.  To become a member, one has to be an Indonesian national,
have an ID card, and pay a monthly fee of Rp500-Rp1,000. There is also an initial membership
fee of Rp5,000-Rp25,000 (depending on the village). After deducting costs from revenues, the
members get an annual (percentage) share of the profit depending on their activities. For
instance, the earnings are higher for people who shop consistently at the KUD store. An annual
meeting is held in December.  Members are recruited through general announcements. KUD
officials are selected and elected every five years.  There are two possible electoral systems.
In the direct system, the members choose and elect their officials. In the indirect system, the
members compile a list of candidates from which the head office in Ambon makes the selection.
Ideas from members can be dropped into a suggestion box or put forth during the annual
meeting. Suggestions sent through the suggestion box are discussed in monthly executive
meetings. If a suggestion supports the annual program as decided in the annual meeting and
the field conditions are right, the suggestion will be accepted and implemented directly. Ideas
deemed to be important for the future development of enterprises will be put forward in the
next annual meeting. Members thus have a voice and the structure appears more democratic
and decentralized than most village organizations.
4.6 Church Organizations
4.6.1 Church hierarchy
Protestant Christianity was introduced to Maluku during the Dutch colonial time. The role of
the Protestant Church of Maluku (GPM) is still prominent. Executives who control programs
and funding form the Synod in Ambon. Below this is the Klasis office in Saparua, which covers
the Lease Islands. The Klasis instructs at the congregation level and they communicate with
the local church branches. Communication from one level to the other is through meetings.
To obtain funding, the village church submits a yearly program proposal to the Synod. The
time required to get a proposal approved is approximately one year.
In predominantly Christian villages, the GPM has a strong influence on the people. The relationship
between the church and village government is often very tight. Announcements on village activities,
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The church generally has representatives in the LMD and can thus influence decision-making.
In some cases, the church motivates people to support government economic programs.  The
GPM also may have its own economic and social programs, as in Hutumuri. There are church
groups for men, women and youths (see below).
4.6.2 Pelwata
The Pelwata is the church organization for women. The aim is to serve and motivate Christian
women. The central committee consists of a chair (always the wife of the church minister), a
vice-chair, a secretary and a treasurer. There are sections, led by chairladies, dealing with
issues of faith, communications, fundraising, economic development, and the household.
Besides drafting programs, the central committee presents implementation proposals and
financial reports that are taken back to members in each section to be studied. The members
can express feedback during a subsequent service.
Membership varies, but rarely covers more than 30% of the village women. Social pressure to
join the meetings is high. Time constraints, lack of child care and irrelevance of the activities
to the women’s daily lives, however, dampen the enthusiasm of women to join. Women that
do join generally prefer the bible services.  Programs may be passed down from the Synod or
formulated by the local members. The local programs include: 1) spiritual activities, e.g.,
bible services and discussions, 2) pastoral services, e.g., visiting the sick and elderly, 3) family-
based economic activities and skills training, e.g., vegetable gardens, and 4) sports. The external
programs, formulated at the Synod level by the women’s section, are sent to the Klasis and
forwarded to the local groups for discussion by selected representatives of each section. In
this meeting, ideas from members may be included in the final programs or the whole program
can be rejected if it is unsuitable. For example, Pelwata in Seri did not apply a program named
“comparative study” in which women were to visit groups in other churches. In other villages,
a program may be accepted but in most cases, it is only partly realized.  The local officials
have an obligation to present a yearly report to the Klasis through a Pelwata conference.
4.6.3 Youth wing
The youth wing (Angkatan Muda) has a chair, and a number of deputies, secretaries, and
treasurers, depending on the size of the group. The average number of officials is
approximately 12 men and women. The aim is to train youth in useful skills, build good
attitudes, and strengthen their faith in God. It is hoped that members who have been trained
will become leaders in other social groups in the future. Membership is usually around a
third of eligible youngsters in the village. Lack of time, marriage, and shyness after a long
period of absence, or a feeling of inferiority (low education), are commonly expressed reasons
for the inactivity of potential members.
As with the women’s groups, youth activity programs may be developed locally or externally.
Activities include weekly spiritual services and social works, e.g., cleaning-up of public
facilities (in collaboration with the congregation and village government), visits to groups in
other villages, sports, economic activities (growing animals and vegetables), and a pastoral
program to recruit new members. In Seri, the economic program is done in conjunction with
a group of new university graduates. The youth wing is functionally independent of the local
church but is accountable to other levels of the youth organization in the church hierarchy
(i.e., sub-branch, branch, region, province). In addition, the sub-branch has to report its
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At the annual meeting, the local program is drafted. The meeting is attended by members and
other invitees, e.g., the minister, government officials, village elders, etc. The executive presents
a proposal and the members can express their ideas. As long as the ideas are constructive, they
will be considered further. If not, the idea will be rejected and the member who proposes it will
be told the reason. When members do not agree with a proposed program from the higher
level, it is discussed in an open forum without the presence of the section heads responsible for
that program. Through this mechanism, it is assumed that members can freely discuss any
program. When a decision cannot be reached by consensus, a vote is conducted.
Every two years, the local executive has to report to the members regarding the implementation
of the programs and use of funds. When members reject a report, the board has to defend itself. In
theory, the board or sections that are responsible for a program in question may have to resign in
order to restore the members’ confidence in the organization. This, however, has never occurred.
4.6.4 Pelpri
No information is available on this men’s group of the church.
4.7 Adat Organizations
The remaining adat organization found in some villages is the kewang, which enforces sasi
regulations.  In only one case (Haruku) has a kewang spun off a youth organization (mini-
kewang). The kewang structure and function are discussed together with the description of the
sasi institution of individual villages (see Chapters 9-14).
In resource management under adat sasi, there is close collaboration among the Tiga Tungku
i.e., adat leaders, village government and religious leaders.
4.8 Social Organizations
4.8.1 Muhabet
The Muhabet groups in the villages coordinate communal action for house construction and
funerals2. For instance, on every last Friday of the month, the members of the Muhabet in Hutumuri
help to build or repair five houses. The house owners provide tea for the workers but construction
materials are provided by the other members of the group. The amount of money needed is
determined beforehand and the costs are divided evenly. Members who do not work are fined
Rp1,000-Rp2,500. Any member who is consistently delinquent is excluded from the organization.
During a funeral ceremony, the church elders perform the ritual, the church organizations
design the service and the Muhabet groups take care of the rest. Several groups in the village
take turns (on a monthly basis), and are responsible, for instance, for arranging the coffin and
grave, transportation to the burial site, food and beverages at the ceremony etc. Each group
has a coordinator and four workers. Work schedules are drawn up during the membership
meetings. Through this rotation system, the Muhabet group is always ready to act.
2 Holleman (1923) describes a similar custom of mutual help in the construction of houses and processing of sago
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4.8.2 Women’s meetings
Apart from the above-mentioned organizations, there are no informal meetings where women can
discuss problems and/or other village-related issues. The reason is, according to our informants in
Tuhaha, that there is very little trust amongst women. Women are afraid of gossip and informal
meetings would be an opportunity for women to talk about other women in the village. As a
consequence, the women are family oriented. They would not ask their neighbor to take care of
their child for a while, or discuss family issues like alcohol abuse. Problems are discussed and, if
possible, resolved within the family. As a result, women are not united outside the family structure
and are not critically aware of political issues in the village.
4.9 Relative Distribution and Activity of Village Organizations
Among villages, there are some differences in terms of presence and activity of village organizations
(Table 4.1).  These differences shed some light on the characteristics of successful local organizations.
Village organizations depend largely on the stability of the parent institution. The Protestant church of
Maluku, for example, is a stable institution because it is independent from the village government.
Continuity in leadership keeps the Pelwata and other church organizations active.  In contrast, political
instability affects the functioning of government-related organizations since these are often instigated,
supervised or ruled by the village government or its kin. The PKK, for example, is always chaired by
the wife of the village head, and if his position is under stress (Haruku, Hulaliu, Hutumuri) or if the
wife is absent (Nolloth), the PKK suffers. Tuhaha has a more active PKK and this is related to the fact
that it has more support from the common village women because they get direct economic benefits.
Economic rewards are an important factor for the success of organizations set up to carry out
government programs. Savings programs (ARISAN) are widely implemented, as are the direct
aid groups (IDT and KEP).  Another village organization that provides economic benefits and
also is at an arm’s length from the village government is the village cooperative or KUD.  Where
Table 4.1. Presence of village organizations (and activity) in case study villages (1997-1998). *=only four
traditional representatives in Urimesing village, **=for government officials only, not for common
villagers, ***=informally organized, ****=including women’s trade group.
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
LMD active partly partly active active not
functional functional functional
Saniri Negeri included partly partly partly partly not
included included included included* included
Kewang present present no to be established no no
(1997)
PKK not active not active active not active active **** not active
TAKESRA active active active active active active
IDT active (4) active (5) active (2) active (4) no active (3)
KEP present no no present present present
Pelwata active active active active active active
Youth wing active present present active active active
KUD active active no active no active
ARISAN active active** active*** active active not active
Muhabet active active active active active active
Others tolong Learisa/ no health centre/ Young Rock/ no
-menolong mini- kewang non-active women’s trade
Young Rock/ group
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it exists, it has active membership. In Seri, the role that the KUD plays in trading of local products
is filled by independent traders and the PKK women’s trade group.
4.10 Conclusions
As a result of Indonesia’s attempt to build a strong national state, the social and political
structures in the villages of central Maluku are a reflection of centralized and hierarchical
nationally-defined structures. This is true for both government and church-sponsored
organizations. Organizations such as environmental groups, which are outside of the
government and church hierarchies, are rare. Indonesian citizens are trained to identify with
the state rather than with local groups. This is accomplished through promotion of the national
ideology (Pancasila) in schools as well as through various compulsory service and training
programs. As a result, the organizational structures in the villages are largely identical.
Decision-making processes involving higher government levels are not open for local
contribution. Within government organizations, decision-making processes are not
participatory. The leaders in the village and in the organizations have little or no confidence
in the abilities of common villagers. The organizations do not function in the absence of a
leader and they depend on the government for support for their programs.
The Christian Protestant church, like the government, has local organizations nested in a
centralized, hierarchical structure.  We have less information about the role of Muslim leaders
in village life because our case study villages were all Christian.  Muslim leaders appear to
play only a minor role in local resource management institutions.
Kewang, a traditional adat organization, plays a central role in village resource management.
This organization is only present in villages with an active sasi institution.
Besides the government, adat and church organizations, most villages have a village co-
operative or KUD that may be a player in local politics.  The KUD is also part of a national
hierarchy and is overseen by a government department.
The spread and functionality of village organizations is dependent on 1) economic benefits, 2) broad
support by the villagers, 3) stable leadership, and 4) the ability to stay at arm’s length from political
turmoil. Organizations that have clear economic motives and direct benefits are small but active,
and supported by the members. Church organizations are most stable but, in most cases, their spiritual
aim is more important than economic benefits, so membership is limited.  Government groups are
often dominated by the upper classes and are most vulnerable to political instability. Their function
is highly dependent on the presence of a legitimate, strong village leader. An overview of the presence
and functionality of the various village organizations is presented in Table 4.1.
In trying to design local resource management institutions and organizations, therefore, certain
contextual realities must be kept in mind.  Village government leaders are used to taking
orders from above rather than initiating local actions independently.  Any move to establish
local management institutions and organizations must be seen to be supported by higher
government levels.  Village leaders will need assistance and incentives to be proactive and
creative in developing suitable management arrangements.  The organization or institution
must be meaningful to ordinary villagers, provide economic benefits (preferably direct), and
for stability, should be linked to the Tiga Tungku power structure but, at the same time, be
buffered from direct impacts of political strife and changing village leadership.The Fisheries and Fish Markets of Central Maluku        47
Chapter 5
The Fisheries and Fish Markets of Central Maluku
5.1 Profile of Fishers in Villages of Central Maluku
The profile of 508 fishers interviewed in central Maluku in 1997 shows them to be predominantly
45-52 years old (average 47 years, see Table 5.1).  Most have only elementary education and only
11% have finished high school or proceeded to higher education. Most own land and live in semi-
permanent or permanent housing made either partly or entirely of cement.  About three-quarters
have their own fishing boats, but very few own motors.  This is very similar to the demography of
the Indonesian fishery in general.  Almost a third of the fishers we surveyed do not own their
own gears but fish for someone else.  Of those who have gears, a third have only hand lines while
the rest use nets (gill net, seine, etc.) and traps.  A very small proportion own or have shares in
commercial gears such as lift nets (bagans; see Figure 5.1) or FADs (rumpons).
From the data, we see that the central Maluku fishery can be divided into two basic groups:
artisanal and commercial.  A harvester who fishes from the shore or from a small perahu without
a motor and uses a hand line, spear, trap or simple net, is considered artisanal. Operators of
large pole and line vessels, seiners using deep-water fish aggregating devices (FADs) and floating
lift nets, together with their crew, are clearly in the commercial sector.  In the middle are the gill
netters and seiners using small, motorized craft: the small-scale commercial fishers.  The majority
of central Maluku fishers falls into the artisanal category and are, in fact, fisher-farmers.
According to the Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan) statistics, in 1997, fisher-farmers earned an
average of Rp1,124,000 per year (± USD450, early 1997 exchange rate).  Our results suggest that
their livelihoods are currently in danger. Overall, fishers interviewed considered fish catches and
environmental health to be declining.  We found that the oldest fishers, especially those over 60
years of age, report a dramatic decline in marine environmental health over the past 15 years (i.e.,
-41%) and a severe drop in fish catches (-33%).  The younger fishers also perceive serious declines:
27-31% in environmental health and 25-27% in catches compared to 15 years ago.
Figure 5.1.  (Photo) Lift net in Tuhaha Bay, with a local
outrigger boat (perahu) in the foreground.48        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The majority of rural coastal villages are either predominantly Christian or predominantly
Muslim.  In general, fish harvesters belong to the dominant faith.  However, in seven cases
(Soahuku, Tiow, Eri, Seilale, Hutumuri, Seri, Tuhaha), we found a substantial proportion of
Muslim fishers at work in Christian villages.  There is a significant difference between younger
and older fishers in terms of religion (ANOVA, p=0.005).  Whereas only one-third of fishers
over 45 are Muslims, almost half of the younger fishers are so.  This reflects the demographic
shift in Maluku.  A predominantly Christian province since the Dutch colonial period, Maluku
has in the past decades become increasingly mixed, to the point where Muslims now
outnumber Christians.
Socio-economic data were collected from a sub-sample of 178 heads of fishing families in the
six case study villages (Appendix 3).  For data from these villages, the analysis of variance
shows there is a significant difference (p<0.01) in the perceptions of Muslims and Christians in
terms of their access to, or role in, the fisheries decision-making processes.  Most Muslims rate
their level of participation as low compared to the Christians.  Muslims are also significantly
more likely to want their children to enter the fishery (ANOVA, p=0.07) and are much less
likely to consider sasi to be an important or useful institution (ANOVA, p=0.002).  None of the
Muslim fishers are related to any soa besar, the traditional ruling elite in their villages.
Fishing families derive, on average, two-thirds of their income from fishing (Table 5.1).  The
majority (80%) are able to cover daily expenses from fishing alone.  On average, 22% of the
fish caught are eaten at home.  Fishers who do not own their own gears but act as crew for a
commercial enterprise consume on average only 14% of their catch, whereas hand liners
consume the largest proportion: 27%.  The percentage of catch consumed is not correlated
with economic status.
The sub-sample of 178 fishers was divided into age classes (<45, 45-60, 60>) to investigate
age-related differences.  We found that those under the age of 45 have a diverse array of
primary and secondary sources of income, whereas those over 60 are more exclusively fisher-
farmers. Very few fishers are members of organized fisheries groups, and when they are, this
is usually as part of a government-sponsored fisheries development program.  Older fishers
Table 5.1. Profile of fishers sampled in central Maluku in 1997-98.
Demography (n=508) Economic status (n=508) Fishing activities (n=178)
Age: Boat: Target species:
Average 47 None 16% Reef 41%
Minimum 20 Perahu (canoe) 72% Pelagic 20%
Maximum 85 Boat + motor 6% Both 39%
Sex: Gear: % income from fishing:
Male 88% None 30% Average 68%
Female 12% Hand line/spear 21% Minimum 5%
Religion: Fish trap/hand net 0.4% Maximum 100%
Muslim 42% Larger net 38% % fish catch eaten:
Christian 58% Lift net/FAD 3.9% Average 22%
Education: House: Minimum 0%
None 1.4% Gaba + thatch roof 9% Maximum 100%
Elementary level 71% Boards + thatch 16%
Jr. high school 15% Cement + boards 15%
Sr. high school 10% Full cement + zinc roof 59%
Diploma 0.8% Land:
University 0.2% Land owner 81%
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are more likely than the younger ones to belong to a village level, church or government
organization.  There is no grassroot fishers’ union in Maluku. The government-sponsored
HNSI (All Indonesia Fishermen’s Organization) claims to represent artisanal and small-scale
harvesters as well as large commercial enterprises but in fact, its presence and level of
credibility at the village level are very low.
Changing trends in the fishery can be seen from the fact that whereas 19% of the youngest fishers
said they fished in collaboration with outsiders, only 11% of the mid-age group and none of the
elders fished with outsiders.  Target species also change with the generations, with over half of
the youngest fishers being exclusively dependent on pelagic fisheries, while a third of the elders
fish exclusively on inshore reefs.  Younger fishers also have a more positive perception of the role
of women in society.  Twenty percent believe that women are always involved in community
decision-making, whereas only two out of 33 fishers over 60 share this perception.
The middle age group (45-60 years) is significantly (ANOVA, p=0.002) more likely to want
change in fisheries rules.  Although most of them say they enjoy fishing, men in this age
group are also the most likely to change their employment provided they could find something
more profitable or less physically demanding.  They are only half as likely to recommend the
fishery as a career for their children, compared to older or younger fishers.
There are also significant differences (chi square test, p=0.03) among the three age classes in
terms of their perception of the role of the community in fisheries management.  More than
half of the people in every age group think that the government has most or all responsibility
for fisheries management. However, of the remainder, the fishers under 45 years of age are
much more likely to consider communities as having management responsibility. Younger
fishers do not appear to be always thinking of sasi as the institution of their choice for local
level management.  Overall, the majority of fishers (87%) of all ages and in every village
consider sasi to be an important or useful institution.  But, whereas the oldest fishers are
unanimous in this opinion, most of those who rate sasi as not very useful or not important are
under 45 years old (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2.  Opinion of sasi provided by fishers of three different age
groups (<46, 46-60 and 60>).
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5.2 Cost of Entry, Income Levels and Profit Sharing
5.2.1 Artisanal sector
The cost of entry to the fishery largely depends on gear type.  The cheapest option is a hand
line or home-made spear costing less than Rp10,000 (USD4, early1997 exchange rate).  To use
this gear, a fisher does not even need a boat, although most do have a dugout outrigger canoe
(perahu) costing Rp100,000-Rp150,000 (USD40-USD60). Home-made fish traps (bubu) woven
from local materials are the next least expensive option.  With these simple gears, fishers may
catch 2-60 fish a day, depending on the fishing area, season and phase of the moon. Typical
incomes (1997) range from Rp2,000-Rp50,000 per fishing trip.
5.2.2 Small-scale commercial
Nylon nets are more costly and to fish with larger gears, a fisher needs to invest in a long boat
(Rp4-5 million) and outboard motor (Rp12 million or more, approximately USD4,800) and
take on a crew.  For the smaller boats in this sector, a crew may be made up of fewer than 10
men, whereas the larger boats carry 20-40 crew.  A 70m giob net, one of the most commonly
used in the small-scale fishery, cost Rp263,000 in 1997.  In general, the cost of all sorts of
nylon nets increased by 100-200% in 19983.  Nets must be replaced or repaired regularly,
sometimes after only a few months.  Small-scale net fishers bring in from 2-4 (small boat) or
2-20 (larger boat) baskets of fish per trip with perhaps 50-200 fish per basket depending on
the species.  This catch is shared among the boat and gear owners and the crew (see below).
The smallest commercial net/boat owners estimated their average gross incomes to be in the
range of Rp20,000-Rp50,000 per fishing trip (USD8-USD20, early 1997 rate) with expenses
ranging up to Rp10,000.  With larger boats, owners may make Rp0.5-1 million and expend up
to Rp100,000 per trip, depending on the distance to the fishing ground.
Some artisanal fishers have been upgraded to the small-scale sector through government programs.
Recently, the fishing companies have also become involved.  For instance, P. T. Sumber Aneka
Tata Bahari (a fish processing company) has provided loans to fishers in three villages for the
purchase of motorized small boats.  To repay the loans, fishers give the company half their catch.
In each village, there are traditional arrangements for sharing catches on small-scale boats
employing crew.  In a typical example from Tuhaha, the catch from a fishing trip is divided
into nine shares as follows: three shares for the captain (i.e., the boat owner), two shares for
the net owner (also usually the boat owner), two shares for the helpers who fish and two
shares for the boat drivers.  The boat owner pays running costs i.e., gas and, if there is no fish,
food for the crew.  For an afternoon net haul in near shore waters, the catch is split in two: half
for the net owner, half for the crew (20-40 men).
For night fishing, the catch may be split into three portions: one share for the lamp tenders,
one for the net owner and one-third to be divided among the net crew (20-40 men).  Before
making this division, everyone gets to take some fish for food.  Usually five baskets are set
aside as food fish.  The rest of the catch is then sold and the money divided up according to
the share agreement.  In some villages, the crew give part of their catch (fish or money) to the
minister and/or the church and also some to the kepala desa.
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5.2.3 Fish aggregating devices (rumpons)
Of the large gears, FADs require the least capital and those deployed in shallow waters are
most likely to be locally owned.  In 1997-98, it cost Rp1-2 million to construct a FAD compared
to Rp0.5-1 million in previous years.  The major cost involved is for the anchor and rope.
FAD owners often own a number of FADs as well as one or more fishing boats.  Boats fishing
around a FAD may be large seiners but may also be small artisanal perahus.  FAD owners pay
several types of taxes: a FAD permit every six months (Rp7,500), a license to fish in a particular
area (Rp89,000 per year) and a harbor fee for the fishing boat (e.g., in Masohi, Rp15,000 every
three months).  In addition there are marketing fees.
5.2.4 Seiners
Commercial purse seine operators face the costs of buying and maintaining a boat and motor
as well as a purse seine (jaring bobo).  If they sell their catch to Aneka Tata Bahari, the processor
in Tulehu, ice is provided free.  In some cases, the boat owners also own the FADs where their
nets are deployed (see above).  A boat cost about Rp17 million in 1998, while two 40 HP
motors cost another Rp23 million (up from Rp13 million in 1997).  Between 1997 and 1998, the
cost of a purse seine rose 100% to Rp14 million.  A full set of a boat and gears bought second-
hand could cost a total of Rp40 million.  Seiners also have to pay for permits for their gears,
harborage and fishing area.  There were common complaints from boat owners that as of
1997, they could no longer get fishing area permits from the province for boats with motors
over 90 HP.  Now they must apply to Jakarta, which is more difficult and costly.  One seiner
operator estimated that his boat generated Rp36 million in gross income over two years, of
which Rp27 million accrued to him as boat owner (Sam Kalahatu, Seri, pers. comm. 1998).
Each night, the seiner will operate next to a FAD where fish are attracted using lamps.  In
many cases, the boat owners also own up to four FADs for each boat.  The watchman on each
FAD sets up a sign if fish have aggregated.  Any boat can then come to that FAD to fish.
Except when there is a special agreement with a fish trader to provide night transportation,
fishing goes on in the early morning hours so that the catch can be made at daybreak when
transportation is readily available.  This way, the fish reach the market in the freshest condition.
A record of the catch goes into the books of the boat owner, which can be freely inspected by
the crew.  The fish caught are divided into two portions.  The larger portion will be sold and
the smaller portion goes directly to the crew (food fish).
Before 1992, seiner catches were split 60:40 with 60% going to the boat owner and 40% to the
crew.  However, this system was changed.  Now, the crew gets 25-30% of the value of fish
sold, whereas the owner of the boat and FAD retain the other 70-75%.  If the FAD owner is a
different person than the boat owner, the owner’s portion is split between them after they
cover their expenses i.e., daily outlay for oil, gas, food etc., taxes and maintenance.  The crew’s
portion is divided into shares according to the number of crew.  Where there are 20 crewmen,
for example, the money will be divided into 24 shares: one for each of the regular crew, two
for the captain and two for the man operating the FAD and lamps.  If the boat is owned by a
processing company, two additional shares may be allocated to a bookkeeper who records
the names of the crew on each trip and calculates and records all expenses and share values.
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On some boats, the crew get their share of the money as soon as the fish are sold.  On other
boats, earnings are paid out at six-monthly intervals.  As the crewmembers may change on
each trip, this requires good record-keeping and a large degree of trust.  Crew with urgent
needs can ask for advance pay, for instance, at Christmas and New Year.  In one case we
recorded, each crewmember received only Rp240,000 from six months work (Seri seine fishery,
1997).  If a boat catches more than a tonne in one trip, there may be a daily bonus of Rp50,000
divided among the crew.  There is no annual bonus for the crew, but there may be for the
captain.  With incomes so marginal and directly dependent on catch rates, there is clearly a
strong incentive for fishers to work hard to maximize the catch.
The ikan makan (food fish), usually 1-4 baskets of fish depending on the season, are divided
equally among the crew.  Our informants estimated that food fish for one crew member could
be sold for Rp15,000-Rp60,000 (USD6-USD24, early 1997 rate), depending on the season.  This
is the daily income to support the fisher’s family.  As well as the ikan makan, there are also ikan
tacucu.  These are the fish that are not enclosed by the purse seine or that jump out, and may
be caught and kept by any crew member.
5.2.5 Pole and line
Pole and line boat owners face capital costs and fees similar to those of seiner operators, but
they must also pay for bait.  Baitfish suppliers bill boat owners on a weekly basis. The cost in
1997 was Rp2,000 (USD0.8) per pail as well as 10% of the catch. The pole and line boats often
find it difficult to get sufficient baitfish.   Boats operating out of Nolloth in 1997 were reputed
to catch over 100 tonnes of skipjack per month, with catches of 3-4 tonnes per day not being
unusual.  Export quality fish sold for Rp2400 per kg in February 1998.
The pole and line boats typically go out twice a week on three-day trips, unloading fish at the
Tulehu or Masohi cold storage facilities. Fishing takes place throughout central and northern
Maluku.  The profit (i.e., after paying for bait etc.) obtained from the catch is divided into two
portions: 70% for the boat owner and 30% for the captain and crew.  The crew’s share is
divided as follows: two shares each to the captain, bait throwers and motor tenders and one
share each for the other crew. Additional shares may be set aside for the village government,
church and charities in the home port.
There are often extra incentives to catch as many fish as possible. One respondent explained a
current system wherein pole and line fishers in 1997 earned a bonus of Rp50,000 a tonne if the
boat’s daily catch was above three tonnes.  Each year, the crewmen also receive a Christmas
bonus of cookies, butter, milk, sugar and flour.  If the boat harvests over 200 tonnes in the year,
the captain gets a bonus of Rp2 million, which he shares with his best workers and helpers.
5.2.6 Lift nets (bagans)
Lift nets consist of an anchored floating platform equipped with lamps and fine mesh lift nets
(see Figure 5.1). The capital investment in 1997 was in the order of Rp3.5 million for a small
lift net, sized 11 m x 11 m. Larger commercial lift nets, which cost up to Rp5 million prior to
the currency collapse, cost Rp10 million in 1998 (Muhammad Saleh, pers. comm. 1998).
According to one owner in Tuhaha, gross income from his share of the catch on one lift net
ranges from Rp100,000-Rp1.5 million per month, while costs (kerosene, lampwicks, matches,
maintenance etc.) usually total Rp400,000 a month.The Fisheries and Fish Markets of Central Maluku        53
Pelagic fish are attracted to the lift net lights at night.  Catches are shared between the owner
and the lift net crew and helpers (perhaps 10-20 persons in total depending on the size of the
lift net).  One-third or one-half goes to the lift net owner; the rest is divided among the lamp
crew and the net crew.  The net crew portion is divided evenly among the workers (sometimes
including the owner).  The owner keeps everyone’s money and hands it out periodically.
Therefore, just as in the seiner fishery, crew income from the lift net fishery is proportional to
catch rate and this promotes intensive effort.
Lift nets and to a lesser extent, seiners, are the primary sources of baitfish for the pole and
line boats.  Usually, baitfish are sold by the bucket for a fixed price (Rp2,000 in 1997) plus 10%
of the catch realized from that bait.  The price of baitfish sold to pole and line vessels by lift
net operators rose during the study period, from Rp2,000-Rp3,500 per bucket.  The relationship
between suppliers and buyers is based on trust that the pole and line captain will report the
catch accurately and the boat owner will remit the payment (in cash or fish) to the lift net or
seine owner.  Cash payments may be made weekly or monthly.  In peak fishing seasons,
when pole and line boats are catching tonnes of skipjack everyday, payments to the bait fishers
can be substantial.  The general shortage of baitfish in certain seasons no doubt helps to keep
the pole and line operators honest, as they dare not risk losing their bait suppliers. The one
known exception to the above system is the company called Usaha Mina, which pays a flat
rate of Rp5,000 per bucket for baitfish without handing over any percentage of the catch.
5.3 Market Systems for Artisanal, Small-Scale and Commercial Fisheries
5.3.1 Fish landing sites and flow to markets in the study area
Fishers in the study area sell their catch in either their village marketplace or in a regional
center. Officially recorded landings indicate that about 40% of fish caught goes to markets
outside Maluku.  However, because of trans-shipment and illegal fishing, the actual percentage
is higher. Caught fish that are destined for regional, national or international markets mostly
flow through the following centers:
• Tulehu on Ambon Island, the site of a fish processing and export factory, which receives
fish from the entire region.
• Toisapu on Ambon Island, close to several other fish processing factories.
• Seri and Eri on Ambon Island, where fish are landed from the rich pelagic purse seine
and lift net fishery off southeastern Ambon Island.
• Masohi, the largest town on Seram Island, which receives fish caught around Seram as
well as from artisanal and commercial boats operating around the Lease Islands.
• Amahai on Seram, close to Masohi, where there is a processing factory.
• Ambon city, which is the provincial capital and main regional marketplace and is fed
by Tulehu, Seri, and other smaller ports as well as Ambon Harbor landings.
Other smaller landing sites, such as Hitu on Ambon’s north shore and Saparua town on Saparua
Island, generally service local and other village markets.  Artisanal and small-scale fishers
may use either local or regional landing sites depending on the volume of fish caught, access
to affordable transportation and market price.  Commercial operators offloading larger
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5.3.2 Fish market structure
The process of selling fish may involve one or more of a number of participants at different
levels of the market chain, i.e.,
• Fishers or commercial boat crew.
• Retailers /vendors (papalele or jibu-jibu).
• Fish brokers (tuan lelang or borok).
• Wholesalers.
• Fish export and processing companies.
Artisanal fishers and boat crew who receive part of their pay in the form of fish may sell their
fish directly to the consumer. Fishers act independently; there are no existing organizations to
assist with marketing, management or distribution of information.  Therefore, their position in
the marketplace is weak and they have no control over the price they receive for their catch.
In most cases, fish are sold through an intermediary.  For small-scale and artisanal fishers,
this is most likely to be a papalele (in Christian villages) or jibu-jibu (Muslim). These retailers
are almost always female (except for those in the market in the city of Ambon).  Often they
are the wives of artisanal fishers or boat crew or, if not, they are full-time fish traders.  In
smaller ports, the women gather on the shore early in the morning to meet incoming fishing
boats and compete for baskets of fish being landed.  Each retailer generally handles one or a
few particular types of fish.  As a group, these women are also unorganized, with each one
acting as an independent in competition with the rest.  With the exception of family ties, there
are no contractual or other agreements between the retailers and fishers. They do not, for
example, advance loans to artisanal fishers; all transactions are cash.
Over the past ten years, the numbers of these female fish vendors have increased rapidly.
This is particularly true in Seri, where the pelagic fishery has also undergone rapid expansion
and access to the Ambon market has improved due to newly developed roads.
Each retailer usually has the ability to market 1-2 loyang daily.  A loyang is equivalent to two
10 kg baskets of fish.  Fish prices vary according to the species, size of the fish, their freshness
and the season (i.e., whether fish are scarce or abundant).  Each retailer tries to buy the amount
of fish she is sure of being able to sell immediately.  They are most successful if they sell early
in the morning, and especially when there is a shortage of food in the market.  There are two
selling styles: from market stalls and door-to-door.  It is the latter group which is responsible
for the majority of fish sales to both city and village consumers.  The bulk of the fish trade is
in pelagic species.  Reef fish are hard to find in the central markets.  Other species traded
include squid, cuttlefish and octopus.
When a fish vendor fails to sell all her fresh fish in the morning, the remainder may be taken
home and smoked, then taken door-to-door for sale in the afternoon.  When fish are abundant,
a vendor from a small village may smoke several hundreds in order to have enough to make
a trip to a larger market such as Masohi or Ambon.  They will also make a special run to the
city to sell large, highly priced fish such as tuna.
Commercial fishers (seiners, lift nets) may sell part or all of their catch to pole and line fishers
as bait.  If they choose to sell at the Ambon market, they usually send their catch through a
broker/auctioneer called the tuan lelang or borok.  These relationships are not defined by written
contract but are based on mutual trust.  Fish brokers are usually male, although there are
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there are no fish brokers.  In Ambon, all 23 of the fish brokers and their helpers are male,
ethnic Butonese but in smaller ports, the traders may be Ambonese.  Each borok has a set of
clients (a “fishing family”) from whom he or she receives fish.  In a typical day, he may handle
10-20 or up to 40-50 baskets of fish.  The broker is responsible for selling all fish received each
day, for whatever price the market will bear.  For this service, he receives 10% of the net sale
price (i.e., after subtracting expenses for transportation, market taxes etc.).  In 1997, one borok
estimated that he cleared Rp700,000-Rp1 million per month (La Jafar Lim, Ambon, pers. comm.
1998).  Prices are set according to the experience of the broker, the season and the abundance
of fish.  A 10 kg basket of momar, which sold for as little as Rp2,000 in the early 1980s, fetched
between Rp40,000-Rp75,000 in 1997, depending on the season.
Fish brokers in Ambon handle fish that come in from Hutumuri, Seri, Tulehu, Hitu, Waai and
other small ports as well as fish caught in Ambon.  Fish that get to market first thing in the
morning typically fetch the best price.  Market price information flowing out of Ambon
influences fish prices in the outlying ports. Whether the news is carried by telephone to Tulehu
or by speedboat drivers to smaller ports, this information is gathered by retailers (papaleles
and jibu-jibus) throughout central Maluku and helps them to decide whether to sell their fish
locally or risk taking the fish to the larger market.
Each fish broker has a number of helpers called anak buah (a term that connotes dependency
and mutual relations) whose job is to unload fish from incoming vehicles, sort and guard the
fish, report on price fluctuations in the market place and assist with sales.  The broker does not
buy the fish; he simply transfers them from the fisher to the purchaser, usually a fish vendor.
Each morning, several hundred retailers wait in the Ambon market to bargain with the brokers
as the fish arrive.  Bargaining occurs only within limits established by the broker.  A female fish
vendor may bargain for a basket of fish but not pay until later in the morning after the fish have
been sold.  By that time the price may have changed, but she will pay the price agreed upon.
Between fish vendors and fish brokers exist important trade relations based on trust.
Occasionally a fish broker will take the risk of purchasing fish for resale, acting as a wholesaler.
This requires fish holding capacity and access to ice, as well as significant capital.  This strategy
is most often employed by brokers who buy fish for a low price in an outlying port at a time
when fish shortages in Ambon ensure a high resale price.
The last market option is to sell to fish processing companies or transport ships.  Fish brokers will
keep fish on ice and take them to the factories if market sales are slow.  At the factories, prices are
fixed and depend on species, size and quality.  For example, at P.T. Latoka in Masohi, skipjack
was purchased for Rp900-Rp1,700 per kg in 1997, with large fish of over 10 kg fetching the best
price.  During the study period, two major price increases were noted, in January and February of
1998.  This was in response to the monetary crisis that pushed up prices of fishing gears.
Prices at the processing factories are substantially lower than in the Ambon market, so this is
not the first choice for small-scale fishers. However, larger commercial boats needing to move
significant tonnage usually have a steady relationship with the processing companies.  In the
study area, there are several major companies, including Latoka Indonesia in Amahai on Seram
Island, P. T. Sumber Aneka Tata Bahari in Tulehu, Ambon Island and two newer factories in
Leahari and in Toisapu, Ambon Island.  In addition, there are ships such as the Mina Raya
that purchase fish and move them directly to markets in western Indonesia.  These companies
handle pelagic fish: skipjack (cakalang), tuna and several smaller species (komu, momar, see
Table 3.1).  They obtain the bulk of their fish from pole and line boats and seiners, for whom
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Whereas pole and line vessels normally take all their catch to the nearest processor, seiners
often hold back a portion for the Ambon market where prices are better.  The highest quality
fish are sold fresh or frozen into export markets, or processed into specialties for the Japanese
market (katsuobushi).  Other grades may be released into regional and national markets, canned,
or turned into fishmeal.  The major export market of the processors is Japan, with some fish
also going to America and Europe.
5.3.3 Role of government in fish market management
Government involvement in the fish market is minimal in terms of providing infrastructure,
imposing fees or influencing prices. Ice, where available, is provided by private enterprise.
The government Fisheries Agency (sub-district level) gathers market stall fees from fish brokers
and retailers in the Ambon area.  However, management of the market flow is in the hands of
the fish brokers.  They set prices and decide where and when fish are to be sold.  The
government has, however, set up a cooperative (KUD Siwalima) for Ambon fishers and this
cooperative receives half of the Ambon market fees collected by the Fisheries Agency.  The
cooperative in turn makes half of this money available to fishers for boat repairs and other
costs.  Large traders are supposed to pay 10% of their profits as market taxes.  Because of
evasive efforts by traders, the taxes actually gathered are in fact much less.
5.3.4 Marketing sasi products
The commercial products managed under the sasi system include pelagic lompa fish (Thryssa
baelama), top shells (Trochus niloticus), sea cucumbers (Holothuria and various other spp.) and
a variety of ornamental fish.  The ornamental fish are collected by specialized fish brokers,
for direct export.  Lompa fish and other pelagic varieties affected by sasi regulations are either
divided among community members for local consumption, as in Haruku, or enter the market
in the same way as other pelagic fish, via fish traders and retailers.
The village of Nolloth in Saparua provides one example of the sales route for top shells in
central Maluku.  After the 1998 harvest conducted by the Nolloth cooperative (KUD), the
shells were sold to CV Naga Sakti Ambon and Toko Rinjani, two shell collectors based in the
city of Ambon.  The price varied from Rp9,000-Rp19,000 per kg in 1998 according to the shell
quality.  It had resale value in the Surabaya market of Rp24,000 per kg. Because top shells are
a protected species and are illegal to harvest, fishers have no direct access to more lucrative
international markets but must sell to the few Chinese-Indonesian traders who have licenses
to purchase “farmed” top shells (also see Zerner and Thorburn, forthcoming).  Chinese-
Indonesian traders also handle the bulk of sea cucumber sales, directing the harvest into
international markets in Southeast Asia.  Price depends on the species and, in 1997, ranged
up to Rp35,000 per kg for dried animals of the species called teripang durian.
5.4 Conclusions
The marine resources of central Maluku are very rich but not unlimited.  After a period of
rapid increase in fishing pressure and catches, even the optimistic government resource
assessments now indicate a need for more cautious management because several key stocks
appear to be over-fished and harvest potential is declining.  Small-scale and artisanal fishers
clearly recognize the trends of falling catches and the decline in marine environmental health.
Nevertheless, economic pressures mean that there is still a strong incentive for the further
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The bulk of the fish are caught by large commercial vessels employing relatively few crew.
The workforce of the central Maluku fishery is numerically dominated by artisanal fisher-
farmers having low technology boats, fishing gears and limited formal education. The fishing
community is changing, as is the demography of Maluku. Younger fishers are increasingly
Muslim and increasingly focused on targeting deep-water pelagic resources. The local
management institution, sasi, has less credence with these younger, commercially oriented
fishers. However, younger fishers especially do tend to see the community as having
responsibility for management whereas the majority of fishers still view management as a
government affair.
Fish harvesters are moving from the artisanal to the small-scale sector, assisted by both
government and private sector development aid.  They are also increasingly employed as
crew on commercial vessels.  Both artisanal fishers and commercial crew earn marginal incomes
and have no control over fish prices in the marketplace.  Fisheries earnings mostly accrue to
the owners of larger boats and gears, to fish brokers and to the factory owners. Profit sharing
systems that are operating provide incentives to fishers to maximize catch, if necessary through
use of destructive gears such as very fine mesh nets.   It is important to keep all these factors
in mind while analyzing the functionality of current fisheries management systems. These
factors must also be recognized when attempting to design a model for future co-management
arrangements.  The willingness and ability of fish harvesters to cooperate in, and comply
with, fisheries management depends largely on the daily realities of survival in the fishery
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Chapter 6
Fisheries Management in Central Maluku
6.1 Jurisdiction
Under national law, the sea and all its resources are the property of the national government of
Indonesia. National fisheries and coastal management consist of rules and regulations administered
by more than 20 largely uncoordinated ministries (Nikijuluw 1996; Soetaryono 1996; Kusuma-
Atmadja and Purwaka 1996). The consequences of poorly organized management structures at
the national level can be seen in terms of confusion, lack of information, and poor motivation at
provincial and regional levels. Efforts to redress the problems include the recent establishment of
a national, multi-ministerial body (DKN) charged with coordinating marine development and
conservation policy.  There have been moves towards decentralization and the national government
is encouraging provinces to back up national law by developing more detailed and locally
appropriate provincial legislation.  Most recently, Act No. 24, 1992, on spatial planning, gives
regional governments the mandate to zone coastal areas and to establish management plans in
consultation with village level governments. Policy makers are currently attempting to clarify
whether the zoning of territory can be extended into the sea, giving the province powers to zone
marine waters for various commercial and conservation purposes. As of 1998, consultation with
the village level on coastal zoning and planning has barely begun.  Also, comprehensive operational
rules at the provincial level are still lacking for most national laws pertinent to coastal management.
The Maluku province has, however, developed some regulations, for instance, those prohibiting
the mining of corals, the cutting of mangroves and the capture of dolphins.
6.2 National Laws Affecting Artisanal and Small-Scale Fisheries
National level laws that, if enforced, would directly affect Maluku’s artisanal fishers stem largely
from Law No. 9, 1985 on Fisheries and the Agriculture Minister Decree No. 607, 1976, concerning
fishing zoning.  Consequent to these laws, the use of gear types destructive to fisheries such as
explosives and poisons, are prohibited.  There is also an inshore fishing zone designated for use
by small-scale and artisanal fishers, and mesh sizes are regulated.  All mesh must be over 25 mm;
seine nets for tuna and skipjack must exceed 60 mm.  Fish habitats including coral reefs, mangroves
and sea grass beds are specifically protected under the Biological Resource Conservation Act No.
5, 1990. Forty-eight marine mammals, birds, crabs, shellfish and coral species have been declared
protected species, including some that are commonly harvested in Maluku, i.e., turtles, dugongs,
coconut crabs, top shells, giant clams and a number of other edible shellfish.  A few marine protected
areas have also been set up, including Pombo Island in the Haruku Strait in the Lease Islands.
6.3 Key Management Issues
In spite of its huge marine territory, Indonesia has no separate Department of Fisheries.  Fisheries
come under the Department of Agriculture. The country is divided into nine fisheries resource
management areas, two of which lie within the Maluku province.  For each area, there is an
annual exercise of setting Total Allowable Catches linked to the standard fisheries management
concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).  Currently, there is a move to attempt to determine
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Officially, the Fisheries Agency is in favor of responsible fisheries but, on the other hand, there
is tremendous pressure to increase fishery-based income and employment as rapidly as possible,
especially through increasing the industrial fleet targeting pelagic fish in the deep-water EEZ
(V. Nikijuluw, pers. comm. 1998).  The 1997 MSY estimate for the nation is 6.1 million tonnes, and
government statistics suggest that catches amount to only 40% of this potential yield.  According
to government statistics, the Maluku province alone should have a standing stock of fish and
shrimp totaling 2.74 million tonnes.  MSY, calculated as 50% of stock, is, therefore, estimated to
be 1.37 million tonnes. The total catch in 1997 was only 24.4% of the theoretical MSY, leading
the national government to promote expansion of the industrial fishery.  However, there are
questions with regard to the government figures (see below and Section 3.4.2).
One major problem with the national expansionist policy and with the process of setting
catch limits is that calculations of potential yield are extrapolations from stock assessments
conducted in the early 1980s.  These old data are augmented with catch statistics that are
limited in their coverage and often of unknown or suspect quality (Proceedings of the National
Conference on the Role of Communities in Coastal Resource Management in Indonesia, 1996).
As of 1998, Maluku still has no coherent, comprehensive and reliable system for collecting
catch data (Purnomo 1996), although LIPI, a national research institution, has plans to develop
and introduce a system at some future time.  It is widely acknowledged that fishing boats
from other provinces and countries frequently fail to land their catches in Maluku, or they
trans-ship at sea.  Thus such catches go unrecorded.  Hence, despite there being in theory a
large available fish biomass, several important commercial stocks are, in fact, already over-
fished and declining in Maluku (Governor Latukonsina, pers. comm. 1998).
A second key issue is the lack of enforcement power to defend Indonesia’s vast EEZ from
illegal fishing by foreign and domestic boats, including live fish traders using potassium
cyanide.  Illegal fishing contributes to the total of unrecorded fish catches (Fox 1996).
The third key issue is one of allocation: the need to balance industrial-scale fisheries serving
export markets with the need for local food security and employment for coastal communities.
In the Agriculture Ministry Decree No. 607, 1976, Indonesian waters were divided into zones
in an attempt to reserve inshore waters for the artisanal and small-scale sectors.  Under this
law, vessels over 5 gross tonnage (GT) are prohibited from fishing within three miles of shore,
vessels over 25 GT must operate over four miles from shore, and vessels over 100 GT must
stay five miles from shore.  Small boats are free to enter the offshore fishing grounds at will.
This is one of the laws that is not effectively enforced, with the result that clashes between the
industrial sector and coastal communities are increasingly common (Galanggajir 1996).  Those
behind the drive for further expansion of industrial fleets fail to acknowledge this problem.
6.4 Agencies Involved in Fisheries Management and Development in Maluku
The planning board, BAPPEDA, is a coordination institution below the national planning
board, BAPPENAS.  BAPPEDA holds a strategic position for coordinating the development
of various sectors in the region, including fisheries, and has offices at both provincial and
district levels.  The provincial office of BAPPEDA is also the governor’s office.  The provincial
governor holds two positions; he is head of the provincial government as well as the provincial
representative of the Minister of Internal Affairs.  BAPPEDA has a close working relationship
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BAPPEDA has to date largely concerned itself with the expansion of fisheries rather than
with management or conservation. This department is also in charge of environmental impact
assessment.  However, assessments that do occur are typically very narrow, not cross-sectoral.
In Maluku, attempts to rationalize the fisheries development policy have led BAPPEDA to develop
the concept called “Gugus Pulau and Laut Pulau”.  Under this scheme, the province is divided up
into eight clusters of islands (the Gugus Pulau), with the Laut Pulau being the areas of open sea
between these clusters.  To date, these divisions are only poorly defined areas on paper, not
operational management units.  One problem facing provincial planners is that administrative
boundaries of districts and sub-districts do not coincide with ecological boundaries.
Among its many tasks, BAPPEDA oversees fisheries development project planning.  However,
much of BAPPEDA’s energy tends to be directed to large development projects such as the
World Bank-funded COREMAP rather than to smaller programs such as fisheries development
and project evaluation.  Once the planning of a fisheries project has been completed by
BAPPEDA, it goes to the Fisheries Agency for implementation.  This agency also considers
economic development as its first priority.  In practice, there is no coordinating body focused
on coastal and marine resource management and protection.
The various agencies and institutions involved in the fishery resource management system in
Maluku can be classified into two major groups and both groups are coordinated through
BAPPEDA (Table 6.1).  Group I is the group of institutions directly involved in fisheries
activities and deals with supplying skilled human resources in the marine and maritime areas;
supplying maritime facilities such as ships, harbors, and other equipment; facilitating training;
and providing necessary funding, according to formal regulations.  Group II is a group of
institutions that deals with marine and fishery problems as a subset of their duties.  In addition
to these is the national research institute, LIPI, which provides information to policy makers.
LIPI has a regional research center in Ambon.
Twenty-six key respondents from various governmental institutions involved directly and
indirectly in the process of fisheries development and management at provincial and lower
levels were interviewed to identify the roles, strengths and weaknesses of each agency.  The
results are presented in Appendix 5. Roles were tabulated under the following management
functions: 1) information gathering and provision, 2) project planning, 3) project
implementation, 4) evaluation of projects (physical and legal aspects), 5) enforcement of
fisheries law, 6) funding of projects, 7) routine fisheries policy implementation, and 8) issuing
permits and licenses and collection of taxes and fees.
Table 6.1. Government bodies involved in fisheries management at the provincial level.
BAPPEDA
Group I Group II
Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan) Dept. of Internal Affairs (Dep. Dalam Negeri)
Dept. of Transport (Dep. Perhubungan & Dept. of Forestry (Dep. Kehutanan & Dirgen PHPA)
Dirgen Perhubungan Laut)
Navy (TNI Angkatan Laut) Environment Bureau (Biro Lingkungan Hidup)
Police (Polisi Republik Indonesia) Law Bureau (Biro Hukum)Fisheries Management in Central Maluku        61
Information gathering and dissemination are performed by all agencies with the exception of
the police.  The planning of fisheries development projects involves BAPPEDA, all levels of
the Fisheries Agency, the Law Bureau, and village government heads. The process is described
below (Section 6.5.1). Depending on the type of project, provincial and district levels of the
Department of Transport and the resource conservation section of the Department of Forestry
may also be involved.  What is interesting is that the Environment Bureau has not identified
this as one of its areas of activity.  In general, the Environment Bureau is a very weak player,
not least because its area of jurisdiction relative to the environment section of BAPPEDA is
unclear.  However, the Environment Bureau does become involved during the implementation
of a project, along with BAPPEDA, the Department of Forestry, the Department of Transport,
the Fisheries Agency, and regional, district, and village government heads.  Most agencies
(except for the Environment Bureau and Law Bureau) have responsibility for evaluating the
physical and legal implications of projects, but evaluation and feedback into new project
planning forms an area of extreme weakness in the system.
Enforcement is formally a shared responsibility of the police, navy and Fisheries Agency.
The Department of Transport plays a role in enforcing licensing regulations, whereas various
government offices may facilitate reporting of offenses or, in the case of village chiefs, apply
sanctions available under the local government or adat law.
Funding for fisheries development comes from BAPPEDA, the Fisheries Agency and
Department of Forestry and may also be supported from local government coffers.  Routine
management tasks are performed by most agencies, with licensing and collection of fees and
taxes being the special purview of the Fisheries Agency and Department of Transport.  Only
the Environment Bureau, Department of Forestry and provincial and district government
offices are not directly involved in day-to-day fisheries management tasks.  There is, therefore,
a clear need for communication and coordination among agencies.
The key findings from the interviews of government staff were as follows:
• There is no special institution to manage coastal and fisheries resources. The
management  aspects are divided among a range of institutions. This causes difficulties
in coordination.
• Authority seems to be an important factor in the management process.  Because of the
“top-down” approach, the determination of limits of authority must precede any
decision and often, nothing will be done without explicit approval from a higher level.
• Limited human resources and poor motivation very much affect all levels of the
management system.
• Staff personnel in every agency and at every level reveal a lack of knowledge of fisheries
law and management principles.
• Limited equipment, facilities and funding hinder management and enforcement functions.
Budgetary problems are most critical at the lower (sub-district) levels, and greatly hinder
both enforcement and the transfer of training and information to the village level.
• Sustainability of resources and habitats is still a low priority compared to the expansion
and development of fisheries.
• Better scientific data and greater cooperation with research institutions and universities
are essential in order to support the management system.
• Technical guidelines from the national level are inadequate.  For example, national
instructions to collect taxes on shellfish are not accompanied by instructions on the
implementation of such a tax.
• Since the village may carry out many fisheries resource management functions, it means
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However, a legal basis for the village role, and in particular for the adat institution, sasi,is
not explicitly provided. Government staff personnel acknowledge the strategic position of
local governments as implementing agents but also tend to see village chiefs as  being  in-
competent in resource management.
• Fisheries management issues are not of central concern to village chiefs, who have
heavy work loads and are mostly concerned with economic development.
• Control by the navy is difficult because its personnel are found only at the provincial
level and tend to focus on international piracy and deep-water fisheries infringements.
• Cooperation between the navy and the police as well as with the army (Babinsa, who
may be present in villages) is not optimal.
• The enforcers (police and navy) are important players.  In many cases, infractions
which were not dealt with properly have caused other problems to arise (for instance,
bad relations with community leaders) which will hamper future management.
6.5 Operationalizing Fisheries Policy
In operationalizing fisheries policies, there are two central activities: 1) the process of
establishing a plan for a development project, and 2) the process of producing a fisheries law.
6.5.1 The process of establishing a development project plan
As stated in the Governmental Decree on coordination of development planning in the regions
(PP No. 6, 1988), BAPPEDA has to integrate all the development planning within a region so as
to minimize environmental impacts and ensure sustainability of resources.  In the planning
process called P5D, BAPPEDA coordinates the macro planning, whereas technical institutions
establish the micro plans. A proposed project that may bring disadvantage to a community and
offers no appropriate compensation can be rejected by the provincial or district government.
The establishment of the Regional Development Management and Planning Orientation (P5D)
starts with the collection of ideas from village governments and proceeds as follows:
1. Village level.  Through the Village Development Deliberation (Musbangdes), various
village stakeholders have the chance to suggest their ideas, which may include those
for the development of fisheries.
2. Sub-district level.  Ideas from the village are introduced to the Permanent Work Region
Unit (UDKP).  This forum begins selecting ideas for project development.
3. District level. At a Development Coordination Meeting (Rakorbang I), representatives
from relevant sectoral institutions (such as the Fisheries Agency) contribute their
planning suggestions, including suggestions on coastal development.
4. Provincial level. At the Development Coordination Meeting (Rakorbang II), proposals
from all the districts and from the province are reviewed to made sure that provincial
and district level projects can support one another.
5. The final work programs are reviewed by the Regional House of Representatives
(DPRD) and, if approved, will then be announced as development projects.
Because it starts at the village level, this looks like a “bottom-up approach”.  In reality, what
is finally approved after the lengthy rounds of selection and project development may be far
from the original ideas proposed or ideas from a village may be dropped entirely.  Another
problem is that only formal government structures are involved. At the Musbangdes level,
input from local stakeholders is coordinated by the LKMD assisted by a representative from
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the official governmental structure.  Kewang members may be invited by the village government
to discuss and participate in the planning process as individuals.  However, they cannot
formally represent their position as an institution, even though the kewang specifically deals
with the village resources.
6.5.2 The process of producing a fisheries law
The process starts with an academic draft put forward by the appropriate technical institution,
which in this case is the Fisheries Agency (at the provincial or district level). In establishing
the draft, the Fisheries Agency will consult other government institutions as required.  Again,
because the traditional law enforcers in the kewang institution have no standing in the
government, there is no place here for the kewang to initiate the process or draft its ideas.
Once the academic draft is completed, the Fisheries Agency will send it as a proposal to the
Governor, routed through the Head of the Law Bureau  (Department Dalam Negeri) for legal
examination.  In the process of reviewing the proposal, the Law Bureau considers higher-
level regulations related to the proposal, reviews the advantages and disadvantages, and
then invites the Fisheries Agency to cooperatively present the proposal.  In the next stage, the
Law Bureau would ask the Regional Regulations Pre-planning Reviewing Team1 (Tim
Pembahasan Pra Rancangan Perda) for a meeting and discuss the proposal.
After going through several rounds of examination, the team will decree the proposal as a Regional
Regulation Plan (Rancangan Perda), which is then sent to the regional House of Representatives
(DPRD) for approval.  The proposal is sent to the DPRD with a Letter of Introduction from the
Governor. The DPRD will then form a Special Committee (Pansus) to process the Rancangan Perda
further and at the end, it becomes a decreed Regional Regulation (Perda) 2.
6.6 Licensing
Fishing licenses allow access to particular fishing grounds.  Foreign and domestic industrial
vessels over 30 GT which are deployed in eastern Indonesia, obtain fishing licenses directly
from the national government in Jakarta.  Vessels of 10-30 GT are licensed by the Fisheries
Agency at the provincial level whereas smaller boats (under 10 GT) are dealt with at the district
level. Artisanal fishers require no license to fish with hand lines, spears, traps or simple nets.
Commercial operators must obtain permits from the Department of Transport, which regulates
the placement of floating lift nets (bagans) and fish aggregating devices (rumpons) and issues
permits for boats to operate from particular harbors. Interviews with staff in the Department
of Transport revealed that, in general, they simply stamp forms and collect fees.  There is
little attempt to consciously manage or control where and how commercial boats operate.
1 The Team is led by the Regional Secretary (Sekwilda) and consist of the following members: Sekwilda assistants,
BAPPEDA, the Social Politic Directorate, Finance Bureau, Economy Bureau, Environment Bureau, Government
Bureau, Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan) and other related institutions as required.
2 If the Fisheries Agency is in urgent need of a Law, they can ask the Governor (for Level I purposes) or the
District Head/Bupati (for Level II purposes) to issue a decree/statement that can be used as a law in principal
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The Decree of the Agriculture Minister No. 51, 1997 defines responsibilities for permitting
the deployment of fish aggregating devices (referring to both rumpons and lift nets). FADs
within three nautical miles from the shore are regulated by the district government.  Devices
between three and 12 miles offshore are regulated by the province and deep water FADs by
the national Directorate of Fisheries.
6.7 Enforcement
Because of the immensity of the coastline, the national laws as well as provincial regulations are
often effectively unenforceable.  Lack of enforcement is a major problem in Maluku with its multitude
of small islands. Fish and turtle traders exploiting endangered species or using prohibited gear
types bribe enforcement officials or operate in places where the patrol boats never go.
Enforcement is officially in the hands of the navy, which operate at a provincial level, and the
police, who have a “water police” section to deal with fisheries offences.  However, the
boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibility are not clear to the staff in district offices, and
the level of awareness and concern of police to fisheries issues are minimal.  Infrastructure
and funding are extremely limited and any action taken is reactive, not proactive.  In theory,
the police can rely on the navy for assistance with infrastructure (e.g., speedboats) but in
practice, our interviewers were told that the agencies do not work together.
6.8 Communication and Collaboration Between Village and Higher Levels of
Management
Although there appears to be, at least in a de facto sense, a degree of co-management of marine
resources, in reality the government departments and village level institutions (village
government, sasi authorities) operate in isolation one from the another.  Information may, in
some cases, trickle down from the national level to the village but there is no mechanism for
feedback from the village to the national level.  National prohibitions against blast fishing
and the use of poisons are reasonably well known at the village level but other regulations,
including the identity of endangered and prohibited species and the boundaries of marine
parks and protected areas, are virtually unheard of.
Relationships among village, district and provincial levels are also not close when it comes to fisheries
issues.  The Fisheries Agency has extension staff (three on Haruku, two on Saparua, and one on
Nusa Laut) whose job it is to convey information to the village level.  However, they usually act in
response to a request rather than proactively.  They do assist commercial operators to renew their
licenses but, in our interviews with artisanal fishers, we found that they are virtually invisible to this
sector. There has been an attempt by extension staff to influence fishers to stop using destructive
fishing gears but in their own estimation, this program has failed to make any difference.  Instead,
they feel that providing gears and motors to groups of fishermen and promoting aquaculture are the
ways to effect change. Their ability to deliver such assistance is, however, very limited.  This extension
service is short of funds and finds it difficult even to cover transportation costs for field visits.
According to our respondents, village governments and, in particular, the village heads (kepala
desas) have, in theory, a legal role in most management functions (Appendix 5).  In many
cases, however, they lack the means, time and motivation to attempt management at the local
level.  In a political climate of “top-down” decision-making, many local leaders are also
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opinion of Fisheries Agency staff interviewed, the competence of the average village head in
terms of education level and experience is very limited. No doubt, the apparent degree of
condescension and lack of appreciation for local knowledge hinder any move towards power
sharing and decentralization of decision-making.
Fisheries Agency personnel interviewed have positive opinions regarding sasi as an institution
and would like to see some move towards formalizing the rights and responsibilities of local
management bodies through the development of a provincial law (Perda).  They also attested
that in their dealings with commercial operators, they insist that these fishers respect local
sasi rules and pay whatever access fees are imposed by local governments.
The importance of communities in resource management was acknowledged by the national
government in 1982 and 1984, when environmental awards were presented to the villages of Ihamahu
and Haruku in recognition of their local sasi institutions.  However, this was not followed up by
concrete action to formalize a role for community traditional institutions in resource management.
6.9 Conclusions
Indonesian fisheries management is complex, multi-agency, and “top-down” and, at the same
time, is faced with the huge task of controlling a vast marine area and multitudes of islands
and offshore reefs.  Ultimate power is retained at the national level and provincial and lower
levels have insufficient power to control regional marine resource exploitation and conserve
resources.  At the same time, as fisheries exploitation and marketing systems encourage over-
fishing and use of destructive gears, the enforcement of national fisheries regulations is lax
and there are serious deficiencies in government management agencies in terms of motivation,
coordination, knowledge, infrastructure, and funding support.  There is no one provincial
body specifically focused on marine resource management and conservation which has power
to coordinate the many agencies bearing management responsibility.  BAPPEDA, which could
play this role, has many other sectoral responsibilities, is focused on development rather than
management and conservation, is weak in areas of evaluation and inter-sectoral coordination,
and has no presence below the district level.  Also, the limits of power and jurisdiction among
the other agencies are often unclear.
From evidence of over-fishing of several key stocks and drastically declining artisanal catches
(see Chapters 5 and 8), it is clear that the current management system needs to be overhauled
to avert the collapse of Maluku’s potentially rich fisheries.
Government staff generally agree that the role of the local community is essential to fisheries
management because the local leaders hold a very strategic position close to the resource and
fishers. Even though informally supported in some ways by the police and the Fisheries
Agency, sasi and therewith the kewang are effectively isolated from regional and provincial
management structures because of the general lack of effective communication and
coordination. Also, local village institutions, while generally well respected, have no legal
standing and are in a weak position in the process of planning for fisheries development as
well as in the process of developing fisheries policy and regulations.66        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Section C – Research Results
Chapter 7
Results of the Inventory of Sasi
7.1 Presence of Sasi in Central Maluku
This chapter shows the occurrence and activity of the sasi institution in the villages of central
Maluku. Sasi institutions can be classified in two ways (see Table 7.3): where the rules are applied
(on the village, on the land, in a river or at sea), and who is responsible for governing sasi.  Rules
may apply to activities and resources within a village (village sasi), to land crops (land sasi), and
to resources in a river or the sea (marine sasi) (Imron 1995). The governing authorities may be adat
leaders (adat sasi), the church (church sasi) or other secular agents (we call this “other” sasi as it
has no special Indonesian name). In this chapter, the general occurrence of sasi will be reported,
followed by the breakdown of occurrence by each category. Finally, the levels of the activity of
sasi, the types of resources to which it is applied, and how it is enforced, are described.
7.1.1 Overall occurrence
Out of 63 central Maluku villages surveyed, 47 (75%) had some form of sasi institution (Table 7.3).
Sasi occurred on all islands, in all village size classes and in both Muslim and Christian villages
(Table 7.1).  Comparing the distribution of the sasi and non-sasi villages (Table 7.1 and 7.2), we see
that only on the island of Haruku do all villages have some form of sasi.  On an average, non-sasi
villages are larger than sasi villages but when each island is considered by itself, this trend holds
true only for Ambon and Nusa Laut.  When villages were grouped by religion, island and population
size class, no factor had a statistically significant impact on the distribution of the sasi institution in
general (Table 7.4), although there are significant relationships with specific types of sasi.
Table 7.2.  Demography of non-sasi villages. Class 1=population£1,000; Class 2= 1,001-2,000; Class 3=2,001-
3,000; Class 4=>3,000.
Island Total # Muslim Christian Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Avg. pop’n
Saparua 6 2 4 2 3 0 1 1,582
Nusalaut 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1,725
Seram 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2,149
Ambon 8 3 5 0 2 0 6 4,528
Haruku 00 0 0 0 0 0 -
Total 16 6 10 2 6 1 7 3,100
Table 7.1. Demographic breakdown of villages having any form of sasi, including four having only
village sasi.  Class 1=population£1,000; Class 2=1,001-2,000; Class 3=2,001-3,000; Class 4=>3,000.
Island Total # Muslim Christian Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Avg. pop’n
Saparua 10 1 9 0 4 4 2 2,437
Nusalaut 6 0 6 5 1 0 0 720
Seram 6 0 6 0 2 3 1 2,241
Ambon 14 9 5 4 0 4 6 2,967
Haruku 11 4 7 1 4 5 1 2,252
Total 47 14 33 10 11 16 10 2,246Result of The Inventory of Sasi        67
Village, land and marine sasi occurred in every possible combination.  In 11 villages, sasi
covered all three areas i.e., the village, land crops and marine resources.  In 16 cases, sasi rules
were operating in two of the three locations.  Marine sasi occurred by itself in one village,
whereas land sasi occurred by itself in 15 villages.  In four Ambonese Muslim villages, there
was only village sasi. Village sasi involves rules that mostly regulate social conduct and are
applied within the village.  It is significantly more common in Muslim villages and on the
island of Haruku (Table 7.4), but is absent from Nusa Laut Island.  We will not discuss this
form of sasi in any detail.  Rather, we will focus on the 43 villages where the institution included
rules related to land and/or marine resources.
7.1.2 Distribution of sasi on land crops and marine resources
Sasi applied to land crops occurred in 41 villages (Table 7.4).  Occurrence varied with religion
and island, being most common in Christian villages and on Haruku and Nusa Laut.
Only 17 villages had marine sasi.  In two other villages, one or more fishermen claimed that
there was sasi on certain species, but this was not confirmed by village leaders.  The institution
occurred equally in Muslim and Christian communities but its distribution varied significantly
with population, being most common in Class 3 villages (2,001-3,000 persons) and absent
from Class 1 (1,000) (Figure 7.1).  The occurrence of marine sasi also varied significantly from
island to island, being most common on Seram and Saparua (over 50% of villages sampled on
each of these islands had marine sasi) and least common on Ambon (9%). The small sample
on Seram is not necessarily representative of the whole island.  The sample on Ambon is
certainly an over-estimate, as the sample excluded suburban and urban satellite villages.  On
Nusa Laut, there was no marine sasi at all, but until recently, the villagers there still maintained
a practice of communal fish harvesting called sousoki.
Figure 7.1. Distribution of marine sasi in villages of various
sizes.  Class 1= population ≤1,000; Class 2= 1,001-2,000;
Class 3= 2,001-3,000; Class 4= >3,000.
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T
able 7.3.   Inventory of 63 central Maluku villages, 1997.  Presence of sasi is indicated by +.  Each institution is categoriz
ed by the area where rules
are applied and the type of governing authority
. Sasi area: V=village, L=land, S=sea, R=river
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pe of sasi: A=adat, C=church, O=others.  Sasi score
indicates the activity of the institution as measured by the indicators in T
ables 2.3 (land) and 2.4 (marine).  Where information on what species were
managed was unclear or contradictory
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In 18 cases, villagers indicated that marine sasi used to be practiced but had died out in living
memory.  Therefore, historically, over half of the villages in the study area practiced some form
of marine management. Marine sasi was historically most common on Saparua and Nusa Laut.
7.2 Function and Scope of Sasi in Resource Management
7.2.1 Land sasi
In this study, we focused on sasi applied to marine resources.  However, as will be seen,
marine sasi is intimately related to, and influenced by, land sasi.  Sasi as applied to land crops
is generally in the form of a harvest prohibition on fruits that are unripe. For instance, sasi
applied to coconuts usually involves closed seasons lasting three to four months.  When sasi
is declared open, often for just a few days at a time, harvests can proceed.  Sasi is most
frequently applied to just one or two crops (Table 7.5), especially in smaller villages that have
only church sasi.  Coconuts are the most common crop regulated, followed by nutmegs.  In
some places, there may be day-to-day rules concerning the cutting of trees and firewood,
gathering thatch for roofing, and entering forest garden areas on Sundays.  There is often a
village kewang to keep an eye on the crops under sasi and protect them from theft, but this
depends on the type of sasi institution that is practiced (adat or church) and its level of activity.
The division of the harvest is also governed by sasi.  How this is done depends on the type of
sasi implemented.  In some cases, individuals have sasi placed on their own crop (e.g., the
village of Kariu).  When it is harvested, they donate a portion to the church (often 10%), and
sometimes they also donate to the kewang and/or village government.  More usually, sasi is
applied generally to village lands so that all people harvest at the same time (e.g., Nolloth) or
groups harvest in rotation (e.g., Tengah-Tengah).  In some villages, this communal harvest is
placed under the control of a tuan sasi who, after paying a fee to the village government, then
organizes the harvest and sale of the crop and takes a proportion of the sales value (e.g.,
Pelauw, Kailolo).  This is called sasi lelang.  Lelang means auction, and the harvest rights are
Table 7.4.  Presence of sasi in the survey area, and factors significantly affecting the pattern of occurrence.
Where differences among factor categories (two religions: Muslim and Christian, four population size
classes, five islands) are significant according to chi square tests, probabilities are indicated as follows:
*=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.  ns=no significant difference in the occurrence of sasi among the
categories within each factor.
Type of sasi Total # Factor(s) affecting pattern of Notes
present  (%) occurrence (chi sq test)
Religion Population Island
(M or C) size class (1-5)
(1-4)
Any form 47 ns ns ns
of sasi (75%)
Village sasi 27 * ns * Village sasi is more common in
(43%) Muslim villages and on Haruku;
there is none on Nusa Laut.
Land sasi 41 ** ns * Land sasi is more common
 (65%) in Christian villages and on Haruku
and Nusa Laut, least on Ambon.
Marine sasi 17 ns ** * Mostly in Class 3 villages and
(27%) on Saparua and Seram.
Least in Class 1 villages and
on Nusa Laut and Ambon.72        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
auctioned to the tuan sasi.  In some villages, a similar system has developed for harvest of
selected marine resources, either within or outside of the sasi institution.
7.2.2 Marine sasi
What villagers call marine sasi covers a number of different types of marine management
arrangements.  A full listing of rules documented can be seen in Appendix 7.  The sasi rules
may or may not be written down and the kewang, usually responsible for monitoring and
enforcement, may be active or dormant.  There are always rules restricting access to the village
territory.  There may or may not be closed seasons or closed areas; however, 15 out of 17 cases
had a defined area that in theory could be closed to harvesting (Table 7.6).  Almost all village
institutions had bans on destructive gear types.  In most cases, this supported the national
ban on blast fishing and use of poisons.  In several cases, other gears (lift nets, fine mesh nets,
certain fish traps destructive to corals) were also regulated.  In none of the above cases of
community-controlled fishing areas was there any limit on total catch.  Instead, sasi rules
controlled harvest intensity by regulating the number of persons having access to the village
territory and sasi area, the length of the harvest period, the size of individual fish or shellfish
that could be caught, and the gear type.
Different species are regulated in different villages.  In many cases, sasi applies to only one or
two species (Table 7.7).  The most common species managed under sasi are top shells (Trochus
niloticus), sea cucumbers and small pelagic fish (Table 7.8).  On an average, a sasi village had
rules affecting four different groups of marine organisms (i.e., corals, mangroves, pelagic
fish, ornamental fish, reef (food) fish, holothurians or shellfish).  Over half of the sasi villages
sold or auctioned harvesting rights for one or more species.
When there is an access restriction, and the time comes when sasi is declared open, the resources
may be harvested in a number of ways.  The resource may be harvested by individual fishers
Table 7.5. Number of land crops under sasi in each village where there is land sasi.
Number of crops % of land sasi villages Notes
1 46% With two exceptions, size Class 1
villages have sasi only on coconuts.
2 27%
3 or more 27%
Table 7.6. Attributes of marine sasi in central Maluku.
Attribute/activity Number and % of marine
sasi villages  (total n=17)
Restricted access to specific sasi area 15
88%
Fishing gear ban 16
94%
Local fisheries rules other than ban on explosives and poisons 17
100%
Average number of marine species groups under management 4.3
(by periodic harvest restriction or other rule) 35%
Sale or auction of resource harvesting rights 9
53%Result of The Inventory of Sasi        73
living in the community (e.g., Ihamahu), or by the whole community in a single communal harvest
(e.g., Haruku), or by individuals from within or outside the community who have paid for the
privilege of access and withdrawal (e.g., Nolloth, Itawaka, Kabau, Pelauw).  In Seram (Rohua,
Amahai), we found villages that had a nominal form of marine sasi under which the closed season
or area applied only to outsiders, while local residents had unlimited access to the resources.
7.2.3 Village leaders’ opinions on sasi as a resource management institution
People interviewed for the inventory – predominantly male authority figures (see Table 2.2) –
were unfailingly positive about sasi, even if it was no longer functional in their village.  Some
volunteered their opinion on the usefulness of the institution.  Typical comments were:
“It is good if sasi continues because there are benefits for the people and the village;
however the management must be good”. (Morela village)
“The benefit is that harvests are more abundant and this improves the village economy.
Without sasi, coconuts are harvested and sold before they are ripe by people wanting
to process the copra.  Then it is hard to find dry coconuts in the village to eat”. (Rutah
village)
“Sasi is good.  The coconuts get a chance to ripen.  Little fishes are not harvested and
they are used better”. (Hitu Lama village)
“Sasi has three advantages: income for the village, a better quality of life and control
of theft”. (Mamala village)
Less typically, people mentioned ethics and environmental values:
“Sasi is good and needs to be preserved because it has high ideals for protecting the
environment”. (Waitomu village)
“Sasi has to be preserved because it is a positive force.  The population is rising and
 people want to take everything.  This will ruin the resources”. (Amahai village)
Table 7.8.  Most common marine resources protected or managed  (i.e., sasi rule or closed season) through
marine sasi.
Number of the 17 Majority type of village
villages that have (religion, location and size)
marine sasi
Sea cucumbers 14 10 Christian, 8 on Saparua and 9 in size Class 3.
Never in size Class 1.
Top shells 11 9 Christian, 7 on Saparua, 6 in size Class 3 villages.
Pelagic or 12 9 Christian, mostly on Seram and Haruku, 7 in size Class3.
ornamental fish
Corals 5 All Christian, on Seram, Haruku and Saparua.
Mangroves 4 All Christian, on Seram, Haruku and Saparua.
Table 7.7. Number of marine species groups directly affected by marine sasi  rules and/or closures.
Species groups include shellfish, holothurians, pelagic fish, reef fish (for food), ornamental fish,
mangroves and corals.
Number of species groups Number of marine sasi villages
1-2 9 (53%)
3-4 4 (23.5%)
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7.3 The Governing Authorities: Adat, Church and Local Government
In each village, the sasi rules and structure of the institution vary (see Appendix 6 for
translations of some sets of sasi rules).  Sasi can be characterized as fundamentally adat, church
or “others”.  In the past, the distinction of church from adat sasi referred to the dominant
governing authority in the local institution but in modern times, the partnership of the local
government with these authorities is implicit.  In many cases, it is in fact the unnamed partner
– the local village head (kepala desa) – who is the ultimate decision-maker.
In cases where respect for adat is very strong, adat leaders play a prominent role in developing
and enforcing sasi rules (sasi adat).  In church sasi, it is the church that plays the most visible
role.  Church and adat sasi occurred together in 10 villages (Table 7.3).  We have also heard of
a Muslim village in Seram where adat sasi is presided over by the Christian minister from a
neighboring village (L. Wenno pers. comm. 1998).  In general, a movement of authority from
adat to church leaders and to newly defined (since 1979) village governments characterizes
the recent history of the sasi institution in central Maluku.  In one case (Itawaka), this has led
to the formal inclusion of the kewang in the LMD, through a village law passed in 1995.
In six Muslim villages, people did not describe their sasi institution as adat sasi.  These are
tabulated under the name “others”.  The role played by adat leaders, if any, is not clear.  In
these villages, where sasi is applied to marine resources, it is a commercial agreement between
the local government and a harvester who pays a fee for harvesting rights (sasi lelang).  The
owner of the harvest rights (tuan sasi) and his assistants (called the kewang) adopt adat titles
but have no hereditary adat position.  Enforcement involves monetary sanctions (Table 7.11).
The local religious leader is not involved either as a decision-maker or enforcer.
The type of sasi does not vary significantly with island or village size class (chi square test,
p>0.05) but, of course, is correlated with religion, as both church and “other” sasi are specific
to one religious group.
Church, adat and the “other” type of sasi may each apply to land or sea.  Sasi on land crops is
most commonly in the form of church sasi (Table 7.9).  Marine sasi is most often adat sasi.
However, marine sasi frequently occurs in villages that have both adat and church sasi and
there are four marine sasi villages that have only church sasi.
Table 7.9  Combinations of types of sasi that occur in the study area.




Adat and church 10 7
24% 41%
Church only 22 4
54% 23%
Others (Muslim type) 53
12% 18%Result of The Inventory of Sasi        75
7.4 Written Rules, Sanctions and Ceremonies
The sasi institution can be seen as what North (1990 cited in Berkes et al. 1998) calls “humanly
devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints
(rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions and self-
imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.” The rules and regulations
operate on three levels (Ostrom 1990). The operational rules govern and regulate the resource
and affect the day-to-day decisions made by the fishers. Operational rules concern boundaries,
allocation decisions, the scope of fishing etc. The collective-choice rules are the institutional
arrangements to adjudicate conflicts, enforce decisions, formulate and change operational rules
etc. Essentially these rules define how the fishery should be managed. Finally, constitutional-
choice rules affect the rules on the lower level by determining who is eligible to participate in the
system and by establishing the process to design the rules. Constitutional-choice rules define
the sea as belonging to the state and thus place the fishery under the national law. In Maluku,
however, constitutional rules also connote to adat, i.e., the traditional village structure including
a belief system and practices.  It is adat that defines the resource management system.
7.4.1 Sasi rules and regulations
Written rules are found in all types of sasi villages regardless of population size, island or
religion (Table 7.10).  However, the distribution of rules does vary significantly (chi square
test, p=0.04) with the type of sasi (Table 7.11).  Written rules are most commonly found where
adat and church sasi co-exist and in Muslim villages with “other” sasi, and are least prevalent
in villages having only church sasi.  Written rules, the application of sanctions and performance
of ceremonies tend to go together (i.e., all correlation coefficients are highly significant).
People who break sasi rules are punished, but the punishment may be divine, psychological,
physical or financial.  Physical punishment and financial fines are used most often in Muslim
villages, in size Class 3 communities (population 2,001-3,000) and on the islands of Haruku
and Seram (Table 7.10).  Physical sanctions include labor such as moving rocks and sand and
cleaning streets.  Offenders may be detected by kewang members or reported by ordinary
villagers.  Sanctions are imposed by kewang or the village head man unless the crime is such
that the offender can be turned over to the police.
Table 7.10.  Occurrence of various attributes in 43 sasi villages, and relationship to village religion
(Muslim or Christian), population size class (n=4) and island (n=5).  Where occurrence of an attribute is
shown by a chi square test to vary significantly among categories of a factor, the probability is indicated
(**=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001); ns=no significant difference among categories.
Attribute of Number (%) Factor  Notes
institution of sasi villages
(total n=43) Religion Population Island
size class
Written 18
sasi rules (42%) ns ns ns
Monetary or 20 More common in Muslim
physical (47%) *** *** ** villages and size Class 3;
sanctions never in size Class 1.
Most common on Haruku
and Seram, never on Nusa Laut.
Ceremony 15
performed (35%) ns ns ns76        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The use of sanctions varies with the type of sasi (Table 7.11).  Where a village has church sasi
only and no adat sasi, physical or financial sanctions are rare (9% of cases).  This is the typical
scenario in small (size Class 1) villages. In church sasi, participants make a common commitment
through prayer to obey the sasi rules; it is God who punishes offenders.  If there is a kewang, the
members often support the system by patrolling areas under sasi and may or may not impose
fines or other punishments.  Where adat is still strong, or where the village government controls
sasi, the role of the church is to provide support through prayers at sasi ceremonies.
Traditionally, the opening and closing of harvest times and places under sasi are accompanied
by adat ceremonies.  In modern times, the ceremony may be restricted to a prayer. More
elaborate adat ceremonies still take place in villages such as Haruku and Nolloth but fewer
than 100 people attend in the majority (75%) of cases.  Roughly a third of sasi villages carry
out ceremonies regardless of their size, island or religion (Table 7.10).  Ceremonies are most
common in villages having both adat sasi and church sasi but uncommon where church sasi
is alone (Table 7.11).
7.4.2 Occurrence of marine management rules in sasi and non-sasi villages
During the inventory, both sasi and non-sasi rules pertaining to the fishery were catalogued.
Fisheries rules do occur outside of the sasi institution, both in sasi and non-sasi villages
(Appendix 7).  Where gear restrictions, access restrictions, and sale of harvest or access rights
occur outside of the sasi institution, the rules are developed and enforced by the village
government.
The national ban on blast fishing and use of poisons is supported either formally (i.e., written
as a legal village or sasi regulation) or informally (by verbal decree of the village leader), in a
majority of villages (Table 7.12).  Support for this rule in sasi villages is particularly strong.
Regardless of the type of rule considered, the occurrence is highest in marine sasi villages and
is also relatively high in villages that have sasi only on land or in the village. Even villages
which have lost marine sasi have, on an average, a much higher prevalence of fisheries rules
and hence, a significantly higher compound management score when compared with non-
sasi villages (see Section 2.2.3 for method of determining management score).
Overall, the average marine management score for central Maluku is low because some villages
have few or no rules affecting the fishery.  Also, because sasi is applied to relatively small
areas and few species, there is no comprehensive area or species management in place
anywhere.
Table  7.11. Occurrence of ceremonies, written rules, and sanctions in different forms of sasi.
Number and % of each type of sasi
institution having attribute
Attribute Church sasi Church and Adat sasi “Other” sasi Overall
alone (n=22)  adat sasi (n=10)  alone (n=5) (n=6) (n=43)
Written rules 5 (23%) 7 (70%) 2 (40%) 4 (67%) 18 (42%)
Physical or 2 (9.5%) 7 (70%) 5 (100%) 6 (100%) 20 (47%)
monetary sanctions
Special ceremonies 2 (9.5%) 7 (70%) 1 (20%) 3 (50%) 13 (30%)Result of The Inventory of Sasi        77
In sasi villages, the distinction between sasi rules and other formal and non-formal fisheries
rules is often blurred.  In Haruku, for instance, the kewang actively enforces the national
ban on blast fishing and this is accepted as part of sasi.  Bans on the use of poisons, which
also reinforce a national ban, may actually have a history that predates the national
prohibition, as this ban occurs among written sasi rules (see Appendix 6).  Formal village
rules may also be called sasi rules even if, in the strict sense, they are not.  In Paperu, for
instance, new formal village rules set in place by the LKMD are referred to as sasi but there
is no enforcement by a traditional kewang.  The term marine sasi is increasingly used in
common parlance to include any marine management effort, regardless of the level of
involvement of adat authorities.
It is interesting to note that although the auction of marine resource harvest rights occurs outside
of marine sasi, it only occurs in three villages that used to have marine sasi in the past and still
maintain some sort of sasi institution (Appendix 7).  Situations where fees are collected in
exchange for access rights also occur in non-sasi villages.  Harvest and access rights that are
sold, rented out or auctioned cover the same species that are typically under sasi, i.e., inshore
pelagic fish (e.g., Tengah-Tengah, Abubu, Tuhaha, Tial, Wakal, Akoon), sea cucumbers (e.g.,
Tial), top shells  (e.g., Nolloth outside of sasi area), and ornamental fish (e.g., Hulaliu, Tial).
7.5 Discussion
7.5.1 Defining sasi
Comparing our inventory results with information collected by Evans et al. (1997) one notes
differences.  This illustrates the difficulty of making an inventory of an institution that is in
continuous change and may be defined differently according to one’s perspective (village
history, social class etc.), and details which are often only partly known by any given informant.
People may claim to still have sasi even though it has not been physically practiced in years.
Information gained from villagers is often fragmentary or even contradictory, and must be
cross-checked. Evans et al. (1997) recorded the village of Seith in Ambon as having no land
Table 7.12.  Fisheries rules and marine management scores (see Table 2.5) in central Maluku: differences
between villages according to the presence, absence or history of having sasi.  Where an attribute is
marked with asterisks, this indicates that the difference between sasi and non-sasi groups is statistically
significant (p<0.001); ns=not significant.
Attribute/activity Marine Lost Any sasi No sasi All villages
(sig. diff. between sasi sasi* marine  (land, sea n=17 n=63
and non-sasi villages) n=17 sasi  or village)
n= 20 n=46
Local  fisheries rules other 17 8 33 3 36
than ban on bombs and 100% 40% 72% 18% 59%
poisons***
Avg. # species affected by 4.3 1.4 2.6 0.9 2.1
local rules (sasi, lelang
or other rule) ***
Non-sasi auction of 0 3 3 0 3
harvesting rights *** 0% 15% 7% 0% 5%
Non-sasi fees for resource 4 8 13 3 16
access rights (ns) 24% 40% 28% 18% 25%
Gear ban (ns) 16 13 37 11 48
94% 72% 83% 65% 77%
Management score (+ SE) *** 7.35±0.30 3.05±0.55 4.95±0.45 1.83±0.41 3.97±0.3878        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
sasi, whereas our respondents were able to provide a detailed account of where and how land
sasi is practiced in the village territory.  On the other hand, Evans et al. record sasi as occurring
in Hila, whereas we note its absence.  It seems that sasi in Hila has been slowly dying and has
been practiced to some extent into the 1990s.  Whether at this point you proclaim it dead or
alive is a matter of opinion.  Our results should be seen not as an attempt to provide some
definitive single answer to the question of what is sasi. That is clearly impossible.  Rather, our
results are a snapshot of village-level perceptions in 1997.
Some will want to disagree with the fact that we have included among “sasi” villages a few
where there is no access restriction applied to local residents.  Our approach has been to
honor our respondents’ concepts of sasi, not impose any academic definition.  If villagers in
Rohua, Amahai and other parts of Seram say they have sasi, we have recorded the presence of
sasi, even though their system does not conform with sasi as practiced in traditional villages
of the Lease Islands.  In the same vein, we record sasi lelang in Muslim villages such as Kabauw
and Pelauw as sasi, even though the connection with adat tradition has become tenuous.
7.5.2 Variability and core concepts
The inventory shows that occurrence and attributes of the sasi institution and marine sasi, in
particular, vary with village religion, population size and island, and also according to whether
it is adat, church or “others”.  Marine sasi is most common in villages of 2,000-3,000 people
and is most usually administered by adat or local government leaders, with the church playing
only a supporting role.
Despite the welter of variation in the institution as operationalized in villages of central
Maluku, sasi evokes a consistently positive response from village authorities, who regard it
as good and useful even if in their own village, sasi is lost or non-functional.  The value of sasi
is seen to lie in prevention of theft, optimization of village incomes, rational resource use
and, in some cases, resource conservation.
The inventory reveals that in any one village, the sasi institution of today is never a
comprehensive management system.  Its scope and area of application are very limited.
Considering the sum of its many variants, however, we can also say that sasi does involve
many concepts, attributes and structures that are important in any marine resource
management and conservation regime.  These include:
1. The concept of open and closed areas/open and closed seasons.
2. The concept of community tenure rights over a marine area.
3. The concept of limiting access to resources.
4. Controlled harvest and distribution of benefits.
5. Locally developed and agreed upon regulations. These may be specific to the village,
(limitation of gear types, size of fish or shellfish harvestable) or may reinforce national
laws (prohibition of blast fishing, use of poisons).
6. Local wardens or enforcers (the kewang) who have defined rules of process as well as
prescribed sanctions to impose.
7. A responsibility shared by all residents to report violations of sasi rules.
8. Methods operating to advise all residents at regular intervals of the substance of sasi
rules.
9. An overall goal of improving or maintaining community welfare which, being rooted
in adat or the concept of the unity of man with nature, is consistent with modern
concepts of sustainable use.
10. A hierarchical institutional structure wherein various tasks are divided among clearlyResult of The Inventory of Sasi        79
defined bodies (i.e., village government, kewang, church).
11. Low or no financial cost to the formal government i.e., kewang members and church
leaders involved are not paid wages, although they may receive a share of harvests.
Local government  offices may also receive income from the sale of harvesting rights
for communal resources.
12. Resilience and the ability to evolve.
7.5.3 Island synopses
Haruku Island has the largest proportion of existing adat sasi and is also unique in that every
village has some form of sasi and most have village sasi.  Of all the islands, Haruku has the
lowest incidence of gear restrictions and local fisheries rules, and the highest incidence of
marine resource rental or auction.
Saparua, a predominantly Christian island, is exceptional in that over half of all villages have
marine sasi, and a further four villages have lost this form of sasi in living memory.
Nusa Laut is entirely Christian, and the villages are uniformly small.  Church sasi prevails.
Adat sasi persists in only one village and marine sasi and village sasi have died out entirely.
None of the villages has written sasi rules.  In the past, however, most of these villages practiced
some form of marine sasi and/or sousoki (communal fishing).
The villages at Ambon Island had the least sasi. On this island, the coastal villages are mostly
large (>3,000 people) and over half are Muslim.  Because we did not include urban satellite
villages in the inventory, the actual occurrence of sasi on the island is even less than indicated
from our survey results.
Two-thirds of the sasi villages investigated on Seram have written rules and half perform adat
ceremonies.  Marine sasi as practiced in Seram is distinctive in that it may involve only fisheries
rules.  Area restrictions, where they exist, may not apply to local residents.  Because the number
of villages studied in Seram was very limited, this cannot be assumed to be generally true for
the island.
7.6 Conclusions
Sasi, the local resource management institution, has a long history.  The application of sasi to
marine resources, however, has always been limited in scope and some modern forms of
marine management date back only a few decades.   As an institution, sasi has never been
static but has changed with the times and been used by different proponents for different
economic and social reasons, not simply for resource management.  Sasi and the underlying
adat culture have waxed and waned over time, absorbing and reflecting the impacts of
colonialism, war, economic development and social change.  However, despite past predictions
of imminent demise, sasi and adat persist and are, therefore, resilient.
The majority of central Maluku villages still retain some form of local sasi institution, but
only a quarter of them have rules pertaining to marine management.  In the past, half of these
villages had local marine management rules.  Village leaders perceive sasi as a useful
institution.  Sasi practices vary from village to village.  The governing and enforcing authorities
may be adat, church, local government and/or private individuals holding harvest rights.  In
Christian villages, the church is an important supporter, whereas the role of Muslim leaders
in sasi appears to be much more limited.  Marine sasi is most prevalent in mid-sized villages80        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
that are distant from the urban center of Ambon.  In no case is management under sasi
comprehensive; only small areas of shallow waters and few species are regulated.
Nevertheless, the existence of sasi means that certain important management concepts are
widely known and valued as part of local culture. From this, we can see that using sasi as the
basis for development of a modern management institution can be considered to be efficient
because, through sasi, these core concepts are generally known and seen to be legitimate.
This reduces potential costs of public education and enforcement.
The promulgation of fisheries rules at the village level has clearly been influenced significantly
by the sasi institution.  Active marine sasi villages have the most rules in practice, but other
villages where marine sasi has been lost or where some other form of sasi (land, village) persists
are also more active in managing local marine resources than non-sasi villages.Comparison of Equity, Efficiency and Sustainability in Sasi and Non-Sasi Villages of Central Maluku        81
Chapter 8
Comparison of Equity, Efficiency and Sustainability in
Sasi and Non-Sasi Villages of Central Maluku
8.1 Performance of Marine Management as Perceived by Sasi and Non-Sasi Fishers
In theory, sasi rules that restrict access and limit harvest periods have the potential to provide
long-term ecological as well as related economic benefits.  In a few cases, recently revived or
augmented sasi rules are explicitly meant to conserve or protect marine and coastal resources (for
instance, in the Ihamahu and Haruku villages).  In addition, there may be benefits in terms of
equity and social harmony.  Marine resources under sasi may be harvested as communal crops
and distributed equitably among the population (for example, the lompa fish harvest at Haruku).
Marine resources may also be sold to provide funds for infrastructure and projects that benefit
the whole community (as in Nolloth with the Trochus harvest).  It would also seem logical that a
local institution would be more accessible and responsive to local needs than a centralized
bureaucracy, and one can argue that sasi is relatively efficient as it does not rely on expensive state
infrastructure and bureaucracy.  But can these potential benefits be proven to exist?
To evaluate the performance of sasi, a method was used by which the perceptions of fishers on issues
related to social and biological sustainability and the equity and efficiency of fisheries management in
their villages could be quantified (Pomeroy et al. 1996).  Each of the 508 respondents provided
information on current conditions, changes through time (past 15 years) and future expectations for
each of the indicators.  For comparative purposes, the responses were divided into two groups: those
from fishers in marine sasi villages and those from fishers in villages lacking the sasi institution.
8.2 Equity Indicators
Indicators used to measure equity were: 1) the role of fishers in management, 2) the individual
access of fishers to marine resources, 3) fair distribution of fishing gears, and 4) economic
equality among villagers. A definition for each indicator is given in Table 2.6. Significant
differences between sasi and non-sasi villages (for statistical methods see Section 2.3.3) are
represented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.  Comparisons were made between the average condition in
the past in sasi and non-sasi sites, between past and present conditions in each type of village,
and between average change through time in sasi and non-sasi villages (Table 8.1).  The same
series of comparisons was made for present and future conditions (Table 8.2).
The role of fishers in management
There were no significant differences between sasi and non-sasi fishers in terms of average current
and past levels of the first three indicators of equity, i.e., the role of fishers in fisheries
management, access of fishers to marine resources, and fair distribution of fishing gears (Table
8.1). Both types of fishers recorded a static level of involvement in management (Table 8.1) i.e.,
their role had not changed over the past 15 years.  Perceptions of fishers from any one village
regarding their involvement in management were usually mixed, as if involvement depended
on factors other than being involved in the fishery.  A few comments indicated that wealthier,
commercial fishers had more influence than artisanal fishers but others simply said that some
people’s ideas were better than others and were listened to, or not, depending on their merit.82        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
People from the same village were sometimes very consistent.  For instance, comments by
fishers in certain non-sasi villages (Saparua town, Seri, Hutumuri) and in Hulaliu, where sasi
is being revived, suggested that in these villages fishers were never or rarely consulted and
decisions on fisheries issues were made by local leaders. Fishers in Batudua, another non-sasi
village, explained that they were not involved in management and that they did not really
understand what activities management might include.  In contrast, comments by fishers
from other sasi and non-sasi villages (Tengah-Tengah, Seith, Porto, Eri, Itawaka, Seilale, and
Siri-Sori) suggested that they had processes in practice to involve fishers in decision-making,
(for the sasi status of villages, see Appendix 2).  In Seilale, for example, the influence of the
government IDT program (village development program), under which fishers were organized
into groups, had had a large impact.  In other villages as well, involvement in such a group
was noted by fishers as a factor that made them feel involved in management.
By far, the most common factor cited as being influential in the discussion of village issues in
general (102 comments) and fisheries rules in particular (65 comments), was the quality of
village leadership. Other important factors were involvement in fishers’ groups (34 comments),
and awareness and education (55 comments).
Access of fish harvesters to marine resources
Both sasi and non-sasi fishers recorded a decline in access to resources over the past 15 years
(Table 8.1) and they often referred to competition for resources with the commercial sector. In
eight villages, fishers stated that there were arguments and conflicts between artisanal fishers
and the motorized sector. Access to resources was expected to continue to decline, the increase
in the use of modern, large-scale fishing gears being one of the causes. Non-sasi villagers
were significantly more pessimistic about future access (Table 8.2).
Distribution of fishing gears
The distribution of fishing gears was seen by both groups to be getting more equitable over
time (Table 8.1).  This trend is expected to continue into the future (Table 8.2).  Most harvesters
commented on the changing face of the fishery and, again, the increase of modern gears.
Respondents often expressed their belief that the type of gear owned was simply a function
of a person’s willingness to make an effort and work hard (48 comments) but others spoke
also of government programs (16 comments) and a few mentioned access to credit.
Economic equality among villagers
Present-day economic equality within the village was seen as being on average the same
everywhere.  However, in sasi villages, people thought that this indicator had not changed over
time, i.e., the level of equality had always been acceptable.  In non-sasi villages, fishers thought
conditions in the past were worse but had on an average improved, approaching conditions in
sasi villages (Table 8.1).  Neither group expected change in the future (Table 8.2).
8.3 Efficiency Indicators
Efficiency was measured through the following indicators: 1) communal decision-making, 2)
ease of entry into the fishery, 3) control over access to fishery, and 4) compliance with fishery
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Table 8.1. Perceptions of fishers (past and current conditions) measured using a self-anchored ladder
scale combined with a structured interview of 15 questions.  n=508 heads of fishing households, either
from a marine sasi village (n=211) or non-sasi village (n=297).  Significance of differences tested as per
section 2.3.3. Probabilities as follows: ns=not significant, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Prob. Average Prob. Average change    Prob.
past  current through time
condition condition (past 15 yrs)
Sasi No Sasi No Sasi No
sasi sasi sasi
Equity
Role of fishers in management 6.56 6.48 ns 6.70 6.57 ns + 0.1 ns + 0.1 ns ns
Degree of access to marine resources 8.33 8.60 ns 7.56 7.78 ns - 0.8*** - 0.8*** ns
Fair distribution of fishing gears 6.09 5.85 ns 7.23 7.32 ns + 1.1*** + 1.5*** ns
Economic equality among villagers 6.79 6.30 ** 6.57 6.59 ns - 0.2 ns + 0.3* *
Efficiency
Communal decision-making 6.92 6.44 * 6.85 6.71 ns + 0.1 ns + 0.3 ns ns
Ease of entry into the fishery 8.34 8.44 ns 7.50 7.45 ns - 0.8*** - 1.0*** ns
Control over access to fishery 6.76 6.35 ns 7.20 6.41 *** + 0.4** -0.06 ns ns
Compliance with fishery rules 7.63 7.68 ns 7.45 7.09 * - 0.2* - 0.6* *
Social Sustainability
Tradition of collective action 8.69 8.39 * 7.67 7.15 ** - 1.0*** - 1.2*** **
Family well-being 6.24 6.34 ns 7.10 7.10 ns + 0.9*** + 0.8** ns
Income 6.71 6.19 ** 6.42 6.82 ** - 0.3 ns + 0.6*** ***
Community harmony 8.03 7.96 ns 6.90 6.21 *** - 1.1*** - 1.8*** **
Discussion of village issues 8.34 8.01 * 7.50 7.11 * - 0.8*** - 0.9*** ns
Biological sustainability
Marine resource health 8.77 8.45 *** 5.92 5.81 ns - 2.9*** - 2.6*** ns
Fish catch 8.93 8.70 ns 5.50 5.73 ns - 3.4*** - 3.0*** *
Table 8.2. Perceptions of fishers (current conditions and future expectations) measured using a self-
anchored ladder scale combined with a structured interview of 15 questions.  n=508 heads of fishing
households, either from a marine sasi village (n=211) or non-sasi village (n=297).  Significance of
differences tested as per section 2.3.3.   Probabilities as follows: ns=difference not statistically significant;
*=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Prob. Average Prob. Average change    Prob.
past  current through time
condition condition (past 15 yrs)
Sasi No Sasi No Sasi No
sasi sasi sasi
Equity
Role of fishers in management 6.70 6.57 ns 6.81 6.58 * + 0.11ns + 0.01ns ns
Degree of access to marine resources 7.56 7.78 ns 7.03 6.89 ns - 0.53*** - 0.89*** **
Fair distribution of fishing gears 7.23 7.32 ns 7.65 8.00 ns + 0.42*** - 0.68*** ns
Economic equality among villagers 6.57 6.59 ns 6.45 6.69 ns - 0.12 ns + 0.10ns ns
Efficiency
Communal decision-making 6.85 6.71 ns 6.83 6.76 * - 0.02 ns - 0.74 *** ns
Ease of entry into the fishery 7.50 7.45 ns 6.79 6.49 ns - 0.72*** - 0.96*** ns
Control over access to fishery 7.20 6.41 *** 7.54 6.59 *** + 0.33* +0.17 ns ns
Compliance with fishery rules 7.45 7.09 * 7.06 6.59 ns - 0.39*** - 0.50*** ns
Social Sustainability
Tradition of collective action 7.67 7.15 ** 6.91 6.41 ** - 0.76*** - 0.74*** ns
Family well-being 7.10 7.10 ns 7.47 7.48 ns + 0.37** + 0.39*** ns
Income 6.42 6.82 ** 6.47 7.23 ** +0.05 ns + 0.41*** *
Community harmony 6.90 6.21 *** 6.35 5.55 *** - 0.55*** -0.66*** ns
Discussion of village issues 7.50 7.11 * 7.36 6.72 ** - 0.12ns - 0.40*** ns
Biological sustainability
Marine resource health 5.92 5.81 ns 5.92 4.56 ns - 1.18*** - 1.25*** ns
Fish catch 5.50 5.73 ns 5.50 4.49 ns - 1.11*** -1.24*** ns84        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Communal decision-making
Fishermen in sasi villages had a relatively more positive perception of past communal decision-
making.  The degree to which villagers are able to make decisions communally has not changed
over time (Table 8.1). However, whereas those in sasi communities expected this to continue,
non-sasi fishers expected conditions to worsen in future (Table 8.2).  The fishers in these villages
spoke of the loss of respect for adat, increasing population, immigration of people with different
values, and other outside influences as being factors in the decline.  Fishers who were more
optimistic referred to increasing awareness and education as positive influences.
Ease of entry
Ease of entry into the fishery was seen as declining over time because the cost of fees (26
comments) and of new gears (33 comments) increased.  Also, the cost of fuel rose because
fishers had to go farther out to sea to find fish (19 comments).  Here, too, fishers were
pessimistic about future change whether they lived in a village with marine sasi or in a place
with no local management institution.
Control over resources and compliance
Current and future control over access to resources, as well as current compliance with regulations
were rated higher in sasi villages. Both groups thought compliance rates had decreased over time
and expected this decline to continue into the future.  However, this breakdown in compliance
was most marked in non-sasi villages.  Differences among villages were also interesting.  Fishers
in the most traditional sasi villages  (Nolloth, Haruku) perceived compliance to fisheries rules to
be particularly high compared to the 26 other villages in the sample.  Where sasi had evolved into
a commercial transaction, with the kewang being not hereditary village police but a group hired to
guard the resource extraction rights of an individual, fishers perceived compliance to be lower
and on the decline (Kabauw, Pelauw). In villages where the kewang was active or where the village
government played an active role in governing the fishery (mostly sasi villages), control over
access was perceived as high, and this was generally regarded as good.
Fishers from three villages that had lost marine sasi as an institution but still had sasi-style
rules in effect (Hulaliu, Tuhaha, Soahuku), perceived compliance to be significantly lower
than in all other villages.  Factors most commonly identified as influencing compliance were
leadership (72 comments), allegiance to adat (27 comments), economic need (22 comments),
education and awareness (22 comments), and the threat of sanctions (19 comments).
8.4 Social Sustainability Indicators
Five indicators of social sustainability were measured: 1) tradition of collective action, 2) family
well-being, 3) income, 4) discussion of village issues, and 5) community harmony (for
definitions, see Table 2.6).
For four of five indicators, current conditions were significantly different between sasi and
non-sasi villages i.e., the tradition of collective action, community harmony and discussion of
village issues were higher in sasi villages; income was lower.  Considering the change in each
indicator over the past 15 years (Table 8.1), we see that the changes also differed significantly
between sasi and non-sasi villages for three indicators. The tradition of collective action and
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Tradition of collective action
The tradition of collective action was strongest in villages having a sasi institution.  Although
the level of communal activity was in decline everywhere, it was significantly worse in non-
sasi villages.  The most common comment from fishers was that people who used to help one
another voluntarily now expected cash payment.
Family well-being and income
Family well-being, defined in terms of housing, health, and education opportunities, was the
same in sasi and non-sasi villages and on the increase.  When asked to rate their incomes,
however, sasi fishers gave themselves lower current and future scores than did non-sasi fishers.
They also, on an average, reported static incomes, whereas non-sasi fishers reported increasing
incomes.  Perceived loss of income over time was related to age, being most sharply felt by
the oldest fishers.  The average age of fishers in sasi villages (50 years) was greater than that
of non-sasi fishers (44 years).
Community harmony
Present and future community harmony was significantly greater in sasi villages, even though
this group contained Haruku, which is currently in political turmoil (see case study).  Although
both groups perceived a decline in harmony over the years, and expected further deterioration,
this decline was much more marked in non-sasi villages.  The factor most affecting community
harmony was drinking problems among youths (111 comments), especially in Seri, Hutumuri,
Haruku, Seilale and Soahuku.  Another common complaint on Ambon Island was the negative
influence of the city, whereas fishers on other islands spoke of bad outside influences in more
general terms (42 comments).  Poor leadership (39 comments), unemployment (17 comments),
land disputes (10 comments), and erosion of adat (6 comments) were also named.
Discussion of village issues
The level of discussion of village issues (past, present and future) was felt to be significantly
higher in sasi villages.  However, both groups of fishers thought that village issues were
publicly discussed much less now than in the past.  Sasi villagers thought this would not get
any worse whereas non-sasi villagers predicted further decline in the future.
8.5 Biological Sustainability Indicators
Health of the marine environment was measure in terms of 1) resource health, and 2) fish
catches. Both were seen to be in decline everywhere (Table 8.1). Neither fishers in sasi villages
nor those in non-sasi villages were optimistic about the future (Table 8.2).  The oldest fishers
(over 60 years of age) perceived the greatest declines in both fish catches and the marine
environment.
Fish catches
As sasi is applied only to a small number of inshore species, and fishers mostly target pelagic
fish outside of sasi areas, this is not a reflection of catch rates within sasi areas but in the larger
fishery.   Fishers in sasi villages were more sensitive to declining catch rates over the past 15
years, perhaps because of their greater average age and longer experience at sea. When86        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Table  8.3.   Average status of sasi and non-sasi fishers, in sample of n=508.
Characteristic Sasi fishers Non-sasi fishers F P
Average age (S.E) 50.2 (0.83) 44.9 (0.68) 25.0 <0.001 (***)
Average years of education (S.E) 6.81 (0.15) 7.23 (0.14) 3.9 0.048 (*)
Religion 36.5% Muslim 44.7% Muslim 3.43 0.065 (ns)
63.5% Christian 55.3% Christian
Average economic score (S.E) 8.46 (0.15) 8.66 (0.13) 1.1 0.293 (ns)
explaining why they thought their catches had declined, no fewer than 133 respondents blamed
increases in the number of modern fishing gears and a further 67 people pointed to the increase
in lift nets (bagans) and FADs (rumpons) as being especially bad for the fishery.
Resource health
Fishers blamed the decline of resource health on many factors.  The most common were: too
many modern gears (133 comments), too many lift nets and FADs (67 comments), habitat
destruction by fishing gears (35 comments), blast fishing (33 comments), use of poisons (16
comments), domestic wastes and other pollution (86 comments), oil pollution (37 comments),
factory discharges (32 comments), lack of awareness (25 comments), and increasing population
(29 comments).  Complaints about various forms of pollution came mostly from Ambon Island
and from Soahuku on Seram.  Concern about blast fishing and the use of poisons was voiced
on every island.
8.6 Socio-Economic Conditions in Sasi and Non-Sasi Villages
8.6.1 Economic score and relationship to sasi
Fishers in sasi villages were on average older, mostly Christian, and had relatively limited
formal education (Table 8.3).  The economic score of each fisher was calculated using data on
land ownership, type of housing, fishing gear and boat (see Section 2.4.3). Although age and
limited education were each negatively correlated with economic score, there was no
statistically significant difference between average economic status of sasi and non-sasi fishers.
There were, however, significant differences in average economic score among the 28 villages.
Fishers in Seith (sasi), Tiow (non-sasi), Iha (non-sasi) and Pelauw (non-sasi) were the poorest.
It is not the presence of sasi that seems to be decisive, but religion may be a factor.  In all these
villages, either the dominant religion is Muslim or we interviewed Muslim fishers in a
predominantly Christian village.
The villages with significantly higher scores than the above four were Morela (sasi), Siri-Sori
(sasi), Soahuku (sasi), Eri (non-sasi), Ouw (non-sasi), Rutah (non-sasi) and Hutumuri (non-
sasi)  (see Appendix 2 for status of sasi). The other villages were intermediate.  The seven
“richest” fishing communities thus include three sasi and four non-sasi types.  Two of the
seven are Muslim.  Therefore, there is no evidence from our data that sasi as an institution has
either a significant positive or negative impact on the economic well-being of fishing families
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8.7 Conclusions
Sasi as an institution has no demonstrable impact on the economic status of individual artisanal
fishers as measured in terms of ownership of land, housing, boat and fishing gear.  This is
probably because the resources managed under sasi constitute a relatively small proportion
of family income.  Most income is derived from the deep-water pelagic fishery and agro-
forestry.  Fishers in sasi villages perceive themselves as being relatively poor in terms of their
income.  This may be related to the fact that the average age of sasi fishers is higher and age is
negatively correlated with income.  There is no evidence from our data that sasi as an institution
has either a significant positive or negative impact on the actual economic well-being of fishing
families or their communities.  Religion, however, may be related to prosperity. It is generally
acknowledged that Christians became relatively advantaged during the Dutch rule in Maluku.
Generally, there is better social sustainability in sasi villages (more harmony, communal activity,
discussion of village issues) and lesser trends of deterioration through time.  Also, sasi may
be considered to be efficient because of the significantly higher compliance to fisheries rules
in sasi villages.  However, sasi is not inherently equitable in the sense of being inclusive or
democratic.  Common fishers in sasi villages feel no more involved in decision-making than
fishers in non-sasi villages.
There was no evidence from the performance survey that sasi had any impact on the health of
the fishery in general.  This is seen to be in decline all across the study area.88        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Chapter 9
Impact of Sasi on Inshore Fisheries Resources and Habitat in
Central Maluku
9.1 Marine Survey Results in Sasi and Non-Sasi Villages
A second part of the evaluation of the impact of sasi involved direct surveys of coral reef habitats
and resources in marine village territories of sasi and non-sasi villages. Surveys were conducted
in and near the sasi villages (i.e., Nolloth, Ihamahu, Itawaka on Saparua Island; Haruku and
Sameth on Haruku Island).  In several cases (Nolloth, Itawaka and Haruku), guarded sasi areas
were investigated.  The non-sasi areas of Nolloth, Haruku and Sameth marine village territories
and the sasi area of Ihamahu, which is not actively protected, were also surveyed.  In addition,
coral reefs were investigated in non-sasi villages (Iha on Saparua Island, and Hutumuri, Lapaut,
Toisapu, Seri and Airlow on Ambon Island).  Detailed survey information can be found in
Appendix 1.  Maps of each surveyed area accompany the village case studies (Chapters 10-15).
9.2 Coral Reef Surveys in Sasi and Non-Sasi Areas
9.2.1 Saparua Island sites
There are no sasi rules applied to those portions of the marine village territories of Nolloth,
Iha and Ihamahu that lie inside Tuhaha Bay (Table 9.1 and Figure 12.1).  These areas lie directly
in front of the villages.  They have a less live coral cover and more dead corals and rubble
than the outer coast.  There was no sign of healthy reef fish stocks.
In Itawaka’s marine territory, sasi is applied (Tables 9.1 and 9.2), but there is, nevertheless, evidence
of past blast fishing.  The northwestern part, bordering Tuhaha Bay, has less of a live coral cover than
the northeastern part, which lies on the outer coast.  South of Itawaka’s marine territory is the part of
Nolloth’s main marine area which is not under sasi.  The northern portion of Nolloth’s east coast
territory is devoid of living corals.  The beach is covered in cobbles and the reef flat is exposed at low
tide, making coral survival unlikely.  South of this is a stretch of narrow fringing reef lying close to
the shore.  The coral cover here is on an average equal to that in the more southerly sasi area (Table
9.2).  Fish are not abundant, but there are few dead corals or rubble, and no bomb craters are seen.
Nolloth’s eastern shore is a typical wave-exposed fringing reef, dominated by massive and soft corals.
Table 9.1.  Survey of village territories inside and on the northern edge of Tuhaha Bay, indicating overall
average condition of the marine village territory directly in front of each village.  Numbers refer to coral
cover categories, i.e., 0=no hard bottom for corals, 1=≤10% cover on hard bottom, 2=11-30%, 3=31-50%,
4=51-75%, 5=76-100%. Abundance indicators: 0=absent, —=rare, -=uncommon, +=common, ++=abundant,
+++=superabundant.
Location Status Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb
corals  hard  corals  craters
 corals
Itawaka (northwest side) Sasi, guarded 3 2 1 ++ + - No
Nolloth Non-sasi 411 - + + - N o
Iha Non-sasi 4 2 2 - ++ - Yes (old)
Ihamahu Non-sasi 4 2 1 - ++ - Yes (old)Impact of Sasi on Inshore Fisheries Resource and Habitat in Central Maluku        89
Sasi is applied to an approximately 2.5 km long area at the southeastern end of Nolloth’s
marine territory.  This sasi area is actively guarded to protect the top shells (Trochus niloticus)
and sea cucumbers (various species).  It has a good coral cover on a hard bottom that is
interspersed with sandy patches.  Tinauw, the area reputed to be the richest in top shells, has
a mixed coral, sand and rock bottom, including one stretch of 51-75% hard coral cover (see
Figure 10.1).  Reef fish are common.  There is not much rubble but bomb craters were detected,
mostly in the very southern area.  This southern reach borders a stretch of just a few hundred
meters claimed by Ihamahu.  Ihamahu’s area is regulated under sasi but not actively policed
and, therefore, extensively damaged by blast fishing.
9.2.2 Haruku Island sites
The villages of Haruku and Sameth jointly administer marine sasi.  The sasi area is inside Haruku’s
territory and is mostly sea grass rather than corals.  However, the kewang of Haruku attempts to
protect the small patches of coral reefs in front of both villages. The survey was started at the northern
edge of the marine village territory of Sameth  (see Figure 11.1 for map). Where there was a hard
bottom suitable for corals, there were also bomb craters and a great amount of dead corals and
rubble (Table 9.3).  In Sameth, where the total living cover sometimes exceeded 50%, soft corals
were more abundant than hard corals.  Few fish of any sort were seen with the exception of parrot
fish. After completing seven tows over mixed sand and patchy corals, we reached a continuous
sandy bottom and discontinued the survey.  Tows were begun again in front of the Sameth graveyard
and continued to the southern edge of the Learisa Kayeli River in Haruku.  In this area, which is
part of the sasi area, we found that the coral reef had been heavily damaged by sedimentation,
which kewang members blamed on erosion stemming from mine exploration in the upper watershed.
Table 9.2. Average condition of carol reefs in village territories on the northeastern shore of Sapurua
Island.
Location Status Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb
corals  hard  corals  craters
 corals
Itawaka Sasi, guarded 3 3 2 - + ++ Yes (old)
(northwest side)
Nolloth Non-sasi 23 2 + - + N o
Nolloth Sasi, guarded 2 3 2 - - + Yes in 1/3
of tows
Ihamahu Sasi, not
guarded 4 3 1 - ++ + Yes in all
tows
Table 9.3. Survey data from marine territories of Haruku and Sameth. Numbers refer to coral cover
categories, i.e., 0-=no hard bottom for corals, 1=≤10% cover on hard bottom, 2=11-30%, 3=31-50%, 4=51-
75%, 5=76-100%.  Abundance indicators: 0=absent, --=rare, -=uncommon, ++=abundant,
+++=superabundant.
Location Status Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb
corals  hard  corals  craters
 corals
Sameth Sasi, guarded 4 2 2 + ++ _ Yes in over
half of tows
Haruku Non-sasi 2 1 1 +++ - _ No
guarded
Haruku Sasi, guarded 2 1 1 ++ - _ No90        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
9.2.3 Ambon Island sites
Hutumuri includes several dusuns (sub-villages), including Lapaut and Toisapu (see map in
Figure 15.1).  The marine village territory starts close to Batugong, located to the north of
Toisapu.  Between here and Toisapu, it is sandy bottom, which we did not survey.  The shallow
sand shelf (4-8 m deep) stretches out over 200 m, then dips to 20 m deep.  Blast fishers targeting
schools of pelagic fish commonly operate over the sand shelf.
Along the shore between Toisapu and Lapaut, and from Lapaut to Hutumuri, there is a narrow
fringing coral reef (Table 9.4).  The shore is mostly cliff, dropping rapidly to depths of 5-10 m.
Surveys were conducted all along this coast to the bay in front of the Hutumuri village.  Here
at low tide, there is a 100 m exposed rock flat.  Along the outer edge are living corals, barely
submerged at low tide, which are very much trampled and only partly alive.  The Toisapu,
Lapaut, and Hutumuri marine village territories had a more live hard coral cover than Haruku-
Sameth and slightly less than Nolloth.
The Seri cove is one of the few places on southern Ambon Island where there is a ribbon of
coastal flat land, fronted by a beach of pebbles and dark sand dipping to a broad expanse
(perhaps 100 m wide) of intertidal rock flat fringed with living corals.  In contrast, most of
this coast of Ambon Island is rocky cliff rising straight out of the water.
This shore is very wave-exposed during the eastern monsoon (May-September).  Hard corals
are, therefore, mostly massive forms.  There are also areas of boulders and cobble bottoms
where corals cannot survive.  The hard coral cover in the Seri cove rarely exceeds 30% but
soft corals are more abundant.  Dead corals are most common directly in front of the village,
where people gather shellfish and go spear fishing.  To the northeast of the Seri cove, the
shore drops steeply to deep waters and there is little or no coral reef.  Seri’s marine territory
extends to the headland called Tanjung Vanahu, beyond which the coast is claimed by the
village of Mahia (see map in Figure 14.1).
Seri’s land territory is bounded on the west by Airlow, a dusun of the desa of Nusaniwe that
includes the Muslim coastal hamlet of Wemi. We surveyed Airlow’s coastal territory from the
border of Seri and Wemi, south to Pintu Kota, the mouth of Ambon Harbor (Table 9.4).  There is a
river on the boundary between Seri and Wemi.  In front of the Wemi village, the bottom is a mix
of rock and sand, with soft, massive and sub-massive corals increasing with greater distance from
Table 9.4.  Average condition of coral reefs in non-sasi village territories on the southern shore of Ambon
Island.  Numbers refer to average coral cover categories, i.e., 1=≤10% cover on hard bottom, 2=11-30%,
3=31-50%, 4=51-75%, 5=76-100%.  Abundance indicators: 0=absent, —=rare, -=uncommon, +=common,
++=abundant, +++=superabundant.  Details of individual tows in Appendix 1.
Location Status Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb
corals  hard  corals  craters
 corals
Toisapu Non-sasi 2 3 1 ++ - + Yes in half
of tows
Lapaut Non-sasi 13 4 -- + + N o
Hutumuri Non-sasi 3 2 1 - - + Yes in 1/4
Headland of tows
Hutumuri Bay Non-sasi 2 3 2 - - + Yes in 1/4
of tows
Seri Non-sasi 3 2 2 - - - No
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the fresh water influence.  In this area, old rubble is common, as well as dead, algae covered, coral
rocks. The area looked bombed or wave-damaged in the past but no recent craters were seen.
9.3 Top Shells and Sea Cucumbers in Sasi and Non-Sasi Areas
9.3.1 Saparua Island sites
Areas surveyed were less than 5 m deep at low tide.  The first area surveyed for top shells
(Trochus niloticus) and sea cucumbers was Hatwa, in Nolloth’s sasi area.  Here we were not
able to find any top shells (Table 9.5).  We then moved to Tinauw in the Nolloth sasi area,
reputed to be the richest top shell habitat. Four top shells in three transects were found.  The
animals were hiding in shaded holes and crevices.  A similar habitat was discovered in
Wailalone, also in the sasi area.  Then we moved onto a sandy habitat to check for sea
cucumbers, as these had also been rare in the transects.  Finally, we performed several transects
at Wailesi at the southern end of the sasi area, and in the narrow Ihamahu territory immediately
south of Wailesi.  All transects were performed at low tide, as local fishers advised that at this
time, top shells come out to feed.  Top shells were divided into “juvenile” (4-6 cm) and “legal”
(>6 cm), based on the sasi regulations.  Work was scheduled around mid-day when light was
optimal.  However, this was not optimal for finding sea cucumbers, many of which tend to
hide in sand during the day and surface at night.  The Stichopus sp. and Bohadschia sp. found
were typically hidden in crevices whereas the Holothuria spp. lay out in the open.
To check whether skilled harvesters would come up with comparable results, we hired two
local fishers to perform 5-minute searches over the same areas.  They also emerged with only
small numbers of top shells and sea cucumbers (Table 9.6).  In Ihamahu, the harvester commented
Table 9.5. Results of 50 m x 1 m transects in different parts of Nolloth’s sasi area and to the south of
Nolloth in the Ihamahu marine village territory.
Site #Sea cucumbers, # Top shells and Notes
type and length  basal diameter
Hatwa 1 Stichopus sp.: 30 cm, 0 1-2 m depth; massive corals on sand,
(Nolloth sasi area) 1 Bohadschia sp.: 40 cm. plus algae-covered rocks and old rubble.
Tinauw 0 0 Branched, foliose and massive corals.
(Nolloth sasi area)
Tinauw 0 1 (9 cm) Sand, rubble with occasional clumps
of corals.
Tinauw 0 3 (4, 9 and 9 cm) Shoreward of previous transect,
bottom similar.
Wailalone 0 2 (4 and 7 cm) 4-6 m deep, mixed sand/rock/corals.
(Nolloth sasi area)
Wailalone 0 0 Sandy area.
Wailalone 0 0 Sandy area.
Wailesi 0 3 (4, 8.5 and 9.5 cm) Rocky with clumps of corals and
(south end of sasi area) sandy patches.
Nolloth 0.25 Juveniles: 0.5
(average per 50 sq m) Legal size: 1.0
(hard bottom only)
Ihamahu 0 0 Coral reef in moderate condition, looks
like good top shell habitat.
Ihamahu 0 1 (8 cm) Mixed rocks, corals and sand.
Ihamahu 0 Juvenile: 0
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that, unlike the sasi area of Nolloth, the Ihamahu area had no “signs” of top shells.  He also said
that this unprotected sasi area was subject to poaching by people from the Ouw village.
9.3.2 Ambon Island sites
According to local informants, top shells and sea cucumbers had been harvested from the
waters of Hutumuri and Seri over many years by Butonese and Madurese traders, but there
has been no harvest in recent years because stocks have been depleted.  We performed very
careful transect searches in both areas and failed to find a single specimen of either inside the
transects (Table 9.7).  One sea cucumber was seen outside of the sample area.  Both depth and
habitat were comparable to those at the Saparua Island sites.
9.4 Butterfly Fish Counts in Sasi and Non-Sasi Areas
Butterfly fish, being obligate coral feeders with varied food preferences, are often most diverse
where corals are similarly so.  Approximately, 50 species of butterfly fish are believed to inhabit
eastern Indonesia.  Half-hour surveys of butterfly fish in seven different sites provided species
counts ranging from 8 to 18 per site (Table 9.8).  These counts were performed over the best
coral cover available in each marine village territory.
Unpublished research conducted in Biak, Irian Jaya (I. Novaczek, pers. comm.), using the same
method and personnel, suggests that counts of 12-18 are common, whereas counts over 20
usually are obtained only in very rich coral habitats.  Counts under 10 are usually found
where there has been extensive damage to the reef.  In this case, the lower counts were all in
sasi villages.  In each case, there was evidence of blast fishing, with the most extensive damage
being evident in Sameth, the site with the lowest number of butterfly fish.
Table 9.6.  Results of 5-minute searches by experienced harvesters (Ulis and Julius Tutawarima) at various
sites inside and immediately to the south of the Nolloth sasi area.  Habitat type: mixed rocks, coral
clumps and sandy patches.
Site # Avg. # sea Sea cucumber  Avg. # Avg. #
searches cucumbers# species  “legal” size  juvenile top
 per search top shells shells
(>6 cm) per (4-6 cm)
search  per search
Tinauw, Nolloth 10 0 1.1 not collected
Wailalone, Nolloth 4 1.25 4 Holothuria spp.;0 0
one 19 cm; three black
and slippery sp.
of 42-45 cm
1 Bohadschia sp.,35 cm
Wailesi, Nolloth 4 0 0.75 1.00
(south)
Ihamahu marine 4 1.25 5 black slippery 0 0
village territory Holothuria sp.,
35-45 cmImpact of Sasi on Inshore Fisheries Resource and Habitat in Central Maluku        93
Table 9.8. Butterfly fish surveys in sasi and non-sasi village marine territories.
Species Nolloth Ihamahu Sameth Hutumuri Toisapu Seri Airlow
(sasi)( sasi)( sasi)( n o   sasi)( n o   sasi)( n o   sasi)( n o   sasi)
Chaetodon  adiegastos xx
C. auriga xx x
C. baronesa xx x x x
C. citrinellus xx
C. ephippium xx x
C. guttatissimus x
C. kleinii xx x x x x
C. lineolatus x
C. lunula xx x x
C. melanotus xx x x
C. meyeri xx xx x x
C. ornatissimus xx x x
C. punctofasciatus xx x
C. rafflesi xx x x x
C. semeion x
C. speculum xx x
C. trifascialis xx x
C. trifasciatus xx xx x x x
C. ulietensis x
C. unimaculatus xx x
C. vagabundus xx xx x x x
Forcipiger flavissimus xx x x x
F. longirostris xx x x x
Heniochus chrysostomus xx x x x x
H. various xx x x x x
Total # spp. 11 11 8 14 17 18 17
Table  9.7. Ambon Island sites: 50 m x 1 m transects, searching for top shells and sea cucumbers.
Site #  Sea # Top Notes
cucumbers shells
Seri 0 0 Over 50% cover of living hard corals, mostly massive and
sub-massive, with <10% sand. Large cracked boulder
bottom i.e., extensive good top shell habitat.
Seri 0 0 5 m seaward of #1, habitat similar.
Seri 0 0 5 m shoreward of #1, habitat similar.
Hutumuri 0 0 Hard corals 10-30%, mostly massive and sub-massive.
10-20% sand.  Appears to be good habitat for top shells.
Hutumuri 0 0 On the rocky bottom, hard corals cover more than 50%,
dead corals with algae 10%.  Appears to be good top
shell habitat. Mixed sand/rock area has only rare
massive corals (10%) and extensive algae.
Hutumuri 0 0 First 30 m has over 80% dead coral rocks with algae.
Last 20 m over living corals. One black sea cucumber
(Holothuria sp.) seen but not on transect.
Toisapu 0 0 North of Toisapu. Bottom irregular, 0-10% sand, 75%
dead corals and other animals, 5-10 % live hard corals
(mostly massive and some table); 20-25% soft corals.
Appears to be good top shell habitat.
Toisapu 0 0 Position seaward of and above transect, near sand flat.
50% soft corals, 20% hard corals, 30% dead corals with
algae or other animals.  Giant clams present but rare
and small.94        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
9.5 Conclusions
The ecological benefits of sasi in terms of coral reef health were not clear-cut.  In Nolloth, there was no
detectable difference in the coral cover or butterfly fish diversity between the sasi and non-sasi areas.
When compared to the adjacent marine village territory of Ihamahu, however, it was seen that the
latter, which is less effectively guarded, was more scarred by blast fishing, more covered in coral
rubble and relatively lacking in soft corals.  The most damaged reefs, in terms of the dead coral cover
and general absence of fish, were seen inside Tuhaha Bay and in front of Haruku and Sameth.  Tuhaha
Bay and Haruku Strait are both relatively heavily populated, heavily exploited areas.  In contrast,
reefs surveyed along the south shore of Ambon Island were in moderately good condition and
comparable to reefs along the eastern shore of Saparua Island.  Both of these shores are relatively
isolated and thinly populated.  Also, they are very wave-exposed during seasonal monsoons and thus
are allowed to “rest” for part of each year.
Both sasi and non-sasi villages suffer from blast fishing.  Even when a kewang is present and motivated
to enforce the ban on this gear type (as in Haruku and Nolloth), that is not effective.  Sasi areas are
also vulnerable to damage caused by external forces, as seen in Haruku where sedimentation from
recent mining exploration has damaged one area of coral.
Butterfly fish species, an indicator of coral diversity, were more abundant in the non-sasi areas (14-18
species) than in sasi areas (8-11 species).  The lowest diversity, seen in Sameth, appeared to be correlated
with damage from blast fishing.  Evidence of blast fishing on a lesser scale was also seen in Toisapu
and Hutumuri (non-sasi) as well as in Nolloth (sasi).  Of the fish survey sites, only Seri and Airlow
were free from bomb craters.  These also had the highest fish diversity.
Data from previous surveys around Saparua Island (Leonardo 1996) indicate that the average living
cover on reefs along the eastern shore is 42% hard corals and 26% soft corals.  This suggests that the
sasi area in Nolloth, where the living cover of hard corals averages 31-50% and the cover by soft corals
averages 11-30%, is an “average” area compared to others on the same coast.  Leonardo’s figures for
the north shore are 24% cover of hard corals and 37% of soft corals.  Our data from inside Tuhaha Bay,
from in the protected marine territory of Itawaka, and from the unprotected territories of Nolloth, Iha
and Ihamahu, suggest an average of 11-30% hard corals and <10% soft corals.  Compared to the
regional data, this is average for hard corals but below average in terms of the soft coral cover.
According to regional coral reef surveys (LIPI 1996), almost half of the reefs in central Maluku have a live
hard coral cover of less than 25%.  Compared to this, the marine territories of Nolloth, Ihamahu, Itawaka,
Hutumuri, Lapaut and Toisapu are better than average for the region, whereas Haruku, Sameth, Seri, Iha
and Airlow have relatively less hard coral covers.  Thus, in this limited data set, there is no convincing
correlation between marine sasi and coral reef protection.  The reef condition seems more closely related to
relative population density and fishing pressure than to the presence or absence of the sasi institution.
More research into the condition of a larger number of guarded sasi areas would be useful.
Although not showing evidence of measurable habitat protection, surveys of sasi and non-sasi areas
did indicate that the local management has resulted in demonstrable benefits at least in protecting
two sessile species, top shells and sea cucumbers.  Although there were suitable habitats in Hutumuri,
Toisapu, and Seri, and these non-sasi villages did historically exploit both resources, sea cucumbers
and top shells were extremely rare and absent, respectively. A poorly guarded sasi area subject to
poaching and blast fishing (Ihamahu) also had very few top shells and sea cucumbers.  This suggests
these two resources may now be largely confined to sasi areas such as those of Nolloth, which are
subject to harvest restrictions and guarded.  Because of the limits of the survey areas and methods,
it is also possible that deep-water refugia may exist for both species.Desa Nolloth, Saparua Island        95
Section D – Institutional  Analysis of Case Study Villages
Chapter 10
Desa Nolloth, Saparua Island1
10.1 Physical, Biological and Technical Attributes
10.1.1 Physical environment
The Nolloth village is situated on northeastern Saparua Island, one of the Lease Islands. Before
the Dutch colonization, the people of Nolloth originally lived in the hills, organized in a clan
structure (margas). Two groups of margas (uku lua with two clans and uku lima with five)
descended from the hills and settled on the coast where the village of Nolloth lies today.
People from what is now the Paperu village also came down from the hills at the same place
but later, they split and moved south.
1 For the data tables see Appendix 3. Nolloth has a relatively large (27 ha) land and sea territory (petuanan)
compared to other villages (Antariksa et al. 1993). Stories vary, but it seems that at one time, the reigning raja of
Nolloth collaborated with the Dutch and, in return, acquired more extensive marine and land rights than other
villages. The land is divided among the uku lua and uku lima. Each of the two groups maintains its identity and
has its own traditional leaders who mediate land disputes and manage certain natural resources in their territories.
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Figure 10.1. Sketch map of marine territory at Nolloth (features not necessarily to
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Nolloth has a relativety large (27 ha) land and sea territory (petuanan) compared to other
villages (Antariksa et al. 1993). Stories vary, but it seems that at one time, the reigning raja of
Nolloth collaborated with the Dutch and, in turn, acquired more extensive marine and land
rights than other villages. The land is divided among the uku lua and uku lima. Each of the two
groups maintains its identity and has its own traditional leaders who mediate alnd disputes
and manage certain natural resources in their territories.
The forest garden area straddles the northeastern cape of Saparua Island (Figure 10.1), south
of the village of Itawaka. The main marine territory lies along a 6-7 km stretch on the eastern
side of the cape. South of Nolloth’s village territory lies the shore claimed by Ihamahu (just a
few hundred meters), then a stretch claimed by Itawaka and finally, the village marine
territories of Ulath and Ouw. The villages of Iha and Tuhaha have no claims on this coast.
The marine sasi area is about 2.5 km long, lying within the southern reaches of Nolloth’s
village territory, approximately one hour by small boat from the village. The area is wave-
exposed and fringed by a narrow reef dominated by massive and soft corals and interspersed
with sandy patches (Andamari et al. 1993).
10.1.2 Biological characteristics
The majority of fishers (60%) target pelagic fish only, others, both reef and pelagic fish (33%).
Fourteen fish species were recorded as commonly caught, i.e., eight pelagic and six reef fish
(Appendix 3). In addition, men may collect several large shellfish species, while women collect
mainly small shellfish. The fishers prefer the more profitable pelagic fishery to coral reef
fishing since inshore reefs are already depleted.
Most fishing takes place in the open sea and not in the sasi area. Fishers perceived that the
general condition of the marine environment has drastically declined over the past 15 years,
and they expect resources to decline further in the future (see Section 10.8). In Nolloth, the
main causes for resource decline identified were household waste and industrial pollution.
The number of motorboats has also increased and subsequently, more oil spills into the sea.
Nearly all fishers also perceived significantly reduced fish catches. Blamed for resource
depletion are the increasing numbers of vessels from outside Lease Islands and the use of
modern gears, i.e., FADs (rumpons), fine mesh lift nets (bagans), nylon gill nets and blast fishing.
Since the 1980s, the number of motorized boats, modern gears, FADs and lift nets has increased
markedly around the Lease Islands. Fishers complain that pelagic fish no longer come to
shore because FADs in offshore waters have disturbed their migratory routes.
Most fishers agree that fishing is different now from that in the past. They have to paddle
further and further in trying to keep their fish catches stable. Nearly all fishers (93%) reported
reduced catches and a subsequent decline in income. Over the last years, the price of fish has
become so high that lower yields still provide an acceptable income. But gradually, price
increases will no longer make up for the increased input of time and labor. In these times of
increased financial needs (education, “luxury” commodities such as TVs), compounded by
increasing prices for boats, engines and nets, fishers find it more difficult to cover their expenses
and make a living.Desa Nolloth, Saparua Island        97
Attributes of the sasi area
Under marine sasi, the harvest of top shells (Trochus niloticus) and sea cucumbers is regulated
within a specific part of the sea. In the sasi area, different zones are recognized (Figure 10.1).
The stretch called Tinauw, between Wailalone and Hatwan, is the richest fishing area for top
shells. Sandy patches are key sea cucumber areas. A seaward fringe is where a restriction on
the use of gill nets is enforced. These three zones in the sasi area are open and closed at the
same time. The sasi products may be harvested only during the open season, which may be
proclaimed at intervals as short as a few months or as long as three years. In the sasi area
spear fishing, the use of nets, swimming and diving are not allowed during the closed season.
Nevertheless, fishers who are village residents may fish using hook and line.
Sea cucumbers caught include Teripang nanas (green colored sea cucumbers) and Teripang
susu (black and white ones). The latter attain huge sizes and are taken from deep waters (>30
m). In the past, they were harvested by Madurese compressor divers from Java, but are now
collected more and more by local divers.
The top shells sit around 1-5 m deep at low tide, among the corals and rocks. Depending on
the size and abundance of the top shells, sasi can be closed for up to several years. The optimal
closure is three years.  In three years, the animal matures and its shell reaches prime condition
(Zerner and Thorburn, forthcoming). The minimum size for harvested top shells in Nolloth is
four fingers (6 cm). After the harvest, the remaining small shells are left to grow.
Biological surveys indicate that Nolloth has better than the average live coral cover compared
to other areas in Saparua (see Section 11.2). During the opening of sasi, spear fishers have
access to the sasi area. Fishers report that the fishing is better in the sasi area than elsewhere.
They believe that the ban on gill netting and destructive gears in the sasi area helps to preserve
the live coral reef and allows the fish to grow. In fact, the sasi areas of Nolloth and Ihamahu
were the only places surveyed by the research team in 1997 where top shells could be found
at all (see Section 11.2). Top shell yields dropped precipitously through the 1980s (Evans et al.
1997).  The 1998 harvest of almost 500 kg of top shells from the sasi area reveals that
management under the new village head, who is committed to waiting at least two years
between harvests, is allowing the resource to recover.
10.1.3 Fisheries technology
There are an estimated 400 fishers in Nolloth. Most fishers are involved in the pelagic fishery
in the open sea using their small outrigger boats (perahus), or they work as crew on pole and
line boats. The majority (70%) of fishers in our sample own their own small boats; only a few
(7%) have a motorboat. The fishers in Nolloth mainly use hand lines and nets that are 50-150
m long. Most common is a type of net called giob, which has quarter inch mesh and catches
tuing-tuing (Cypselurus spp.). Also very common are very fine mesh nets called siru and tanggu
(1-2 mm mesh) and komu nets (4.5 cm mesh). Relatively few fishers have other types of nets,
such as lalosi nets (4 cm mesh), lema nets (6 cm mesh), and “sardine” nets. 23% of the fishers in
the sample interviewed did not own any gear. Often they lease, borrow or rent equipment, or
they work on the boats of other fishermen. According to the people, whether a fisher owns
gears and what types reflect a person’s willingness to make an effort. The coast near Nolloth
is wave-exposed and not suitable for lift nets. Therefore, in contrast to the non-sasi villages,
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Artisanal and small commercial fishers
The artisanal and small-scale fishing grounds include the village marine territory of Nolloth
and neighboring villages of Itawaka, Ouw and Ulath, as well as waters as far away as Nusa
Laut, southern Seram and the Banda Islands (see Figure 1). Fishers do not necessarily go to
sea everyday; it depends on weather and what other work is to be done on land. If fishing is
close to home, fishers may go to sea several times a day and spend a couple of hours fishing
each trip. If they head further out, they can be gone for 24 hours or more.
Catches vary greatly depending on gear type, species, weather and season. For the inshore
pelagic fishery, the year is divided as follows: moderate seas in January-April with small
catches; huge waves during May-September with hardly any fishing; seas are calm from
October-December and catches large. On a good trip, a small-scale net fisher working with
several helpers might bring two to four baskets of fish to shore. Depending on the species
and size, a basket could hold 50-150 fish. The catch is divided according to long established
tradition, with one-third going to the owner of the boat and net, two-thirds going to the other
crew of up to four fishers. If the fish is caught at Nolloth, each man gets his share of fresh fish.
If caught elsewhere and sold, they split the money. The boat/gear owner covers any expenses
(gas for the motor, repairs). His profit is in the order of Rp30,000-Rp50,000 per fishing trip
(USD12-USD20, early 1997 rate).
The costs for net fishers have risen dramatically in recent years. The price of some types of
netting and nylon line and buoys has increased two to five-fold. Nets can last ten years but
must be repaired three to four times a year. Before the currency crisis pushed prices up again
in 1998, a longboat suitable for net fishing cost Rp5.5 million (± USD2,200), and a motor,
Rp1.3 million (±  USD520).
In spite of the increased difficulty in catching fish, most fishers see no reason for concern.
Generally, the trend in fishing is still towards intensification and fishing techniques have
increased both in number and in effectiveness (smaller mesh sizes, change to nylon nets).
Rather than limiting their fishing, fishers compete over the fish and wish to have faster boats.
The younger generation is apparently optimistic and would like to take up fishing. They
explained that they fish with the same fishing methods used by older people from whom
they learn to fish, but “with some improvements towards the modern methods”.
Large-scale commercial fishers
Presently, there are seven large-scale, motorized pole and line boats operating from Nolloth.
Each boat employs 25-30 fishers who are employed locally and learn “on the job”.  Their
income is significantly higher than that of the artisanal fishers who, with their small outrigger
boats, get at most 20 kg/day. Only one of the boats is owned by a family from Nolloth.  The
others are owned by Ambonese and Tulehu businessmen who have been active in the area
since the 1980s. According to the village head, the commercial fishers prefer to operate from
Nolloth because the Nolloth crew are skilled and honest. The boats spend Saturday nights
and Sundays in Nolloth. On Sunday nights, they leave again to pick up baitfish in Pia or
nearby Tuhaha, or from lift nets and seiners near Ambon or another island.
The economic benefits from the large-scale pole and line fishery are significant. The village
does not collect any formal fees from the boats, but accepts “voluntary” contributions. The boat
owner gives one share of the total catch to the church in Nolloth, half a share to local widows
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adds up to Rp50,000-Rp200,000 (USD20-USD80, early 1997 exchange rate) a month  (see Chapter
5 for more details on catch divisions). All in all, the fishery brings in about Rp50 million (±
USD20,000) a month, including the wages for about 150 fishers who work on the boats.
10.2 Attributes of the Community and Fishers
As of 1997, the middle-sized village of Nolloth has 2,546 inhabitants divided over 530
households. The average household size is about five persons. The village is 100% Christian
with no recent history of in or out-migration. There is no tourism. Visitors usually visit relatives,
and sometimes, they come to observe the sasi rituals.
Present village facilities include electricity, three elementary schools, two gas stations, a food market,
a drug store and a banking service from the KUD. Many residents have TVs. The village has an
open storm drain system. There are both private and community wells, with some water brought in
from a spring in Itawaka, a village to the north. Additional water wells are currently being developed.
The nearest health center is in Ihamahu, a neighboring village within walking distance.
Transportation to the village is good. The village has hard top road access, and there are
frequent public minibuses connecting Nolloth with Saparua Kota, the largest town center on
the island. Speedboats also take passengers and trade goods directly from Nolloth to the
urban centers of Ambon on Ambon Island, and Masohi on Seram. Communication links are
limited to a radio connection; there is no telephone.
Employment
The village is mainly dependent on agriculture and fisheries. Fishing is a full-time job for
40% of the villagers while another 30% fish part-time. There has been a slight shift from farming
to fishing in recent years due to increasing revenues from fishing (higher fish prices).
Since 1979, the number of small shopkeepers has increased to 18. There are a few artisans who
make furniture, and several who work in housing construction. The number of government
employees has tripled from 16 to 44 persons as a result of the new government structure.
10.2.1 Village government
The village head himself distinguishes three main political bodies in the village: the village head,
the village officials and the cooperative (KUD) of which the manager is an important adat leader,
the tuan negeri. In Nolloth, the church minister is also a noted person. Among these authorities,
there is close collaboration concerning village matters and they are mutually supportive.
Table 10.2.
Village leaders in Nolloth
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In Nolloth, there is a large overlap between traditional and modern village institutions. The
LMD consists mainly of clan leaders (kepala soas) from the former saniri negeri. After the
installation of the formal village structure, it became possible to elect a village head who is
not from the raja clan. For example in 1987, Arnold Matatula became the new village head.
He was also the treasurer but lost the people’s trust following problems with village finances.
Therefore, people were glad that in November 1995, Pieter Huliselan returned from Ambon
to become the new village head. Being from the raja clan, he had a legitimate claim on this
position. Yet, after the “election”, he did not automatically have the traditional authority that
is connected with the adat structure. The tuan negeri of the village had to perform a traditional
ceremony to recognize him as the kepala adat (head of the adat). Because of his high legitimacy,
the current village head has a very strong position in the village.
The village is financially supported through a national government program administered
by the sub-district office (Kecamatan). After submission of an annual proposal, the village gets
a Rp6.5 million (± USD2,600, early 1997 exchange rate) grant. One part of the grant is given to
the PKK, another part is reserved for additional livelihood projects, but the largest share is
used for village development, e.g., fresh water supply, rehabilitation of the village market
and renovation of the village museum. The schools are supported mostly by community effort.
The village economy receives additional support from relatives who live elsewhere (e.g., the
Netherlands) and from renting out marine resource harvesting rights (sasi).
10.2.2 Village organizations
In Nolloth, the usual village organizations have been installed and are, to a more or less
extent, active (see Chapter 6). As of 1997, the PKK is awaiting the arrival of the wife of the
village head in January 1998 before starting any activities. The church organizations are all in
place, but the Pelwata is attended by only a small number of women because the program
does not meet the needs of ordinary women and they are too busy to attend. As with the PKK,
women are not actively recruited. Most village women do not know what the organizations
do, so interest to join is minimal. The youth organization of the church is relatively well
attended and active in the village, e.g., cleaning up, helping the kewang etc. The organizations
were quite conscientious in carrying out their programs.
Some women have organized themselves in the ARISAN savings group. The women say they
act independently from the village government. Savings are used for small-scale trade (bread,
sago) or to buy food. The TAKESRA was installed recently. The 22 members are saving Rp1,000
monthly to gain capital for a kiosk or sago trade. The village also has an IDT program. In two
years, about 60 people benefited from this project. One use of the subsidy was to process and
sell sago. Compared to the PKK and church organizations, the ARISAN, TAKESRA and IDT
groups are more relevant to poorer villagers because they provide economic benefits.
The KUD in Nolloth is a Manderinti (highest level) and primarily occupied with the clove and
nutmeg trade. Approximately, a third of the adults in the village are members. They get a
monthly payment from the KUD and a yearly bonus. The amount depends on the profitability
of KUD enterprises, i.e., through the operation of several shops and a speedboat. Their annual
turnover is Rp70 million per year (± USD30,000, 1996 rate). The KUD donates Rp1-2 million
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10.2.3 Role of women
Some women are working in the village organizations, often as treasurer or other “female-related
tasks”, but they are not found in the LMD or LKMD. Despite their active role in income generating
activities, women are excluded from most village affairs: 10% of survey respondents considered
women to be completely outside of decision-making processes. Women’s public activities in the
village are usually related to what they do in the household, i.e., they provide the refreshments at
village meetings and traditional ceremonies. Women also expressed reluctance to take concerns
directly to village leaders. They would be more likely to deal with their clan leader or try to
approach government through the PKK or the wife of the village head.
Many women are involved in cottage-scale businesses related to food processing (sago2, bread,
smoked fish) and trading of fish and agricultural products. In the 1990s when the clove
monopoly caused a severe reduction in income from cloves, pressure on marine resources
and the number of women involved in fish trading3 increased tremendously. The women
also harvest shellfish, small fish, and octopus from intertidal and shallow inshore waters.
This is strictly a food fishery. The shell fishery has also intensified over the years, and for the
women, it has become harder to find large shellfish as well as certain species.
The women are worried about the decline in marine resources because they depend on shellfish
for food, and on the fishery for household income. To the women, sasi, just like most village
matters, is “a government affair” and they have no voice in decision-making regarding sasi
nor do they attend the sasi rituals. The women interviewed did express the need to be involved
in decision-making on marine resource management. Yet, they thought that since their fishery
is for food and not profit, the men in charge would not take their concerns seriously.
10.2.4 Profile of fishers
Of the 30 fishers surveyed, 93% were born in Nolloth and the same percentage has only
elementary education. On an average, fishers in the sample were 47 years old, while nearly
half of respondents were under 45. The respondents had an average of 6.6 household members,
i.e., more than the overall village average. No women were interviewed.
On an average, fishers had been active in this profession for 27 years. They generally spend
more than 8 hours per day at sea (most common is 7-10 hours daily), which is second highest
from our sample villages. The fishers expressed great personal satisfaction in their chosen
career but only 18% (still twice as high as the other villages) want their children to be fishers.
Most (61%) want them to be government staff. Only three of the respondents belonged to a
fishers’ group and membership in other village organizations was also low. All of them said
that sasi is very important.
The principal part of their income (81%) is from fishing. Other income comes from land crops
(peanuts, coconuts, spices etc.). About a third (27%) have income that is sent from a distant
family member. Children who have left Nolloth have usually gone looking for work, and
often provide the family with an external income that is on an average Rp264,000 (USD105,
early 1997 rate) per year.
2 The sago processed in Nolloth is imported from Seram, and the end product is sold in Ambon.
3 The women involved in the fish trade are usually those living next to the shore in Nolloth and Itawaka where fish are landed.102        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The economic indicator of the fishers’ sample was made up of adding scores for land ownership,
boat ownership, type of house and fishing gears (for full explanation see Section 2.5). Most
fishers (83%) are landowners and almost half (47%) have permanent housing (cement with zinc
roof). In Nolloth, the average economic score was 8.1 (with a standard error of 0.35), which is in
the lower third of the 27 villages investigated (Appendix 2). When TV ownership is factored in,
the economic score is 8.5, the lowest of the case study villages (see Appendix 3).
10.3 Market Attributes
Artisanal fishers in Nolloth generally sell their catch either directly to consumers or to small
traders. A few (17% of sample) deal with wholesalers. Most fishers (97%) say it is they or their
wives who set the sale price. The majority (70%) sell their fish in Nolloth or elsewhere on
Saparua Island (17%). The key factor in choosing the point of sale is the price. Prices vary, but
in 1997, it was usual for fishers to sell their mid-sized fish (komu, lema) for Rp1,000-Rp2,000
each while smaller species (lalosi, sardinia) could fetch Rp250.
Compared to fishers in other case study villages, Nolloth fishers sell a relatively high
percentage of their catch. Only 13% is used for family consumption. Eight fishers said they
do not eat any of the fish they catch, and none eat more than half of their catch. The shellfish
and fish gathered by women, in contrast, are not sold but used for family consumption.
The small-scale fish trade is mainly in the hands of village women, called papalele, many of
whom are wives of fishers. The female fish vendors buy and sell all kinds and sizes of fish,
both in fresh and smoked form. The post-harvest processing of fish is limited to smoking.
None of the vendors has access to ice. The price of fish depends on various factors: weather
conditions, the amount of fish in the market, the size of the trader network, and the auction
price of fish set by the fish brokers who handle commercial catches (see Section 3.2). The
profit of the retailer can approach 150-200%.
The fish vendors mostly sell their fish in the local village market or in other villages on Saparua
Island, including the town itself. The remainder ends up in urban centers i.e., Masohi, Tulehu
and Ambon city. Fish are taken to market via public transportation: bus or speedboat. The women
never travel to or from a market empty-handed and often deal in sago and vegetables as well as
fish. Fish that cannot be sold fresh before noon are smoked and either go into the stock needed
for a long distance trading trip or are peddled door-to-door in the village in the late afternoon.
Compared to the other case study villages on Saparua and Haruku, the wide range of markets
enjoyed by Nolloth traders is exceptional. The fish vendors use their long experience and a
strategy of flexibility to find the best place to sell fish for the best price. They gather information
on city market prices from bus and speedboat drivers and from people freshly arrived home
from the city. Those who choose a district or provincial market for their sales do this because:
1) the price is higher there than on the local markets, 2) it is easily accessible, and 3) they can
sell fish together with other commodities.
10.3.1 Commercial large-scale fish trade
The financial control over the pole and line fish trade is mainly in the hands of Chinese
Indonesians. The pole and line boats typically go out twice a week on 3-day trips, unloading
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The pole and line boats target pelagic fish, especially skipjack (cakalang). Fishing takes place
throughout central and northern Maluku. Prices of fish are increasing. In February 1998, the
price given to Nolloth fishers for export quality fish almost doubled. These trends are directly
related to the availability of fish and to market structures. More details on the commercial
fishery and on the commercial fish trade can be found in Chapter 5.
10.3.2 Trade in top shells and sea cucumbers
Under the current village head, there is a harvest of sea cucumbers and top shells from the
sasi area every two years. There is a large market demand for sea cucumbers by Chinese
traders as well as by Butonese and Javanese fishers who travel around the Moluccan seas.
The KUD, which pays for the harvesting rights, sells both sea cucumbers and top shells to
Chinese-Indonesian traders in Ambon.
Trochus niloticus is a protected species under national law and trade in top shells is, therefore,
illegal. As a result, all shells must be sold to certain traders who have government permits to
handle cultivated top shells and use this as a cover for trading wild shells. The profits enjoyed
by those in control of this trade monopoly are significant (also see Zerner and Thorburn,
forthcoming). On the international market, the price is paid in US dollars. The traders however,
pay the villagers in Indonesian rupiahs and so benefit from the plunging exchange rates.
Profits at the village level are far below what they could be if the controlled harvest of top
shells in sasi areas was legal and villagers could gain direct access to the foreign market.
10.4 Sasi Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Nolloth is one of the villages where sasi is still strong. The practice of sasi dates back at least to the
colonial period (Huliselan 1996, pers. comm.). Sasi rules in Nolloth, whether implemented by kewang,
church or the village government, are based on adat or customary law. In the absence of a formal
and legal mandate to manage the marine village territory, adat provides village authorities with the
legitimacy to undertake resource management and collect resource rents, both within and outside
of sasi (Hualopu 1991). The adat rules are, in effect, the constitutional rules of the sasi institution.
Under adat law, the rights, authority and obligations of the kewang are defined, as well as the
boundaries of the village territory and the marine sasi area. The rights of villagers to enter
common property areas and utilize natural resources are recognized and supported. Some of
these de facto rules and customs are written down, others are not, i.e., the decision-making
process (see Appendix 6 for Nolloth sasi rules).
The traditional sasi institution (sasi adat) has been complemented with a type of sasi controlled by
the church (sasi gereja) that is applied on coconuts. These arrangements are also not written down.
On land, sasi defines the areas belonging to different families and thus manages the resources
as a private property system under constitutional rules. The sea, on the other hand, is by its
nature seen as a common property resource with defined access rights in the sasi area. Within
the village territory, local residents and their non-resident children have rights of access and
withdrawal for all living marine resources except those under sasi or other village regulation
(see below). Adat allows sasi authorities (the kewang and village government) to exclude
outsiders from fishing in the village territory, or at least require that they ask permission
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Collective-choice rules under sasi determine what types of activities may be controlled in the
village, define a process and confer authority on certain leaders to resolve land and resource
disputes. These rules also define the structure of marine sasi as an institution that regulates
access and withdrawal rights in the marine sasi area. Examples of collective-choice rules are
that the responsibility for patrolling the sasi area lies with the kewang, or that sanctions for
stealing sasi resources are applied by the village head and the police.
Various sets of operational sasi regulations control the harvest of certain commercially important
marine resources and terrestrial crops. These operational sasi rules are written down.
Harvesting is only allowed during the open season (buka sasi). Coconuts, for example, are harvested
every three months for one week. The season is usually opened before Christmas so that people
have money and food for the celebrations. Operational rules like these are not static and if no longer
appropriate, they can be changed.  Sasi on young pineapples, for example, is no longer enforced.
Under marine sasi the harvest of marine products, e.g., top shells and sea cucumbers, is
regulated by the proclamation of operational rules (Table 10.4). During the closed season,
access rights and rights of withdrawal are materialized through prohibitions on entering into
the sasi area and on the use of certain fishing techniques. Evidently, the rights of withdrawal
are restricted to the winner of the auction (KUD) and its assigned helpers. Common villagers
cannot enter the area and partake in the harvest unless they are hired by the KUD. Outside
the sasi area, harvest rights are sold on a regular basis, primarily to Butonese fishers.
Some rules are rather specific. The harvest of corals and large rocks is limited to what is
needed to build a house, with a maximum of 2 m_ per person. However, even though most
people know that these rules exist, there may be confusion over exactly where the rules are
applicable. Some rules are embedded in formal government rules. For example, for larger
amounts of corals, according to the village government, a permit from the sub-district level is
required. However, when asked about coral harvesting, the sub-district office declared that
they would never grant a permit because officially, it is prohibited to harvest any coral at all.
Table 10.3. Products whose harvest times are determined under land sasi.
Land sasi operational rules
During closed sasi, it is prohibited to:
• Harvest coconuts (kelapa), pineapples, mangoes, durian, jackfruit,
bananas, nutmegs, areca nuts, and kanari nuts.
• Cut sugar palm and cut sago leaves for roof construction.
• Cut fruit trees and harvest young fruits.
Table 10.4. Operational rules on marine products.
Marine sasi operational rules
During closed sasi, it is prohibited to:
• Harvest sea cucumbers, top shells (Trochus niloticus), Turbo spp., and caping-caping shells in the sasi area.
• Swim in the sasi area except at the harvesting period.
• Use gill nets and poisons in the sasi area at any time.
• Take sand, corals and rocks without permission.
Non-sasi fisheries rules in the village territory
• Non-residents must have permission to fish in the village territory.
• The harvest of sea cucumbers and top shells outside the sasi area is regulated.
• Gill nets can be used only with a permit from the village head.
• Blast fishing and the use of poisons are prohibited in the village territory.Desa Nolloth, Saparua Island        105
In other cases, the operational rules may be overruled by the village head, who has the
authority to make decisions based on constitutional rules (adat). In emergencies, when
individuals ask to open sasi on their own land, permission is usually granted to harvest some
products. For marine sasi, a communal resource, individuals cannot be granted access rights.
However, in exceptional cases, the prohibitions on diving and harvesting may be lifted. Two
occasions may illustrate this. First, in 1997, a research team from the Department of Fisheries
in Jakarta was allowed to harvest top shells for an aquaculture project. Later, an ICLARM-
Hualopu research team was allowed to enter the sasi area to carry out a biological survey.
However, this was only possible under the supervision of the kewang and after permission
from the village head.
In addition to the official sasi area, a part of the village marine territory north of Umisini
(Figure 10.1) is also managed for top shells and sea cucumbers. The ban on net fishing, diving
and swimming is not exercised here. After the sasi harvest is complete, and if the KUD has
agreed to it, Butonese or Madurese divers are usually permitted to enter after having paid a
fee to the village head.
As well as the sasi rules, other formal operational rules exist. Gill net fishing, for example, is
allowed only after explicit permission from the village head and the payment of a Rp100,000
fee. Blast fishing and the use of poisons are banned. These regulations are applied to all
villagers and outsiders.
10.4.1 Marine sasi: the players
Decision-making is carried out by those who, according to adat, have the mandate to do this,
i.e., the raja (who is also village head), the tuan negeri (who also happens to be the head of the
KUD) and the kewang. Marine sasi is operationalized by the kewang in close collaboration with
the village government. Both the kewang and the government are recognized by villagers as
fundamentally adat-based organizations.
Because marine sasi in Nolloth has evolved into an institution for collecting resource rents for
the village government, it is the village head who holds the key decision-making role. Although
he confers with other authorities, it is really he who decides when and how often the sasi area
will be opened. Also, if thieves are apprehended, it is the village head who imposes and
collects the fine and who decides whether to turn the offenders over to the police.
The kewang’s main role is to patrol the area but its members do not have the mandate to
punish offenders (see below). The kewang also monitors the size of the shellfish and sea
cucumbers in the sasi area. When the products under sasi are big enough to be harvested, the
kewang members inform the head of the kewang who will report to the village head. In a meeting
with the harvesters (in this case, the KUD), the traditional authorities, and the church minister,
a date is set to open the season.
Although the church plays a part in land sasi, and prayers accompany marine sasi ceremonies,
the minister is not among the decision-makers or enforcers for marine sasi. As villagers
explained, fish are too important to be under church sasi because an infringement of the rules
would be punished by God and this would be too hard on people who are dependent on fish
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The KUD has no decision-making role, but has an economic interest, especially now that it
organizes the harvest and division of the catch. The KUD officials and the members (to a
lesser extent) share in the catch/revenues. The common villagers play no active role in sasi
and are merely recipients of the indirect benefits derived from sasi.
Sasi is clearly a village-based institution. Outside organizations are not involved in sasi or
decision-making. The police will only interfere on the request of the village head.
10.4.2 Ceremonies for marine sasi
The decision to close sasi is made by the village head and the head of the kewang. To close sasi,
the kewang members gather in the house of the pakter (kewang leader), then proceed to the
village head’s house and from there to the Baileo or community house. At each street corner, a
kewang member blows the sea shell, while the head of the kewang announces the sasi regulations
(specific products and places). After the sasi signs (palm fronds tied to a stick) are put up, the
ceremony is proclaimed over and sasi is closed.
When sasi is opened, there is a communal prayer in the office of the village government where
villagers await the arrival of the attendants for “buka sasi”. The real ceremony to open marine
sasi takes place at the sea-shore near the sasi area. With the village officials and kewang in
attendance, the tuan negeri makes a speech explaining how important sasi is and how the
kewang is responsible for guarding the area. This is followed by a prayer by the minister. All
the players (village government, traditional and religious leaders, and the kewang members)
then go out to sea, where the minister prays again for a rich harvest. The village head utters
an invocation in the traditional language and then sprinkles fresh water over the sea as a
symbolic gesture. Sasi is declared open. Skin divers, hired through the village cooperative,
harvest at least three top shells and there is a break during which everyone rests and eats a
traditional feast (patita) provided by whoever has won the auction for harvest rights. Then
the divers continue their work (see Figures 10.2-10.10).
Figure 10.2. Village authorities, Kewang menbers, and invitees
gather on the beachDesa Nolloth, Saparua Island        107
10.4.3 The harvest
In the past, sasi on top shells was opened every three years and all villagers who wanted to
could participate in the harvest. Top shells were valued as a food source. In the late 1960s, top
shells became a commercially interesting commodity and in 1968, the harvest was brought
under government control. Later in 1978, the village government, with the consent of the
people, decided to sell the right to the sasi harvest to outsiders in order support the village
administration. The result was that common villagers saw their rights of access and extraction
being exchanged for a system where they would only get indirect benefits.
Profits from the sale of top shells and sea cucumbers were attractive. However, during the
1980s, the former village head opened sasi every six months. The result was that the harvest
dropped dramatically from 1,200 kg in 1988, to only 50 kg in 1994 (Evans et al. 1997). Now,
with the new village head, they are back to a longer closed season (approximately two years).
Sasi was closed throughout 1995 and opened near the end of 1996, and again, in January 1998.
Formerly, the right to harvest in the sasi area was sold to the highest bidder. This could be an
outsider (e.g., Chinese traders from Ambon) or a local who hired clan members and friends
to dive for the top shells. It also happened that a villager was “sponsored” by a Chinese
trader to buy the rights. Common villagers without connections were excluded from the
harvest. However, resistance against this style of business grew and the villagers objected to
the sale of harvest rights to outsiders. To have more control over the harvest and more benefits
for the villagers, in 1995 after his installation, village head Huliselan decided to arrange the
harvest and sale of top shells through the village cooperative (KUD).
The harvesting is done by selected KUD members (skin divers). In 1998, they received Rp5,000
per kg of shells, which is about a third of the final sale price. Once the harvesters and other
expenses have been paid, the profits are split evenly between the village government and the
KUD. The village head will then contribute a part to the church and the kewang. The money
for the village treasury is meant to be redistributed as the benefits to the village population in
the form of development projects.
The total revenues from marine sasi can be considerable. The price per kilo (3-5 large shells)
in 1996 was Rp14,000 (USD6, 1996 rate) and in 1997, Rp17,000 (USD7, early 1997 rate). Before
the currency crisis, that meant that a 1,000 kg harvest could yield about Rp14 million or up to
USD6,000 gross returns. In January 1998, sasi was officially opened again. The total catch of
460 kg top shells and 67 kg sea cucumbers was larger than in former years, but lower than
expected. Previously, the divers had calculated that a harvest of over a 1,000 kg was feasible,
but when they entered the shallow waters, most of the large shells were gone. Villagers believe
the top shells were probably stolen during the Christmas activities in the village. The catch
was sold for Rp19,500/kg for the high quality shells (300 kg) and Rp9,500/kg for the rest. The
total yield was approximately Rp7.3 million, which at the then current exchange rate (1998)
was only USD730.
Since trade in sea cucumbers has proven lucrative, the village head is studying the feasibility of
sea cucumber culture at Tinauw in the sasi area. The villagers plan to have a holding area of
stakes, planks and nets, feed the young ones with mangrove leaves and harvest every six months.108        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Figure 10.9. Opening of Trochus shell. Figure 10.10. The ritual ends with a
feast.
Figure 10.7. A diver enters the water and Figure 10.8. Other boats enter the
comes up with the frist Trochus shell. water.
Figure 10.5. The traditional authorities Figure 10.6. The village head
pronounce the opening of sasi. pronounce the ceremonial words and
sprinkles the water over the sea.
Figure 10.3. Kewang members await Figure 10.4. Prayer for the sasi ritual.
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10.4.4 Enforcement
Enforcement of sasi on land crops is traditionally in the hands of the kewang. Nolloth has two
kewangs (one from each clan group). Each has a leader, or head of the kewang, and both are
under the authority of a man called the pakter. The 40 kewang members are selected from
particular families. The kewang has a secretary, a treasurer, and two marinyo (news bearers).
When informed of an offense, kewang members will immediately go and try to make an arrest.
They try to be fair in their approach and not cause bad feelings (and so maintain their legitimate
position). When a thief is caught, the fine money goes to the kewang. Every villager is obliged
to report sasi violations to the elders or the kewang. However, cases that concern family and
friends are complicated matters and often go unreported. Villagers themselves play no role
in enforcement.
Where there is a difficult problem with a persistent violator of land sasi, the kewang will ask
the village head to help with enforcement or punishment. In the past, people were publicly
sentenced, and would serve as an example. For instance, they could have to wear a sign around
their neck that said: “Do not do what I did”. Nowadays, offenders can be forced to work in
the village (road construction, cleaning of the village), or may face corporal punishment at
the hands of the village head. Serious offenders and especially outsiders may not be prosecuted
locally, but are reported to the police in Saparua Kota.
The marine sasi area is guarded by the kewang members who stay in their two guardhouses.
They take turns in guarding the area. Armed with knives and bamboo sticks, they patrol
along the beach. However, the kewang lacks equipment such as motorboats, communication
devices and modern weapons. Also, the remoteness of the sasi area makes it hard to control.
In the case of thefts of top shells from the sasi area, the village head imposes large cash fines
directly. Since the proceeds of sasi go to the village, the village head feels this is his
responsibility although it is the kewang who guards the area. Recently, Butonese intruders
were caught in the marine sasi area and punished to serve as an example.
Currently, enforcement based on adat is supplemented by the power of the church. The role of
the church is mainly to perform the prayers for sasi to facilitate religious sanctions. In the
past, thieves have been known to give themselves up to the church when overcome with fear
of spiritual sanctions.
Where, as in Nolloth, the village head plays a key role in enforcement of marine sasi, his
legitimacy is crucial. If the person is not trustworthy or not from the royal clan (raja), his
position as an enforcer is weak.  Such was the case with a former village head (Section 10.2.1).
During his term, intrusion into the sasi area was more common than is the case currently.
This was in part because he himself neglected the rules. When he opened sasi too often,
depleting the resource for what appeared to be personal gain, he undermined the kewang
and, thus, sasi. However, before sasi could collapse, this leader was replaced by a raja who has
a strong position in the village and is very strict. His legitimacy allows him to enforce the
regulations, and he has passed the news to neighboring villages that he is determined to deal
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10.4.5 Compliance
Every month, the kewang members catch one or two locals who steal coconuts from the village
gardens. These are usually poorer villagers or people that indulge in greed. Income depends
for a large part on the personal efforts that people make, and people who steal are usually
considered “just lazy”. Thefts from the marine sasi area also occur. Within six months, there
were two cases of intercepted thefts of top shells from the sasi area by outsiders (none by
Nolloth villagers). In addition, there was the unconfirmed suspicion of a major theft of top
shells over the Christmas holidays of 1997, just before sasi was opened. It is likely that such
thefts are most common in the six months leading up to a harvest, when the top shells are
relatively large and plentiful.
10.4.6 Significance of sasi and local knowledge
The sasi knowledge base shared by the head of the kewang and village elders is still strong.
Common villagers have general knowledge of sasi and they conform to the regulations, but
detailed knowledge is exclusive to adat elders. The current village head, who grew up in
Ambon, was initiated into the sasi rituals by his predecessor and the head of the kewang. The
head of the kewang shared only such knowledge as was appropriate. He is very careful to
guard his knowledge because it is sacred. The head of the kewang and other village elders
expressed concern that they would not live long enough to pass on the knowledge to suitable
descendents. The son of the head of the kewang, for instance, seems uninterested in the
information and thus is not ready to receive it. But to keep the tradition alive, it is essential
that knowledge is passed on to the younger generation.
The two main objectives of sasi are said to be protection of the harvest and theft control. Most
villagers have little practical knowledge about sasi; to them, sasi is part of tradition and people
simply “do what the ancestors did.” What is clear to them though, is that sasi does have
certain benefits. For example, it was mentioned that sasi protects the reef from being damaged
by blast fishing and nets. Otniel Patty, a Nolloth fisherman explained: “Sasi helps to protect
the area from people” and “to keep the fish big and many”. Most villagers and all fishers
interviewed agree that sasi is important because it prevents people from stealing or destroying
the resources. Sasi thus not only ensures that the products are ripe when harvested, but also
that the yield is maximal. This works for forest products and certain marine products, but is
not applied to fish because “people have to live” and a prohibition on catching fish could be
unacceptable (Otniel Patty, pers. comm.). In the sea, conservation in the form of sasi regulations
is only applied on resources that are not essential for people’s livelihood and that have a
considerable market value, i.e., top shells and sea cucumbers.
To most women, marine sasi is less relevant than land sasi. The women gather shells in the
sasi area but there are no sasi rules that directly apply to the species that they harvest. Apart
from a share of the top shell yield, which they get if they are KUD members, the women, since
they cannot work as harvesters, get no direct benefits from marine sasi.
From our interviews, it appeared that younger respondents generally valued sasi and they
believed that traditional village leaders should protect it. They explained that as long as the
relationship between the village government and the people is good, and as long as everybody
collaborates in the management and implementation of sasi, it will be continued. However, to
keep young people involved in sasi, it is necessary that they understand the purpose of sasi
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10.5 External Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
The external institutional and organizational arrangements are the linkages between the village
(government) and outside political organizations or government structures, and other external agencies.
Link with higher government bodies
The link with external government agencies is tenuous. Apart from the family visits from a
sub-district representative, government officials are rarely encountered in the village. Neither
have there been any meetings nor workshops related to marine resource management
organized by higher government levels. The village head meets every three months in Saparua
Kota with other village authorities to exchange information. Fisheries issues, however, are
not discussed here. Fisheries regulations are not a high priority in the village; people are
more concerned about developing the fishery. Besides, there is no government assistance for
monitoring and there is no patrol boat for enforcement. Where the village head is concerned,
the most reliable sources of information on fisheries regulations, besides the radio and TV,
are the Ambon-based NGO Yayasan Hualopu, and friends in the university.
Links between the community and government fisheries management
The regional Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan Tingkat II Maluku Tengah) is involved only in
licensing the pole and line boats, which are licensed for two years at a time. The fisheries
officers deal only with the boat owners.  They have no contact with the crew, and do not give
out information to them or make inquiries concerning the fishery.
Collaboration with other institutions
Yayasan Hualopu has carried out an extension program in Nolloth that aimed to inform people
on customary laws and sustainable resource use. They also assisted with the current evaluation
of management activities. In the past, information on marine issues and on marketing
possibilities of other marine products was provided through their publication “Marinyo”.
External economic influences
The decline in clove prices in the 1990s had a negative influence on the village income.
Consequently, fishery and the trade in top shells and sea cucumbers became more important.
When in February 1998, the government’s monopoly on cloves was lifted, it initially had a
positive impact on the clove price but later in the year, this was nullified by low harvests due
to the drought. The full effect of the monetary crisis is not yet known (1998).
Infrastructure and development projects
There are no major constructions in or around the village. Within the village, there are small-
scale development projects (infrastructure, small enterprises). In the sea, there are plans to
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10.6 Incentives to Cooperate
The keys to resource management are enforcement of, and compliance with, fisheries rules
and regulations. However, various contextual variables affect an individual’s inclination to
participate in, and be governed by, sasi.
Spiritual significance of sasi
Compliance and legitimacy are closely related to respect for the ancestral spirits and God.
People in Nolloth believe that neglecting traditional rules or pledges results in illness or even
death. Ceremonies are essential to win the ancestors’ approval and to keep harmony, and
they need to be carried out in the proper, prescribed way and by the appropriate people. Fear
of, and respect for, ancestral powers are, therefore, profound. “Sasi is something from the
ancestors, it needs to be followed.” (Otniel Patty, pers. comm.).
Legitimacy
The sasi rules in Nolloth are the result of a collective process nested in adat and, therefore,
highly legitimate. Adat, the traditional customary law, provides the constitutional basis of
sasi as an institution. The village officials explained: “Adat is important, and adat cannot be
changed. People acknowledge adat and this is their incentive to accept the rules and regulations
that come with it.”
The overlap between formal and traditional village authorities in Nolloth is very high
compared to other villages. The village government is, therefore, seen to be highly legitimate.
The legitimacy conferred upon the village head, through his association with sasi and adat, is
an incentive for him to support and participate in sasi.
Sasi can and does evolve through time, as seen in Nolloth. With the increasing involvement
of the church, the sasi institution has become both more complex and even more legitimate in
the eyes of the people. On the other hand, the minister also comes to share the legitimacy and
respect of adat through his association with sasi.
Status
There was no clear answer to the question why Nolloth still has sasi while it has been lost in
many other villages. But although the villagers could not give an explanation for the strength
of sasi, they felt it was important to have sasi. They were proud to be a sasi village and not in
the least because of the attention of researchers, NGOs, and tourists that are attracted to the
village. This pride and status apply to all the (traditional) village officials and kewang members.
Economic benefits
Village leaders make decisions concerning the harvest and sale of sasi resources: a position
that is not only prestigious, but also allows them certain powers and economic benefits. The
kewang members earn little in the way of economic benefits, but for them, the status makes up
for their efforts and the time they spend guarding the sasi area and village.
Whereas land sasi benefits the individual landowners, the profits from marine sasi disappear
into the village treasury. The KUD, harvesters, the kewang and church get direct shares, but
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at the discretion of the village government and the villagers have neither knowledge of, nor
control over, the expenditures. However, because the village head is well respected, people
do not complain about the lack of transparency. Like most Mollucan villagers, Nolloth people
believe that their leaders will act for the common good. This belief is an incentive to cooperate.
Most fishers interviewed, however, thought that the people should benefit from sasi directly.
They argue that the revenues from sasi ought to be shared among those who are excluded
from the fishery. Several respondents (Catharina Huliselan, Frederik Matatula, Augustina
Lohenapessy) indicated that under the current arrangement, “the rich benefit more than the
poor.” If the people do not feel they benefit, they will have less incentive to support sasi.
In our survey of 30 fishers, the majority (53%) disagreed with the sale of resource harvest
rights to outsiders. Therefore, the move by the village head to sell the harvest rights to the
local KUD rather than to outsiders was politically wise. At the moment, the enforcement of
sasi regulations is strong and compliance high. However, if in the future, the people do not
support sasi any longer because they perceive it to be too unfair, some will encroach on the
area as soon as the power of the kewang declines.
Individual incentives to comply with sasi rules depend on well-being, income, fish catches
and agricultural yields, in relation to economic needs. These needs include food and housing,
school fees for children’s education and capital to invest in alternative, additional or improved
livelihood activities. In the case of fishing, fishers see the need for new boats, engines and
modern fishing gears. At moments when these needs are difficult to meet (start of school,
monetary crisis, etc.), the temptation to trespass the sasi area will increase.
Sanctions
The sanctions and enforcement by the village head and kewang are an important incentive for
people to comply. The kewang is impartial and vigorous in applying the rules, and, therefore,
respected. The kewang’s authority and the fear of social or religious sanctions is amplified by
the involvement of the church in sasi. “Even if the kewang is strong, the people are very clever
and escape. God, however, is everywhere, and the presence of the church helps the people to
obey the rules” (Otniel Patty, pers. comm.).
Social pressure
In a small village like Nolloth, it is difficult to move unseen. The 40 kewang members live all around
the village, the government and church representatives keep an eye on their fellow villagers, and
besides, there is peer group pressure from within the church organizations. It is hard to commit an
offence without being spotted, and the social pressure to comply with the rules is likewise strong.
Conservation of scarce and valuable resources
Nolloth has valuable resources, i.e., top shells and sea cucumbers, for which there is a strong
market demand. These initially provided the incentive to institutionalize and then strengthen
marine sasi as a means of collecting resource rents. The continuing success of sasi, in providing
sustainable harvests in the face of virtual extinction of these resources in other areas, is an
incentive to maintain the institution. The Nolloth villagers have already experienced the
dramatic decline in harvests that follows when sasi is opened too often, as happened under
the former village head in the 1980s. This experience has helped them appreciate the
importance of careful management of the sasi area.114        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Acknowledgment of problems in the fishery
The acknowledgment of fisheries problems differs more between young and old people than
between males and females. Over-fishing is a problem particularly mentioned by older fishers.
Many younger fishers have limited knowledge of management issues and are not too concerned.
This is also the case with women who have a strong idea that sea resources cannot be depleted
because they are a “gift from God”. Therefore, although some people do think it is important to
protect the resource, the idea that marine resources are infinite is still strong, and young men,
especially, tend to think in terms of intensifying rather than managing the fishery.
Attitudes
Laziness and greed were often mentioned as a reason for people to non-comply. Most offenses
committed by young people involved theft of coconuts, simply because they were “greedy”.
Another reason for non-compliance is the current tendency towards individualism as the
result of modernization. Several times, it was mentioned that people need education on natural
resource management and must become aware of the fact that natural resources have to be
protected. This is believed to be one way of increasing compliance.
10.7 Patterns of Interaction
The history of sasi in Nolloth shows that the system is a common property regime of which
the access rights and the rights of withdrawal have changed. In the late 1960s when top shells
became a commercially interesting commodity, government officials realized that the sasi
system offered an institutional and legal means to control the top shell harvest and its profits
(Zerner 1995). In Nolloth in 1968, Matatula, the village-level government head, issued a
proclamation declaring the existence of sasi on top shells within community waters and
asserted control over sasi on behalf of the local government (Matatula in Zerner 1995). From
a common pool resource where, at set times, the whole community could harvest, the rights
of extraction have become limited to a defined group within the community (divers appointed
by the village cooperative).
The benefits are divided amongst the appointed harvesters, the KUD and the village
government. It is stressed that the benefits are for the community as a whole in the form of
village development. The villagers benefit indirectly and some villagers benefit more than
others (e.g., KUD members).  Also, common villagers no longer have the rights of extraction
or the rights of access. In theory, the resource is still managed as a common property, but now
that benefits flow to the village government, in practice, the property rights regime has changed
from communal to private property. The benefits are for the community, but it is the village
leader who makes the decisions on how to spend the revenues for village development.
This is an important issue in the functioning of sasi and compliance to the sasi rules. In Nolloth,
compliance to sasi and other fisheries rules depends, for a large part, on the position of the
village leader. At first when the former village head controlled the benefits from sasi, villagers
complained and compliance was said to decline. However, before sasi could collapse, a new
village head took his seat in the village government. Based on his highly traditionally legitimate
position and a strong kewang system, the sasi rules are currently complied with.
Compliance, however, must also be seen in the light of marine resource use in general. The
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fishers have always ventured far to sea in their small boats to catch skipjack, tuna and other
pelagic species. This reduces pressure on the sasi area and also decreases any incentive to
break sasi rules.
In the past (15-20 years ago and more), most fishers targeted reef fish within the village marine
territory, and fish were both abundant and cheap. However, with the introduction of nylon
gill nets, the area became too crowded with nets and fish were rapidly depleted. Fishers moved
increasingly into the pelagic fishery. In response, the village government instituted rules to
limit the use of gill nets on the inshore reef by imposing access fees.  In this case, the rule was
developed outside of sasi and applied to the entire village territory.
There is a general agreement, especially among the village elders, that the depletion of the
reef fish stocks was caused by over-fishing. People are becoming more environmentally aware,
and sasi is said to be important for protection of natural resources.  Even so, management in
the form of a closed area and regulated harvest is applied only to several sedentary species in
the sasi area.
For the pelagic fishery, the village government follows the general policy set out by the national
government, which is to try and further expand the fishery (Budiman 1982 and Hannig 1988
in Mantjoro 1996). Nolloth fishers are involved in government programs that supply
motorboats and larger nets with fine meshes. Although the village government sees the need
to address the decline in the fishery, regulations limiting the number of fishers or types of
gears allowed are not part of the strategy. The importance of fish as a primary source of
income and food impels the village government to opt for intensification instead of
management. The results (higher yields) are “promising”. At a meeting, the village officials
explained: “It has already become better since they became motorized and can go further to
get the fish.” It is thus clear that compliance within a limited area – whether communal or




1. The role of fishers in management
The role of fishers in management is seen as having improved compared to the past, but is
expected to remain stable in the future (Table 10.5). Some fishers mentioned education as
enabling them to partake in discussions. However, the hierarchical structure in the village
keeps fishers from direct involvement in decision-making and this is not likely to change in
the near future. Compared to the other villages, Nolloth has the smallest proportion of fishers
(33.3%) who actually want to change the fisheries rules. The majority (56.7%) agree with the
current regime.
When asked about power-sharing, 60% of fishers thought the government had most or total
responsibility for fisheries management, 33% thought the people shared responsibility equally
with the government, and the remaining 7% felt the community had more responsibility.116        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
2. Access to resources
The fishers’ individual access to fisheries resources has significantly declined and they expect
more restrictions in future. The respondents explained that this is caused by the fact that
there are more and more regulations and the requirement of permits. Over 50% of the fishers
thought it was acceptable to ask for dispensation to enter the sasi area. This does not mean
that this would be granted (because it would not), but reflects the fishers’ wish to have
flexibility in the application of rules.
3. Distribution of means of production
The distribution of means of production among Nolloth fishers is perceived to be much fairer
now than in the past, and it is expected to improve further. Ownership of fishing gears is seen
to be related to personal ambition and willingness to work. Therefore, the fishers argue that
everybody who wants to, could work for fishing gears etc. Besides, there are the government
programs that include the fishers and help them generate money.
4. Income distribution
When asked about the level of economic disparities between the villagers, fishers reported
that conditions have remained the same. The village women distinguished three social classes:
the rich, the medium (who are just able to send their children to school in Ambon), and the
poor (who live on a subsistence level). Social status is easily recognized in the housing situation
of the villagers. Fishers appear to be mostly in the middle and lower classes. Contact between
the different classes seems limited. One fisher mentioned that the drop in clove prices positively
influenced the level of economic disparities, because, although it had a dramatic effect on
Nolloth’s economy, it leveled out the incomes of people in the village. Individualism caused
people to look only for their personal advancement, resulting in competition.
Although in the minds of fishers, sasi appeared to provide more benefits to the rich than to the
poor, it was not identified as a factor contributing to economic disparity. This is probably because
sasi applies to a limited area, not to the larger fishery that supports most fishing families.
10.8.2 Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making
The degree to which fishers have been able to communally make decisions with regard to the
fishery has decreased and future expectations are negative. Many fishers (77%) saw the style
of decision-making in the village as being a process of common or majority agreement. The
other fishers felt that the village head, with the village government staff, makes all the
decisions. In fact, whether or not the people are involved in decision-making at all depends
mainly on the village leader.
A number of factors may have had an effect on decision-making.  It could be that the
introduction of modern fishing gears has caused divisions among harvesters Also, over the
last years, some fishers have seen their access and harvest rights in the sasi area being decreased
in favor of fishers who are members of the KUD.  The introduction of national fisheries rules
directed to the village from Jakarta could add to a feeling of alienation. Finally, the soa system,
in which the community members were represented through their clan leader, has been
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All in all, only 10% of the respondents felt that local groups had no role in decision-making at
all. Most respondents (87%) said that outsiders had no influence in village decision-making,
but all agreed that every stakeholder should be involved in decision-making.
6. Ease of entry (costs)
Entry into the fishery is perceived to be, on an average, more difficult because of rising costs.
Fishers expect costs to rise even more in the future. In Nolloth, fishing has become more
expensive because people cannot fish in the sasi area; they have to go further out to reach
pelagic resources and they have to buy new types of gears in order to have good catches. The
recent increase in the price of fuel and the currency devaluation make fishing and purchase
of fishing gears and engines even more expensive.
7. Control over access
Government control over access to the fishery has increased and is expected to become stronger
in the future. This is especially the case where it concerns the enforcement of sasi. Over 50% of
the fishers felt that they should be able to ask for and get harvesting rights in the closed sasi
area if needed. Strikingly, relatively many fishers (43%) found it no problem to sell rights to
outsiders.  In contrast, our key informants had stated that fishers/villagers strongly objected to
the sale of harvest rights to the Chinese because they wanted to keep the benefits for themselves.
8. Compliance
Compliance with fisheries rules as perceived by our respondents is said to be relatively high
(score 7.47) and has not changed significantly over time. This is contrary to the fishers in the key
informant interviews who stated that compliance has become better now that there is a new village
head who is trustworthy. There are no changes in compliance to be expected in the future.
10.8.3 Social sustainability
9. Family well-being
Generally, family well-being is moderate compared to other villages and has remained stable
over the years. No changes are expected in the future.
10. Income
The actual income of people has not changed dramatically, but individuals noted an upward
or downward change depending on whether they have seen their catches increase (fishers
with modern gears), or decline (artisanal fishers).
11. Tradition of collective action
Most fishers perceive the tradition of collective action in Nolloth to be stable over time. Many
fishers rate past performance very highly (score 9-10). The comments that some fishers made
about this question indicated a perception that people’s interests are shifting towards individual
profits due to economic pressures. Still, the church and the village government collaborate closely
in organizing the villagers. The decision to sell the sasi harvest rights to the KUD instead of to
outsiders is a good example of cooperation between the leading village institutions.118        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
12. Discussion of village issues
Discussion of village issues is perceived as being relatively high (score 8). There are no
significant changes over time. From the interviews, it became clear that management problems
of the fishery in the village area are not publicly discussed.
13. Village harmony
Village harmony is highest compared to other villages (score 6.20), and has not changed
significantly over time. Conflicts generally arise over land, sago and cloves. Alcohol abuse
was also mentioned. At the village level, conflicts are more apparent, especially in cases where
outsiders try to illegally harvest sasi products. Others, however, had the opinion that conflicts
in the community were less now than in the past. An important role is played by the village
head, who is legitimate and trusted by the people. The harvest rights and boundaries of the
sasi area are also generally accepted.
10.8.4 Biological sustainability
14. State of the marine resources and fish catches
The general condition of the marine environment has drastically declined. Fishers perceived
an average 31% decline over the past 15 years, and they expect conditions to decline another
15% in the future (also see Section 10.1).
15. Fish catches
Fish catches have also reduced drastically. The average drop noted was 38%, and the fishers
expect a further decline of 20% in future. In Nolloth, the main problems causing both general
decline of the resources as well as declining fish catches were said to be: 1) pollution, 2)
intensification of the fishery, and 3) the use of modern gears.
Nevertheless, biological surveys indicate that Nolloth has better than the average live coral
cover compared to other Saparua shores (Tables 9.1-9.4). Also, fishers report that the fishing
is better in the sasi area than elsewhere, suggesting that the management system does have a
positive effect on the state of the inshore resource.
10.9 Synthesis
Nolloth is an example of a village that has successfully integrated traditional and formal
government structures. Decisions are made by the village government, but with the implicit
consent of the villagers who trust the government to make the right decisions for them. The
village head has a powerful position, but he is legitimate, respected, and trusted not to abuse
that power. The political structure theoretically allows participation or open discussions, but
the common villagers (women and the poor, in particular,) are excluded from decision-making.
In some cases, they could work through clan leaders, who are government officials, to get
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Not everybody is selected to partake in the government programs that aim to improve the
livelihood of poor villagers. The ones not included feel that the village government does not
address their concerns. These people, who represent the lower social classes in Nolloth, have
less confidence in the village government and say that “they take care of themselves.”
Women in the village are marginalized and have a dependent attitude. Communication among
women also seems minimal where it concerns village issues or problems. This is possibly a
result of village organizational structures that are hierarchical and leave little space for internal
discussions. Ordinary women have no voice and are not well represented within the women’s
organizations. When it comes to village affairs and decision-making, the women generally
show a lack of interest.
Nolloth has a relatively strong local resource management system because it has a strong
village government and an organizational structure that includes traditional authorities. The
village has clearly defined operational rules that are written down, executed according to
accepted collective rules and based on adat constitutional rules. Compliance to the rules is
high, not in the least because of an active and functional kewang system. Nolloth does face
difficulties defending its territory against outsiders. In these cases, the Saparua police force
can be counted upon to assist, but only if the kewang catches the offenders first.
The Nolloth form of sasi confers certain economic benefits to the village, in general, and to
the ruling elite and their associates, in particular. Leaders associated with the institution are
also rewarded with high social status. However, the institution cannot be said to be inclusive
or democratic. In fact, the originally common property regime has become a system with
private property rights.
Table 10.5.  Results of the performance analysis in Nolloth. n=30 heads of fishing households. ns=trend
not significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01,  ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Average change Average future
current  through time expectedchange
condition  (statistical significance) (statistical significance)
on scale of 1-10
Equity
1. Role of fishers in management 7.63 1.2667** +13%  0.1000ns +1%
2. Access to marine resources 6.60  -1.6667*** -17%  -0.8667*** -9%
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears 7.63  1.7333*** +17% 0.4667* +5%
4. Economic equality 6.67 -0.4333ns -4% -0.5667ns -6%
Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making 6.77 -0.8667* -9% -0.5333** -5%
6. Ease of entry into the fishery 7.20 -1.0333* -10% -1.000*** -10%
7. Control over access to fishery 7.30 1.1667* +12% 0.4000* +4%
8. Compliance with fishery rules 7.47 0.4333ns +4% -0.5000ns -5%
Social Sustainability
9. Family well-being 7.13 0.7333ns +7% 0.0333ns +0,3%
10. Income 6.23 -1.0667ns -11% -0.3667ns -4%
11. Tradition of collective action 7.53 -0.8333ns -8% -0.4667ns -5%
12. Discussion of village issues 8.00 0.6667ns +7% 0.0333ns +0.3%
13. Community harmony 6.20 -1.1667ns -12% -0.7667* -8%
Biological sustainability
14. Marine resource health 5.63 -3.1333*** -31% -1.5333*** -15%
15. Fish catch 5.23 -3.7667*** -38% -2.0333*** -20%120        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The village government uses the financial benefits from marine sasi for development projects
and infrastructure. The villagers thus benefit indirectly. To the villagers, sasi is meaningful,
especially in regulating thefts and general destruction of resources. It is considered relevant
and important to village life and “people are used to it.”  The cooperation of traditional and
government authorities and the church, in the context of sasi, serves as a model for cooperation
in village life and contributes to social sustainability.
Fishers, as a group, do not participate in the development of sasi and other fisheries regulations,
and there is mild resentment over the fact that the system of selling harvest rights seems to
benefit the rich more than the poor. The sasi system thus proves not very equitable, but it is
still highly legitimate. On the other hand, sasi in Nolloth is certainly efficient: decisions are
made with a minimum of fuss by a respected central authority and the rules are enforced at
no cost by volunteers in the kewang. The biological outcomes are also positive. Despite the
severe general resource degradation, the sasi area has relatively healthy resources. Sasi rules
are only applied to two commercially interesting products in a small area and sasi, therefore,
has little impact on the larger fishery.
Although the ladder survey indicated strongly that marine resources (and fish catches) are in
decline, fishery problems in the sense of over-fishing are not generally acknowledged. Pollution
and the use of modern fishing techniques are seen as having a major impact on the fishery but
interventions to deal with these are not suggested. Although they need to go further and further
for their daily catch, most fishers still catch enough to cover their daily needs. The impact of the
decline is also obscured by the fact that fish prices have increased and, thus, rewards are still
good. The species caught have changed dramatically over the years. From inshore fishing on
demersal fish, the fishery is now nearly fully geared towards pelagic fish in the open sea.
However, there are no plans for enhanced fisheries management outside of the sasi regulations.
The sub-district, regional and provincial levels of government do not support monitoring or
enforcement of fisheries regulations in Nolloth. Since sasi regulations are limited in scope
and area of application, there is a need for more elaborate fisheries management. Collaboration
between village and outside organizations such as Yaysan Hualopu are, therefore, important.
Collaborations with other institutions should be developed to: 1) educate people and
complement people’s knowledge on the environment to facilitate resource management, 2)
support a process to monitor sasi, and 3) facilitate productive activities (additional income) to
support sasi. There is also a need for higher government levels to provide more information,
suitable legislation, and support.Desa Haruku and Sameth, Haruku Island        121
Chapter 11
Desa Haruku and Sameth, Haruku Island1
11.1 Physical, Biological and Technical Attributes
11.1.1 Physical environment
As the story goes, the history of Haruku village dates back to the 8th century. Haruku and Sameth
were situated in the mountains of Haruku Island, together with the kingdom of Alakka that
consisted of five villages. Initially, the Alakka people conquered Haruku and Sameth, but in a
second battle, the victory was for Haruku. The Alakka kingdom was divided into what are now
the villages of Hulaliu, Pelauw, Kabauw, Rohomoni, and Kailolo. The confiscated land areas
were returned to Haruku and that is how the village is today.  The people of Sameth live in
close proximity. In fact, the two villages run together and from the sea, appear to be one village.
The Haruku village is situated on the west side of Haruku Island. Haruku Strait separates it
from Ambon Island. Arriving by boat, the dominant structures seen are a large church and
remnants of the old Dutch fort “Zeelandia”. Over land, the village is more difficult to reach
because of the mountainous topography and steep roads.
1 Data tables for case study village can be found in Appendix 3.
The village has a large forest garden area (360 ha) that starts at Tatuhutu at the west side of the island.
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Figure 11.1  Sketch map of Haruku village territory
(features not necessarily to scale).122        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Haruku’s marine territory is a patchy mixture of sea grass beds, sand and patches of corals.
The sasi area for pelagic fish capture runs along the coast from the village meeting hall (Baileo)
to the kewang house near the mouth of the Learisa Kayeli river. Along this stretch of coast, the
bottom is predominantly sand and sea grass. It is in the Learisa Kayeli river that the lompa
fish (Thryssa baelama spp.) are caught when sasi lompa is open.
The outermost edge of the sasi area in the sea is a coral fringe. The idea of expanding sasi to
cover top shells (Trochus Niloticus) and sea cucumbers in the rocky area near the fringing
coral reef is currently under discussion. The size of these resources has not been estimated.
The purpose would not be commercial, but in the first instance, it would serve simply to
prevent people from taking these species so that their populations could recover.
Since about 1992, a mining consortium has been exploring the Haruku area and has determined
that the island contains an ore body rich in copper, lead, zinc, silver and gold. Although
stating that they would not go into exploitation because this would mean the mass removal
of population, exploration, nevertheless, has continued and there are fears among many
villagers that eventually, a mine will go ahead and they will lose their land.
11.1.2 Biological characteristics
Most Haruku fishers target either pelagic fish exclusively (43%), or both pelagic fish and reef
fish (43%). Fifteen species of pelagic fish and 10 reef fish were recorded as commonly caught
(see Appendix 3). In addition, fishers target squid, sea urchins, and two types of shellfish.
Since 1995, fish catches in Haruku have declined dramatically. The respondents perceived an
overall drop of 30% in fish catches over the past 15 years, and they expect a further decline of 17%
in the future. Also, the state of the marine environment has declined significantly during this
period. Motorboats allow the fishers to go out further to fish and the use of modern techniques
increases fish catches; however, the fishers agreed that these introductions are a major threat to
the fishery. The increasing numbers of nets and lift nets cause fish catches to decline.
Our biological survey has shown that the corals are in poor to moderate condition. Blast fishing
and the use of toxins destroy the coral reefs and are mainly used by intruders from other villages,
particularly from Rohomoni which lies to the north. The negative effects are aggravated by the
mine exploration activities that seem to cause sedimentation of the coral reef patches near the
mouth of the Learisa Kayeli river, and pollution which reduces the water quality.
Illustrative of the decline in resources is the trend in lompa fish harvests in the Learisa Kayeli river.
Reduced yields have been occurring more frequently. When a lift net operating near the mouth of
the Learisa Kayeli river over-fished the stock, the opening of sasi lompa had to be abandoned in
the years 1993-94. Fishers also report that the number of fishers harvesting when sasi lompa is
open has increased.  This happened when, after his visit in 1986, Emil Salim, the Minister of
Environment, invited everybody to join the “famous” lompa fishery. Some fishers, therefore, believe
that their decreased catches are related to the greater degree of competition.
In 1997, the season was exceptionally poor. Early in the season, as usual, the lompa fish were
spotted in the sea and sasi was closed. After a while, the fish vanished never to return. It was
generally blamed on the high water temperature as an effect of El Niño. Others, however,
blamed it on the water pollution caused by the mine. As of today, no research has been carried
out to determine whether the fish stocks are affected by pollution or whether reduced yields
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In the meantime, the kewang and local NGOs are
active in creating a higher awareness with the people
about environmental problems. As a result, the
planting of mangrove trees along the coast has been
promoted, and people are developing a strategy to
stop the mining activities.
11.1.3  Fisheries technology
Almost all fishers own boats (perahus) and 27% also
have motors – a much higher percentage than is found
in most other villages surveyed. The most common
fishing gears are nets (50%), hand lines (27%), spears
and fish traps. Fishers from the shore use cast nets
and beach seines with a mesh size of 2-3 cm. For the
lompa fishery, the women use a small scoop net. The
use of bombs in the local fishery is also reported.
Quite a large number (23%) of fishers owned no
fishing gear at all.
Apart from their activities in the lompa fishery, not many women fish. If they fish, they work
part-time. Jemi Maatita, originally from Nusa Laut, explained how women on her native island
fish with cast nets. However, in Haruku a woman fishing embarrasses the family, and therefore
she has limited her fishing activities to gathering shellfish. According to the women, the
number of shellfish in the sasi area exceeds that of the open-access area.
There are no lift nets owned by Haruku fishers. Formerly, they operated in Haruku waters,
but since they over-fished the stock at the Learisa Kayeli river, the use of lift nets near the sasi
area is restricted by sasi rules.
11.2 Attributes of the Community and Fishers
Haruku is a middle-sized village with a population of 2,122 people who are divided over 480
households. The average household size is six. Five percent of the predominantly Christian
village has an Islamic background (101 people). Each year, about 70 people leave the village
for educational purposes of whom the majority never return when they find work elsewhere.
There is no significant in-migration. Haruku is the only one of the six case study villages that
attracts tourists. Some come to visit the kewang house but most come for the opening of sasi
lompa, which is a real festival. There are no resorts or anything of the kind; visitors reside
with local villagers and pay for bed and breakfast.
The village has its own health center and there are three schools: primary (SD), junior high (SMP)
and senior high school (SMA). Most adults have only primary education (870), but more than 25%
have some higher level of education. The village has a fresh-water supply. Canals, sewer pipes and
septic tanks handle household waste. The village has electricity and some people have TVs.
Transportation links to Haruku are limited. There is only one minibus in the village and
transport to and from the village by road is irregular. From Pelauw, the road is steep and part
Figure 11.2.  Haruku fisher mending
a fishing net.124        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
of the year, inaccessible. From Ambon Island, however, the village can easily be reached by
boat in half an hour and there is a regular boat service. Communication links are minimal;
there is no telephone connection.
Employment
The majority of the employed adults (295) are registered farmers. Cloves are an important
cash crop. Most people combine fishing and farming. Of the 150 registered fishers, only 20
men fish full-time. The number of people involved in various trades and construction activities
is 89, there are 16 vendors in the village, and 42 people are government officials. For all
occupations, the numbers have increased since 1979.
11.2.1 Village government
In 1979, the new village structure became a fact. The LMD, consisting mainly of former
members of the saniri negeri, was chaired by the village head. Three committees were
established to deal with: 1) general affairs, 2) government, and 3) development. However, the
introduction of this new village structure caused a division within the village government:
the formal government bodies, on one side, and the traditional adat institutions (e.g., kepala
soa), on the other. Political stress led to unstable leadership.
The 1997 elections made Jonas Pieter Ferdinandus the new village head. Over the previous 10
years, Haruku was governed by several interim leaders (Table 11.1). Often, interim leaders
come into power if a village head is not able to finish his term in office or if nobody wants to
run for the job after his term ends. In this case, the formal election may be postponed until
there are sufficient qualified and acceptable candidates.
The interim village heads lacked the mandate to restructure the LMD with the result that, at
the time of our research (1997), the LMD was not fully functional. This was aggravated by the
perception that the formal elections in 1997 were manipulated to ensure that a pro-mining
leader won the contest. One of the former village heads and raja, Bertie Ririmasse, was not
allowed to run for office owing to alleged communist sympathies. In fact, he was a popular
leader committed to environmental conservation.  In the end, voter turnout was low and the
new village head became elected with a slender majority. Not only was the village divided,
but within the LMD, a pro and contra group also arose.
Village affairs are currently being managed by the village head, the village secretary and the
vice-chairs of the LMD and LKMD. In the meantime, the village head is trying to reconcile
the LMD members and re-organize it into a functional institution.
Table 11.1.
Village leaders in Haruku




no date Domingus Nanlohi
no date John Polnaya
no date Domingus Ferdinandus
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Because he lacks general support in the village and legitimacy, the position of the village leader
is rather weak. Illustrative is the fact that people question his descent while, apparently, the
village head is from a raja line. Besides, according to tradition, he was inaugurated by the kepala
adat Latu Hari Hari to make him also kepala adat or traditional village leader. Representatives
from the Kissya and Hendatu clans were present, as well as the church minister and the kepala
adat of Sameth. Nonetheless, many villagers feel that his leadership is not legitimate.
In Haruku, the shift of authority from the clan to the LMD has seriously undermined the
traditional village structure. The village head explained: “The year 1979 was not a good year
for Maluku. It was a mistake to apply the new structure (Law No. 5, 1979) in every province
because it was designed for the Javanese situation.” Adat leaders, such as the kapitan, the tuan
negeri, the kepala jajano (head of the young women who have marriage partners from outside
the village), and the kepala mangari (head of the young men) are still acknowledged but not
actively involved in the village government. Also, before, the villagers were represented through
the clan (soa) structure. This structure has been replaced by a general, geographically-based
structure and the village is divided into dusuns (RT and RW, see Section 4.3). This has caused
confusion where it concerns, for example, the division of the fish after the sasi harvest. The only
sphere in which the clan system is still functional is social occasions, e.g., funerals and weddings.
The kewang is the only traditional institution that is functioning, but it is operating outside
the formal village government and as such, not acknowledged. In the eyes of the people,
however, the position of the kewang is strong and its authority highly legitimate.
Building on the appreciation by the villagers of adat structures, the village head has proposed
to re-institutionalize some of the old adat rituals and practices and to renovate the Baileo
(traditional community house). One of the customs that will be re-established is that when
somebody marries a person outside Haruku, the newcomer is to be introduced to the
Sahumahu clan. However, whether these attempts will include re-establishment or
acknowledgment of political functions, i.e., the kewang, is not clear.
11.2.2 Village organizations
The KUD was installed in 1981 and has 187 members of which more than 50% are women. The
KUD is prosperous and derives a significant income from the clove trade. The KUD also runs a
kiosk, a savings and credit unit (USP), a unit grinder and it processes the billing for the electricity
company. The KUD is not involved in the sasi harvest. Profits are shared among the members.
Membership fees are high; the initial payment is Rp25,000 (USD10, early 1997 exchange rate)
and members must also save Rp500/month. The KUD officials have well-built houses and own
means of transport such as boats. Although it was stated that the KUD acts autonomously from
the village government, supporters of the former village headman boycott it.
Both government and church women’s organizations are not active. The PKK awaits the
formalization of the new village government and involvement of the wife of the new village
leader. Future activities, however, are already planned, e.g., sowing, gardening, cooking and
general participation of women in village programs. The Pelwata was established in the 1920s
and has 250 members. But they, too, are awaiting the inauguration of a new leader (at the
time of our study, in 1997, the new church minister had just arrived). Their program has the
standard activities. The church also has a men’s group (Pelpri) and a youth wing.
The Kaolina is a sub-group of TAKESRA and was installed in 1997 by government decree. The
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supported by the wealthy who donate 2% of their income. A total amount of Rp800,000
(USD320, early 1997 exchange rate) is administered by the chairlady, Carolina Kissya, and is
used for the small-scale enterprises of the 20 members. If they succeed in repaying the original
loan, they get an additional Rp2 million loan to start a larger enterprise.
The IDT government program to support the poor, consists of four savings groups of 25 people
each (men and women). The beneficiaries are selected by the village government. Every month,
the profits of the kiosk and credit unit are divided amongst the members. So far, they have
performed well. There is good financial management and more groups will be established later.
Learisa Kayeli is a local organization that is occupied with environmental issues (nature
conservation) and the implementation of adat. Up until 1998, the organization was led by
Bertie Ririmasse and collaborated closely with the kewang. Haruku is the only case study
village that has an environmental organization.
11.2.3 Role of women
Since the late 1980s, and especially after the drop of the clove price in 1991, marine resources
have become increasingly important. Many women are directly dependent on the sea as a
source for food and income. The lompa fish that the women catch are dried and so provide
food for several months. Naturally, sasi is very significant to the women in Haruku. “Sasi
covers everything”, they say. However, the women regret there is no sasi on young fruits in
the home gardens because theft is prevalent. The women know the sasi rules and live in
accordance with them, but have no mandate to change or adapt them.
Historically, women played an important role in the village. There are stories of female village
leaders and kewang members, but over the years, this has changed and now men occupy all
the important political positions. The concept of “women being less capable than men” limits
women’s role in decision-making and reduces their activities to those related to their role as
household manager, e.g., income-generating activities, treasurer in village organizations, or
as food provider at festivities.
Women are informed of new laws or government decisions through the church or PKK. Women
are not allowed to speak at formal meetings, and if they have any suggestions, they would
have to submit them informally through a kewang or LMD member, the church minister or the
village head. As a consequence, the women’s self confidence in the political sphere is low.
Although in our interviews, they came up with some relevant ideas, they do not see how they
could contribute to the village because they feel “they are only small fishes”. Our respondents,
of whom a third considered women to be completely outside of decision-making processes,
confirmed this idea.
Interesting is the fact that the village head suggested, as part of the re-organization of the
village government, that women (as well as commoners) should be able to take a seat in the
newly to be installed LMD.
11.2.4 Fisher profile
The average age of the respondents was 50 years, and 37% of them were under 45. Only one
woman was interviewed. Relatively few of the fishers (67%) were actually born in Haruku;
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The fishers have, on an average, 6.8 household members. Children that have left the village
have gone for work, and less often to school or to be married. Almost 30% of the fisher households
in our sample have an externally derived income of, on average, Rp343,500 (USD137, early
1997 rate) per year. The standard of housing in Haruku was relatively low. A third had type 4
housing (cement with zinc roof), while the others had wooden or gaba-gaba (palm) houses.
The economic indicators, made up of adding scores for land ownership, boat type, house and
gear, averaged 8.3 (with a standard error of 0.42). This puts Haruku into the middle third of
all the 28 villages in the performance study. When TV ownership is factored in, the score
becomes 8.7, leaving Haruku (with Nolloth and Seri) in the lower half of the case study villages.
Most respondents are land owners (83%), but, on an average, 66% of the family income is
from fishing. The fishers were highly experienced. The average number of years the men had
spent fishing was 30. They spend on average 8 hours at sea each day, with 6-10 hours being
most common. Despite the long days at sea, the men were generally satisfied with their job.
Most men stated that they are used to fishing, but over 40% would change jobs if they could
find less strenuous work as a salesman, carpenter, mechanic, etc. Also for their children, the
majority preferred other jobs over fishing, with a strong preference for government positions.
11.3 Market Attributes
On an average, 26% of fish caught are eaten by the family. Seven fishers from our sample of
thirty eat more than half of their catch. Seven others do not eat any of the fish they catch. A
large part (70%) of fish sales is direct to consumers, mostly in the local market. The fisher or
his wife usually sets the price. The rest reaches larger markets, e.g., Ambon, through
wholesalers or through female fish vendors (papaleles). The key factors in choosing the point
of sale are proximity of the market and the price paid for the fish.
11.3.1 Local fish trade
Besides fish, Haruku women trade all sorts of products such as sago, bread, fruits, etc. Many women
have husbands who work as fisher-farmers so they sell the family’s harvests. The price of fish is set
by the female fish trader, not by the harvester. There are no credit or debt relations between the
female fish traders and their providers. Currently in Haruku, there is a group of female fish vendors
who is assisted in its business through financial capital from the Masohi Fisheries Service in Seram.
11.3.2 Commercial small-scale trade
Trade with other villages and a town is largely in the hands of local female retailers. Their long
years of experience (15-20 years) provide them with a fine nose for marketing. Fish of all kinds
of types and sizes are bought locally or from fishers from other villages (from Tulehu, Waai and
Mamala on Ambon or from Rohomoni on Haruku). The fisher usually will have an arrangement
with a particular retailer. The small-scale traders (papalele) go as far as Oma, Tulehu and Ambon
to sell the fish.  When fish are scarce in Haruku, they bring them back from these markets.
Regional markets (e.g., Masohi on Seram) provide the highest profits to the fish traders, up to
150-200%. Now that fish have become scarcer, the prices, compared to the 1980s, have
increased.  The consumer’s preference for fish, however, has not changed.
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11.4 Sasi Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Haruku has an active sasi system, which defines the use of terrestrial and marine resources as
well as social behavior. The collective and operational rules and regulations are embedded in
adat custom. Sasi was established before the Dutch colonial period and was the result of a
collectively-felt need to protect the village’s natural resources against theft and intrusion from
outsiders. Sasi has had periods of decline but has been fully active since the revitalization of
the kewang in 1979. The sasi rules and regulations are written down in a book composed by
the head of the kewang (Kissya 1995).
The marine resources of Haruku are open-access resources, but in designated parts, resource
use is restricted by sasi rules during certain periods of the year. During sasi, the resource
changes its status to that of a common pool resource to which access is limited and harvest
rights arranged, but where the benefits are for the whole community. The system includes the
principle of redistribution, which forms an important aspect of village life.
The rights of entry and withdrawal are defined under adat law as collective rules and, as
such, guarded by the kewang and the church. Local operational fisheries rules as described in
sasi can, in theory, be applied to any resource as long as they do not contradict national fisheries
law. In Haruku, formal fisheries regulations have been incorporated into the traditional sasi
regulations.
The sasi regulations have been adapted to modern times. New regulations, for example, concern
the use of lift nets, karolo and other fine mesh nets.
Table 11.2. Sasi regulations of the Haruku village.
Land sasi 1. Seasonal prohibition on the harvest of fruits and trees.
2. No trees may be cut along the riverbank except for sago, and these have to be
replaced.
River sasi 1. Seasonal prohibition on the harvest of lompa fish (Thryssa baelama).
2. Prohibition on running or cleaning boat engines in the river and on spilling oil.
Marine sasi 1. Seasonal prohibitions on catching sardinia, momar (Decapterus macrosoma),
make (Clupea fimbricta/stereolepis; Lutjanus sanguinens), kawalinya (Selar
cryonenopthalmus), and tatari (Rastrelliger kanagurta).
2. Seasonal prohibitions on use of boats and nets in the sasi area with the exception
of cast nets that are used from the beach.
3. Prohibition on harvest of top shells (Trochus shell) and sea cucumbers under sasi;
other shell fishing is allowed.
4. Prohibition on the use of lift nets.
5. Prohibition on karolo nets with extreme small meshes.
6. Stones, sand and corals are also under village regulations. For the harvest of corals,
permission has to be asked from the village government and a fee paid
(Rp10,000 per piece).
General 7. There are no auctioned fishing rights (lelang labuan) in Haruku, but non-residents
fisheries rules must ask for permission to fish in the village waters.
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11.4.1 Sasi
River Sasi
For sasi on lompa in the river, a specific set of rules defines the opening and closing of the
river, access rights and division of the catch.
Lompa fish, a sardine-like pelagic fish species, enters Haruku waters yearly.  The immature
fish (ca. 1 cm) are seen off the coast in April or May. Within weeks of their first appearance,
the young fish start running into the river, where they spend the daylight hours. Usually the
ceremony to close sasi is at the moment when the fish are entering the river at spring tide.
When sasi is closed, at every corner of the village, the head of the kewang blows a traditional
trumpet shell and pronounces this closing (nowadays with a megaphone). The head of the
kewang has to go to the mountains to pick a sacred tree for the sticks that are used at the adat
ceremony. According to tradition, the sticks should be secretly taken into the kewang house.
After the ritual ceremonies are complete, the signs, made of sticks and coconut leaves, are set
in place to define the sasi area. From this point on, the river and mouth of the sea are no
longer accessible for fishers so that the fish can grow. Over some months, the fish will swim
from the river down to the sea and back in daily cycles. When after about 6-7 months they
reach maturity (ca. 10 cm), people believe they spawn in the river.  Then the kewang head
picks a date for opening the fishing season.
The night before the opening, the kewang carries out another ritual and people place barriers
into the river so that the fish cannot escape. The opening of sasi is always planned when there
is a low tide in the morning, so that people can easily enter the water to catch the fish. At the
sign from the head of the kewang, everybody (i.e., men, women, locals and strangers) starts
fishing. The village head of Sameth explained: “The opening of sasi lompa is a fiesta; it is a
social event and people share. If somebody would have an empty container, the people of
Haruku would fill it up.” Everybody thus can fish. Later, the fish are gathered and divided. A
great deal of fish are directly consumed in a traditional feast, what are left are dried by the
villagers to be eaten in the following months.
Sasi lompa is an extremely important aspect of village life. It not only provides the villagers
with fish and confirms social relations, but foremost, the ceremony and opening of sasi (buka
sasi) are a spectacular event which attracts visitors from all places, and this means a great
deal to the villagers (see as an illustration, the newspaper article by Hann 1996).
Marine Sasi
Sasi on pelagic fish is closed when the small fish are spotted in the sea, usually around July-
August when there has been a high tide. The kewang and fishers monitor the fish and when
they are big enough and have settled in the sea grass beds, a date will be set by the LMD to
open sasi. When sasi is opened, the head of the kewang performs the rituals according to
tradition while the villagers witness the event.
The fishery is coordinated with Sameth, the neighboring village. After the ceremony, the net
owners will draw lots and groups of 10 to 20 fishers with beach seines enter the water. They
take turns and fish until the efforts exceed the benefits. At the time of our research (July
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The harvest from marine sasi is divided among all villagers, including those who do not fish
by profession. One part is for the church, another for the village head, and a third for the
widows; the rest is divided amongst the households. This principal stems from the realization
that benefits from the sea have to be shared among all villagers. The direct re-distribution of
resource benefits makes Haruku’s marine sasi unique.
11.4.2 Sasi: the players
In sasi, the three principal social institutions play a complementary role or, as the village head
attests: “The village head is the government and arranges it, the church prays for it, and the
kewang watches the people and enforces it.”
The formal village government has no active role in resource management or monitoring. The
village head in Haruku is also inaugurated as kepala adat. This position allows him to open and
close sasi together with the village head of Sameth, the church people and the head of the kewang.
However, compared to Nolloth, the role of the village head is relatively insignificant.
The kewang is the principal institution when it comes to the execution of marine sasi and
enforcement of the rules. Officially, the head of the kewang functions under the authority of the
village head. However, when the kewang and sasi were revitalized in 1979 (see Section 11.4.3),
the sasi rules were written down and revised by the traditional council of clan leaders, and not
by the formal government. The kewang has become a relatively autonomous institution and
only relies on the village government when its members have to deal with offenders of sasi.
The Protestant church of Haruku plays an important role in sasi. The church’s involvement in
sasi on coconuts goes back many years and is executed in collaboration with the kewang. When
sasi on coconuts is closed, the people gather in the kewang house where there is a communal
prayer “to protect the people from stealing.” Cloves have only been under church sasi since
1992 when theft was so intense that the people asked the village head to put the crop under
church sasi. Church sasi has been stable over the last years because the church is independent
from village politics, or as the church minister explained: “People commit to God and not to
the village head.”
The church minister feels strongly that there is a mission for the church in sasi. Gradually, the
church is getting more significant and it is slowly taking over “adat things”. The minister
explained: “Adat is a behavioral code, not a traditional law. The spirit of sasi is adat and thus
part of the culture. But where adat provides the cultural framework, the church provides the
spiritual content. Therefore the church and adat have to merge.”
The formal enforcers (police) play a marginal role. The local policeman assigned by the state
(the catadara) represents formal authority. In reality, his authority is limited and when local
authorities cannot deal with a matter, it is reported to the police in Pelauw. Occasionally, the
police patrol catches a blast fisher, but it does not have its own speedboat. The police station
is 18 km from the village and the police tend to leave the arrest and prosecution of offenders
to the local authorities.
A last organization that may not be very prominent, but that is essential for the future execution
of sasi is the kewang kecil or mini-kewang. It was installed in 1994 by Eliza Kissya (the current
head of the kewang) and is meant for children who assist the kewang, report offenders, and
take care of mangrove reforestation. The group is open for boys and girls from all social classes.
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among young children. Through their involvement in environmental activities, the mini-kewang
members become more aware of the need for nature conservation. Besides, since the children
are from different families, the mini-kewang serves as a bridge between the pro and contra
groups in the village.
11.4.3 History of the kewang
Haruku and Sameth share the kewang for the sea because both villages have access rights to
the same area. For land resources, each village has its own kewang. Eli Ririmasse, the head of
the kewang for the sea, narrated: “A long time ago the ancestors lived in the mountains. The
grandmother of the Ririmasse clan was the leader. Later she met the grandmother of the
Kissya clan who arrived from Ambon and joined the people living in the mountains. When
Haruku moved down from the mountains to the coast, the two women led the ceremony.
They played a very important role in the village beside the raja because they could use black
magic. The women and the raja established the adat institution and developed sasi. They chose
a kewang from each clan and that is why there are two kewangs.”
Throughout history, clashes between the kewang and village leader were prevalent. In 1962 under
village head Johannes Ferdinandus, the head of the kewang resigned and until 1979, the village
had no kewang at all. In 1967, a new kewang head had taken position, but very briefly. He was
not from the original kewang line and when he fell ill, he feared it was caused by the divine
wrath of the ancestors and he quit. At the time, sasi lompa was still performed by the village
officials, and despite the weak enforcement and lack of rituals, people respected the rules.
In the meantime, Eliza Kissya, a descendant from the original kewang clan, learned about the
kewang practices from his uncle. In 1979, he was ready and re-established the kewang. Ely
Kissya became the head of the kewang for the land. The current head of the kewang for the sea
is Eli Ririmasse who was appointed in 1994. He functions under the authority of Kissya who
is the tuan tanah (oldest clan). Since then, the kewang has become a strong institution in the
village when it comes to sasi and natural resource management.  Its position was strengthened
after it won a national environmental award in 1982.
Figure 11.3.  Children, of whom some are mini-kewang members,
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Status is an important reward for the kewang members, especially since the financial benefits
are minimal. The money the kewang members get from fines is just enough to cover their expenses
e.g., for transport, meetings, maintenance of the kewang house etc. The kewang has always been
supported by the former village head, Bertie Ririmasse. Now that the new village head has
arrived, their position is undermined. The new village head encourages the mining operations
in the village, which goes against the conservation goals of the kewang. Because of their
environmental concern, the kewang members had to form an opposition. However, in order to
be formally acknowledged, the kewang needs support from the village head. To be really effective,
and preserve the natural resources of Haruku, the kewang and the village head need to collaborate.
11.4.4 Enforcement
Enforcement is traditionally in the hands of the kewang. The kewang members, the mini-kewang
or regular villagers report violations to the head of the kewang. The head of the kewang will
order his members to catch the culprit. Before, the kewang would act independently. As long
as it concerns relatively small offenses, the head of the kewang still disciplines the offender,
but in more serious cases nowadays, the police will be involved.
The church also plays a role in enforcement. Compliance is stimulated through communal
prayers in which people commit themselves to the sasi rules. The success the church has in
“enforcing” the rules on coconuts and clove leads to the question whether the involvement of
the church should be elaborated.
The church minister acknowledges the ancestral spirits and adat, but feels that the church is
of a higher order and thus could be of more significance. The kewang, on the other hand,
accepts the collaboration with the church, but stresses that sasi is adat and that the role of the
church should be limited. Its members argue that everybody knows the rules, that the ancestors
are involved, and that the adat ceremonies are important to ensure success. In order to
collaborate productively, the church needs to respect these adat structures.
11.4.5 Compliance
There are no available data on rule violations. According to the villagers, compliance is
relatively high due to the tight rules, adat and custom. However, it was stated that the number
of offenses has risen since the current village head came into power. The conflict between the
village head and kewang is a main reason for people to non-comply. A few respondents
expressed economic need and a lack of respect for the kewang. Some of the offenders are poor,
but often, people steal for fun or to test the rules.
11.4.6 Significance of sasi and local knowledge
Sasi is spiritually of great significance as J. Rehena, the church minister, explained: “Everybody
carries it because it is adat and part of their culture”. As part of daily life and culture, everybody
has knowledge about sasi.
Traditional sacred knowledge concerning sasi is in hands of the two kewang heads and adat
elders. Knowledge is passed from father to son, but the head of the kewang had to learn it
from his uncle. The new village head spent most of his time in Ambon and thus did not share
the knowledge that comes with his position. Since he is inaugurated as the kepala adat, he has
to learn about sasi. He derives his knowledge from the former head of the kewang and the
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For the Haruku people, sasi is highly significant. Due to the involvement of Yayasan Hualopu,
a local NGO, the people in Haruku have become more environmentally aware than those in
most other villages. Their idea that sasi is important to “preserve the environment until
everything is ripe, to keep it sustainable and in good shape” is underscored by sasi rules that
are meant to protect resources, e.g., the obligation to plant a tree at the riverbank after you
have cut one, the prohibition on oil spilling and the bans on destructive and overly-efficient
gear types. Although sasi is not exclusively meant to preserve the resources, it creates potential
for sustainable resource management.
11.5 External Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Links between the community and government fisheries management institutions
Recently, an official from the fisheries department assessed the fisheries resources of the village
to see which have potential for development. The government programs in the village were
mainly training: for the LMD, the women’s organization, and for the fishers on the use of
motorboats.
Links with higher government bodies
Links with the higher government levels are limited. Government officers, including fisheries
staff, visit the village irregularly. The village head knows that there are fisheries laws, but
new laws are not actively communicated to the village. Fisheries management in Haruku, as
in the other villages, is not yet an issue and the fishery tends to intensify due to the government
subsidies for new nets and programs such as IDT, which supply new fishing gears.
The village government is subject to the sub-district government. The possibility for the village to
bring up ideas and forward these to the higher provincial or national governments, however, is
limited. The local government could make propositions and deliver them to the sub-district
government for approval, but this office has no independent authority to approve the plan. This
is a problem where it concerns the mining permit, which was issued from Jakarta. There is no
structure that allows either the village government or the kewang to appeal against this decision.
Collaboration with other institutions
Since 1995, Haruku has been the scene for various coastal zone management promotional
activities like workshops. Over the past years, several institutions and organizations have
carried out training and programs: 1) Pattimura University (the Environmental Studies Center
and Fisheries Faculty) on aquaculture and development, 2) local NGOs (e.g., Hualopu and
Baileo) and several government agencies were involved in several training and awareness
programs, 3) JANNI, a Japanese organization, supported a mangrove rehabilitation program,
4) OXFAM has included Haruku in its study tour, 5) the Department of Industry initiated a
wood-carving training, but 6) the most prominent visitors were representatives from Ingold
and Aneka Tambang to give lectures on community involvement in the proposed mining.
External economic influences
In the Strait of Haruku where local fishers operate, they face competition from large-scale
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Infrastructure and development
The environment of Haruku is seriously affected by the mining operations executed by Ingold
and Indometal in collaboration with an Indonesian firm Aneka Tambang. Ingold and Indometal
are Canadian companies that are already promoting shares on the international market based
on the results of their explorations on Haruku and further prospecting on Ambon, Saparua
and Nusa Laut. Now that the preliminary drilling has been successful, the mining operations
will be extended with detrimental effects for the environment and the village society. Already,
the intervention has led to political conflicts and soon there will be severe conflicts over land.
There will be infrastructure changes since the government is planning to provide finances for
road construction and public toilets at the end of 1997.
On the other hand, the operations will be beneficial in terms of job opportunities for laborers
and construction companies. The need for increased economic activities has been aggravated
by the current currency crisis in Indonesia.
11.6 Incentives to Cooperate
The keys to resource management are enforcement of, and compliance with, fisheries rules
and regulations. However, various contextual variables affect an individual’s inclination to
participate in, and be governed by, sasi.
Tradition
Tradition and adat are kept very much alive by the active elders. Sasi is an intrinsic part of the
Haruku culture and automatically, people have great respect for sasi regulations.
Status
Haruku has a history of resource management.  Their sasi system on lompa fish is unique in
the region and widely appreciated. In 1982, Haruku obtained an environmental award from
President Suharto. In 1986, the Minister of Environment, Emil Salim, came to Haruku
personally to open sasi. These highly appreciated visits have stimulated the people of Haruku
enormously in their willingness to comply to sasi rules.
Economic benefits
People have direct benefits from marine sasi and sasi lompa. The catches are divided fairly
amongst the villagers and the opening of sasi is a feast. This is a strong incentive for people to
respect sasi regulations.
Destructive fishing methods are used by a small part of the population, mainly immigrants,
who have no entitlement to land, and derive little benefit from resource management.  This is
their incentive to non-comply. The use of destructive techniques and intensification of the
fishery are, in general, aggravated by the current economic crisis in the country.
Sanctions
The kewang members take a tremendous pride in their position. Their commitment to manage
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incentive for the people to comply with the sasi regulations. However, if the kewang is
undermined by conflicts and lack of support from the village leader, its position will weaken
and some people will be encouraged to try breaking the rules.
The church plays an important role in enforcement through their communal prayers. Respect
for God and fear of retribution keep people abiding to the rules.
Social pressure
Since most people benefit from sasi in terms of resources and status, peer group pressure to
respect the rules is strong. The fact that many young children are members of the mini-kewang
and authorized to report offenders will be a strong incentive for people (and young children)
to abide to the rules.
Conservation purposes
The continuous efforts of Ambon University and local NGOs have led to awareness by a large
part of the population and people are developing an appreciation for resource management.  Visible
protection of natural resources is in many cases an incentive for people to comply with the rules.
Awareness
The programs carried out by various external institutions have created environmental
awareness that will be an incentive for some people to comply with the rules.
Youths can partake in the mini-kewang where they learn about the environment and how to
protect it. They are rewarded within the organization but also see the effect of their personal
efforts. Children thus learn to appreciate nature and this will be an important incentive not to
destroy the resources.
11.7 Patterns of Interaction
The village territory can be categorized as a collective good and as such, under the
responsibility of the village. A clear set of property rights has been installed to secure a stream
of benefits for all. Fruit and tree gardens are private property, but harvest rights are arranged
under sasi as a collective right. Sasi on land is imposed to provide benefits to the individual
while protecting the resource.
The sea is a communal property (res communes) in which the resource is controlled by an
identifiable community of interdependent users. An identifiable community in this context
refers to the people who live in Haruku-Sameth (Mantjoro 1996a). The members of neighboring
villages on the same island are excluded. Marine sasi has direct communal benefits and people
have the right to them.
This system, however, is under threat. Land resources, which are private property, are subject
to national legislation that defines all land as belonging to the state. Article 33 of the national
constitution enacted in 1945 stipulated that land and water-based resources belong to the
state and will be exploited to the optimum for the wealth and welfare of all citizens (Mantjoro
1996a). This has allowed the Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources to issue a permit for
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This has led to social and political stress in the village. A split has developed between a group
that supports the mining operations because of the potential economic benefits, and a group
that is concerned with environmental destruction and the disregard of land ownership. The
village head leads the first group while the kewang typically supports the latter. A conflict
between the two groups will negatively affect sasi. The role of the kewang will weaken
dramatically and although the kewang is locally highly legitimate, its members may find they
are no longer in the position to enforce the sasi rules.
The adat rules do not deal with impacts of mining on small islands and the kewang is powerless
against the mining corporations. The activities of Ingold, Indometal and Aneka Tambang have
not only had a negative impact on the environment and people’s land and forest gardens. The
conflicts in the village have weakened the program that was developed to create environmental
awareness and organize the community in coastal management.
11.8 Outcomes
11.8.1 Equity
1. The role of fishers in management
The role of fishers in management is seen as having been the same in the past, but fishers
expect a little improvement. Education has made people “smarter” and their opinions are
more respected.
The fishers noted that a strong role for the village government and kewang is customary. It is
the leaders who make the decisions about the fishery (together with the lift net owners, as
one person noted). When asked about power-sharing, over half thought that the government
had most or total responsibility for fisheries management, while the rest thought the people
shared responsibility equally with the government. Although it was mentioned that people
trust that the decisions the leaders make are good for the village, some also said it would be
preferable to increase direct involvement of fishers so that not all the decisions are made by
the village government alone. Half of the fishers agreed that fisheries rules should be changed.
2. Access to marine resources
Access to marine resources is limited by the sasi rules. The fishers’ own access to resources is
seen to be significantly less now than in the past. The reasons for the decline are unclear.
Nearly half  (40%) agreed that a fisher in need should be able to ask for and get harvesting
rights in a sasi area during the closed season. Only 10% of the fishers agreed with the sale of
resource harvest rights to outsiders.
3. Distribution of means of production
The distribution of the means of production is seen to be fairer now than in the past, but
further future improvements are not expected. The overall number of boats and gears has
increased and so have the fishing efforts as people have obtained more machinery. However,
declining yields, more pressure, and competition are having a negative effect on the equality
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4. Income distribution
On an average, the level of economic equality is perceived to have declined and is expected to
decline significantly in the future. The reasons for the decline are: 1) because of increasing
opportunism, and 2) because some people simply work harder than others. On the other
hand, some people reported that the drop in clove prices has resulted in more equality among
the villagers, because the very rich have “dropped” into the middle class. Also, the fact that
generally people have to work harder and others are supported by government programs,
has resulted in more equality.
11.8.2 Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making
Communal decision-making is seen as stable. The style of decision-making in the village was
seen by 62% as being a process of common or majority agreement. The rest thought that the
village head, with the village government staff, makes the decisions. In either case, the process
is seen to be legitimate. However, when asked directly about their involvement, nearly all
respondents (97%) agreed that all stakeholders should participate in decision-making,
especially now that people have become more educated.
Seventy-three percent felt that local groups do have a role in decision-making, whereas an
even larger number (83%) was convinced that outsiders had no involvement at all. Outsiders
are mostly Butonese fishermen.
Table 11.3. Results of the performance analysis in Haruku. n=30 heads of fishing households.  ns =trend
not significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01,  ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Average change Average future
current through time expected change
 condition on (statistical significance) (statistical significance)
 scale of 1-10
Equity
1. Role of fishers in management 6.07 0.5333ns +5% 0.5333* +5%
2. Access to marine resources 7.50 -1.2000*** -12% -0.6667*** -7%
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears 7.00 1.8333*** +18% 0.4000ns +4%
4. Economic equality 6.13 -1.0333* -10% -0.7667** -8%
Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making 6.73 -0.1000ns -1% -0.0333ns -0,3%
6. Ease of entry into the fishery 7.07 -1.6333*** -16% -1.1333*** -11%
7. Control over access to fishery 7.47 1.2333** +12% -0.1000ns -1%
8. Compliance with fishery rules 6.73 -1.1000* -11% -0.5667* -6%
Social Sustainability
9. Family well-being 6.47 0.4333ns +4% 0.7000* +7%
10. Income 6.00 -1.1333* -11% -0.2000ns -2%
11. Tradition of collective action 6.30 -1.8333*** -18% -0.9000*** -9%
12. Discussion of village issues 6.40 -1.5667*** -16% -0.1000ns -1%
13. Community harmony 5.73 -2.4000*** -24% -0.9333** -9%
Biological sustainability
14. Marine resource health 6.00 -2.6000*** -26% -1.4333*** -14%
15. Fish catch 5.73 -3.0333*** -30% -1.7333*** -17%138        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
6. Ease of entry (costs)
The costs of entry into the fishery have significantly increased (16%) and are expected to rise
another 11% in future. Around Haruku Island, people have to pay in order to fish in specific
parts of the sea and this is especially the case for Butonese fishers who have to pay goods,
gears, or fish, to the respective village government. Our sample contained a number of
Butonese fishers and, therefore, the perceived costs were relatively high (score 7.07).
7. Control over access to the fishery
Control over access to the fishery is seen to be better than in the past. The kewang was said to
play an important role in controlling access and enforcing regulations, and the mini-kewang
will ensure control in the future. However, for the future, no changes are expected. It was
said that control has to be good because people depend on the fishery.
8. Compliance
According to the fishers, compliance is high. However, compared to the past, compliance
with fisheries rules has declined by 11%. It was explained that the conflict between the village
head and the kewang is, for some people, a reason not to comply. Also, people who do not
respect the kewang do not abide by the rules. Compliance is expected to decline 6% further.
Compared to villages where sasi is lost, however, compliance rates are still high (score 6.73).
The respondents explained this score as being due to tight rules, adat and customs that are
still important to the people.
11.8.3 Social sustainability
9. Family well-being
Family well-being has remained the same compared to the past, and is expected to improve
only slightly in the future. The villagers’ livelihood has been negatively affected by the declines
in clove harvests and clove prices. They had to turn to the cultivation of cacao and coffee. A
common notion of the respondents was that “people will have to work harder especially
since the prices for daily needs have increased.”
10. Income
Fishers reported a significant 11% decline in their income over the past 15 years, but expect
no major changes in the future. The drop in clove prices has been disastrous, but for the
farmers who are also fishers, the decline was compensated by higher prices given for the fish.
11. Tradition of collective action
It was felt that the level of communal action had gone down significantly: 18% less compared
to the past and a further drop of 9% was expected in the future. The respondents rated past
performance as high (mostly score 8-9 out of 10). At the root of the decline lie personal financial
interests and growing individualism (especially of young people), loss of customs, and good
leadership. However, collaboration is part of the culture, i.e., “the way they were brought
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12. Discussion of village issues
The open discussion of village issues is reportedly in decline. A number of respondents felt
that the degree to which people can participate in discussion depends for a large part on the
village head. He was said to arrange all village matters as do, to a lesser extent, the LMD and
the kewang. People, however, felt that they are becoming more educated now and wanted to
participate more in the discussion of village issues.
13. Community harmony
The number of conflicts in the village has increased dramatically (i.e., harmony has declined
by 24% and is expected to decline further). According to the fishers in our sample, this was
due to the elections and political division in the village. Other main problems were alcohol
abuse and juvenile delinquency.
At the family level, there are conflicts over the garden boundaries and ownership of the trees.
Usually these problems are dealt with within the family. Conflicts have been arising since the
number of people in the village increased, but the new village structure has also caused confusion.
Sasi and marine access rights, as defined under sasi, provide no ground for conflicts. The
kewang takes its job seriously and people are aware of that and respect the rules. The equitable
sharing of lompa fish managed under sasi is a key aspect that promotes harmony in the village.
11.8.4 Biological sustainability
14. State of the resource
The fishers perceived an average 26% decline in the condition of marine resources over the
past 15 years. They expect resources to decline another 14% in the next 15 years. Sediment, as
a result of the upstream mining activities, pollution and the use of modern fishing gears and
bombs, have had negative effects.
15. Fish catches
The latter also have a negative impact on fish catches. Nearly all (93%) of the fishers reported
significant reductions (-30%), and in the future, the fishers expect the situation to become
even worse (-17%). More reasons for this decline can be read in Chapter 8.1.
11.9 Synthesis
Sasi in Haruku is unique because it recently has been “greened” in the sense that new rules
with overt environmental purposes have been introduced. Government programs stimulate
the use of modern nets and intensification of the fishery. However, the authority of adat and
sasi regulations is strong enough to keep these developments within bounds. The high level
of collaboration with outside NGOs and researchers also sets Haruku apart. The village has
been included in various environmental programs and has served over the years as an example
of successful resource management. The kewang plays an important role in the extension of
environmental knowledge and it is crucial that the kewang remains functional. At the moment,
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One of the key features of sasi in Haruku is its emphasis on equity. Catches of lompa fish and
other pelagic fish, both from river sasi and sea sasi, are shared among the village population.
The derivation of direct benefits promotes social harmony. This stands in contrast to the
situation in some other villages where the routing of harvest profits through the village
government for “village development” or the sale of sasi harvest rights to outsiders are often
resented by the common villagers.
Under the local management system that affords protection to juvenile fish and prohibits
overly-efficient harvesting, lompa harvests in Haruku appear to have the potential for
biologically sustainability. However, because the species under management is pelagic fish
and thus may be intercepted outside of the protected area, this sustainability is very vulnerable.
Local management can only hope to ensure stock health if the fishery is restricted to community
waters.  In fact, most lompa and other pelagic fish are caught by offshore lift nets where the
profit-sharing system and minimal crew wages promote intensification of fishing efforts.
Sasi in Haruku is undoubtedly efficient in that it is carried out with a minimum of expense
and compliance to rules is high because of the legitimacy of the kewang.
Currently, however, this strong sasi system is undermined by political instability, conflicts
between the village head and the kewang and environmental degradation due to mining
activities on the village territory. Property rights issues and access to land resources are subject
to conflicts. Whereas some people welcome the potential employment and economic activity
from mining, others fear the loss of their land and livelihood. If a planned resettlement scheme
is realized, the village of Haruku, together with its distinct sasi institution, will be consigned
to history.
Even in the exploratory phase, the ecological impacts of the mining activities on the
environment are manifest: downstream sedimentation pollutes the river estuary and covers
the corals and thus forms a direct threat to the lompa fishery. Interviews conducted by Yayasan
Hualopu in 1997 show that, even though they do not fully comprehend the potential
destructive effects of mining operations in the future, the villagers are concerned about these
environmental impacts. The possibility for villagers to defend their interests, however, is
limited by the centralized village structure that effectively excludes them from the decision-
making process.
At the moment, the village head is trying to restructure the LMD into a functional village government.
His strategy to get support and to become a more legitimate leader is to base his actions on adat
structures. He also concentrates on “politically correct” issues such as the involvement of women in
the village government. In the meantime, however, the village is at an impasse.
Strict application of the sasi rules and the education of young children through their
involvement in environmental management are the two building stones of sasi in Haruku.
The village leader was optimistic and felt that sasi would be continued because “it is a
traditional thing and Haruku has a kewang, which makes it stable”. The authority and
responsibilities of the kewang, however, have never been formalized and now that the influence
of formal authorities, like the police, is becoming more prominent, acknowledgment is
imperative. The relationship between the village head and the kewang is decisive for the
stability of sasi. Only under a functioning village government and through collaboration with
the adat leaders, church and kewang, can village resources be protected.Desa Tuhaha, Saparua Island        141
Chapter 12
Desa Tuhaha, Saparua Island1
12.1 Physical, Biological and Technical Attributes
12.1.1 Physical environment
Tuhaha is situated on the peninsula of Hatawano, facing Tuhaha Bay. On the opposite side of
the bay lies the Pia village. Except for the water right in front of the Pia village, the fishing
rights over the bay seem to be exerted by Tuhaha. The bay is divided into four zones (Figure
12.1). Three are subject to access limitations: the former sasi area; a part for which the fishing
rights are auctioned (lelang labuhan); and a part that is reserved for the village head.
1 For data tables see Appendix 3.































Figure 12.1.  Sketch map of Tuhaha Bay (features not necessarily
to scale).142        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The former sasi area is a shallow stretch that runs west from the village to the point where the
river enters the bay. It runs along the shore from the low tide level to the high tide level i.e.,
the intertidal level. The 3 m deep area (at high tide) is a sea grass bed and an important fish
spawning place. If the new sasi regulations are installed, the boundaries will be shifted a bit
outwards because the traditional spot for the sasi sign has been built upon. Beyond the sasi
area lies the auctioned area. This 500 m long stretch runs towards the outer bay up to the
village. Around the pier lies an area called the “lelang kepala jembatan”, where the village head
used to put his lift net2. The fourth zone, the middle section of the bay, is an open-access zone
where fishing is free (see Figure 12.1).
12.1.2 Biological characteristics
The fishing grounds of Tuhaha fishers are located in Tuhaha Bay, along the outer coast of
Saparua Island and in the Strait of Seram. The majority of fishers (57%) target both reef and
pelagic fish, while 40% catch pelagic fish only. About 20 fish species were recorded as
commonly caught: 11 pelagic fish and 9 reef species (see Appendix 3). In addition, fishers
target various types of shellfish.
All fishers reported a negative trend in their fish catches and a general decline of the marine
environment (see Section 12.8.4). The main causes, according to the fishers, were the increasing
number of fishers and the shift from traditional to modern gears. The increasing numbers of
FADs and lift nets have intensified the fishery dramatically and are said to have had a
destructive effect on the ecosystem. The larger numbers of motorboats have led to the
additional problem of oil spills in the water.
12.1.3 Fisheries technology
There are approximately 200 small boats and four motorized boats in the village. Of our fishers’
sample, 70% owned a small boat (perahu) and 7% had an engine. Most fishers used hand lines
and (cast) nets, 37% had hand lines only and 27% owned no gear. Three of the respondents
owned lift nets (Appendix 3).
Of the five lift nets in Tuhaha Bay, one is owned by the village head; the rest are owned by
other villagers. In order to place a lift net, the owner has to buy a permit from the Fisheries
Agency and ask permission from the village head, which is usually granted. Most artisanal
fishers have strong objections against the lift nets3. Some of them, however, benefit. They
work with the lift nets at night. With the lights on their small boats, they lure away the fish
from the lift net, so that the net can be dropped. In exchange, they are allowed to fish around
the lift net and get a percentage of the catch.
Lelang labuhan
A special case of a private property resource with harvest restrictions enforced by the
temporary owner of a particular part of the bay is the lelang labuhan or the auctioned fishing
2 In our last conversation (Oct. 1998), the village head explained that the use of lift nets has become prohibited
within the bay. Regular fishers, whom he appoints, can now use his privately owned area. If a fisher really
needs it, he can also ask for permission to fish in his area.
3 Apparently, the village government has acknowledged the negative effects of the lift net fishery. As of 1998, the
use of lift nets is no longer allowed within Tuhaha Bay in order to preserve the fish spawning grounds. They
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rights in a particular part of Tuhaha Bay. The system has been known to exist for at least 50
years. The boundaries were originally defined by the community through a referendum in
the community house (Baileo), but no women voted. The auction takes place in January and is
attended by hundreds of people but few are wealthy enough to join the bidding. The revenues
from the auction go to the village government. The catches from the auctioned area are
exclusively for the lessees.
The auctioned area is a 500 m stretch of shallow water along the bay. The area is divided into
five separate pieces each worth Rp100,000 to Rp300,000 (± USD35-100, 1997 rate). The pieces
can be rented out separately, and used for fish traps (sero). However, in order to allow fishing
with long nets, it is preferred to have more than one piece.
When Sahusilawani was installed as the village leader, his family won the rights over
substantial parts of the auctioned area. In 1997, four-fifths of the auctioned area were in the
hands of Fredric Sahusilawani, a cousin of the former village headman. For the four pieces, a
total sum of Rp650,000 was paid (± USD230, 1997 rate). Sahusilawani uses long nets (100-200
m) in the area (7 m high, mesh size 5 cm). The area is perfectly suited for trap fishing too, but
he could not proceed due to a lack of hands to place the fish traps in the water.
The other part was in hands of Pieter Lohenapessij who paid only Rp80,000 for it. Lohenapessij
uses mainly nets to catch palala fish (Abudefduf sordidus) and bulana bulana (Mugil cephalus).
Another species that attracts fishers to the auctioned area is komu (Auxis tharsard). At the time
of the interview (December 1997), the fish had not yet appeared and his efforts had not been
profitable, but he hoped for the best.
Whereas sasi has largely vanished, the regulations in the auctioned area are still in practice.
The strength of lelang (the auctioning of fishing rights) lies in the fact that it has always worked
independently from the village government and the kewang. It largely depends on the owner
who is responsible for the enforcement of access rights. Jacob Sahusilawani (the brother of
the current (co-)owner of the auctioned area) explained: “I have all the rights over the area.
All the people have to pay to me if they want to fish, otherwise they have to go to court.” If
necessary, he can count on friends, the police and the village head, to enforce his rights, but
generally, compliance has been high. Lohenapessij also explained that intrusion into his area
was limited. He had made it very clear to the fishers that he would allow night fishing, but if
he saw fishers pulling their nets during daytime, he would inform the village head who would
fine the offender or send him to the police.
There are no conflicts over the access restrictions or the boundaries of the area. People are not
happy with the restrictions, but are afraid of the sanctions and accept them because it is
tradition. Or more pragmatically put by Jacob Sahusilawani: “If you are poor, you are poor;
what can you say, what can you do?”
12.2 Attributes of the Community and Fishers
Traditionally, like Nolloth, Tuhaha was situated in the hills. The village was governed by the tuan
negeri (traditional village leader). The current tuan negeri, Max Aipassa, explained: “The Aipassa
family is the family that has the greatest power in the village. They are the leader of all traditional
authority. It is the biggest clan and also the clan of the kapitan (war leader). Long ago, it was the
kapitan who managed the village; there was no raja in Tuhaha. It is also the clan that fought the144        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Dutch in the Pattimura Battle in 1817.” He explained further that during the Dutch colonial period,
the people were forced to come down to the shore. The Sasabone clan followed the orders and the
clan leader became the regent for the Dutch. The Aipassas, however, refused to come down. They
split into two groups; one went to Seram and the other remained on Saparua. From the hills, they
fought the Dutch. The clan later moved down to what is now Tuhaha.
With 2,022 inhabitants, Tuhaha is a middle-sized village. The 417 households have an average
size of five persons each. Only 10% of the predominantly Christian village is Islamic. These
Islamic Butonese, however, are 3rd generation inhabitants. There is no recent in-migration.
Except for 40 households that took part in a transmigration program and moved to Seram in
the 1970s, Tuhaha has no history of significant out-migration. Some 25 young people leave
the village each year. There is no tourism in the village.
Tuhaha has a health center (PUSKESMAS). There are two primary schools and a junior high
school in Tuhaha. The general education level, however, is relatively high with 700 people
having attended elementary school, 150 junior high school, and 150 senior high school (data
from 1993). The village has electricity and some people have TVs. The village also has a fresh
water pipeline system and septic tanks to contain household wastes.
The transportation links to Tuhaha are good. There are frequent minibuses and the village
has a hard top road. There are seven motorcycles and five public transport buses in the village.
The communication links are minimal. The village only has a walky-talky system and for
communication, relies primarily on the mail.
Employment
Most villagers combine fishing and farming. However, Tuhaha has a relatively small forest-
garden area and farming is apparently no alternative for the growing population. This may
explain the significant increase in the numbers of fishers from 49 registered in 1993 to more
than 200 in 1997.
There are two small active home industries. The number of shopkeepers, laborers and government
employees has increased since 1979. As of 1998, there are over 50 government staff in Tuhaha.
12.2.1 Village government
For village administration and physical development, the Tuhaha village government receives
an annual subsidy of Rp6 million (± USD2,100, 1997 rate) from the district level. Additionally,
they receive Rp1.5 million for the PKK women’s organization. The village revenues are used
for development projects e.g., a pier in the harbor, a fresh water supply, and a fence project.
For these projects, the money from the auctioned area is also used. The village government
bears the actual costs while the villagers provide the labor.
Over the last 20 years, the village government has experienced periods of political instability
due to, amongst other causes, conflicts between the village headman and traditional
authorities. In the 1970s, Sahusilawani implemented the new government structure. The
traditional leaders were included in the formal village government (LMD), but their authority
based on adat was not acknowledged. The tuan negeri, Max Aipassa, however, insisted that
his traditional position (and, therewith, adat law) be formally acknowledged and in the
meantime, refused to accept his formal position in the LMD. This conflict is one reason why
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Several interim leaders have not been able to set up a functional village government (Table
12.1). To end the political instability, Albert Tanalepy, a businessman who works in Surabaya,
was asked to come back to Tuhaha to become the village head. He agreed, but since his business
also demands his attention, he spends regular intervals outside the village. People do not like
his absence, but are generally content with their new leader. “He speaks English and he is
very generous because he takes care of the harbor, fences and a fresh water supply” commented
Mrs. Lopatty, one of our respondents.
As of 1997, the village government was still in the process of establishing itself. Of the 17 LMD
members, four persons are from the traditional saniri negeri. The other elected members are
regular villagers. The village head and village government members agreed to revitalize sasi, to
establish a kewang, and to acknowledge the authority of the adat institutions. In the course of
1998, an agreement is to be reached between the formal and traditional authorities on the
development of a new structure in which division of roles and responsibilities are defined.
12.2.2 Village organizations
Most of the other common village organizations are present in Tuhaha. The PKK is active and
offers a program that connects more to the daily life of women than in other villages.
Membership is higher than in Nolloth, but is also dominated by women from the higher
social classes.
The Pelwata is also active and meetings are attended by women from all social groups. They
felt involved and said that they benefited from the church organization. However, the
formation of annual programs was in arrears, which hampered the activities.
There are four IDT groups, but there is no KEP for fishers. Both the TAKESRA and ARISAN
are present and mainly occupied with sago processing. Members in these last groups are, so
far, mainly men. It was proposed that in 1998, programs be set up for women.
Tuhaha has no village cooperative (KUD).
12.2.3 Role of women
In early history (before 1800), the village seems to have had a female raja. Apparently, times
have changed because today, women’s influence on village matters is limited to household
affairs. This is the sphere where the women can make decisions, but even so, in most cases,
they need consent from their husbands.
Women play an important role in the village as petty traders. They trade in palm sugar, sago
and fish. Many women sell the fish they get from their husbands. Shellfish are gathered and
Table 12.1




1958-1963 Johanis Sahusilawani (interim)
1917-1958 Hendrik Dominggus Tanalepy
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used for household consumption. Women thus are highly dependent on marine resources, but
they are not involved in resource management. Now that sasi will be re-established, their opinion
is not sought. The women simply wait for things to happen: “If the village government wants
to establish sasi, they will do that.” (Augustina Lohenapessij, a Tuhaha fish trader). Consequently,
women have little practical knowledge of sasi; they only know that “sasi is good”.
Likewise, in other village matters women are generally not consulted. About 23% of the fishers
in our sample considered women to be completely outside the decision-making process.
Women are not invited to general government meetings, and have no say in village
expenditures. Only when training and programs are planned specifically for women, are they
asked for advice. Yet, because women in Tuhaha harvest, trade and consume marine resources,
their involvement in decision-making is crucial.
12.2.4 Profile of fishers
The average age of the 30 respondents was 53 years, and 11 were under 45 years old. Only
two women were interviewed. Nearly all of the respondents were born in Hulaliu. Their
families consist of seven people on an average. Children who have left, have mostly gone to
work with a few leaving for school or marriage. Of the respondents 73% had only elementary
education, less than the average education level in Tuhaha.
Nearly all fishers (97%) are landowners, but the principal part (75%) of the household income comes
from fishing (a relatively high percentage). Additionally, 27% of these households have an externally
derived income of an average Rp596,000 per year (USD238, early 1997 rate). The fishermen were
highly experienced and had spent on an average 34 years in the fishery. On fishing days, they spend
about nine hours at sea, while a third of the fishers made fishing trips of 12 hours.
Despite the long hours at sea, nearly all Tuhaha fishers expressed satisfaction with their jobs.
They felt happy and free at sea and fishing provided them with an acceptable income. Nine
fishers said they would change their job if somebody offered a more profitable alternative.
Although the respondents were satisfied with their profession, only 7% wanted their children
to be fishers. Farming was not a favored alternative either.  Three-quarters of respondents
would much rather see their children become government staff.
The economic indicator of the fishers’ sample is made up of adding scores for land ownership,
boat type, house and gears. Most fishers lived in a cement house with zinc roof. The overall
average economic score for 27 villages was 8.6, SE=0.10. For Tuhaha, the indicator was 8.7
(with a standard error of 0.36), which is mid-range (Appendix 2). Adding TV ownership brings
the total score to 9.3, which is second highest among the case study villages.
12.3 Market Attributes
Approximately 75% of the fish sales are direct to consumers. The fishers sell their fish either
through their wives or other female fish vendors. Small amounts are sold at auctions through
fish brokers (borok) or sold to wholesalers.
The fish vendors sell over half of their fish in the local market. About 20% are taken to the
town of Saparua and the rest go to regional centers. The key factor in choosing point of sale is
price. In most cases, the fishers say the price is set by the fisher or his wife, although in fact,
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The fishers in Tuhaha sell the major part of their catch; only 23% are used for household
consumption. Four fishers of our sample do not eat any of the fish they catch, and none eat
more than half of their catch.
12.3.1 Local fish trade
The trading of artisanal catches is mainly in the hands of women. Our respondents had extensive
experience in retail (20-30 years). Especially after the clove market was monopolized, more
women reverted to the fish trade. The women trade in all kinds of fish that they take as far as
Masohi (on Seram Island). They buy the fish straight from local fishers in Tuhaha, Nolloth and
Saparua. However, unlike the Nolloth traders, they bring no merchandise back to Tuhaha.
Between the buyer and seller, there is no relationship, i.e., the person who comes first gets the
fish. The fish vendors in Tuhaha sell only fresh fish. The fish that are not sold are smoked or
dried and used for household consumption. Other post-harvest techniques are not used.
In the 1980s, prices for fish were low, but currently the prices are very high. Despite the high
prices, the preference of consumers for fish has not changed.
12.3.2 Commercial-scale trade
Tuhaha Bay is an important provider of baitfish that are caught with lift nets. The small fish
are sold to the large pole and line fishing boats that use them as bait to catch, amongst others,
skipjack and tuna. At night, these fishers from Ambon come to buy the fish directly from the
lift net fishers. These lift net fishers receive an initial payment of Rp2,000 per bucket of fish,
plus an additional 10% of the revenues made by the pole and line fishers. These transactions
are based on trust, and it is not surprising that, between the two parties, long-term trade
relations sometimes exist.
Others send their fish to auctioneers who wait at the fish landing areas and take the fish to the
market in Ambon. In this case, the price paid usually depends on the outcome of the auction and
can vary daily, but the price can also be determined between the buyer and seller beforehand (see
Chapter 3).
If there is no such arrangement, the lift net fishers may choose to bring their fish to local or regional
markets (e.g., Tulehu, Ambon, Masohi), wherever they have regular customers. The market in
Seram is dominated by South Sulawesi traders and here the fish are sold for cash only.
12.4 Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
12.4.1 Loss of sasi
The former sasi regulations in Tuhaha were designed during the Dutch colonial period. The
regulations were designed by the kewang and the traditional village leaders and approved by
the Dutch. The aim of sasi was to protect the resources from destruction and also to provide
boundaries for both the land and the sea territories. On the land, sasi was applied on fruits,
e.g., cloves, durian, bananas, and coconuts. Sasi regulations prevented theft and assured timely
harvests during which large amounts of ripe products could be harvested.
Later, in the 19th century, sasi operational rules on fish were established. Fishing was prohibited
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(Thryssa baelama)  4 and the rituals of opening and closing the area were comparable to the
current lompa fishery ceremonies in Haruku. Additionally, the spawning grounds of the fish
were protected in the sasi area. Later, other sea products under sasi were sea cucumbers and
top shells (Trochus niloticus). Until they finally disappeared in the 1980s, the regulations
basically did not change. The regulations were never written down.
The exact year in which sasi was abolished is not clear. According to the current village head,
Tanalepy, adat was abolished in 1958 and sasi was subsequently lost. Max Aipassa, the tuan
negeri at that time, stated that he performed sasi rituals in 1963, 1969, and 1983. From this
information, it can be concluded that the process of the decline of sasi, on the constitutional
level, has had a different pattern of loss than the practical (operational) aspects of sasi. The
process of decline has also been irregular.
Aipassa’s explanation of the loss of sasi was also not attributed to the loss of adat, but to
political problems in the village during the reign of the former village head. He explained
that in the 1960s, conflicts arose between the people and the village headman at the time,
Sahusilawani. In the process, the village became divided into two parties that were extremely
hostile towards each other. One group was in favor of the village head and the other group
opposed him. At the height of the turmoil in 1969, the house of Max Aipassa, who was mistaken
for that of a member of the opposition party, was attacked. He immediately resigned his post
(tuan negeri) and no longer performed the sasi rituals.
In order to restore the peace in the village, the village leader convinced Aipassa to resume his
post again and to continue sasi, which Aipassa did. Between 1969 and 1983, sasi is said to
have been active, but with ups and downs. Apparently, the villagers were not particularly
interested in sasi. In 1983, new conflicts arose in the village. Again, the village became divided
into pro and contra groups with respect to the village head, and again there was political
turmoil. Apart from this, the members of the saniri negeri (traditional village council) were
involved in a land dispute. As a result of these political conflicts, the kewang withdrew and
the tuan negeri resigned for a second time. According to his information, the last sasi sign was
put up in 1984 and since then, sasi can be considered dormant.
4 Nowadays, the lompa fish are caught throughout the year. Lompa fish are mainly caught when the weather
prevents the fishers from going out to sea.
Table 12.2.  Timeline of events in Tuhaha
Year Decline of sasi
1958 The old raja died and was succeeded by an interim raja.
Some people marked this year as the end of adat and the end of sasi.
1960 Max Aipassa became the tuan negeri.
1963 A new raja, Frans Sahusilawani, was installed.
1964 Sahusilawana quit and was succeeded by an interim raja.
Later he took up his post again.
1969 Incident with Sahusilawana, and Aipassa resigned.
Later he agreed to take up his position again.
This year marked the first stage in the recent decline of sasi.
1969-1983 Sasi still exercised (rituals were performed), but people were not very interested.
1983 Second conflict in the village and between Aipassa and Sahusilawani.
The kewang quit.
1984 Last sasi ritual performed and Aipassa resigned, marking the final collapse of sasi.
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Sasi on coconuts was taken over by the church, which required no kewang. Land sasi, however,
was no longer actively implemented, and the marine sasi area was encroached upon by people
who fished for economic reasons.
Sasi on coconuts is still applied in the village. The enforcement and regulation of the harvest
are arranged by the church. Although it handled sasi on coconuts successfully, the church
never became involved in marine sasi. Bram Pattipeluhu explained: “The church could not
take the responsibility. When sasi is closed, the villagers go to the church and swear they will
obey the rules. Everybody knows, however, that people, especially in times when the economic
pressure is high, do not always comply with the rules. If people encroach the sasi area while
it is under the observance of the church, not only would they have to face the punishment
from the ancestors, but also from God himself.” When asked if this was true, the church
minister added: “The power of God is great. So to avoid a situation where many people have
to deal with these powers, it is best to involve the church only in sasi regulations that are
easily observed by the people.”
After the abolishment of sasi, the area turned into an open-access area and what some people
feared came to be: the resources declined. When asked what sasi meant to them, various
respondents replied in a similar way as Abraham Pattipelu, who explained: “If there is no sasi,
everything will be destroyed. Nothing is left for the next generations.” Although it has been
dormant for at least 10 years, sasi is still valued and regarded as important for village life.
12.4.2 Fisheries regulations
Current village fisheries regulations mostly concern the use of lift nets and destructive fishing
techniques. Registration is meant to control the number of lift net fishers in the bay. There is
also a formal restriction on mesh size to prevent the use of the extreme small karolo nets (1-3
mm meshes). Blast fishing, cyanide fishing and the use of other destructive fishing techniques
are also prohibited. There is no active enforcement, but the use of bombs is said to have
drastically gone down since one fisher died while blast fishing (Lopatty, pers. comm.). Other
rules mentioned were a ban on cutting mangroves in the bay and harvest restrictions on sea
cucumbers. Apparently, neither of these regulations is enforced. Tuhaha has no sasi system or
kewang and relies on the police for enforcement.
12.4.3 The players
The main players in fisheries management in Tuhaha are the village government and the
owner of the auctioned area. The kewang has been abolished and no comparable enforcement
institution is present. The police reside too far away to be effective in enforcement and their
role is limited to the prosecution of offenders presented by the village officials.
Tuhaha’s fisheries are managed largely by private persons for their personal benefit. The
temporary owner of the auctioned area will protect his property rights himself with the aid of
some selected people and the village government. The part that traditionally belongs to the
village head is also under his supervision; he will decide which people are allowed to use the
area. The rest of the bay, except for the Pia territory, is managed by the village government,
i.e., the village head, who is involved in the decision-making process concerning the allocation
of fishing rights in the deeper parts of the bay and the collection of fees.
In Tuhaha, the fishery is dominated by a few wealthy people, i.e., those who can afford to
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and other valuable fishing devices. Artisanal fishers are largely excluded from transactions
and, therefore, do not play an active role in fisheries management. The common villagers and
women have also no say in the fishery.
12.4.4 Enforcement
During the Dutch colonial period (19th century), the enforcement of village regulations was
carried out by a 50-member kewang force. Offenders were taken to the community house (Baileo)
where they were tried by the village court. A common way of punishing people was to tie a
red cloth around their neck and waist and make them walk around the community house as
a form of public shaming. Offenders who did admit their crimes could also be fined while
those who did not confess risked death by vengeful ancestral spirits (Aipassa, pers. comm.).
In a later phase, the local village government was no longer allowed to carry out justice
independently from the colonial powers. The kewang was to bring offenders to the Dutch
“controleur” (government official) or “polis Belanda” who would punish them.
Later, when the Dutch colonial period ended, the cooperation between the kewang and the police
continued. Offenders were halted by the kewang, who brought them to the police office for prosecution.
Since the kewang has been abolished, it is the village officials who report to the police in Saparua.
The actual enforcement of formal and informal rules is still a critical issue. National fisheries law
should be enforced by the police. On the village level, however, the police personnel lack authority
and legitimacy because they are influenced by personal relationships. Therefore, although they are
the formal authority, the effectiveness of the police in enforcing both formal and informal rules is low.
An interesting example of strong local enforcement is the one applied on the auctioned area.
The access rights to this private property regime are strictly enforced by the temporary owner,
his appointees and with back-up from the village government. The limitation of access rights
is based on tradition. Because of this, but also because the owner protects his access rights
strictly and the sanctions are severe, compliance is high. This thus seems an effective way to
manage certain parts of the fishery, despite the lack of a legal enforcement agent.
12.4.5 Compliance
Abraham Pattijpelu, a fisherman from Tuhaha, explained that compliance to regulations is
based on traditional beliefs in powers of ancestral spirits and adat. If an offender is not caught
by the kewang or police, he may have “a lucky day”. This does not mean, however, that the
offender will go unpunished. The spirits of the ancestors or God can make the person sick.
Therefore, it may happen that somebody who breaks the rules gets ill. “The person then realizes
he has stolen and will go to the kepala adat (the village elder) to confess. Subsequently, the
kepala adat will perform a traditional ceremony and pray for him. After that the spirit will not
disturb him any longer and the person is released,” Pattijpelu added. Although today the
people’s belief in these spirits has diminished, they would not run the risk of neglecting these
forces, and, therefore, spiritual powers still play an important role with regard to compliance.
Despite the strength of these spiritual enforcement mechanisms, active enforcement is
important. When in Tuhaha the kewang resigned, encroachment of the sasi area became a
problem. Poverty was often used as an excuse for breaking rules. Bram Pattipeluhu, a retired
fisher, explained that the local government was not strict in enforcing rules because “when
people starve, they will go and catch fish.” Our performance study, however, indicated noDesa Tuhaha, Saparua Island        151
significantly lower economic score for Tuhaha compared to other villages. In fact, the economic
situation is above average. Even though nowadays people have greater economic demands,
it is likely that other factors, for example, the political instability in the village, contributed to
non-compliance (also see Section 12.8).
12.5 External Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Link with higher government bodies
The village government obtains information regarding laws and ordinances through the district
government. An officer visits the village approximately 15 times a year to carry out extension
programs and to give advice to the villagers. Other government agencies, like BAPPEDA, are
not active in the village. There is no support from higher government levels to enforce the
existing fisheries laws. The villagers, for instance, have never seen a patrol boat in the area.
The village head gets general information about policy issues through regional government
meetings. This forum has to date not dealt with fisheries management, which, in the light of
general fisheries development and intensification, is not yet an issue.
In 1993, the Fisheries Agency of central Maluku initiated a program in Tuhaha to stimulate
and develop the local fishery through the establishment of fishers’ groups and extension
programs on the use of modern gears. For some unknown reason, the program was not
particularly successful.
Collaboration with other institutions
Recently John Lokollo, a legal expert from Pattimura University, came to the village to talk
about the extension of the formal government structures and laws and the potential role of
village institutions in marine resource management.
Technical assistance was further provided by Yayasan Hualopu for the establishment of
aquaculture (sea cucumbers) but natural disasters ruined the project. Additional extension
programs promoted the use of fish cages, cold storage techniques, sea cucumber processing
and awareness training on sustainable resource use. Material on marketing possibilities for
other marine products was provided through the Hualopu publication “Marinyo”.
External economic influences
The effect of the drop in clove prices may have had less effect on the local economy compared
to other villages, because cloves are not extensively produced in Tuhaha. The size of the forest-
garden area limits agricultural production.
Economic stress was several times mentioned as affecting resource use, despite the relatively
high average score for family well-being. The monetary crisis also affects the villagers, but to
what extent, this is not clear.
Infrastructure and development
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12.6 Incentives to Cooperate
In Tuhaha, incentives for fisheries management have to be studied on different levels. Firstly,
there are the incentives that people used to have or still have with regard to compliance to the
former sasi rules. Secondly, there are the incentives that explain the fishers’ conformation to
the formal rules (i.e., on blast fishing) and their acceptance of the limitations imposed under
a private property rights regime. Finally, there are incentives to re-institutionalize sasi or a
similar form of fisheries management.
Adat
Before sasi collapsed, compliance was high and enforcement vigorous. The traditional adat
leaders enforced the rules and respect for ancestral spirits was prevalent. Reluctance to harvest
unripe fruits and small fish in the sasi area was high because “if you took it, you would break
the traditional rules.” This respect for adat, which is still present, is an important building
foundation for sasi and for compliance with fisheries regulations.
Sanctions
Strict enforcement by the owners of the auctioned area is a key incentive to comply with
current access restrictions. On the other hand, lax enforcement allows for non-compliance to
the rules limiting the numbers and mesh size of lift nets.
Acknowledgment of problems in the fishery
Mostly older people had a very strong idea that without sasi, resources will be destroyed. The
younger fishers also noted negative effects related to the abolishment of sasi, but most of
these fishers target pelagic fish. They fish inside Tuhaha Bay only when the sea is too rough
to go beyond. These fishers did mention the increased number of fishing boats and introduction
of modern gears as causing problems, but active fisheries management is not yet discussed.
Nevertheless, they acknowledge that the spawning grounds in the bay need to be protected.
This realization is an important incentive for revitalization of sasi and will enhance compliance
to fisheries regulations that may be installed.
Government support for management
A few women in our sample stated that they believe that marine resources are a gift of God and
that harvests depend on God’s will. It is up to the people, however, to protect and preserve the
resources. They say this concern should be supported by the village government and should be
passed on to the higher levels, so that government could help the villagers to manage the
resources. For long-term protection of the resources, the women said sasi has to be revitalized.
Interests of the local government
The village government has certain interests in the re-institutionalization of sasi. The
establishment of a kewang and acknowledgment of traditional authorities based on adat would
provide a legitimate basis to implement local rules and restore order in the village. Moreover,
the village government is interested in the financial benefits that are associated with sasi, i.e.,
the auction of the harvest rights of commercially interesting products. Political stability and
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Local knowledge
The tuan negeri, the kepala kewang, and other traditional village authorities share the sacred knowledge
and secret language (bahasa tanah) of sasi. In order to preserve this knowledge, it has to be passed to
the younger generations. The tuan negeri, for example, while awaiting his son to reach the age when
he would share his knowledge, wrote his narratives on sasi in a small book. This knowledge is
essential to preserve the sasi ideology and it is an effective tool in providing a management structure
for sasi, i.e., the definition of rules and regulations, rights and responsibilities.
Economic needs
Most fishers target pelagic fishes and are not dependent on the inshore fishery. Sasi regulations
and access restrictions are, therefore, not expected to jeopardize the livelihoods of the fishers.
Still, economic needs can be an important incentive for fishers to non-comply. Where fish catches
fail to provide adequate livelihoods, fishers may be negatively affected by the installation of
fisheries rules. In such cases, livelihood programs such as aquaculture may be introduced at
the same time as the new rules, so that people have less of an economic incentive to non-comply.
Legitimacy
The sale of harvest rights to outsiders while restricting the access of fishers to the sasi area can
seriously undermine the management system. If sasi predominantly benefits the village
government and/or if the villagers only obtain indirect benefits, the incentive to comply to
the rules is low. Direct benefits and involvement of the fishers would be strong incentives for
fishers to preserve resources and to comply with the sasi regulations.
12.7 Patterns of Interaction
When the kewang decided to withdraw, the clashes between landowners in the village
increased. Since then, the village has had a history of political turmoil and unstable leadership.
In order to restore village harmony and security and to control resources, it has finally been
decided, after three years of deliberations, to re-establish sasi.
In 1997, the revitalization process started. In the meantime, the idea has been presented to the
newly installed Latupati (an island level institution). The first action was to make the LMD
operational. During a village government meeting, arrangements were written down and
presented to the tua tua adat (traditional village elders) for approval. It was decided to make the
formal structure dominant over the traditional village institutions. The main players in the
process of revitalization are, therefore, the village head and the LMD members who have de jure
authority. The tuan negeri, who is also the kepala adat, will have de facto authority (i.e., is responsible
for the sasi rituals). A third key player is the church minister. The village head, together with the
traditional leaders, will choose the new kewang members. The kewang will be re-installed as a
part of the LKMD, but its actual power will be limited. Its role is to notify the village head of
offenses and report the offenders to the police. The common villagers are not involved in the
process of revitalization; they will be informed of the decision in a general meeting.
The operational rules that are planned for sasi concern both the land and the sea. Marine sasi
regulations will be applied on fish (bulana bulana or Mugil cephalus) and on sea cucumbers
(Holothuria scabra) for which there is a market in the city of Ambon. In the bay, only traditional
fishing methods will be allowed. The rights to harvest in the marine sasi area will be auctioned,154        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
5 Because of the division of Tuhaha Bay into various fishing zones, i.e., the sasi area, the auctioned area and the
open sea, the question concerning access may have led to confusion which is reflected in the varied answers.
with the revenues going to the village. This means that some fishers will face access restrictions.
Initially, the village government expects some resistance because “without sasi they can fish
wherever they want.” In the long run, however, the village government does not expect problems
because many villagers feel that “sasi is good for the people” and will thus support it.
The village government realizes that for the continuation of adat institutions and sasi, they
need the active support and input from younger generations. The fact that the sasi regulations
would defend the fishers’ interest through the active exclusion of fishers from surrounding
villages will stimulate support for sasi from young people.
In Tuhaha, successful revitalization is highly dependent on a functional kewang. Most people trust
the government to take decisions for them and they will thus respect sasi regulations as a government
decision. Others, for example, those who view sasi as a restriction, may cause problems. The kewang
is needed to “help the people to respect the sasi regulations”. Based on tradition and the fact that the
kewang members, through a vow, commit themselves to apply the law to anybody who breaks the
rule without favour, the kewang is highly legitimate. Besides, if a sasi regulation is broken, it is the
kewang that is the legitimate actor: “The police cannot do anything because it is traditional.” Therefore,
for the practical enforcement of sasi regulations, a kewang institution is indispensable.
Finally, it is essential for stability that formal and traditional government institutions are
integrated in a defined structure that is acceptable to both parties.
12.8 Outcomes
12.8.1 Equity
1. The role of fishers in management
The participation of fishers in management is seen as having remained the same over time and most
fishers expect either stability or a slight decline in the future. Perceptions on the role of fishers in
management vary greatly. Some say that fishers are more educated and aware, and could and should
thus participate in the management process. Others are happy with the fact that the village head
makes the decisions. They trust the village government to make the right decisions for them.
When asked about power-sharing, 63% thought the government had most or total
responsibility for fisheries management, while 33% thought the people shared responsibility
equally with the government. Only 3% saw the community’s responsibility as being dominant.
2. Access to marine resources
Despite the breakdown of sasi, which turned the sasi area into an open-access regime, the fishers’
personal access to resources is seen to have declined compared to the past, i.e., the 1980s, when
the sasi area was a common property regime. The fishers expect to be more restricted in future.
The re-establishment of sasi in combination with the limited access to fishing grounds and the
auctioned area, plus the increasing numbers of lift nets in the bay, influence this perception. Note,
however, that perceptions were highly variable5. In general, older fishers who own motorboats
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3. Distribution of fishing gears
The distribution of fishing gears was seen to be fairer now than in the past, and this is expected to
improve in future. It was noted that the number of fishing gears increased due to growing numbers
of fishers, and that fishers are becoming more skilled. This caused a more even distribution of gears.
4. Income distribution
When asked about the level of economic disparities, the fishers reported no change compared
to the past. They expected less disparity in the future. The fall in clove prices was not dramatic
but is said to have had an equalizing effect on incomes. People seeking to advance their own
economic position also tend to reduce economic disparity at the village level. The introduction
of modern gears and access to capital most likely play their roles here.
12.8.2 Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making
Partnership in fisheries decision-making is seen as having remained the same. Most
respondents see the style of decision-making in the village as being a process of common or
majority agreement. However, 40% of the fishers thought that the village head, with or without
village government staff, makes the decisions. This does not necessarily mean that this is
perceived as centralized decision-making. Traditionally, people believe that decisions made
by the village leader are for the good of the community.
About 83% of the fishers in our sample felt that local groups played a role in decision-making.
Four people noted that education makes people more capable of actually getting involved.
Nearly all agreed that every stakeholder should be involved in decision-making. A large
majority said that at this stage, outsiders had no involvement.
6. Ease of entry
The ease of entry to the fishery has declined compared to the past because of increased costs.
Access fees (tax) have increased, especially for large-scale fishers (those using lift nets);
artisanal fishers pay less. Most respondents expect costs to be worse in the future.
7. Control over access
The control over access to the fishery is seen as having remained the same over time. The
government control over large fishing gears and boats is perceived to be firm.
Nearly half of the respondents agreed that a fisher should be able to ask for and get harvesting
rights in a private property zone, i.e., the sasi area during the closed season and the auctioned
area. A large majority (77%) disagreed with the sale of resource harvest rights to outsiders,
but not to the extent that this is ground for conflicts. The majority of the fishers agreed with
the existing fisheries rules while 37% thought they should be changed.
8. Compliance
Compliance has declined significantly compared to the past, and this trend is to continue in
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for people to invade the easily accessible sasi area. Compliance depends greatly on the firmness
of the village head (and the church minister). Every month, a few offenders are caught. Most
are young men who steal coconuts to buy cigarettes or just for the fun of it. Written information
with exact data on compliance rates and types of offenses is not available in Tuhaha.
12.8.3 Social sustainability
9. Family well-being
The economic well-being of the fisher households has significantly improved compared to
the past. The reasons, according to the respondents, were the village development programs,
family assistance by the village government, and increased personal efforts. Various people
mentioned “increased efforts” as having an effect on personal well-being: positive for those
who want to work harder or negative for people who were not able or willing to put more
efforts into the fishery and other activities. In the end, it was explained, some became richer,
and some poorer. No further changes are expected in the future.
10. Income
Fishers report no changes in income over the past 15 years and expect income to remain static
in the future as well. The fishers have a pronounced bimodal distribution, i.e., they fall into
two groups: “poor” and “rich” (also see above). Fishing yields have declined, but the price of
fish has risen which makes up for the loss in income.
11. Tradition of collective action
People were previously more involved in collective activities. Generally, past performance was rated
high (mostly score 8-10). The perceived downward change compared to the past is significant. The
reasons given for the decline are increasing individualism, the payment system through which people
have to pay for assistance, alcohol abuse and low awareness (i.e., “loss of values”). From the notes, it
also became clear that the village head or the church can either stimulate or obstruct collaboration.
The expected future drop is also significant despite the fact that nearly half of the respondents noted
that conditions will stay the same or improve, because collective action is part of the tradition.
12. Discussion of village issues
Discussion of village issues is less compared to the past and future prospects are also negative.
The fishers noted that their input in village matters depends largely on the village head.
13. Community harmony
Community harmony has declined significantly, and further decline is expected. Education
and changes in the way people raise their children are causing more conflicts in the village.
Alcohol abuse is also an important factor. Finally, population growth was mentioned. This
possibly refers to conflicts over land.
Conflicts at the village level (which were not directly mentioned by the fishers) were those
between traditional and formal village authorities. These conflicts have their roots in the 1960s
and caused the formal village government (LMD) to be dysfunctional over the last few years.
The demand for acknowledgment of traditional authorities is currently being addressed
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There are no conflicts about the sale of harvest rights and access restrictions. The boundaries
of the auctioned and rented areas are seldom challenged. The artisanal fishers have become
disturbed by the efforts of the fishers using lift nets and the purse seines. Thus sectoral
competition is a major issue in coastal management.
12.8.4 Biological sustainability
14. Marine environmental health
Fishers perceived a significant decline (31%) in the condition of the marine environment over
the past 15 years, while over the next 15 years, they expect it to decline another 19%. Although,
according to some respondents, the marine environment has become cleaner due to less litter
on the beach, the general perception is a decline due to the use of more and more destructive
fishing techniques.
15. Fish catches
All fishers reported a negative trend in fish catches over the past 15 years, while over the next
15 years, they expect resources to decline further due to intensification, i.e., the use of modern
fishing gears (see Section 12.1).
Table 12.3.  Results of the performance analysis in Tuhaha.  n=30 heads of fishing households. ns=trend
not significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01,  ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Average change Average future
current through time expected change
condition on (statistical significance) (statistical significance)
 scale of 1-10
Equity
1. Role of fishers in management 6.47 -0.2667ns -3% -0.6333* -6%
2. Access to marine resources 6.33 -1.9000*** -19% -1.3333*** -13%
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears 7.23 2.1333*** +21% 0.5000* 5%
4. Income distribution 6.30 -0.3667ns -4% -0.7667* -8%
Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making 6.80 -0.1333ns -1% -0.3000ns -3%
6. Ease of entry into the fishery 6.73 -1.5333*** -15% -0.9333*** -9%
7. Control over access to fishery 6.63 0.3333ns +3% -0.3000ns -3%
8. Compliance with fishery rules 6.20 -1.9667*** -20% -1.4667*** -15%
Social Sustainability
9. Family well-being 7.07 1.7000** +17% 0.3667ns +4%
10. Income 6.97 0.3333ns + 3% -0.4667ns -5%
11. Tradition of collective action 7.03 -1.2667** -13% -0.9333** -9%
12. Discussion of village issues 6.80 -1.0000** -10% -.8000** -8%
13. Community harmony 5.73 -2.6000*** -26% -1.7333*** -17%
Biological sustainability
14. Marine resource health 6.00 -3.0667*** -31% -1.8667*** -19%
15. Fish catch 5.87 -3.2667*** -33% -2.4000*** -24%158        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
12.9 Synthesis
Tuhaha was chosen as a village where sasi was lost in living memory. In Tuhaha, sasi declined
over a long period of time before it finally disappeared in the 1980s. This was mainly caused
by political problems, i.e., conflicts within the village between pro and contra groups with
regard to the village headman, but also between the traditional and modern village authorities.
As of today, the problems are not yet resolved and the LMD not fully functional.
The village organizations, i.e., Pelwata, PKK, and savings group are all active, but there is no
KUD in Tuhaha. The economic situation in Tuhaha is average compared to the other five
villages in our sample.
Tuhaha has a relatively small garden area and the village is heavily dependent on fishing.
Both the fish catches and general condition of the marine environment have deteriorated
significantly. Compared to the other villages, Tuhaha fishers spend on average the most hours
at sea (> 9 hrs per trip). Nevertheless, fisheries management is not yet an issue in the village.
Catches have declined but are still sufficient, plus the high prices currently paid for fish make
up for the reduced quantities. In fact, the village plan includes aquaculture as well as expansion
of night fishing using lamps.
To solve the conflicts with the traditional authorities (and, therewith, improve the functioning
of the village government) and to regulate access to resources, sasi is being revitalized. The
opinion of the villagers on sasi varies: some hardly remember it, while others find sasi
important. The cultural and social significance of sasi was especially stressed by the traditional
village leaders who obviously have seen their authority decline together with sasi. Without
exception, the respondents agreed that sasi is functional in preserving the resources against
over-exploitation and theft. Sasi is also still valued as a mechanism to control social behavior
(e.g., alcohol abuse).
The village officials see great commercial potential for marine sasi on valuable sea cucumbers.
Harvest rights will be auctioned and income will be generated for the village. The process of
revitalization is mainly an action of the formal village government, in which traditional leaders
collaborate. Individual villagers are not directly involved. They will not get direct benefits
from sasi. Nevertheless, support from the villagers is high because 1) it is tradition, 2) it protects
the resources, and 3) it will stop intrusion from outsiders.
Possible threats to the re-establishment of sasi are economic difficulties and the indifference
of young people towards sasi. The village government is aware of these issues. The main
obstruction is the incomplete integration of traditional institutions and regulations within
the formal government structure. The system is said to have been acknowledged by the
Latupati, but acknowledgment from higher government levels is also required. What is
important is that the village leader has a strong position, is trusted by the villagers, and
collaborates closely with the traditional authorities in the village. If this is the case, the
realization of local management will face only minor difficulties, because general support
from the villagers is strong.Desa Hulaliu, Haruku Island        159
Chapter 13
Desa Hulaliu, Haruku Island1
13.1 Physical, Biological and Technical Attributes
13.1.1 Physical environment
Hulaliu is situated on the north side of Haruku Island between the two coastal villages of
Aboru in the east and Kariu in the west (see Figure 1). Similar to the other villages, the people
explained how they originally lived in the hills. The village was subdivided into 12 clans
(margas) under two kapitans, Taihutu and Noija. Later a third kapitan, Siahaya, was included
in the village structure. Under the influence of foreign traders, the villagers were converted
to Islam. In 1527, the Portuguese arrived in Haruku Island and they attacked the villages.
Under the Portuguese, the villagers changed their religion to Catholicism. When the Dutch
arrived in 1590, Hulaliu, as well as the villages of Kailolo, Pelauw, Rohomoni and Kabauw,
settled on the coast. Hulaliu became a Protestant village.
Behind the village, lies an extensive garden area that runs southwards in the direction of the
village of Aboru. The village territory of Hulaliu stretches from the point of Haluamuna to
the headland at Waihokol (see Figure 13.1).
1 For data tables see Appendix 3.
Figure 13.1.  Sketch map of Hulaliu (features not necessarily to
scale).
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Hulaliu lies on the south shore of Seram Strait, which is the main fishing area. The fishing
grounds are divided into the white waters (shallow) and the blue waters (deep). Along the
drop-off is a coral fringe. When the weather is calm, most fishers go out to fish in the deep
strait between Haruku and Seram, but when the weather is bad and the currents strong, fishing
is limited to the near-shore shallow areas, like the former sasi area.
The former sasi area covers a 3 km long, shallow stretch of water in front of the village. It runs
from the SNP school in the south to the headland just north of the built-up area. The sasi area
is mainly used by fishers who fish from the shore with cast nets, and by shellfish gatherers.
The area is divided into different parts depending on the marine products that can be found.
The predominantly sea grass area is an important nursery ground for fish.
The village of Hulaliu claims (informal) property rights over certain parts of the deep sea and
shallow areas. Fishers from outside, using a particular area for a certain period of time, are
required to pay a fee to the village government.
13.1.2 Biological characteristics
The majority of the fishers (57%) target both reef and pelagic fish. Twenty-one types of fish
were recorded as commonly caught. In addition, fishers target octopus and various shellfish.
In the shallow waters, women are active in shell gathering, mainly for consumption. One
female respondent mentioned she used vegetable poisons (akartuba) to catch the fish trapped
in the shallow waters at low tide. Shellfish are an important food supplement when there are
no fish available. Women also catch top shells (lola), japing-japing shells (also called Mancadu),
and black oysters. The pearl oyster shells are sold, while other shells are locally used as garden
decorations or the like (see Figure 13.2).
The women we interviewed explained that there are still many shells on the beach. They do not feel
the situation is deteriorating, but admitted that big shells (>30 cm), like the one the kewang uses for
announcements, can no longer be found. An old lady, Anto Siahaija (71), has been picking shells
since she was a 17-year old girl. She explained: “There are still big shells on the meti (shallow coastline),
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but the people have taken many.” The women felt that the harvests were small, but still sufficient.
Apart from shellfish, fish catches have also declined dramatically. Nearly all fishers in our
sample reported reduced catches (also see Section 13.8.4). The use of modern gears, increased
fishing efforts, and especially blast fishing, cause catches to decline. The use of destructive
fishing techniques, like bombs, appears to be prevalent and was mentioned by nearly 30% of
the respondents as a major cause for coral reef destruction. Other human activities that have
an impact on the resource are the harvest of corals for house construction, littering, the use of
toxins and the increase in the numbers of fishing gears.
13.1.3 Fisheries technology
Angling (pancing) is the most common fishing technique used by Hulaliu fishers. Other
techniques used are nets, fish traps, spears, beach seines and lift nets (bagans). Of our
respondents, 43% had only hand lines and 27% had nets. Six fishers (20%) owned no gear at
all. About 70% of the village households (22 fishers in our sample) have a boat, but only one
fisher has an engine.
The fishers also report the use of bombs and poisons in the local fishery. Blast fishing takes
place mainly in the coral reef area at the transition between the shallow and deep waters.
According to the fishers, these are the breeding grounds for fish and usually left alone. Often,
economical pressure is said to be the driving force behind resource destruction, but currently
the area is subject to local bombers who are said to act out of discontent with the current
village government (read: village head).
There are three lift nets operating in Hulaliu waters owned by Asnanolaita, Noija, and a third
person. A fourth lift net is under construction. The lift nets provide baitfish for hook and line
fishers from Ambon Island (Galala, Halong, and the city of Ambon).
There are also five beach seiners operating in Hulaliu. These seiners target baitfish used by
pole and line fishers. The beach seines are made of the karolo net that has been used since the
1970s. This net is generally regarded as a destructive fishing technique because of the extremely
small meshes. There are two types of beach seine nets. There is the “siru siru” net which is
used for puri puri fish only, and has a mesh size of 3 mm. There is also the kareng kareng which
is used for both laor (a type of worm) and puri puri fish (a tiny fish used in food). This net has
a mesh size of only 1 mm.
Large-scale fishing activities in the area are limited.
Auctioned fishing rights
In the 1980s, Maurits Taihutu, the village head at the time, decided to rent out parts of the sea
to outsiders. It is, however, not unlikely that even before this date, fishing rights were sold.
The entrance fee, paid to the village head, was supposed to be shared with the kewang that
would use it for its meetings. However, Taihutu neglected to share the money and had a
dispute with the kewang. In the process (when sasi also declined), the kewang ceased to exist.
Contrary to the history of sasi, though, the rental system still exists.
Regardless of their catch, outsiders pay Rp40,000 a day to the village. Revenues for the village
can reach up to Rp350,000 (± USD150, 1996 rate). The shallow area is extremely suited for
traditional gears like the hook and line (using small baitfish), floating nets, cast nets, and the
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learn their fishing methods. Some fishers come from neighboring areas. A group of Tuhaha
fishers, for instance, rented the shallow area in 1993 for two months. Others come from further
away, i.e., Sulawesi or Arboru. Sometimes the arrangements with outside fishers lead to
problems. In 1996, there was a group of fishers who caught lobsters, but they destroyed the
coral reef in the process. Since these fishers did not even have a permit, they are still being
prosecuted. Other fishers target ornamental fish which are not caught by local fishers.
It is also possible to rent parts of the deep sea. Decisions on licensing these to fishers are
made by the village government without consultation with the villagers, while the revenues
are for the village (government). When an agreement is reached with the outside fishers and
the decision is made, the village head will announce in the village which parts are rented out.
The local fishers then are not allowed to fish there.
13.2 Attributes of the Community and Fishers
Hulaliu is a middle-sized village with 2,122 inhabitants. The people are divided over 359 households
with an average size of five persons. The total number of families has increased over the years due
to population growth. The predominantly Christian village has a small Butonese minority of 130
persons. The migration rate is negative. The emigrants are relatively small numbers of youngsters
who leave for Ambon to go to school and never return. There is no tourism in the village.
Hulaliu has its own health center (PUKESMAS). There are two elementary schools (alternately
in the morning and afternoon), and a high school. The village is equipped with water pumps
and has 160 m open waste water canals (plus an additional 28 m from the school to the sea).
Ninety-five houses have septic tanks. The village has electricity and some villagers have TVs.
Compared to the other villages, transport links are extremely low. There are asphalt roads, but there
is no frequent mini-bus service. Chartering transport is very expensive. The nearest village where
speedboat service is provided is Pelauw, approximately 10 km away further along the road. Hulaliu
has no telephone connection and for communication, the village depends on hand-delivered mail.
Employment
Hulaliu is predominantly agriculture-oriented. The official village records registered 797
farmers and only 18 fishers. But as in the other villages, this figure is not accurate because
most people fish part-time or seasonally. Only three people were reported as professional,
full-time fishers and these were the lift net owners. Currently, the number of people fishing is
increasing because of the need for the additional income.
Since 1979, the number of vendors and traders has increased from 6 to 24, and the number of
laborers has increased from 6 to 34. The most significant increase, however, are the people working
for the village government. Before, there were 10 government officials (mainly teachers), but after
the restructuring of the village government, the number of government staff has increased to 79.
13.2.1 Village government
Hulaliu receives annual subsidies from the higher government levels for village administration
and development. The subsidies are supplemented by contributions from relatives who live
outside the village or abroad, and by the fees derived from the lease arrangements with outside
fishers who fish in the Strait of Seram.Desa Hulaliu, Haruku Island        163
In 1979, the traditional government structure was replaced by the formal structure as prescribed
by the district government. The traditional saniri negeri members were placed in the new
village council LSD (Lembaga Social Desa) which became the LMD in 1980. The members of the
traditional village council have always been descendants from the Taihutu, Noija, and Siahaya
clans (Table 13.1). The Noija clan is the clan of the kepala adat. The Siahaya clan traditionally
safeguards village security; they are the kewang clan. The Taihutu clan delivers the tuan negeri.
These clans are still highly respected in the village.
The new election system did not change the ruling authorities. The LMD members are chosen
through the adat laws, so that the village representatives still represent particular families.
Presently, the LMD consists entirely of members of adat clans. Theoretically, the new election
system would enable more villagers to be involved in village governance, but as of today, the
common villagers are represented through their clan leaders.
What was adopted from the new government structure was the procedure to choose the village
head who was no longer appointed by the traditional village elders. Domingus Noija, the
current village head, is from the Noija clan and has a traditionally legitimate position (Table
13.2). He was elected, but with a minimum required number of votes. As a result, he faces a
large opposition party in the village where the political situation is extremely unstable.
In his function as kepala adat, Noija carries out the adat rituals as far as they still exist (e.g.,
arrange the Tomanusa which is the dowry paid when a man from another village marries someone
from Hulaliu). The kepala adat also has a hand in the design of village regulations, and this
explains why the arrangements surrounding the revitalization of sasi are carried out by Noija.
Table 13.1. Principal village clans.
Leader Name of the soa (clan)
Noija soa Nusahuhu
Taihutu soa Pake - 5 other margas
Siahaya soa Sourissa - other margas
Bebas Pendatang - for outsiders
Table 13.2.




1985-1993 Hans Maurits Taihutu
1979-1983 Nataniel Taihutu
1971-1979 Interim government
1969-1971 Frits A. Matulessy
1958-1969 Interim government
1954-1958 Semuel Laisina
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13.2.2 Village organizations
The PKK was established in the 1970s. But since the wife of the current village head took over
from Christina Noija Taihutu last year, the PKK has become inactive. The activities (a kiosk,
breeding chickens, baking and family gardens) were not continued. The wife of the new village
head is not active and limits her activities to cooking for the school and providing secretarial
support to her husband. The weak position of her husband, the village head, will surely not
motivate the women to join the PKK.
The Pelwata aborted most of its activities when the former chairlady became involved in a
conflict with the Pelwata officials. When she left, the problems were not over, because the new
minister’s wife is not interested in the position of chairlady of Pelwata. Despite the lack of an
active chairlady, the Pelwata continued the bible services, skills training, and regular visits to
other villages and the sick. However, the Pelwata is not fully functional. Hulaliu once rejected
a Klasis program. It concerned a recreation program for which the women simply stated that
they had no time.
The KUD or “Haturua” (lit. two stones) has existed since 1985 and is active. The KUD has a
kiosk, a credit system, a speedboat, and a minibus, but the main income is derived from the
trade in cloves. The KUD does not deal with fisheries or fisheries management. The benefits
are divided among the 163 members in a yearly meeting. Despite the fact that the KUD has an
active savings program, membership is lower than these in the other villages.
There are two KEP organizations in the village. The first was established in February 1997 to
improve the productivity of fishers in Hulaliu. The members, appointed by the village
government, received Rp3 million (± USD1,070, 1997 rate) government funding to purchase
boats, nets and other fishing gears. The fishers will be trained, and after the money is invested,
the revenues will be saved. Recently, a second KEP was established for female fish traders.
There are four IDT groups in Hulaliu and a group of farmers started an “agro business”
supported by the Department of Agriculture.
People can save their money either through the ARISAN savings group (open for men and
women) or the KUD. Besides these formal groups, there are no informal meetings.
13.2.3 Role of women
Women in Hulaliu are very skilled in dry-land agriculture, especially the cultivation of corn
and yam. They have a leading role in cultivation, maintenance, harvest and post-harvest
activities, whilst men only support women in this sector. However, the drought has drastically
decreased the women’s income from agriculture. After clove prices dropped, women shifted
their attention to marine resources. Currently, marine resource use by women is rather intense.
Commodities, such as shells, snails and the fish they find at low tide, are usually for family
consumption. For income earning, the women trade fish they obtain from the fishers.
Despite their activities on the economic and household levels, women are excluded from
decision-making processes in the village. The village head argued that women are involved
in village affairs, but as in the other villages, only where they concern “women’s activities”.
Women perform public tasks like being secretary and treasurer, or work in the refreshment
section, but they are not involved in decision-making. The traditional system limits women’s
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and designed by higher government levels. When the village government has a meeting, the
village head informs his wife about new developments. She will invite or inform the minister’s
wife and the head of the school, who will pass the message to others.
Not only are women excluded from decision-making, they could neither name anybody to
represent them. As a result, the women feel excluded from “official procedures”. This was
confirmed by 23% of the respondents of the general survey who considered women to be
completely outside of decision-making processes.
13.2.4 Profile of fishers
Only 70% of the fishers in our sample were born in Hulaliu; the other 30% came from other
parts of the island, Saparua and Ambon. The sample comprised one female respondent only.
The average age of the respondents in our sample was 47 years, while half of the respondents
were under 45 years old.
The fishers have on average 6.6 household members. Children who have left have gone to
school or work. One-third of the households have an externally derived income averaging
Rp485,700 (USD194, early 1997 rate) per year. In our sample, 60% of the people have only
elementary education.
Eighty percent of the respondents own land. Seventy-seven percent had type 4 housing (cement
with zinc roof). The economic indicator of the fishers’ sample is made up of adding scores for
land ownership, boat type, house and gears (see Section 2 and Appendix 2). At Hulaliu, this
indicator is 8.7 (with a standard error of 0.38), which is middle range. Adding TV ownership
as a factor, the score rises to 9.1, close to the average for the case study sites (see Appendix 3).
The average years the men spent in the fishery is 25. Compared to the other five villages,
Hulaliu fishers spend relatively short periods at sea with on average 6 hours per day, with 2-
5 hours being most common. In this light, it is not surprising to see that Hulaliu fishers get
significantly less of their income from fish compared to fishers in Tuhaha and Nolloth, this
being only 56%. Besides, a relatively large part of the catches (26%) is used for consumption.
Eighty percent of the fishers said they were satisfied with their job. They described it as their
“hobby”, and felt that fishing was good because it provides them with a daily income. The
disadvantage of fishing is that it is a hard life. Half of the fishers would change their job if
there was a better alternative. Some fishers aspire to have their own fishing business. For
their children, only 10% the fishers aspired a future as fishers. The majority (70%) preferred
their children to become government employees.
13.3 Market Attributes
13.3.1 Local fish trade
Nearly all fish sales are made directly to local consumers, usually through the fishers’ wives.
The key factor in choosing the point of sale is its proximity. A part of the fish goes to
wholesalers. On an average, a third of the fish caught is eaten by the family. Of the 30
respondents, seven eat more than half of their catch, while five fishers do not eat any of the
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Before, the top shells (Trochus Niloticus) were harvested for their meat. The shells only became
commercially interesting in the 1960s. With the decline of sasi, the regulated harvest of these
shells was, however, not possible. The village government realizes the potential for top shells
and this is one of the reasons that sasi is being revitalized.
13.4 Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
13.4.1 Loss of sasi
Sasi was established in the early 19th century during the reign of Abraham Tuanakotta (the “Pati
Kotalesia”). Since then, sasi has had alternate periods of decline and revival (Figure 13.3). As far
as people can remember, sasi was abolished during the reign of Frits Matulessy (1969-1971). In
the following eight years, Nelis Noija was the interim village head, and he re-established sasi
but to no avail. During the headship of Nataniel Taihutu (1979-1983), the process of decline
started again, to reach its downfall during that of Maurits Taihutu (1985-1993).
As had happened before, the decline coincided with problems between the political authorities.
This time, the impetus was the village head who confiscated the fine money meant for the
kewang. The kewang members were discouraged and left the enforcement of sasi regulations to
the village government. The village officials, however, did not establish their own enforcement
and offenders had a free hand. The process of decline reached its lowest point when the
villagers entered the sasi area. Bobby Leisana, a local fisher, remembered that the sasi signs
were put up, but after several months, the villagers ignored them and entered the sea. The
kewang members did not stop them because they had resigned, and the villagers thought: “If
they don’t take sasi seriously, then we don’t take it seriously either.” In 1993, marine sasi
definitely vanished; land sasi was taken over by the church.
13.4.2 Former sasi regulations
The traditional sasi rules were originally written in the secret language bahasa tanah. Unfortunately,
the original set of written rules was lost by the former head of the kewang. The current village
secretary, Nelis Noija, compiled a new set which will be used in the new sasi system.
The sasi operational rules are embedded in a set of general adat rules which define geographical
boundaries, resource use and social behavior. Social behavior is mainly regulated through
operational rules. A collective-choice rule is that resources have protection (lit. “Do not destroy
anything”). This rule is specified through operational rules, which define the products the
rule is applicable to, when, where, and by whom. Marine sasi, for example, principally
Figure 13.3. Process of decline and revival of sasi.
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restricted access to the sasi area through seasonal closures. Every three months, the sasi area
would be open for three weeks during which all (non-destructive) fishing techniques were
allowed. Once open, there were no regulations to limit the harvest of specific fish species
(Albert Matulessy, pers. comm.).
13.4.3 Formal fisheries regulations
Aside from the prohibition to fish with destructive fishing methods (i.e., bombs and poisons),
there are limitations on the mesh sizes being used (minimum mesh size >1.5 mm). In order to
protect the shoreline, the harvesting of sand, stones and corals (except for small corals) is
prohibited. However, no enforcement agent is present to enforce these rules. At all times, a
permit can be obtained from the village government, which allows the harvest of marine
products outside the shallow waters. There is no restriction on the use of lift nets, but owners
have to register at the village office.
13.4.4 The players
The fishery in Hulaliu is dominated by artisanal fishers who have access to all the fishing
grounds except those reserved for outside fishers. Management consists primarily of the
levying of access fees by the village government. The village head is the key player when it
comes to implementing fisheries regulations and the revitalization of sasi. The church is
exclusively involved in sasi on coconuts. There are formal fisheries regulations, but these are
not actively enforced. There is no local enforcement agent and the police personnel are not
direct players in resource management.
Traditional authorities, such as the head of the kewang, play no active role in fisheries
management, but are the keepers of the traditional local knowledge on sasi which is passed
from father to son. Until sasi is revitalized, it is important to keep this knowledge because it
will be the base for the structure of the new sasi system.
13.4.5 Enforcement
During the heyday of sasi, the rules were enforced by two kewang heads assisted by 20 kewang
members. The commitment of the kewang was strong. The former kewang head in Hulaliu, Albert
Matulessy, explained: “The rules are applied to anyone, with no exception, not even for a kewang’s
wife. If she would take anything that is not ripe, and he (i.e., the kewang husband) would not
interfere, another kewang might see it and punish him. But also if nobody would see him, the
ancestors would deal with it.” The kewang oath (to apply the regulations to any offender
regardless of their position or relationship) ensured fair and legitimate enforcement. Small cases
were fined, but serious offenders underwent more severe punishment. While drums were played
in the background, the offender was made to walk around the village dressed in coconut leaves
tied around the waist. While walking, people would beat him/her with wooden sticks. This
custom ended when the position of the kewang was undermined by the village head, who would
confiscate the fine money. The village head further undermined the kewang’s authority when he
protected his relatives, who broke the rules, against the kewang. The kewang was discouraged
and not willing to deal with the lack of support, and they decided to quit.
The kewang’s authority was taken over by the church. Enforcement was effective: “When the
kewang was alive, the people would break the rules all the time. But when control was taken over
by the church, the people obeyed,” Bobby Leisana, a Hulaliu fisher explained. The strength of
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the village authorities. The church was more continuous than the ever-changing village government
which, each time, would install a new kewang with members who supported that particular village
government (read: village head).  This was possible, because only the position of the kewang head
is based on descent; the kewang members were chosen. The change in kewang and their position
towards the village authorities led to favoritism and undermined the effectiveness of the kewang.
As a result of their strong position, the church became a major pillar in resource management.
Another aspect that made the church an institution with regard to enforcement is the power
of the institution itself. Bobby Leisana illustrated: “The advantage of church sasi is that you
actually do not need any guards, since God sees everything and will punish the offender.” He
explained: “Several times people took coconuts during sasi. A few days later they got severe
stomach aches and had to admit their crimes to the priest.” For land-based products, thus,
church sasi is strong and effective. Similar to the situation at Tuhaha though, the option to
have marine sasi enforced by the church was not considered.
The formal authority and responsibility for law enforcement, including fisheries regulations,
are in the hands of the police. The fact, however, that the police personnel are based in Pelauw,
10 km from Hualiu, reduced their effectiveness significantly. For example, when an offender
breaks the rules, the village officials would have to make a formal report to the police, but by
the time they arrive the offender has already disappeared. Therefore, the village officials (LMD
and LKMD) are the ones catching offenders, but this implies certain risks. The village
government realizes that if they or, for example, the kewang members injure the offender, the
local authorities could be held liable. Therefore, they will not deal with the offender locally
but bring him to the police.
Since the implementation of the new formal village structure, the prosecution of offenders is
handled according to the formal government regulations and procedures. Traditionally, the
local court consisted of the saniri negeri, the village officials, and the kewang, and despite the
abolishment of these structures, adat law is still taken into account. The village authorities
collaborate closely with the sub-district government, and once a case is in the hands of a
judge from the sub-district, the village leaders can still influence the matter. This, of course,
also allows the village leaders to manipulate the course of events in favor of their relatives.
From our study, it appeared that the formal enforcement structures are inadequate. For
example, despite the village fishery regulations, there is a relatively high occurrence of
dynamite fishing and the use of poisons.
13.4.6 Compliance
Since sasi disappeared, compliance to fisheries rules has become a problem. The lack of an
enforcing institution creates opportunities for illegal fishing. The belief in ancestral spirits and
their revenge is still mentioned as an important reason for people to comply, but it was obviously
not sufficient to keep the people on track when sasi was lost. Economic difficulties aggravated
the situation. In order to get their share in what had become an open-access resource, people
infringed the sasi area. The short-term benefits exceeded the need for a management system.
The process of decline is illustrated by Ama Sihaya, an old fisher-woman, who stated: “The
grace of God is lesser, the world is getting harder and harder, and the people are not good
anymore.” Currently, contra groups in the village use destructive fishing techniques to
undermine the village head’s authority and encroachment and bombing are merely a sign of
political dissatisfaction. This situation severely undermines village authority and it will
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13.5 External Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Link with higher government bodies
The links with the higher government levels are maintained by the village head. Ordinances
and development programs are sent to the village through the district government. The
regulations are adapted by the village head who sends them back for approval. The village
head knows that there are fisheries regulations, but has no copies of these in the village. He
explained that if he wants to be informed about the law, he would ask the Fisheries Agency or
Fisheries Department of the Municipality of Ambon.
With regard to fisheries management, the role of the national government is limited. Fisheries
management is not yet an issue in Hulaliu. There is no active enforcement of fisheries laws;
the villagers have never seen a patrol boat. Resource management, i.e., the enforcement of
local regulations, is carried out by the village government.
Twice a year, representatives from BAPPEDA, the planning agency, visit the village. Other
visitors are officers from the Fisheries Agency. They showed an interest in the fishing methods
of the people and promoted aquaculture (fish). However, the village has had a shrimp farm
that failed due to the rough seasons and the wind from the sea.
The village head of Hulaliu realizes that support by government institutions is important. He suggested
to the higher government levels to recognize adat. Later, he reported that the plans to revitalize sasi
were actually approved. The village head explained: “They cannot change everything, it is adat.”
Collaboration with other institutions
Collaboration with other institutions is seen as crucial for technical assistance and the
development of sustainable resource use. In 1993, the Hualopu Foundation and the
Environmental Studies Center of Pattimura University worked in Hulaliu to produce a booklet
on the management of local resources. The coastal management plan, which was the output
from the project, aims to preserve the natural resources. One component is the revitalization
of sasi and re-establishment of the kewang. A second component is the establishment of fish
ponds for the fishers to provide an additional income.
Learisa Kayeli, the small NGO based in Haruku, currently also has a project in Hulaliu.
External economic influences
In Hulaliu, a village with an extensive forest-garden area, the drop in clove prices has had a
negative effect on household well-being. People had to diversify their activities in order to
earn a living, and it has had a negative effect on natural resource management. The current
monetary crisis aggravates the situation even more, but to what extent is not yet clear.
Infrastructure and development
There are no large-scale development or investment projects in or around the village. The
mining operations in Haruku village have not yet had an impact on Hulaliu. Activities that
will be the result of mining operations, such as resettlement schemes, are as yet not taken
seriously. The village government also stated that if they are ordered to leave, they would
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13.6 Incentives to Cooperate
The key to resource management is compliance. Despite the fact that currently compliance to
fisheries regulations is low, there are certain motivations for people to comply with existing,
or newly to be installed regulations for resource management.
Custom
Due to the gradual loss of sasi, some people were actually not aware of the fact that sasi had
been lost. When asked about marine sasi, they explained: “There are regulations on taking marine
products.” Even though there are no sasi signs, no ceremonies, and no kewang, this group of
people will follow the fisheries regulations whether or not they are prescribed by sasi.
Positive opinion on sasi
The women we interviewed generally approved of sasi. The involvement of the church (in
sasi on coconuts) is an improvement compared to the past. Christina Noija Taihutu (wife of
the former village head) explained: “When sasi was still adat, women were excluded from the
ceremonies, but now that sasi is organized by the church everybody can go.” Women’s
involvement in sasi thus stimulates appreciation of sasi and compliance to the rules.
Sanctions
Fear of God and the ancestors’ spirits are important reasons for people to comply with the
rules. The collective prayer (commitment) in the church induces social control mechanisms,
which will be a stimulus for people to follow the rules.
Enforcement
The installation of a local enforcement agent is important for a functioning management
system. In particular, the kewang is an effective institution. Its legitimate position allows the
members to enforce the rules, but only if they act independently from the village government.
Involvement of the formal enforcer, the police, can also be an extra incentive for people to
comply with the rules. If the newly to be installed regulations are approved by the higher
government, the village can ask for police support which will help to stimulate compliance.
Position of the village head
A strong disincentive to comply with the rules is the weak position of the village head. In
contrast to, for example, Nolloth, the village head in Hulaliu has no firm ground to exert his
authority. In the eyes of nearly half the village population, he is not a legitimate leader and
their dissatisfaction is a reason to use illegal fishing methods.
Benefits
The village head has great interest in the commercially interesting commodities that he wants
to place under sasi. The revenues, however, will be used to boost the village treasury. The
villagers strongly oppose fisheries rules if they will not gain direct benefits. The sale of harvest
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Acknowledgment of a problem
Even though fish catches and the state of the resource have declined dramatically, the limitation
of catches, and fisheries management in general, is not yet an issue. The women mentioned a
decline in the number and size of sea shells and they thought that over-exploitation was the
reason for the decline. Nevertheless, this was not a reason to limit or regulate the harvest. The
same attitude is expressed by the male fishers.
Other women still use the extracts of poisonous plants to fish in the shallow waters, even
though the women know it is harmful and is prohibited. Generally, most fishers do not seem
to link their activities to the general decline in resources.  Besides, they believe that resources
will always be available since they are “a gift of God”. The lack of knowledge and awareness
causes people to disregard regulations.
13.7 Patterns of Interaction
Currently, Hulaliu is in the process of revitalizing sasi. The idea has been initiated by the
village head who is also the kepala adat and as such, is entitled to do so. The procedure followed
is slow and carefully designed. This because the last attempt to revitalize sasi in 1986 by
Taihutu, failed due to a strong contra movement. This course of events is likely to happen
again. Currently, the strategy of the village head was to start initial deliberations with the
village officials and the sub-district government respectively. After the LMD approved the
plans, the village head talked to the church minister to ask for his collaboration.
At that stage, the villagers were not informed or consulted because the village head was
afraid that his opponents would sabotage the plan. First, the village head wanted to have the
regulations approved by the sub-district so that he would have formal support and could
send for the police if people did not cooperate.
In November 1997, a kewang head was installed and 30 kewang members selected. The selection
went through the kepala dusuns who asked the people in his area who were interested. The kewang
members initially consisted of representatives from different families (“everybody with the right
skills can join”), but, of course, these were those who approved of the plan (and the village head).
Sasi rules
The objective of the new sasi rules is “the protection of the culture through the exclusion of
outsiders” as Noija described it. The rules aim to keep people from destroying the resource
and from taking unripe products, e.g., top shells and sea cucumbers.
The current set of sasi regulations is a combination of the formal fisheries rules and traditional sasi
regulations with some adaptations to the current situation. These fisheries regulations are written
down. The rules for resource use are applicable to terrestrial and marine resources (see Table 13.3).
Besides these harvest restrictions, there is a restriction on the mesh size for the karolo nets,
used by lift nets in the pelagic fishery (>1.5 mm).
The marine sasi area will be divided into three parts: a specific are for sea cucumbers in the
central part, the Mencadu shells are protected in the northern part, and top shells in the southern
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Benefits
The village government decided to auction the rights to harvest in the lelang area, but only to
Hulaliu inhabitants. The revenues from the auction are used to provide the village with an
income and pay the kewang. The benefits will be split equally between the kewang and the
village government. The villagers, however, prefer a public harvest from which they would
derive direct benefits. It also would prevent the village head from confiscating the access
fees. Having learned from the past, the villagers’ trust in the village government is limited.
The players
Acknowledgment of the local regulations by the sub-district government is necessary to make
them operational. Formally of course, the sasi regulations will at all times be subject to higher
government laws, i.e., they may not contradict the national fisheries laws and/or
environmental regulations. The advice of the higher government officials is, according to the
village head, “to take sasi as adat and do it traditionally”, which is what he will do.
The tasks with regard to sasi are divided as follows: the government office organizes and
monitors sasi, while the kewang and church secure enforcement and compliance. The role of
the church is very important because the people will have to commit themselves to the sasi
regulations through a communal prayer. The practical enforcement is in hands of the kewang.
The police will not be actively involved. The village head felt he did not actually need them:
“Sasi is a traditional adat thing.”
Participation in the decision-making process has been limited to the village government, the
kewang and some active villagers. A meeting was organized to discuss the scope of sasi.
Lahesina, one of the new kewang members who attended the meeting, explained that the
meeting was not attended by common fishers: “It is for the government and the people who
work in the sea (read: lift net owners).” Later, the plan was presented in the Baileo (traditional
community house) where people could make suggestions. However, not the whole village
was present, and only three women turned up. The audience suggested an increase in the
penalty for offences that affect people’s livelihood and this idea was accepted.
A centralized procedure, such as the one described above, is perfectly acceptable to the villagers and
many people stated that they did not expect to be included. Others were not even aware of the fact
that sasi was being re-installed, but they felt that it was a decision of the government and the church,
and that they would hear the message about sasi over the megaphone once it was implemented.
Table 13.3. Sasi rules in Hulaliu.
Land sasi 1. Coconuts are under sasi and there is a prohibition to cut young
(straight) leaves at the top of the tree (because this kills the tree).
2. There is a restriction on the harvest of young fruits of the durian,
pineapples, campedak (type of nangka), jackfruit, and mango trees.
  Marine sasi  and 1. There is a seasonal prohibition on collecting top shells and gastropods.
pelabuhan (harbor) 2. There is a seasonal prohibition on collecting sea cucumbers.
3. There is a ban on fishing with vegetable poisons, e.g., akar tuba,
hutung/ buah perdamatan and aiasa.
4. There is a ban on fishing with bombs, chemicals and other poisons.
5. There is a ban on harvesting stones, sand and corals in front of the village.Desa Hulaliu, Haruku Island        173
13.8 Outcomes
13.8.1 Equity
1. Role of fishers in management
Generally, the role of fishers in management has not changed compared to the past, but in the
future, the fishers expect the situation to be worse. Answers were extremely varied (score 2-
10 on the 10-rung scale), and a positive or negative perception is likely to depend on the
attitude of the respondent toward the current village government (supportive or not). The
voice of a pro-government person is more likely to reach the village officials.
When asked about power sharing, 77% thought the government had most or total responsibility for
fisheries management. The rest thought the people shared responsibility equally with the government.
2. Access to resources
Compared to the past, the fishers’ access to resources has not changed. It was noted that
people were free to fish anywhere they wanted, except for the rented areas, and that only lift
net owners need a permit. In the future, however, fishers expect significant reductions. The
current open-access area will become restricted once sasi is re-established. Access to the shallow
coastline for cast net fishers and women will be limited too, because some of the shellfish
caught by women have a commercial value. These harvest restrictions, however, will negatively
affect the household well-being in terms of food. The restrictions on the fishing area of cast
net fishers and the fishers who do not own a boat, will most probably result in major problems.
3. Distribution of fishing gears
The distribution of means of production is seen to be significantly fairer now than in the past,
and this is expected to get even better. No explanations were given for this change.
4. Income distribution
When asked about the level of economic disparities, the fishers reported that conditions had
not significantly changed. No change was expected in the future.
13.8.2 Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making
Compared to the past, the involvement of fishers in fisheries decision-making has declined
significantly. A third of the respondents stated that the village head – with or without village
government staff – makes all the decisions. The breakdown of customs, the political situation,
and decision-making behind closed doors play a role here.
Nevertheless, most fishers see the style of decision-making in the village as being a process of common
or majority agreement. The people trust the village government “to know what they do” and are
confident that the government’s decisions will benefit the village. All agreed that stakeholders should
be involved in decision-making. A large majority (83%) felt that local groups had a role in decision-
making, while the same percentage stated that outsiders were excluded. It was mentioned that the
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6. Ease of entry (costs)
Ease of entry has declined significantly compared to the past and further decrease is expected in
the future. It was mentioned that outsiders have to pay in order to fish. Local fishers, however,
also experienced higher costs, but did not specify why. Probably the necessity to acquire more
expensive fishing gears due to competition plays a role here.
7. Control over access to the fishery
Control over access to the fishery has not changed over time, but it is expected to decline
slightly in the future. Again, perceptions varied.
Access is mainly regulated by the village government. Over half agreed that a fisher should
be able to ask for and get harvesting rights in a sasi area during the closed season. Nearly all
disagreed with the sale of resource harvest rights to outsiders. However, they have no power
to change this. About 63% of the fishers agreed that fisheries rules should be changed.
8. Compliance
Compliance with fisheries rules has drastically declined since the past, and further
deterioration is expected. There are no data on the numbers of offenders caught each month,
but the villagers explained that certain people use the political instability in the village as an
excuse to ignore the rules. Most offences are made because of economic needs, but foremost,
because of lack of control by the village head.
13.8.3 Social sustainability
9. Family well-being
Family well-being has improved significantly, but is not expected to improve in future. The drop in
clove prices has had a negative effect on family well-being, and it was mentioned that the people
lack the skills to improve their livelihood. On the other hand, there are some factors that stimulate
family well-being, such as the improved infrastructure and favorable markets which stimulate profits.
10. Income
Fishers reported no significant increase in income over the past 15 years and expect no further
change. Better infrastructure and job prospects have a positive effect on income. Favorable are
also the high prices paid for fish, but yields are low. The lack of hope for future prosperity shows
that people understand that the benefits from rising prices will only last as long as fish are available.
It was also noted that markets are far away which makes trade difficult and less lucrative.
11. Tradition of collective action
Hulaliu fishers rate past performance very high; scores of 8-10 predominate. Compared to
the past, the respondents perceived a significant negative change in communal activities in
the village. They expect it to drop further in future. The main causes for the decline are the
change in mentality (materialism) and the payment system which replaced the voluntarily
help people had provided before. Other people blamed the “village administration” (read:
village head) for the decline in collective action. Thirty percent of our fishers’ sample hoped
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12. Discussion of village issues
Discussion of issues is significantly declining compared to the past and further decline was expected.
This was blamed on the village head and the loss of customs, possibly due to political stress.
13. Community harmony
Community harmony has also declined significantly compared to the past and further
deterioration is expected. Conflicts are caused due to drinking and problems over land and
cloves. However, the main problem is the political situation in the village and harmony
depends a great extent on the village head. Some hoped that education would make people
more aware and would lessen the conflicts in the village.
13.8.4 Biological sustainability
14. Fish catches
The fishers in our sample perceived a serious decline in their individual fish catches of 34%.
They expect a further decline of 16% in future. The main causes for declining fish catches are
the use of modern gears, increased fishing efforts, but especially blast fishing.
15. State of the marine environment
The general decline in the condition of marine resources over the past 15 years is 32%, while Hulaliu
fishers expect resources to decline another 22% in the future. The use of destructive fishing techniques
and other human activities have an impact on the state of the resource (see Section 13.1).
13.9 Synthesis
When the new village structure was introduced in Hulaliu, the adat and the formal village
structure merged. It is not clear to what extent the traditional authorities still play a role
related to their traditional position, especially when it comes to decision-making, rule
development and enforcement. The situation is obscured by the fact that the village is under
political stress, which affects the functionality of the village government and centralized the
decision-making processes. The key figure on the scene is the new village head. His election
was controversial and he won with only a small majority. The opposition has a strong position
in the village and formed a contra group. What exactly happened is not clear. According to
adat, the position of Noija as a village head is legitimate, but ever since he became elected, his
position has been unstable.
The fragile position of the village head undermined the PKK women’s group, which has been
dysfunctional since the elections, but the political division also influences membership of
other village organizations. Communal activities have declined and conflicts have increased.
The resources are declining as a result of blast fishing directed as a sign of protest and to
stress the inability of the village government to enforce the rules. However, despite these
problems, or maybe in an attempt to solve them, the current village head started the process
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In the context of political instability, the process of revitalization is precarious. It offers,
however, interesting insights concerning the conditions needed to allow the process to take
place, as well as the right strategy under these circumstances. At the same time, it demonstrates
the extent to which sasi is resilient and able to evolve. In order to avoid obstruction by his
opponents, the village head developed a strategic plan. Higher government levels are involved
as a formal back-up for the process, but the traditional authorities and the church are also
included in the deliberations. Common villagers, on the other hand, were excluded until the
plan was in the final phase to avoid preliminary obstruction or sabotage.
Thus far, it seems that Hulaliu has successfully attempted to get recognition of adat, as well as sasi,
by higher government levels. The sub-district government in Masohi, on the other hand,
acknowledged that sasi is “adat” and as such, should be locally implemented, and enforced by the
kewang. By playing it through the higher government, however, in case of problems, the village
head secured back-up by the police who formally have the authority to interfere in village affairs.
The process of revitalization is merely a “one-man show” run by the village head. Traditionally,
as the kepala adat, he is in the position to re-establish adat institutions by himself. On the other
hand, the lack of transparency may obstruct the process in a later phase. The decline of sasi in
the past was due to mismanagement of the village head who confiscated fine money that
belonged to the kewang. He undermined the authority of the kewang who resigned and
instigated the loss of sasi. Wider back-up and clear defined responsibilities of every involved
institutions are, therefore, crucial. The fact that the new sasi system will generate money for
the village only, without direct benefiting the local fishers directly, is also a point to take into
account. The villagers’ interest is to get access to the fishing grounds and secure protection of
the resources against outside exploitation, including the rented parts of the village marine
territory.
Table 13.4. Results of the performance analysis in Hulaliu.  n=30 heads of fishing households.  ns=change
not significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Average change Average future
current through time expected change
 condition on (statistical significance) (statistical significance)
 scale of 1-10
Equity
1. Role of fishers in management 5.93 -1.2333ns -12% -0.8000* -8%
2. Access to marine resources 6.53 -1.1667ns -12% -1.0000*** -10%
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears 7.33 2.2667*** +23% 0.6000* +6%
4. Income distribution 6.60 0.6000ns +6% -0.1000ns -1%
Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making 6.17 -1.6000** -16% -0.8667*** -9%
6. Ease of entry into the fishery 6.13 -1.9667*** -20% -1.1667*** -12%
7. Control over access to fishery 6.63 -0.0666ns -0.7% -0.6333* -6%
8. Compliance with fishery rules 5.80 -2.2667*** -23% -1.2333*** -12%
Social Sustainability
11. Family well-being 7.43 1.3333* +13% 0,2333ns +2%
12. Income 6.70 0.8333ns +8% 0.0666ns +0.7%
13. Tradition of collective action 7.20 -1.6667*** -17% -0.8667*** -9%
14. Discussion of village issues 6.07 -2.3333*** -23% -1.2667*** -13%
15. Community harmony 5.70 -1.8667*** -19% -0.8000* -8%
Biological sustainability
14. Marine resource health 5.60 -3.1667*** -32% -2.0333*** -20%
15. Fish catch 5.50 -3.4000*** -34% -1.5517*** -16%Desa Hulaliu, Haruku Island        177
The decision-making process, according to the villagers, should be more transparent. On the
one hand, they trust the village government to take the right decisions for them, but awareness
and education, stimulated by NGOs working in the village, make people more independent
and responsible. If the interests of the fishers are not met, the process of revitalization may
face major obstructions, especially by those who are already not in favor of the village
government.
Epilogue
On 13th December 1997, sasi on coconuts was opened. The harvest provided the people with
an income to celebrate Christmas. When sasi was closed again on 28th December, sasi on marine
products was also announced and in January 1998, a kewang was installed and sasi was officially
effective.
However, when our research staff visited the village in August 1998, sasi had already faced
major challenges. Of the 33 kewang members who were installed, only 10 were left and willing
to continue their job. The reason for their resignation was, like before, the village head. In
February 1998, when sasi was still closed, the village head made an arrangement with fishers
from Ambon which allowed them to catch ornamental fish in the village marine territory. The
kewang, however, was not consulted and felt excluded. In March, parts of the sea were again
rented to outsiders. The village head wanted to share the Rp60,000/day he obtained with the
kewang, but the kewang refused. They argued that they only wanted to be involved in decision-
making, especially where it concerned the sale of harvest rights, because it was agreed upon
that no fishing was allowed. The kewang members explained that they could not carry out
their job if the village head himself ignored the regulations. By November 1998, a number of
kewang members resigned and/or were replaced. The head of the kewang decided to quit his
job and joined the contra group in the village. Another kewang head took his place.
After these problems, the villagers asked the village head to put sasi on coconuts again under
the authority of the church. The village head refused, or at least, did not immediately respond
to this request, and village support for sasi decreased. In the light of these developments, it
will be interesting to monitor the process to learn about the obstructions that cause sasi to be
functional and to identify the conditions under which it will be able to successfully manage
the resources.178        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Chapter 14
Dusun Seri, Desa Urimesing, Ambon Island1
14.1 Physical, Biological and Technical Attributes
14.1.1 Physical environment
Seri is situated on Ambon Island and functions as a dusun, an administrative section under
the authority of the Urimesing desa2 (a higher administrative level). Urimesing has four dusuns
all of which are geographically separate villages: Seri, Kusu-kusu, Mahia, and Tuni. In the
past, Seri was the governmental capital because it was the residence of the royal raja clan, the
Wattimena family. At a certain point in time, it was decided by a new village head to make
Kusu-kusu the seat of government for the desa of Urimesing.
Seri covers the areas called Kudamati, Karang Tagepe and Siwang. With 16 km2 (or 1600 ha)
of land area, Seri is the largest dusun in Urimesing (total land surface of 62.5 km2). The village
area is delineated by the city of Ambon in the north, dusun Mahia in the east, dusun Airlow in
the west and the Banda Sea in the south (see Figure 14.1).
Seri has spacious agriculture land with fertile soils, fresh water sources and potential fish
resources. An upwelling in the Banda Sea right off the coast of Seri attracts pelagic fish and
makes the fishery highly productive.
1 Data tables for the case study villages can be found in Appendix 3.
2 Dusun Seri will be referred to in English as a village.
Figure 14.1.  Sketch village map of Seri (features not
necessarily to scale).
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14.1.2 Biological characteristics
Many fishers (55%) target pelagic fish exclusively. Another 24% fish both pelagic fish and reef
species. Seventeen fish were recorded as commonly caught: 10 pelagic fish and 7 reef fish. In
addition, fishers target shrimp, squid, and a type of shellfish (see Appendix 3). Women are
also involved in shell gathering.
Fishers perceived an average 11% decline in the condition of marine resources over the past 15
years, and they expect resources to decline another 15% in the next 15 years. More than half of the
fishers of our sample reported decreasing catches. They noted an average drop of 21% in fish catches,
and expect a further decline of 11% in future. However, they noted that catches fluctuate seasonally.
The main causes for the general degradation of the marine environment as perceived by Seri
fishers are pollution from factories, oil spills, and littering the beach. The decline in fish catches
is ascribed to the increasing number of nets and the number and size of boats. Although
modern gears (FADs, small mesh lift nets) and motorboats lead to over-exploitation, they
also lead to increasing yields for some.
To deal with the declining catches, the Social Department initiated a carp breeding program.
Some villagers were trained to carry out fish farming, and now they cultivate silver carps in
their house yards. The juveniles are sold. The people are rather enthusiastic about the
cultivation of silver carp in ponds because the fish are bought by the Chinese from Ambon at
the price of Rp10,000/kg (approximately 300-750 gram/fish). In a restaurant in Ambon, the
fish are worth approximately Rp25,000/fish (± USD10, 1996 exchange rate).
14.1.3 Fisheries technology
Seri has 75 registered fishers, but most farmers (150) also fish part-time. In the fishers’ sample,
79% owned boats (perahus), but none had a motor. Most common fishing gears are nets, hand
lines, poisons and spears. Of all the fishers interviewed, the majority only had hand lines and
the rest had nets. Some fished at FADs. Five fishers (17%) owned no gear at all, but it is very
well possible that these fishers work on the boats and use the lift nets of the commercial fleet.
The number of fishers working on the lift nets and FADs is not known. Others work on the
fishing boats (seiners), where they get approximately Rp50,000 a night per person (± USD20,
early 1997 exchange rate). A fishing boat takes approximately 20 young men in a fishing trip.
Artisanal and small commercial fishers
Many small-scale fishers use a giob, a 70 m long net. The best months for giob net fishing are
January, June, July and November; in September and October, catches are average. The fishers
work six days a week. Their fishing grounds are about 3-4 km away (one hour by boat). The
fish may be sold directly to consumers by the fisher’s wife, but in cases where the catch
exceeds three baskets (approximately 600 fish), the fisher will sell the fish through a borok
(fish broker) or to a wholesaler. Earnings vary between Rp20,000 to Rp40,000/day (USD8-
USD16, early 1997 exchange rate).
To start a fishing business requires about Rp350,000 or approximately USD140. A boat costs
Rp100,000 and nets cost about Rp35,000/10 meter. Additionally, a fisher will spend on an
average Rp5,000 a week for repairs. A net can last up to 10 years, but since it needs major
repairs each year, it is often cheaper to buy a new net.180        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Large-scale commercial fishers
The bait fishery which uses FADs, purse seines and lift nets is highly developed on the Seri
coast. Most lift nets are owned by outsiders, but two are in the hands of local fishers. During
our research, 15 purse seine boats, at least 48 FADs and lift nets, two long liners and one
trawler (the Mina Raya V used for fish transport) were observed in operation (Sahertian, pers.
obs.). Of the 15 purse seiners off the coast of Seri, four are owned by a Butonese fisher who
lives in Wemi (near Seri), one boat is owned by a fisher from Hatalai, and two are in hands of
local fishers.
The purse seine fishery is arranged through an array of informal agreements among the boat
owners, the crew and buyers etc. There is a code of conduct that fishers abide by, which
regulates the division of catches and facilitates labor arrangements and responsibilities (see
Chapter 3).
14.2 Attributes of the Community and Fishers
In 1997, the total village population of Seri was 1991 persons divided over 425 households
with an average household size of 4-5 people. The large majority of villagers is Christian with
a minority (10%) of Islamic Butonese people. There is no indication of migration. Last year, 16
tourists visited the village.
The village has a health center and electric service (there is TV). There is an elementary school.
A public water supply provides the houses with fresh water. Canals and septic tanks handle
wastewater and sewage respectively.
The village is connected by asphalt road and there is public transportation straight to the city
of Ambon where the main (fish) market is. The distance from Seri to Ambon is 24 km and to
the sub-district center, Amahusu, 17 km. Seri is situated near an important landing place for
fish called Wemi. The means of communication are limited; there is one telephone in the
house of the dusun head.
Employment
Contrary to the official figure, approximately a quarter of the population are full-time fishers
(also working on boats and lift nets) of whom 75 fish in the artisanal sector. Most people work
both as fishers and farmers. The forest gardens are mainly cultivated during the east monsoon
season (the wet, rainy season) when vegetables and fruit trees are planted. In the dry season,
people work both as fishers and part-time farmers. In the last month of the dry season, people
start to plant their gardens to anticipate the incoming rainy season. However, when the dry
season is too long, people take up fishing again.
The numbers of fishers, farmers, vendors/shopkeepers (20), laborers and government officials
(160) are higher in 1997 than in 1979. In the past 10 years, the number of fishers has increased
because the fishing facilities have improved.
14.2.1 Village government
Seri is a dusun (sub-village) of Urimesing and, therefore, does not have an independent village
government. The LMD of Urimesing has 17 members of which four are representatives fromDusun Seri, Desa Urimesing, Ambon Island        181
Seri, including the dusun head. The representatives have an important function in channeling
the people’s ideas to the village government. At the moment, only two representatives are
still active, the others retired. They have not yet been replaced. Originally, they were traditional
authorities and were appointed by the dusun head. Supposedly, the fact that no wages are
paid makes it hard to find replacements.
The dusun government of Seri itself consists of the dusun head and his secretary. They are
assisted by a head of RT (neighborhood group) in Karang Tagepe. According to the new
government structure, the dusun head is appointed by the village headman of Urimesing.
The appointment is acknowledged through a decree at the sub-district level (on behalf of the
mayor of the Ambon municipality). Government decisions are communicated to the people
by an elected marinyo (lit. messenger).
For the last 10 years, the dusun head of Seri has been H. Wattimena, 72 years of age. He is a
highly respected and a legitimate leader, although some feel he is not strong enough and,
therefore, have more faith in the remaining adat leaders. Wattimena’s authority is based on
his descent and position in the government, but also on his intellect. He is a schoolteacher
who stresses the importance of education, hard work, honesty and discipline.
The dusun head is responsible for the development of the dusun. The annual dusun development
proposal is first tabled at a meeting of the Urimesing LMD. From there, the proposal is sent to
the Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) of the Ambon Municipality for approval.
The development programs are based on the needs of the people. The villagers, however, like
to see results before they adopt a new innovation. To motivate his people, the dusun head
personally demonstrates projects, e.g., a vegetable yard and silver carp pond. Because of his
concern, the people have confidence in him.
Since Seri lost its central position in the desa of Urimesing, the people in Seri feel marginalized.
Many government programs and social activities are now focused on Kusu-kusu. Besides, they
do not feel that the government of Urimesing is legitimate. The current leaders (Tuhumury,
Gasperz, DeFretes and Gomies) are not from the traditional raja clan. The Seri villagers have
more confidence in traditional leaders because the new elected leaders “are more concerned
about money than about the people.” In some cases, for example, non-raja leaders have sold
adat lands to get extra income. The raja clan on the other hand, possesses both adat lands and
family gardens in the forest. Therefore, they do not worry about their income and can concentrate
on the peoples’ needs. Besides, people believe that the descendants of the raja clan can talk to
the dead ancestors and that they have supernatural powers to govern the village.
As a result of their discontent, the Seri villagers decided to become an independent village. In
1997, a proposal to change the status of Seri from a dusun to that of a desa was accepted by the
Urimesing LMD and enforced by a decree (No. 141.2/1391/1997). The process was accelerated
by a dusun meeting in which representatives from all clans agreed to nominate one single
candidate for the next elections for the village head of Urimesing: someone from the raja
(Wattimena) clan. This will increase the chance of winning the election. Once a person from
Seri is the new village head, he can change Seri’s status from a dusun to that of a desa with an
autonomous village government.
The dusun head explained that people in Seri hold to the principle of Tiga Batu Tungku (the
three stones of a fireplace), in this case, the village government, the church, and the teachers3.
3 In sasi villages, the three stones are usually the village government, the church and adat.182        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
He said that these three groups have to work hand in hand to develop a village or dusun. It is
interesting, however, that he did not list adat among their “tungku”, indicating the political
position of the traditional structures in Seri.
The dusun government cooperates closely with the church. The government activities, e.g.,
cleaning up the roads, construction of fences and water canals, are announced during the church
services. Church activities are, in turn, reported to the dusun government. The church also
maintains good relations with the Islamic minority (Butonese) in the village. The church involves
the Butonese people in extension programs and their children attend the Christian primary
school in Seri. Before they go out to sea, the Islamic fishers usually ask the church minister to
pray for them. In return, they donate fish for the annual meeting of the church congregation.
14.2.2 Village organizations
There are two Protestant churches in Seri territory (one in Seri and the other in Siwang). The
secretary of elders in Seri is Johanis Tuhumury, 53 years of age. The congregation consists of
more than 1,150 people. Besides maintenance of church facilities, the church is involved in
economic activities. They collaborate with the government on the silver carp culture program,
and they execute a gardening program to generate income for members (cultivating chickens
and planting banana trees). Part of the profit goes to the church. The church plans to build a
lift net, but has no funds for construction and labor.
The women’s organization of the church, Pelwata, has 177 members. It focuses on spiritual
activities such as bible studies, but is also involved in social and economic activities including
ARISAN, an informal savings group. Within the Pelwata, problems concerning attendance
and child care are openly discussed. The Youth Wing of the church in Seri was formed in
1958, has 60 members and is active.
In his position as dusun head, Wattimena supervises and co-ordinates social organizations in
the dusun. The PKK was established in the 1970s, has 120 members and is chaired by Rachel
Wattimena. The objective is to activate women in alleviating the economic problems of their
families. Over the last couple of years, the PKK itself has become dormant due to lack of
funding and interest from the PKK officials in Urimesing.
The current PKK program includes ARISAN (also see Pelwata) and the women’s productive
group “Emping Melinjo Seri Jaya” (emping=chips and melinjo=fruit) which was founded in
November 1997 by the Urimesing village government. The group is under the supervision of
the Department of Industry and Trade and sells products in the Matahari store in Ambon (a
large supermarket). The products they produce are dry shredded fish meat of mackerel and
skipjack, banana chips, ginger powder, vegetables, etc. In the store, the shredded fish meat is
worth Rp12,500 a pack (USD5, early 1997 exchange rate).
The TAKESRA was founded in May 1997 by the Family Planning Agency. This group, also
chaired by Rachel Wattimena, involves nearly all low-income women in the dusun. The 20
members work as fish and vegetable sellers in the Ambon markets. The members save their
money in the post office and will be eligible to borrow money from the government after
saving money for one year. The chairperson, for example, will use the loan as a capital to
trade chickens and pigs in the Ambon markets.
The women’s groups in Seri are highly productive. Besides the fact that the village is close to
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of Industry and Trade. The Social Department may also provide funding for social groups in
the villages.
The chairman of the Youth Wing, Weitema, also leads a youth group, Karang Taruna,
established in 1978 by the Social Department to stimulate economic activities among youths.
The group planned various enterprises, amongst others carp breeding, but none has been
very successful.
Seri has no KUD.
14.2.3 Role of women
Many women in Seri are teachers or civil servants. Women also play a key role in trading
products from their forest gardens and the fishery. They are important providers of household
income.
Despite their importance for the village economy, women are generally not involved in
decision-making. They rarely attend meetings. Occasionally, for example, when guests from
the district level visit the village, the village head will ask the women to prepare a small
presentation on a topic that relates to the purpose of the visit. In other cases, the church
organization represents the women, but mainly on women’s issues such as child care programs.
Nevertheless, the feeling of consensus decision-making is strong in Seri: only 3% of the fishers
in our sample considered women to be completely outside of the decision-making processes.
In reality, women have a strong implanted feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis the men-governors
in the village. When asked about their input in fisheries management, they said that “they
have no opinion” and they tend to agree with what is decided by others. Only few women
would like to be represented in government meetings.
Women generally seem less concerned with the situation in the village than in the household.
Here things could be improved, especially in the light of the current monetary crisis. Merry
Abrahamsz, a woman from Seri, explained: “Women would like to manage the family better,
and plan things together with their husbands. The wife should help to find some more money
and try to manage the money better.”
14.2.4 Profile of fishers
Nearly all the respondents in our sample were born in Seri. A large proportion (72%) had
only elementary education. A relatively large number (66%) of respondents are under 45 years
of age. The fishers’ household consists of 5.7 people on an average. Children who have left,
have gone to work or school (few left for marriage). Two women were interviewed.
On an average, the respondents were 42 years old and they have been fishing for 19 years.
The average hours of fishing is 7.6 hours per day, with 5-10 hours at sea being most common.
Although many of the respondents (86%) are landowners, on average they derive 65% of
their income from fishing. Additional income is derived from farming. Only 7% have an
externally derived income (which is relatively low), but the average contribution from outside
is substantial: Rp775,000 per year (USD310, early 1997 rate).
The economic indicator of the fishers’ sample for Seri was made up of adding scores for land
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4 housing (cement with zinc roof). For Seri, the indicator is 8.6 (with a standard error of 0.25),
which is in the middle of the 27 villages (Appendix 2). If TV ownership is added, Seri scores
8.8, one of the three lower scores for the case study villages (Appendix 3).
The fishers are highly satisfied with their job. They are free and happy when they are at sea,
and it gives a good income. For some, it is also frustrating and difficult to be a fisher. The Seri
fishers had the strongest tendency to change jobs if they could find a better alternative (54%).
They wanted to be independent, have less physical labor and an easier job. Only 4% want
their children to be fishers. The best alternative for them, according to their fathers, was to
become government staff. However, compared to other villages, the options and alternatives
mentioned were more varied, e.g., tradesman, worker in the city.
14.3 Market Attributes
Artisanal fishers in Seri sell about half of their catch directly to local consumers. None of the
fishers eat more than half of their catch but all eat some. On an average, 22% of the fish
caught are eaten by the family. Most of the fish are sold in the city of Ambon (93%), the rest
are sold to female fish traders.
14.3.1 Local fish trade
Small-scale fish trade is mainly in the hands of women. Before, when there were no asphalt
roads, the women had to walk to the Ambon market. At that time, not many women in Seri
were involved in trading. But now that the infrastructure has improved, markets have become
more accessible. The demand for fish has also increased, and most men work full-time on
their boats. Improved fishing techniques such as purse seines have increased yields. There is
thus enough work and the wives and daughters of the fishers are now becoming more and
more involved in the processing and selling of fish.
The number of traders has increased rapidly from about 15 in the 1980s to more than 40
currently. Anyone is free to trade fish. Besides the local vendors, there are Butonese and people
from Eri, Airlow and Latuhalat who come to Seri to buy fish. A fishing boat from Mahia is
active in Seri waters and the fishers catch their fish in Seri. In the eastern monsoon season,
fish are caught in Eri.
Most female vendors buy their fish directly from the fishing boats; others sell the fish caught
by their husbands and sons. In most cases (69%), the fisher or his wife sets the price. The
women base their price on information from larger fish traders and wholesalers, or on the
price of fish traded the day before.
If the vendor does not have enough money to pay for the fish right away, she sells the fish first
before paying the fisher. This arrangement requires trust and, therefore, it is easier if the transactions
happen between relatives and friends. On days no fish are caught, the fish vendor needs credits
from other people. She repays them according to the fish price on the market. All these arrangements
are informal. Generally, however, the transactions are well managed and cause no problems.
For the women, the main market is Ambon. Others take fish to villages on the island, e.g., Latuhalat,
Eri, and Amahusu, or sell them to another vendor (papalele) or to the fish factory. The key factor in
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Women, generally, do not trade processed fish. During the fishing season, the women smoke or
salt the fish for consumption and sell the rest fresh. The marketing of fresh fish is sometimes
difficult. The fish are not transported using ice or anything to preserve them. Sometimes, the
means of transport are limited and by the time the women reach the market, the fish have
already lost freshness and the price goes down.
Other problems that the fish vendors face are related to the informal nature of the small-scale
fish trade. It is possible to buy or rent sales tables at the Ambon market but they cost Rp175,000
(USD76, based on the 1996 exchange rate) and renting is Rp7,500/month. The small-scale
vendors also pay Rp300/basket in market tax. Many women have unofficial market spaces,
but sometimes when they arrive at the market, they find that they are not allowed to use
them anymore. Other women lack capital, which hampers their marketing.
Despite these problems, marketing for women from Seri is relatively easy because of the proximity of the
market to fishing grounds. Improved transportation, fish processing and secure market spaces would
help the women to improve their situation. Generally, however, women are satisfied with their businesses.
14.3.2 Commercial fish trade
The boat owners have a choice of selling their catch directly to the pole and line fishers, to female
fish vendors, or taking it to a large trader (borok) who auctions the fish in the city of Ambon.
Many boat owners have a trade relation with a particular borok. For example, Sam Kalahatu, a
purse seine captain from Seri, sells his fish either via a trader called “La Obe” or straight to the
cold store in Tulehu for eventual export. The trader pays the boat owner the net revenues from
selling the catch minus 10%, which is the payment for his services. This transaction is based on
trust. There is no written contract, and once a borok is proven to cheat, he will be dismissed from
this service. The advantage to the fisher is that he has a steady market and although the prices
in Ambon fluctuate, they are usually higher than those at the fish factory. For example, at the
cold store he will get only Rp20,000 per basket of momar (Decaptherus macrosoma), about half the
retail market price. At the same time, the trader is also assured of a supply of fish. If both
parties follow their unwritten obligations, the relation can function for years.
The fish from Seri are sold through the following channels:
1. Directly to long line boats as baitfish.
2. Through the fishers’ wives who act as vendors and sell fish directly to consumers at
home or at the local market.
3. Through other small-scale traders who bring them to the Passo market or Ambon.
4. Through a large-scale trader (borok) who auctions the fish at the Ambon market.
5. To the cold store in Tulehu (Sumber Aneka Tata Bahari).
6. To the PT Dharma Samudera, a fish company in Ambon (for larger quantities).
7. The fish can be directly sold to the Mina Raya V, a large trawler that transports the
product to Bali.
14.4 Community Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Seri was chosen as a representative of a non-sasi village. The village headman explained: “Before,
when the population size of Seri was still small, there was marine sasi. Now, there are too many
people and it became difficult for the dusun government to control the sasi area.” Sasi is not
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A remnant of sasi that apparently is still practiced by a few people is sasi on coconuts. It is an
individual kind of sasi arranged by the church (sasi gereja). A person can ask the minister to
pray for and announce sasi on his coconut garden. After a 3-6 month sasi period, the church is
asked to pray for the opening of sasi. The owner and his family can then harvest the coconuts
for one or two weeks (depending on the owner’s needs) before the garden is closed again.
If a person has several gardens with fruit trees, i.e., coconuts, duku (lansium fruit), nutmegs
and langsat, he can ask to have sasi on one or more gardens. This allows the owner to harvest
fruits from non-sasi gardens for his daily needs while protecting the other gardens from damage
and theft.
14.4.1 Fisheries regulations
On the local level, there is support for the national prohibition on blast fishing and use of
poisons, i.e., the dusun head is prepared to enforce the rules, but, as he explained, there is no
problem with non-compliance. The official permits that outsiders need to use their nets, boats
and lift nets are issued from a higher level of the government.
Some local informal rules are applied on the commercial fishery. Net fishers are required to
have a permit from the Fishery Agency. Lift net operators also have to pay contributions to
the village and are obliged to hire local labor. The fees can be up to Rp100,000/year (USD43,
1996 exchange rate). Outsiders and owners of fishing vessels also have to pay the dusun for
the rights to harvest marine products such as top shells, sea cucumbers and shrimp. They pay
Rp25,000-Rp50,000 for the right to fish. Since the village has formally no right to ask for a fee,
the contributions are “voluntary”, but if not paid, the boat owner runs the risk of his gears
being destroyed.
The fishery as well as fish trading is open to everyone and there are no formal regulations on
access for locals. Minimal access rules placed on outsiders are meant to collect revenues not
limit access. There are no rules governing the landing of fish. Most local rules deal with division
of catch, labor, or marketing. They are informal and are commonly agreed upon, and as stated
earlier, based on reciprocity.
14.4.2 The players
There are no direct players in fisheries management in Seri. A kewang or comparable
enforcement institution is not present. Neither the village head of Urimesing nor the LMD is
involved in management or rule enforcement. The dusun head of Seri plays a distant role in
managing the payments from, and placement of, lift nets.
The Department of Fisheries and the Department of Transport play no role in fisheries
management apart from the issuing of permits. They receive taxes, but do not provide any
facilities for landing, storing and trading fish.
Seri’s fisheries are for a large part governed by market mechanisms, relationships among the
owners of commercial gears and their crew, and interactions of artisanal fishers and traders
at the market place. Small-scale fishers sell their catches through their wives or other relatives.
These women (small-scale traders) deal with auctioneers and wholesalers. All these relations
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14.4.3 Enforcement
Seri has no kewang or police or other enforcing agent. Minor crimes are settled by the dusun head
who plays an important role in the village. He regulates social behavior (punishes thieves, drunks
and offenders), and he arranges labor for village activities. His actions are legitimized through
adat, but he will not undertake action or punish young people without consent from their parents.
The village head knows that the people are busy and therefore, instead of organizing a formal
meeting, he asks them to join informal meetings (after the Sunday service) to talk to them
about development issues, adat laws, drinking problems, taxation etc. He allows the people
to express their ideas in the meetings because he realizes that his people are getting more
critical and are smart. “However”, he said, “as their leader I try to be smarter than my people.”
He thus has a great influence on the villagers and is personally involved in the regulation of
social behavior.
14.4.4 Compliance
Enforcement and compliance have to be studied in the light of large-scale fishing and the use
of modern gears. The boat operators work under regional and national law, and cannot be
sanctioned by the local village government. Even if the village did have a formal enforcement
institution, its mandate would not comprise these outside fishers. On the other hand, if the
boundaries of Seri fishing grounds were acknowledged and rules formalized, fisheries
regulations (i.e., on mesh size) could be implemented.
14.5 External Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Link with higher government bodies
Government officials from the (sub-) district level, municipality, provincial agencies and the
municipal PKK group, visit the dusun about five times a month. Seri is more frequently visited
than the other dusuns in the Urimesing village.
The village has been involved in several development programs proposed by higher
government levels. The Animal Husbandry Agency established local groups, and most
households now grow chickens. The agency officials routinely visit Seri each month for
vaccination and skills training.
The Fishery Agency assisted three fisher groups to build lift nets. Target groups were fishers
that had no nets or were not associated with commercial lift nets. However, in 1995, the project
was abandoned after the lift nets washed away during the eastern monsoon period.
The Fishery Agency also conducted a week’s training in silver carp culture and hatchery. For
this purpose, the leader of the project was sent to a fish culture apprenticeship in Bogor.
Apparently, this fish breeding program is a success.
In 1996, Seri obtained assistance directly from the Public Works Department to renovate houses
and to construct footpaths. With this aid, Seri won a national competition for housing and
environment development in 1996. As a gift, the Department gave additional funds and cement
to build drainage canals and pathways to the primary school, church, beach and water source.
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Collaboration with other institutions
In 1997, a private organization called “Sarana Maluku Ventura” organized a credit system
through which the fishers can obtain a 15 HP engine for a boat. The fishers have to pay back
15% of their catch. In 1997, a loan for one boat plus engine was issued. In 1998, another six
engines were distributed, and 14 more are planned.
External economic influences
The economic crisis has apparently caused the number of FADs (and lift nets) to decline.
Before the monetary crisis, 20 FADs were owned by local people, five in 1997 and in 1998,
only three were left because there was no money to replace the lost and damaged FADs.
Infrastructure and development projects
The fishers complain about the nearby wood factory that causes pollution.
14.6 Incentives to Cooperate
The keys to resource management in Seri can be found on two levels. First, there are the
formal fisheries rules (e.g., on blast fishing and use of cyanide) that must be enforced. Secondly,
there is the effect of the largely unregulated large-scale fishery. Currently, this type of fishing
has a positive effect (higher catches) for the commercial sector, but is already acknowledged
as a possible threat to the fishery in general on the longer term, i.e., artisanal fishers blame
their falling catches on the commercial sector.
Tradition
Lien Wattimena explained: ”Traditionally the fishers would only fish at the “dark moon”.
When the moon was full, it was impossible to fish and so the fish had time to grow. But now
the fishers fish all the time. Also when it is full moon, they gather the fish with the lift net
while it is better to let them get bigger before you catch them.” The acknowledgment of
traditional limitations to fishing could be an incentive to comply with new fisheries regulations
if similar restrictions were in place.
Local knowledge and problem acknowledgment
Although there is a firm belief that God will protect the fishery, women and men in Seri seem
to have a notion of the need to manage their fishery. Merry Abrahamsz, one of the female
respondents, for example, came up with a very clear statement that “the amounts of fish and
the sustainability of the resources depend on how we manage them.” The increasing number
of fishing boats and lamp fishing are regarded as a problem because the fish have no time to
mature.
The solutions according to the fishers were: diversification, the processing of fresh fish,
aquaculture projects, but most important, the prohibition on bombing and the use of cyanide.
Besides, water pollution needs to be controlled. This realization and the acknowledgment
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Competition
Coral reef destruction, however, is only one of the problems that people face. The increasing
competition with outside and commercial fishers plus the intrusion of large-scale fishers and
companies, have a large impact on the local, artisanal fishery. It is not surprising that the
majority of the respondents (55%) disagree with the sale of resource harvest rights to outsiders.
As long as their interests are not defended, and others would have access to the benefits
derived from improved management efforts, the local fishers have no incentive to cooperate.
Economic needs
The depleting fish catches urge the fishers to go further away to fish. Local fishers have inadequate
fishing techniques to reach the remaining fish resources, and they lack the capital to obtain competitive
fishing gears. In some cases, competition from outside fishers forces the fishers to sell their catch for
lower prices. All in all, this situation is a disincentive to comply with fisheries regulations.
Lack of alternatives
The increasing numbers of FADs obstruct inshore fishing. The fishers asked the village government
to develop the small-scale fishery and recently, there have been some moves to organize the fishers
in the village. They tried aquaculture of top shells, but the natural conditions are unfavorable. Offering
alternatives will help the fishers to comply with fisheries regulations and limit over-fishing.
Establishment of fisher groups, training, and workshops are needed to educate people and
create awareness. Responsibility should be shared. Fishers see the village government as being
responsible for support, i.e., providing ideas and technical assistance for the fishers’ groups.
Women specifically asked to learn fish processing and to be provided with capital.
Economic incentives
The perception of the crew working on the commercial fishing boats is different than that of the small-
scale fishers. The commercial crews have a clear interest in large catches. Their income is marginal, and
proportional to the catch. This arrangement is a strong incentive for over-fishing by the commercial fleet.
Establishment of an enforcement agency
The villagers felt the need to stop the decline of the marine environment and asked for a village
meeting. Plans have to be made and a role defined for the LMD and LKMD. The fishers would
like to see enforcement of the law on blast fishing, but this is only possible if there is a kewang or
similar institution that can enforce the rules. The establishment of such an organization would
have a positive effect on fisheries management.
Attitude
The average scores for the state of the resource, fish catches, family well-being, income and
distribution of benefits, indicate that generally, the Seri people have a positive attitude and
hope for the future. Their development, security and economy are perceived as satisfactory.
In fact Seri, as the representative of Maluku Province, won the first price in a national
competition for the development of housing and the environment in 1996. The pride of the
people and the fact that they have seen they can actually achieve something communally, are
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Leadership
The dusun head, who is said to be highly legitimate and respected by most people, plays an
important role in the development of the village. Others criticized him for being in this position
too long and for being not strong enough. But as a former school teacher, he has had most of
the villagers under his wing at some time, and still wields authority over them. He is said to
rule as an understanding man and he tries to involve local villagers in meetings. A good
example and strong, active leadership are important incentives for fisheries management.
14.7 Patterns of Interaction
Seri’s fishery is in a good condition because of a rich upwelling area in front of the village.
The intensification of the fishery, through the use of lift nets and large-scale purse seiners,
has lead to increased catches for the commercial sector. Artisanal fishers have observed a
decline in their catches, but the idea of intensifying fishing efforts still prevails. For poverty
alleviation, the fishers thought, the best strategy was to build a lift net.
However, due to the ever-increasing, apparently unregulated, installation of fishing devices,
the resource is deteriorating even more. Permits, however, are granted by higher government
levels and all that the Seri village government can do is informally ask for access fees.
Few regulations, combined with a lack of enforcement agent, leave the Seri fishery as an
open-access regime. For the artisanal fishers, there is no alternative but to increase their efforts.
The large-scale fishery is productive and powerful. In order to regulate the fishery and manage
it for the common good, regulations should be installed and a management regime established.
14.8 Outcomes
14.8.1 Equity
1. Role of fishers in management
The role of fishers in management has not changed significantly over time. The perceptions
of past, current and future roles are varied. Some feel that the dusun head makes all the
decisions. Others noted that the fishers are involved and that their input has increased. For
example, when researchers come to the village or training is conducted, the villagers are invited
to be present and discuss matters. Some fishers noted that people can easily make decisions
more now that they are better informed and educated.
When asked about power sharing, the majority of the fishers saw the community as having
main responsibility for fisheries management. Roughly a third felt that the government had
actually most or total responsibility for fisheries management, while 7% felt responsibility
was shared equally between the people and the government.
2. Access to marine resources
The fishers’ individual access to resources has diminished significantly compared to the past
and they expect more restrictions in future. People explained that access is limited because
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are defined. Additionally, it was noted that certain nets, boats, and outside fishers need a
permit, and that there is a ban on the use of destructive gears.
3. Fair distribution of means of production
Distribution of the means of production is seen to be fairer now than in the past, and this is
expected to continue to improve. In Seri, 13 people stated that the numbers of fishing gears
increased as the result of increased efforts and competition. They explained that peoples’ incomes
improved and more people are fishing, so the spread of gears is wider. The strong market position
of Seri and an improved transport system also contributed positively to this trend.
4. Income distribution
On an average, the level of economic disparities has remained the same, but opinions were
varied. Personal efforts and motivation were mentioned by some people to explain why economic
levels have become more equal. Others mentioned the same factors as the reason why differences
increased. People also perceived heightened competition and an uneven spread of capital.
14.8.2 Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making
Partnership in fisheries decision-making has remained the same. Nearly half of the fishers
perceived conditions to be static. The style of decision-making in the village is seen by most
fishers as being a process of common or majority agreement. This may be a result of the
respected and legitimate leadership of the dusun head. Although he plays the key role in
decision-making, the needs of the people prevail. However, a third of the respondents felt
excluded and complained that “people are never heard”. They do suggest ideas in village
meetings, but the suggestions are rarely implemented or agreed upon. One example was about
the pollution caused by the wood factory in the neighboring village. The fishers complained
but the government did not handle the problem.
Nearly all respondents agreed that all stakeholders should be involved in decision-making.
Of the respondents, 93% felt that local groups already had a role in decision-making, but only
31% said that outsiders were involved. This number is significantly higher than in the other
villages, possibly because our sample included some commercial fishers that do have an
influence on village affairs as well as commercial links to the outside.
6. Ease of entry (costs)
Due to increased costs, entry into the fishery is perceived to be significantly more difficult
than in the past. Fishers expect costs to continue to rise in the future. Reasons given are: 1)
taxes, 2) larger investments in gears and boats, and 3) increased fuel costs because fishers
have to go out further to reach productive fishing grounds.
7. Control over access to marine resources
Control over access by the village over the fishery has not changed significantly. There are no
fisheries regulations in place, and there is no enforcing agent. Artisanal fishers and villagers
can fish freely, while outsiders have to pay a “voluntary” contribution. Over half of the fishers
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8. Compliance
On an average, compliance with fisheries rules has not changed significantly, but the variance
in answers is wide.  Some respondents felt that compliance is lower now, while others felt it
is actually higher compared to the past. This last group of fishers thought that compliance is
high because of the sanctions and control, tighter rules, and awareness. It was mentioned
that compliance depends highly on the village government (dusun head) and the church.
Considering the absence of an enforcement body, these comments are confusing.
It was noted that compliance depends on economic needs that may force people to break the
rules. One-third of the respondents agreed that it was acceptable for a fisher to break the rules.
14.8.3 Social sustainability
9. Family well-being and income
Family well-being has improved over the last years, but no further improvements are expected
in the future. The notes from Seri showed a very diverse picture. Increasing competition is an
important factor influencing well-being. Competition often has a negative connotation but
some felt that their increased efforts improved their well-being. However, in most cases, the
improvements were counterbalanced by increased economic needs.
10. Income
The income of fishers was reported to have significantly increased over the past 15 years. Development
programs, improved infrastructure, and higher catches from large-scale fishing techniques have a
positive effect on the household income. The fishers’ future perspective is generally positive too, but
some small-scale fishers expected a future decline of their income once the fish stock is depleted.
11. Tradition of collective action
Communal activities in the village were significantly less compared to the past and are
expected to drop even more in the future. The main cause is said to be the introduction of the
“rental system”. This change refers to the fees that people nowadays ask for services that
they would deliver for free before. Loss of tradition, individualism, conflicts in the village,
alcohol abuse and TVs were also mentioned as negatively affecting communal activities. The
fishers rate past performance as very high (mostly 10s) but opinion on future performance is
extremely divided with scores ranging from 1 to 9.
12. Discussion of village issues
Discussion of issues in the village has decreased significantly compared to the past, and further
decrease is expected.
13. Community harmony
Harmony in the community is perceived as being significantly less now than in the past and
further deterioration is expected. The score on village harmony was not only very low
compared to other villages (5.07), but nearly all respondents also made notes about conflicts
in the village, a clear indicator that this issue is on people’s minds. Alcohol abuse, primarily
by youths, is a major problem. Leadership is another important reason for conflicts. MinorDusun Seri, Desa Urimesing, Ambon Island        193
reasons were unfair competition and external influences that caused conflicts. Elders blame
the conflicts on the life style of the youths. Only two people noted that harmony in the village
is positively related to increased awareness of the people, and one person even tried to explain
how fishing reduces criminality in Seri: “Almost all young men fish at night, sell the fish,
sleep and prepare to fish again the next day, so they have no time to drink and fight”.
14.8.4 Biological sustainability
14. State of the resource
The fishers perceived a significant decline in the condition of marine resources over the past
15 years, and they expect an even more severe decline in the future. There were some positive
comments about a cleaner environment because more people are aware now, but most
comments described the deterioration of the resource and some claimed that certain types of
fish have disappeared.
15. Fish catches
More than half of the fishers in our sample reported significantly decreasing catches. They noted
an average drop of 21%, and expect a further decline of 11% in future (also see Section 14.1).
Table 14.1. Results of the performance analysis in Seri. n=29 heads of fishing households.  ns=trend not
significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01,  ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Average change Average future
current through time expected change
 condition on (statistical significance) (statistical significance)
scale of 1-10
Equity
1. Role of fishers in management 6.52 -0.2069ns -2% 0.2759ns 3%
2. Access to marine resources 7.72 -1.1424*** -12% -1.2414*** -12%
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears 8.41 2.7931*** +28% 0.8621*** +9%
4. Economic equality 7.17 0.7931ns +8% 0.2069ns +2%
Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making 6.72 -0.1379ns -1% -0.3793ns -4%
6. Ease of entry into the fishery 6.48 -1.7241*** -17% -1.5517*** -16%
7. Control over access to fishery 7.52 0.9310ns +9% 0.3103ns +3%
8. Compliance with fishery rules 7.69 0.8621ns +9% -0.2069ns -2%
Social Sustainability
9. Family well-being 7.59 1.4483* +14% 0.1724ns +2%
10. Income 7.72 1.8621*** +19% 0.9655*** +10%
11. Tradition of collective action 6.48 -2.1724*** -22% -1.6207*** -16%
12. Discussion of village issues 6.86 -1.5517*** -16% -0.6897* -7%
13. Community harmony 5.07 -2.8966*** -29% -1.2069** -12%
Biological sustainability
14. Marine resource health 7.10 -1.0690* -11% -1.4828*** -15%
15. Fish catch 6.55 -2.1379*** -21% -1.1379** -11%194        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
14.9 Synthesis
Seri has many productive farmers, animal growers, and fishers. Compared to other dusuns in
the Urimesing village, Seri is doing well. The government programs, e.g., chicken breeding,
are successful, and generally, people see their livelihood improving. Although the figures of
well-being and income are not significantly higher than those in the other villages, the Seri
people are relatively confident and optimistic. This is not in the least owing to the current
village leader who, despite the resistance of some, is determined to work for the prosperity of
the village.
Village institutions (church and government) seem to cooperate well. The village organizations,
informally organized under the PKK, function and are involved in economic activities. There
is no KUD but there are several local productive groups.
Seri has easy access to local and regional markets and the market structures are interesting.
Small-scale fishers usually sell through their wives or other female fish vendors. Large-scale
fishers have several options but often sell to traders who auction the fish for them in return
for 10% of the net sale price. The traders often auction the fish to female vendors. If a vendor
cannot pay directly, she can take the fish and pay later. Trust is a key factor in these transactions.
Between the commercial owners and their captains and crew, comparable relations exist. A
crewman’s percentage may be paid months after the harvest and people have to trust the
boat operator to pay these revenues. If a trader, fisher or boat operator neglects his duty to
pay, or if he cheats, he will be cut off from further interactions.
The current situation in the Seri fishery is especially difficult for artisanal fishers. There is a
large divergence in income and opportunities between the artisanal and the large-scale
commercial fishers. Even though artisanal fishers are more likely to identify resource problems
and reduced catches, fishing efforts are generally increasing. The fishers on the large fishing
boats get a percentage of the catch, which is a clear incentive for them to try to increase their
yields.
At the same time, there are no fishery management rules in place that regulate access and
limit efforts. Except for the fact that outside fishers pay a contribution to the village, the
marine resources of Seri are open-access. Only the national prohibition on destructive fishing
techniques is being implemented, but besides the dusun head, there is no enforcing agent.
The situation for artisanal fishers is difficult. While few of them have the means to compete
with large-scale fishers or fish in remote fishing grounds, outside fishing vessels have
government permits that allow them to fish in Seri’s waters. The local administrative structure,
however, cannot challenge the permits issued by higher government bodies. Besides, the village
government takes a dualistic position. On the one hand, they are concerned with the fishers
and try to help them financially through government programs. On the other hand, they are
pleased with the significant fees and fish derived from the large-scale fishery.
The fishers feel strongly that a local enforcement mechanism should be in place. The village
government is likewise interested in a better organized fishery. It is very well possible that,
when Seri has derived a more autonomous village status, its fishers will be able to design
local regulations and establish an enforcement structure so that the fishing grounds can be
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Chapter 15
Dusun Toisapu, Desa Hutumuri, Ambon Island1
15.1 Physical, Biological and Technical Attributes
15.1.1 Physical environment
Hutumuri lies on Ambon Island2, bordered by the Halong village in the north, the Passo
village in the east, and the Rutong village in the west. In the 1950s, when Hutumuri became
very large, the village split into dusuns (lit. garden). One of the dusuns is Toisapu, which lies
north of Hutumuri on the edge of Baguala Bay (see Figure 15.1).
The dusun boundaries of Toisapu run from the Toisapu bridge up to the next bridge towards
Hutumuri. This stretch is about 1 km long by road. Hutumuri has a large forest-garden area
and most people are farmers. They cultivate cloves and coconuts.
1 Data tables for case study villages can be found in Appendix 3.
2 Toisapu and Hutumuri fishers were interviewed because there were not enough fishers in Toisapu alone.
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Figure 15.1.  Sketch village map of Toisapu-
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The main fishing grounds for the fishers of Hutumuri traditionally lie in Baguala Bay. Due to
industrial activities around Baguala Bay, the water in the bay has become polluted. In addition,
competition from commercial lift nets has increased. Therefore, the fishing grounds now extend
north to Tial.
15.1.2 Biological characteristics
The greatest number of fishers (40%) target only pelagic fish, while a further 17% fish both
pelagic fish and reef fish. Seventeen species of fish were recorded as commonly caught: 10
pelagic fish and 7 reef fish. Women are active in bameti (shell gathering) for food production.
No shellfish were listed as commercially important.
The marine environment has visibly deteriorated and fishers expect further deterioration (see
Section 15.8.4). If they have the appropriate gears, fishers nowadays go as far as Liang, Nurue,
and the island of Seram to fish (see map). Most of the fishers (76%) also reported reduced
catches. Certain fish species have become rare or seem to have disappeared, i.e., tatihu (type
of tuna), cakalang (skipjack) and komu (mackerel). Baitfish are still abundant in the bay and
the use of lift nets is prominent.
The most outstanding threats to the marine environment around Toisapu-Hutumuri are a
plywood factory and two fish plants. The factories release wastewaters that pollute the bay.
Oil spills from large boats and the use of toxins and bombs in the fishery have devastating
effects on the local fishing grounds as well.
Fish catches depend to a great extent on the techniques used. For fishers using lift nets and
FADs, fish catches are increasing. But more than a third of our sample fishers saw these modern,
highly competitive gears as a threat to the fishery.
15.1.3 Fisheries technology
There are fewer than 15 full-time fishers in Toisapu and, therefore, it was decided to include
Hutumuri fishers in our survey. Nearly all the fishers own their own boats (perahus) but only
17% have motors.
Commonly used fishing techniques are nets, fish traps, hand lines and lift nets. Nearly half of
the fishers in our sample (46%) had nets, 27% had only hand lines, and 17% used other gears.
Six lift net owners were part of our sample. Ten percent of the fishers owned no gear at all. It
is very likely that these fishers work on the lift nets.
Artisanal and small-scale fishery
Most artisanal fishers fish in front of Toisapu and Hutumuri. They have no preference for
certain species or sizes of fish. Commonly caught with hand lines are tengiri (Gymnosarda
unicolor), silapa (Pristipomoides sieboldi), gorara (Lutjanus basmira), and gora (Holocentrus sp.),
(also see Appendix 3). Reef fish, such as the last two species, get a better price in the market.
Generally, fishers go out 1-3 times a week depending on the availability of baitfish. The best
time to go out is at full moon and spring tide. The best months for fishing are September and
October when the tides are highest. Other months with large amounts of fish are April-June
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If a fisher catches only a small amount (5-15 fish), he will take the catch home to his wife who
will sell the fish. If he has a good catch (20-30 fish), the fisher will sell them through an
auctioneer (borok). The fish are sold locally, in Passo or in the Ambon market.
A hand liner will on an average earn a net profit of Rp5,000 to Rp30,000 per trip to sea (USD2-
USD12, early 1997 exchange rate). In order to start hand line fishing, certain investments
have to be made. Fishing lines cost Rp10,000, and a box of hooks of Rp1,500, but the major
investment is the boat. Before the currency crisis, a boat would cost up to Rp100,000, but
prices have gone up and a boat currently costs Rp150,000 or more.
Large-scale commercial fishery
Lift nets are common in Hutumuri’s waters. There are no restrictions to the placement of lift
nets in the water. Owners obtain permits from the Department of Fisheries and pay only
Rp50,000 to the village government for a six-month fishing season.
Of all the lift nets, only six are owned by locals and five of these are Butonese villagers. All
the others are in the hands of outside entrepreneurs from the Chinese Indonesian community.
Few villagers have a lift net because, firstly, the village is not traditionally a fishing center.
Secondly, the investments in a lift net are heavy. The price of a lift net before the currency
crisis was Rp50-75 million (± USD20,000-USD30,000, 1996 exchange rate), while in early 1998,
the price had already increased by at least 50%.
Also common in the large-scale fishery are FADs, in this case owned by Butonese fishers. These
fishing installations are also expensive: Rp0.5 million before the crisis and up to Rp1 million in 1998.
The numbers of both FADs and lift nets are increasing, to the despair of small fishers. At night, there
are so many lift nets at work in the mouth of the bay, that they actually form a wall and block the fish
from the bay (Ais Sohouwat, pers. comm.). Most of these large-scale fishing gears are in the hands of
urban businessmen and the small-scale fishers feel that their fish are being taken by outsiders.
15.2 Attributes of the Community and Fishers
Dusun Toisapu is politically dependent on the Hutumuri village and has politically the same
position as dusun Seri in respect to Urimesing. Toisapu has 1,400 inhabitants divided over 264
households of approximately five persons each. Because the number of inhabitants is less
than 2,000, it cannot obtain the status of a desa (lit. village).
In Toisapu, we could not find enough fishers and decided to enlarge the village sampling
area to include Hutumuri proper. Hutumuri has 3,285 inhabitants (including the population
of Toisapu and other dusuns). The 692 households consist of five people on an average. Nuclear
families are common. Approximately 95% of the people in Hutumuri are Christians. About
100 Moslem Butonese villagers are mainly involved in fishing.
Figure 15.2. Fishing seasons (black color is high season).
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Tourism is limited to occasional foreigners, for instance, relatives from the Netherlands. More
common are the students from the Fishery Faculty of Pattimura University who come to the
village to do their fieldwork.
The village has a health center, a hospital and a resident doctor. It is the only case study
village with a banking service. There is an elementary, a junior high and a senior high school
in Hutumuri. Through a public water supply, water is piped to homes. Open storm drains
and settling tanks receive household waste. The village has electricity and TV.
The village lies close to the city of Ambon markets and transport is frequent. The road has a
hard top, but at some parts of the road are dangerous curves and steep hills. Communication
with Hutumuri is difficult and can be done by mail only. Hutumuri has no telephone or radio
connections. Toisapu, on the other hand, has two telephone lines (one public and one private).
Employment
Hutumuri has a large forest-garden area and 85% of the people are farmers. Most fishers
work only in the calmer season. The number of full-time fishers in Toisapu is less than 15.
Over the past years, the number of farmers and fishers has decreased. Droughts and natural
calamities have caused a great loss of crops. For the fishers, the costs of fishing equipment
and taxes have increased. As a result, more and more people are switching to other occupations.
The number of vendors has increased to 45. The number of laborers (house construction,
furniture) is almost the same as before 1979, i.e., more than 50 people. There were very few
government employees before 1979 because there was no high school and no health center at
that time. Now, one in ten villagers is a present or pensioned government employee.
15.2.1 Village government
In 1979, when the new government structure was implemented in Hutumuri, the saniri negeri
(traditional council) was replaced by the LMD. Three of the five former clan leaders (kepala
soas) obtained positions as heads of government affairs, general affairs and development affairs
respectively. The two remaining leaders obtained informal positions as RTs (leaders of
neighborhood units). However, as RTs, they were subject to their former equals. For clan
leaders of high prestige and status, it was an important demotion. As a result, they never
functioned in the formal village structure.
The village head at the time, Lewarilla (1982-1993), also abolished the appointment of the
village head based on the adat system. When he passed away, no new leader was elected and
only in 1996 – after a three-year period of interim leadership – was J. Lilipory, aged 58,
inaugurated as the new village leader of Hutumuri.
At the inauguration, the LKMD was installed, but a real village government (LMD) was never
established. Instead of the representatives from the adat institutions, the church, the PKK,
and the KUD that normally has seats in the LMD, the village is governed by a group of
influential villagers. People do not support the LMD, but neither have they confidence in the
higher government levels who failed to question the village head about the LMD and passively
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The current village head in Hutumuri has no firm position in the village. He is not from the
traditional adat lineage (i.e., Tipiorij or Waas). One villager complained “anybody who can
get support from influential villagers nowadays can become a village leader.” Besides, people
feel that he has insufficient management skills and so have no confidence in him. His position
is further undermined by lackluster staff, whose motivation has flagged ever since government
officials and the heads of the RTs3 stopped receiving regular salaries.
Faced by conflict and confusion, the new village head decided to reorganize the village
government. In the course of 1998, a new LMD will be formed that will include all traditional
clan leaders (including the tuan negeri). The ones who are old or who have died will be replaced
and elected by the clan members. In total, the new LMD will have 10 clan leaders: five kepala
soa adat (traditional) and five kepala soa perintah (government). The former will take care of
adat affairs, while the latter will be involved in government affairs. In this way, both adat and
government sides are involved in the decision-making process. The village head is to
inaugurate the officials and have their positions acknowledged through an official decree
from the municipal government in Ambon.
Dusun Toisapu will be represented in the Hutumuri LMD by the dusun head, Poli Thenu.
Unlike the village head in Hutumuri, Thenu has a highly legitimate position in his dusun. He
takes care of the village in such a way that people feel included; they, therefore, trust him to
represent their interests.
15.2.2 Village organizations in Hutumuri
Most village organizations are based in Hutumuri. The Protestant church in Hutumuri was
established by the Dutch in 1830. In 1997, the congregation consisted of 1,884 people. There is
a close working relationship between the church and the village government. Important
announcements from the government are made after the Sunday service. Sometimes instead
of bible reading during an in-house service, there are lectures about agriculture, improving
family income, health, etc. The church also works together with the village government to
maintain a social organization called “Muhabet” of which Hutumuri has five.
People have confidence in the church because it has a more solid structure and is more
accountable than the village government. Also, the government development programs are
developed without involvement of the people, and therefore, the more participatory church
programs are preferred. The church programs include spiritual empowerment, environmental
programs (cleaning up places containing potential diseases), economic programs (development
of clove cultivation), and social services (yearly gifts to elders and low-income families). The
church officials are responsible for the implementation of the programs.
Carolina Souhuwat-Thenu chairs the Pelwata in Hutumuri, which aims to “unite and nurture
women as wives and mothers in relation to their responsibility in the family life, to the mission
of God in the world, and to village development.” Membership is relatively low (154) because
for many people, the economic burdens are too heavy (they have to wear special clothes to
the meetings etc.). In 1984, when the church opened its branch in Toisapu, a church youth
wing was established. Under the supervision of Jakob Waas, the 40 members develop spiritual
and social skills that will help them to become leaders.
3 The RT groups consist of several neighborhood households. It is the lowest level in the government structure.200        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
The PKK in Hutumuri was established in 1984. The majority of PKK members are farmers’
wives, with very few teachers and wives of civil servants. The main activities of PKK are
gardening, skills training, trade and sports. Income is derived from the sale of vegetables and
each unit had an ARISAN savings program. However, the PKK has been dormant since the
previous village head passed away. The wife of the current village head has health problems
and the members feel uncomfortable about initiating their own activities without her because
“they honor the wife of the village head as their leader.”
The KUD in Hutumuri was established in 1988, but really developed when in 1992, an asphalt
road was opened. The KUD in Hutumuri is successful and was recognized as the best KUD in
Maluku in 19974. The KUD trades in cloves and nutmegs; it operates a shop, a minibus, a
coconut and sago grinder, it has a credit and savings system, is involved in gasoline retail
and processes bills for the Electricity Company. A fishery unit is to be started in February
1998. The KUD officials and 18 workers are paid a monthly salary of Rp100,000 (USD40, early
1997 exchange rate) plus a share from the annual profit. The annual profit is divided into
three parts: 5% for officials, 5% for workers (through the manager) and the rest for the members.
Besides, the members get cheaper goods from the KUD shop and have access to loans and
credit. The membership fee is Rp10,000 and compulsory savings are Rp500/month. Although
the KUD is doing very well, the members feel that they have few benefits. They feel that most
of the profits are for the officials and workers of the KUD. The low clove prices paid to
producers, for example, were beneficial for the KUD, but the revenues were not reflected in
the annual share of Rp10,000 that the members received.
In 1992, a group of fishers in Hutumuri received a fishing boat and net (purse seine) from the
Provincial Fishery Department. The KUD provided the capital (Rp11 million or nearly
USD5,000, 1996 exchange rate) for the operational cost of the enterprise. However, as of 1996,
the fishers were not able to pay the money back. They decided to return the boat and fishing
net to the KUD as payment. Now the KUD plans to hire the fishers as KUD workers (to run
the fishing enterprise) to assure that the fishers will not lose their jobs. This plan will be
discussed in the annual membership meeting in February 1998.
15.2.3 Village organizations in Toisapu
Several church organizations, Takesra, and IDT are represented in Toisapu.
For the IDT program, each village receives a Rp20 million loan (± USD8,700, 1996 exchange rate)
from the government which may be paid back without interest. In Hutumuri, there are three IDT
groups of which one is in dusun Toisapu. In 1996, the 32 members received a Rp6.5 million fund to
be used to grow pigs, chickens, peanuts, yam, etc. There was a suggestion for a fishery enterprise,
but because all members are farmers, the idea was turned down. Within the year, the individual
loans of Rp200,000 have to be repaid so that a new, larger enterprise can be started.
In 1996, the Takesra savings group “Lansat” was established in Toisapu as a government
initiative by the Ambon branch of the National Coordinating Agency for Family Planning
(BKKBN). The members are women (farmers) with a low income. The members save Rp1,000
each month, and with an additional Rp200,000 government loan, they will start an enterprise.
The current group has five Ambonese and six Butonese members. Beside the Lansat, two new
Takesra groups have just been established, but they are not yet active.
4 In 1997, the manager of KUD Hutumuri represented Maluku during the celebration of the KUD anniversary in
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Besides these programs, the head of RT II in Toisapu initiated some programs. His main task is
to take care of the 43 households in his area. He acts as the mediator between the government
and the people. Besides, he stimulates people to cultivate animals or productive plants in their
yards, and initiated a family savings program. A previous activity is to clean up public facilities.
15.2.4 Role of women
Women in Hutumuri are involved in both village and church activities. Most women sell
garden crops and a few (±10) trade in fish. Women are also active in shellfish gathering for
household consumption.
Amongst themselves, women do discuss issues of interest, such as the rise in school fees.
Apparently, the women can express their opinion in church meetings, although it is usually
the secretary who voices the women’s concerns. In meetings at the (sub-) village level, women
are represented by church members.
Although women play an important role in the fishery and fish trade, meetings on fishery
related issues are not attended by women. They are not directly involved in decision-making
in the village. Of the fishers in our sample, 17% considered women to be completely outside
of decision-making processes. However, during other interviews, women did express a strong
preference to be involved in decision-making.
15.2.5 Profile of fishers
The average age of the fishers in our sample was 47 (age range 29-85), and 51% were under 45
years old. Two women were interviewed. Of all the respondents, 77% have only elementary
education. The fishers have, on an average, 6.5 household members. Children who have left
the village have gone to work, school, or marriage.
Hutumuri is not a typical fishing village; the original inhabitants are farmers. Most fishing is
done by Butonese fishers who have immigrated into the area. Of our 30-fisher sample, 60%
were born in Hutumuri, and most of the other 40% of the fishers were Butonese. Only 7% of
the fishers were related to a founding family or locally important clan.
Many fishers are landowners (73%), but fishing was the primary source of income for most of
them (also 73%). Fishing is the second largest source of income for a further 23%. On an
average, 64% of family income is from fishing, while 67% of the fishers in our sample said
they covered daily needs from fishing alone. Only 14% of the households had an externally
derived income, but the average income from these external sources was Rp1,585,000 per
year (USD634, early 1997 rate), which is high compared to the other villages. Other sources of
income were diverse.
The average time the men have spent in the fishery was 28 years. Most fishers spent 4-6 hours
per day at sea. Compared to the other villages, this was relatively short.
A high number of fishers (25) expressed great satisfaction in their work. “It is my hobby” and
“Fishing suits my talents” were common comments. They also noted that fishing provided
the family with an income, and that the profits were good. Only five fishers would change
their job if they could, if it paid better, and was less tiring. However, only a small number
(7%) wants their children to be fishers; 23% wants them to be government staff but the largest
number wants them to be wage workers or professionals (i.e., “other” category).202        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Over half of the fishers (59%) had permanent housing (cement with zinc roof) and 54% had
TV sets. The economic indicator is made up of adding scores for land ownership, boat type,
house and gear. Overall average economic score for 27 villages was 8.6, SE=0.10. For Hutumuri-
Toisapu, the indicator was 9.7 with a standard error of 0.43 (Appendix 2). Factoring in TV
ownership (Appendix 3), the score was 10.4, the highest of all the case study sites. However,
despite their apparent high economic scores, Hutumuri fishers were relatively dissatisfied
with their level of well-being and pessimistic about the future.
15.3 Market Attributes
Artisanal fishers in Toisapu-Hutumuri sell their catch through their wives who act as small
fish traders. More than half of the fish sales are sold directly to local or city consumers. Fishers
can also decide to sell their fish to small vendors (20%) or through an auctioneer (borok) (27%).
Occasionally, the fisher will take his catch directly to a retailer in Ambon.
On an average, 21% of the fish caught are eaten by the family. Three of the fishers do not eat
any of the fish they catch, while none eat more than half of their catch. Marketing is never a
problem as fish are always sold out. Usually fish are sold fresh, but the fish that are caught at
night are smoked and sold the next day.
15.3.1 Local fish trade
Compared to the other villages, not as many people have picked up trade. Most do some
buying and selling as a side activity to make some extra money for education, clothes etc.
This is probably related to the fact that trade was only stimulated when the transport system
from Toisapu-Hutumuri to the city of Ambon was improved. Toisapu is now a regional landing
place and buzzing with activities. Traders come from all over the Lease Islands and Ambon to
either sell or buy fish. When fish are abundant at the Ambon market, the traders will take the
fish to Hutumuri to sell.
The fishers’ wives sell their fish locally or take them to the Ambon or Passo markets. The key
factor in choosing the point of sale is the price they get for the fish, which in most cases (67%)
is set by the fisher or his wife. Fish prices fluctuate every day, depending on the weather
conditions, demand, supply etc. The women get information about prices from other fish
traders in Toisapu or Ambon. There is no credit system and the fish are paid for in cash.
Between the fishers and the female fish vendors, there are two types of agreements. If the fish
trader is an outsider, he or she has to pay for the fish right away, but if it is somebody from
the village, the fish trader can take the fish, sell them and pay the fisher afterwards. This
relation is based on trust and interdependency. If there is any sign of cheating on either side,
the fishers will sell their fish to another trader or the female fish trader will buy her fish from
somebody else.
15.3.2 Commercial fish trade
The price that the traders get at the Ambon market depends largely on supply and demand:
when fish are scarce, the price increases. It is the market auctioneers who set the price each day.
Hand line fishers often buy baitfish directly from the lift nets. In some cases, the lift net
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Trade in fish is not formally arranged. The Hutumuri KUD is not involved in the fish trade,
and neither the fishers nor the traders are well coordinated. The fishery is individually-oriented
and as a result, the fishers have a weak market position and the market is not managed for
their benefit.
15.4 Community Organizational and Institutional Arrangements
Hutumuri is a non-sasi village highly dependent on agriculture. Fishery has never been the
main occupation of the original residents. Neither sasi nor any other fisheries regulations
have ever been developed. The village government is said to have a rather weak role with
regard to fisheries management. There is no kewang to enforce regulations if there were any,
but the Hutumuri people do respect the kewang and adat in other villages.
Since there is no sasi, fishers from outside can freely fish in Hutumuri’s waters; they only
need a license from the Provincial Fishery Agency. This is to the great dismay of the small-
scale fishers in Hutumuri who have a hard time to catch enough fish as it is. Fishers are aware
of the destruction outside fishers cause and the pressure they put on the marine resources. At
one point, the fishers seem to have had some regulations to limit the fishery to let the stocks
grow, but these rules were not respected.
15.4.1 Fisheries regulations
The few agreements that the village does have concern lift nets. Lift net owners are required
to make a “voluntary” contribution to the village in order to fish. Usually they will donate a
part of the catch, and the village government will ensure that the total value will be around
Rp100,000 a year (± USD40, 1996 exchange rate). Officially, the village government could
never ask for a fee, but if the lift net fishers neglect to pay, they would face negative
consequences at the hands of local fishers. In exchange for their contribution, they are allowed
to fish and get supplies (e.g., drinking water) from the village. Unlike in other villages, there
are no restrictions on mesh size “because in Hutumuri people only catch big fish.”
Except for the payments made by lift net owners, there are no parts of the sea granted to
outsiders, that is to say, by the local village government. Official permits are arranged at
higher government levels. When asked if resource harvest rights should be sold or rented to
outsiders, 67% of the respondents disagreed.
15.4.2 The players
As in Seri, the fishery in Hutumuri is for a large part governed by market mechanisms and
trade relationships. Hutumuri is an important market place and traders and commodities go
in and out. Small-scale fishers sell their catches through various channels, but primarily
through female fish vendors. Commercial fishers work through auctioneers or bring their
catch to the cold store. Between harvesters, traders, and sellers, there are long-term
relationships based on trust.
The commercial fishery has a clear incentive to over-fish. Lift nets require large investments,
and especially since the currency crisis, fishing efforts have increased. This tendency was
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Since there is no fisheries management in Toisapu-Hutumuri, there are no direct players besides
the village head. He handles the informal arrangements, e.g., the collection of fees that is
demanded from outside fishers and lift net owners. He is also the one who reports to the
police if the formal fisheries laws are neglected, e.g., the prohibition on the use of bombs and
other destructive gears.
There is no local enforcement mechanism, e.g., kewang, and the police play a marginal role in
fisheries management.
The fishers, especially from the artisanal sector, have a clear idea about what causes the marine
environment to decline. They suggest installing a management system before the fishery is
depleted. The LMD of Hutumuri, however, is partly dysfunctional and the village head lacks
the authority to be a main player in organizing the people towards management.
The influence of the church on people is significant. The church is a more stable institution,
and people prefer the church programs to those of the government. Traditionally, however,
the church has never been involved in resource management and although support of the
church is indispensable, it is not likely that it will play an active role in future resource
management.
15.4.3 Enforcement and compliance
There are few fisheries rules that are applied to the Hutumuri-Toisapu fishery. Compliance to
these formal fisheries rules is perceived to be low. Management of fishery resources in
Hutumuri can materialize only if the fishery laws can be enforced. Fishery problems, such as
the use of bombs to catch fish, are usually reported by the head of the dusun to the Water
Police Squad, and in a few cases, the police actually went after bombers (who came from
outside Hutumuri). Generally, however, enforcement is difficult because local enforcement
structures are not in place and offenders cannot be forced to pay.
The fact that the LMD is not fully functional at this stage does not help either. Many villagers
regret this state of affairs, and feel that there should be some kind of fisheries management to
protect the resource, as well as to improve people’s livelihoods. There are ideas to coordinate
fishers groups through the KUD in cooperation with BAPPEDA (Regional Development
Planning Agency), have awareness training, and develop local fishing enterprises. In addition,
the re-establishment of a kewang or comparable enforcement institution is necessary.
15.5 External Institutional and Organizational Arrangements
Political link with higher government bodies
National fishery laws are supposed to be delivered to the village by field extension officers.
But if these officers do arrive in the village, they only come to have their logbooks signed,
which the village head refuses to do.
Between 20-30 times a year, government officials from various institutions – mainly the district
and municipal offices – visit the village. Hutumuri is involved in various fishery programs
from the Fisheries Agency. The extension programs usually involve the Butonese because
they are full-time fishers. The activities are under the jurisdiction of the village and dusun
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The Fisheries Agency has advised the people, who are farming-oriented, to develop more
fishing activities in Hutumuri. Together with the Department of Industry and Trade and the
Department of Agriculture, the Fisheries Agency initiated training on fishery resources and
operations, improved fishing methods, economic aspects of the fishery and regulations.
Training was delivered by the KUD. There has been no training on fisheries management,
and the higher government levels are not involved in enforcement. Navy or police patrol
boats never visit Hutumuri.
Collaboration with other institutions
The village head frequently meets with government officials from various departments and
the Ambon Municipality. He also attended a course and training about village government.
One adat custom is still operational. Among certain lineages of Hutumuri, Sirisori and Tamilow,
there are strong traditional ties. Every five years, descendants of these clans meet to
commemorate their pela gandong (lit. “united by ancestry”).
External economic influences
Because Hutumuri is near two important market places (Passo and the city of Ambon), local
trade is significant. A good transport system enhanced market activities and many people
have changed from fishing to the production of cash crops. The drop in clove prices and the
drought in 1997/98 caused a great loss of crops and many people returned to the sea to fish in
order to make ends meet.
Infrastructure and development projects
There are two industrial activities in the vicinity of dusun Toisapu, a fish processing plant and
a paper mill, both in Batu Gong. The fish processing plant provides work for 21 people, and 8
women from Toisapu work in the paper mill.
The oceanology branch of the Indonesia Institute of Sciences (LIPI), in collaboration with the
village government, has conducted a trial on the cultivation of top shells in Hutumuri. Juvenile
shells were used to restock the coastal area. The people support the project. Two villagers (P.
Lilipory, a police veteran, and B. Souhuwat) are paid Rp. 75,000 a month each to control the
project facility and fish ponds.
15.6 Incentives to Cooperate
Acknowledgment of a problem
Fishers notice a clear deterioration of their natural resources. The fish and paper factories
pollute the water in the bay, blast fishers destroy the corals and schools of fish and the use of
FADs and lift nets depletes the baitfish stocks. The fishers have to go further out to fish. Their
traditional methods, however, cannot compete with the modern fishing gears and the fishers
cannot afford to buy modern gears themselves. Aquaculture is difficult because the natural
conditions (winds and currents) are unfavorable. The small-scale fishers have now come to
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Economic needs
Economic needs, however, as a result of the drought at the end of 1997 that caused crops to
fail, and the subsequent monetary crisis, forced people back into the fishery. Even people
who never fished before joined the boats of the established fishers and learned “on the job”.
Economic needs are an important incentive for over-fishing.
Stabilization of leadership
The village leader plans to use the re-institutionalization of sasi and adat institutions. This is
partly to legitimize his position, partly to meet the villagers’ demands for stronger
management. The position of the current village leader, however, is weak. The formal village
government is not fully functional either. This situation is a strong disincentive to comply
with, or support, local management.
Tradition
In the eyes of traditional leaders, Hutumuri is an adat village. After the formalization of the
village government structure, the adat laws were not exercised consistently and as a result,
the villagers have developed an indifferent attitude towards adat. The youths in Toisapu are
involved in some adat activities like the “cakalele” dance, but the adat tradition has lost its
significance for them. If sasi regulations for resource management are going to be re-
established, they will only be respected and continued if they are designed in a way that is
meaningful to the village youths and young fishers.
Role of the church
The influence of the church on people is significant. However, people are rather conservative,
and sometimes it is hard to motivate people because they like to see results first before they
start new activities. If the people see that a program has a positive effect, it will be an incentive
for them to cooperate.
J. Istia, the church minister, explained that a strong leader has to be aware of the needs of the
people, should be well educated and “live by example”. The current leadership, however, is
weak and unstable. The church is a more stable institution, and because the people are more
involved, they prefer the church programs to those of the government. It is thus important to
involve the church in any resource management or livelihood development efforts.
15.7 Patterns of Interaction
Except for a concrete barrier built to protect the village shoreline from wave erosion, the
village government has not yet coordinated any action to protect coastal resources. It claims
to be helpless against the outside fishers who come from all over Indonesia, e.g., Madurese
and Butonese fishers. They fish the Hutumuri waters right up to the shoreline, ignoring the
200 m zone off the shore line where no commercial fishing is allowed.
Fishers identify two major problems: the inability of village government to manage resources,
and competition between local artisanal and large-scale commercial fishers. However, the
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The fishers, though, have ideas on how to overcome some of these problems. They have
suggested the creation of a strong management system. If the village has a kewang with legal
status, the village government could stop the bombing, use of cyanide and the pollution from
the factories, which affect the fishery. Fishers would also like to see the small mesh nets
regulated and suggest zoning the fishing grounds with one part for the lift nets, an open area
where people could fish, and perhaps a zone for a fish nursery or aquaculture project. The
fishers explained that these were their own plans and that the government had not yet been
involved. They had had some meetings and the relationship between fishers and government
is getting better, but the plans are in a preliminary stage.
At the same time, however, the village head told our research team about his plans to re-
establish sasi. Apparently, there are some commercially interesting fish resources in Baguala
Bay, e.g., top shells, which have to be protected from theft by outsiders. The village head
plans to establish the saniri negeri (including the LMD, LKMD, and village leaders) and a
kewang. He explained that the villagers will be consulted, but that resource management will
be a government affair.
When it comes to trade, the fishers feel that they should cooperate more. Currently, every
fisher is working individually and, therefore, they have a rather weak market position. The
fishers would like government support to organize themselves. If the government would
provide the capital for their businesses and subsidies to buy modern fishing gears, groups of
about four fishers could be organized and have a boat, engine and gill net. The investment
would be Rp10 million (USD4,000, early 1997 exchange rate), which they expect to be able to
return after a year. Then they could work independently. The fishers would also like to have
training and awareness programs.
15.8 Outcomes
15.8.1 Equity
1. Role of fishers in management
The role of fishers in management is not very high (5.5 on a scale of 10), and not changing
over time. Opinions, however, were varied. According to some fishers in our sample, the
village government has a decisive role in determining whether and which fishers participate.
They felt that education has made people more capable of joining the discussions on fisheries
management and that they should be permitted to participate.
When asked about power-sharing, 53% thought the government had most or total
responsibility for fisheries management. Seventeen percent thought the people shared
responsibility equally with the government, and 30% saw the community as having more
responsibility.
2. Access to marine resources
The fishers’ access to marine resources has significantly declined compared to the past and
the fishers expect more restrictions in future. Access has been influenced by government
interventions, the need for permits, and tightening of rules. What rules these are, is not clear.
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3. Fair distribution of fishing gears
Distribution of means of production is seen to be significantly fairer now than in the past,
and this is expected to continue to improve. However, it is more likely that it is the result of a
general increase in fishing gears, than a change in distribution. Economic needs, competition
and education pushed people to exert more personal effort to make a living. More people
went to the sea, and purchased gears, and thus the total capital investment increased. More
people have fishing gears now, but distribution depends very much on the extent to which
fishers are able to compete and on how much effort they are willing to put in.
4. Economic equality
When asked about the level of economic disparities, fishers reported that conditions had not
changed significantly. Future change is also not expected. Equality is stimulated through the
establishment of fisher groups and a general increase in income in the village. Factors that
affect economic disparities in a negative way are: 1) the reduction in clove prices, 2) differences
in education, 3) differences in personal efforts, 4) availability of capital, 5) personal motivation,
6) increasing competition, and 7) access to government programs.
15.8.2 Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making
Partnership in decision-making is also limited, and has not changed over time. The majority
of the respondents felt that the style of decision-making in Toisapu-Hutumuri is a process of
common or majority agreement. Others felt that most decisions are made by the village head,
with or without the village government staff. However, education has made people more
aware and these fishers feel they want to be involved. They agreed that all stakeholders should
be involved in decision-making. Of the fishers, 87% actually felt that local groups had a role
in decision-making, but only 17% felt that outsiders were involved.
6. Ease of entry
Entry into the fishery is significantly harder (23% change) due to rising costs that fishers
expect will increase in the future. Although the general tendency for poor farmers is to start
fishing, one fisher stated that “although fish are still abundant, the number of fishers decreases
because of high costs of fishing.” Toisapu-Hutumuri fishers complained about the increasing
costs of gears and maintenance. Fees and increasing fuel costs (due to the longer distances to
the fishing grounds) have also made fishing more expensive.
7. Control over access to the fishery
Control over access to the fishery is seen to be the same as in the past, but again perceptions
vary greatly. It must be noted that the question was interpreted as “the ability of the
government to limit access of outsiders to resources”, and since the village government has
no role in enforcement and neither are there “security officials” or a kewang to take this role,
control is minimal. On the other hand, there were fishers who stated that personal awareness
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8. Compliance
Currently, compliance is seen to be 16% lower now than in the past. It was explained that
compliance decreased due to a weak government leader, the loss of adat, inadequate education,
increased economic needs and generally less control over the fishery. Although there appear
to be no fisheries rules besides the national fisheries law and the obligatory fees paid to the
village government by lift net owners, people believe compliance to fisheries rules will decline
further. When asked if it was acceptable for a fisher to sometimes bend or try to break the
rules, only 13% agreed.




Family well-being has not changed (on an average) and there is no change expected in the
future. Answers, however, were varied. People who saw their well-being decline, argued that
more effort had to be made to get money. They explained that economic needs increased,
money became more important and people now have more expenses. Meanwhile the clove
price has dropped. Others noted an increase in well-being and said it was a result of increased
efforts, participation in development programs and education.
10. Income
With regard to their income, the fishers reported a significant average increase of 14% and
they expect it to rise significantly in the future. A third of the respondents explained that
although the fish catches decreased, the high prices paid for the fish compensated for the
loss. Other factors that positively influence a person’s income are a favorable marketing
position, the use of modern gears, better transport, and increased efforts.
Three people, on the other hand, felt their income had declined. Their catches decreased since
the water had become polluted, competition was increasing, and they were getting older so
they could not work as hard anymore.
11. Tradition of collective action
Past performance in terms of collective action was rated high (8-10 on the ladder scale). This
was attributed to education, the village government, tradition and social bonds. Some
customary adat activities, like the maintenance of the Baileo (the traditional community house),
are still carried out by villagers. However, individualism and the payment system have
undermined collective action significantly. Communal activities in the village decreased 16%
compared to the past and are expected to drop on an average 10% in future.
12. Discussion of village issues
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13. Harmony
Harmony in the community is significantly less than in the past, and further deterioration is
expected. Many conflicts are local and concern the forest-gardens. As in Seri, drinking is a
major problem and was noted by nearly half of the respondents. The reasons for alcohol abuse
and the general increase in conflicts are, according to the respondents: 1) unemployment, 2)
low consciousness as a result of little education, 3) a lack of government control, 4) conditions
in the city, 5) economic demands, and 6) external influences.
15.8.4 Biological sustainability
14. State of the resource
The state of the resource has deteriorated dramatically over the past 15 years (down 37%) and
further decline is expected in the future (21%). The reasons for this decline are given in Section 15.1.
15. Fish catches
Fish catches have also declined dramatically (down 35%). Certain fish species have become
rare or seem to have disappeared. Fishers have to go further out to maintain their catches.
Currently, the high prices make up for the lost quantity, but they expected the situation to
deteriorate further in the future (21%).
15.9 Synthesis
The political situation in Hutumuri is a typical example of confusion caused by the introduction
of the new formal village structure. The village government faces the dilemma of whether to
govern the village according to traditional adat, or through the formal laws. As they see it, the
adat law acknowledges the traditional social structures, clan relations and the function of adat
institutions like kapitan, kepala soa and raja. The new national law, on the other hand, emphasizes
the importance of institutional structures like the LMD and the LKMD.
If Hutumuri follows the national law and establish the official units under the Municipality
of Ambon, the adat institutions would become redundant. But the villagers believe that only
when adat laws are practiced correctly, the village will be prosperous, so they object to the
abolishment of adat institutions. Therefore, the formation of the LMD in Hutumuri would
actually be only to accommodate the government regulations.
The current village head owes his position to the new government structure because he is not
from the traditional raja line and, therefore, not legitimate in the eyes of the villagers. His
lack of management skills and failure to install active government and enforcement institutions
have further undermined his position.
These issues have become critical now that the environmental situation, and therewith the well-
being of the villagers, are deteriorating. The fishers in Hutumuri-Toisapu are educated, aware and
more critical than in most other villages. The fishers love their profession – “it is in our blood” – and
they see their livelihood threatened by industrial activities and large-scale fishing. The idea that it is
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Most Hutumuri-Toisapu villagers are originally farmers but their increasing dependency on
the fishery due to the drop in clove prices, the drought and current economic crisis, brings
these issues clearly to light. The entrance of Baguala Bay appears blocked with lift nets and
few are owned by locals. The fishers are not able to compete with urban entrepreneurs because
they lack capital (a lift net costs over a Rp100 million or ±USD35,000, 1997 exchange rate).
Locals have to fish outside the bay currently because it is polluted and because hardly any
fish are able to actually get in when their way is physically blocked.
The economic position of Hutumuri-Toisapu fishers is, compared to other villages in central
Maluku, relatively good. Hutumuri has the advantage that it is close to Passo and the city of
Ambon where the main markets are. There is a good transportation system and it is easy for
people to sell their products. A clear indicator was given by the church minister who explained
that in most villages in Maluku, people donate only a few hundred rupiahs after the service,
while in Hutumuri people can donate more than ten thousand rupiahs. However, although
the economic indicator scores high, the present situation is deteriorating, and Hutumuri-
Toisapu villagers are negative and have a bleak outlook on the future.
However, local fishers have some ideas and initiatives to improve the situation. They want to
establish a management system and strengthen their market position by working through
the village cooperative (KUD). They organized meetings with the village head to discuss the
possibility of zoning the fishing grounds into parts for local fishers, outsiders and aquaculture
as well indicating some otherwise restricted area. The village head grasps this opportunity to
re-institutionalize adat institutions such as the kewang. He also wants to reorganize the village
government in such a way that the adat positions are represented and functional. This works
Table 15.2. Results of the performance analysis in Hutumuri-Toisapu. n=30 heads of fishing households.
ns=trend not significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01,  ***=p<0.001.
Indicator Average Average change Average future
current through time expected change
condition on (statistical significance) (statistical significance)
scale of 1-10
Equity
1. Role of fishers in management 5.50 -0.6333ns -6% -0.2333ns -2%
2. Access to marine resources 8.30 -0.8667** -9% -0.9000** -9%
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears 7.10 1.7333*** +17% 0.9667** +10%
4. Economic equality 6.57 0.3667ns +4% 0.3333ns +3%
Efficiency
5. Communal decision-making 6.30 0.4000ns +4% 0.1000ns +1%
6. Ease of entry into the fishery 6.33 -2.2667*** -23% -1.0667*** -11%
7. Control over access to fishery 6.43 -0.4000ns -4% -0.0666ns -0.7%
8. Compliance with fishery rules 6.63 -1.6333*** -16% -1.3333*** -13%
Social Sustainability
9. Family well-being 6.20 -0.8000ns -8% -0.6000ns -6%
10. Income 6.80 1.4333** +14% 0.7333* +7%
11. Tradition of collective action 6.37 -1.6000** -16% -1.0000** -10%
12. Discussion of village issues 7.30 -0.5000ns -5% -0.4000ns -4%
13. Community harmony 5.70 -2.2333*** -22% -0.9333*** -9%
Biological sustainability
14. Marine resource health 5.00 -3.7000*** -37% -2.0667*** -21%
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both ways: first, the village would have a regulatory system and an institution that enforces
the rules, while at the same time, the village head would strengthen his own position.
The Protestant church in Hutumuri has a strong influence on the people, especially since the
village government has become unstable. Still, the relationship between the church and the
village government is tight: the government uses the church meetings to publicize important
information, and the church is represented in the village government.
In the process of formalizing the traditional village institutions, it is essential to involve the
church. It can play a major role in the education of the people and in the decision- making
process in the village. The church programs that improve the livelihood of people can support
future management efforts in the bay.Comparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        213
Chapter 16
Comparative Analysis of Case Study Sites
16.1 Introduction
This chapter is a comparative analysis of the six case study villages: Nolloth and Haruku
with a strong sasi institution, Tuhaha and Hulaliu where the sasi institution is dysfunctional
and was lost in living memory, and Seri and Hutumuri-Toisapu, two villages that never had
sasi or lost it a long time ago.  Contextual variables that are compared among the villages are
classified as biological and technical, socio-economic, institutional and organizational, and
external.  Fisher attitudes and performance indicators (e.g., efficiency, equity and sustainability)
in the villages are also compared. The significant relationships between contextual variables,
attitudes and the performance indicators are then investigated. This enables us to identify
some factors that have an impact on coastal management in central Maluku fishing villages.
Detailed demographic information of the six case study villages is presented in the individual
case studies and in Appendix 3.
16.2 Comparison of Contextual Attributes of Case Study Sites
Biological and technical attributes of the case study villages were largely comparable (Table
16.1).  Hulaliu and Hutumuri, being more focused on exploitation of land resources, were less
dependent on fisheries.  The village territories were physically similar, the main difference being
the degree of wave exposure in the marine territory.  Tuhaha differs from the rest in being
enclosed within a bay, whereas Nolloth, Seri and Hutumuri-Toisapu are fully wave-exposed.
Haruku and Hulaliu are intermediate, as they face narrow straits rather than open sea.
Available fish resources are everywhere similar, but pelagic fish are particularly abundant off
the coast of Seri.  Both Seri and Hutumuri waters are dominated by the commercial baitfishery.
In every village, most fishers are artisanal and small-scale and most use simple gears and do
not own motorboats. Fishers with no gears or no boat work as crew on commercial vessels or
participate in communal fishing activities.  These fishers are most numerous in Nolloth and
Haruku, least numerous in Hutumuri. There were no lift net owners in either Haruku or
Nolloth. Top shells and sea cucumbers appear to be only available in guarded sasi areas.
In their socio-economic and market attributes, the villages are also rather similar (Table 16.2).
Of interest is that most villages in central Maluku define their marine territories as extending
only to the edge of the fringing coral reef. In Tuhaha, however, the village claims a large area
in Tuhaha Bay, while Seri claims an even larger part of the sea. Ownership, or at least the
right to collect access fees, is applied for deep sea waters i.e., as far out to sea as can be seen.
Three of these Christian villages had a minority of Muslim fishers, although we did not
interview any of them in either Seri or Tuhaha.  Fishers in the sasi villages were much more
likely to be related to socially important clans (soa besar), compared to the fishers in more
heterogeneous villages on Ambon Island (Seri and Hutumuri).   The main distinguishing
feature of the non-sasi villages was their proximity to the city of Ambon with its markets,
employment opportunities and more advanced infrastructure.  Of the villages on the smaller
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Organizations at the village level were very similar (Table 16.3).  Organized fishers groups
were usually IDT and KEP, i.e., fisheries development aid groups.  Haruku is distinctive in
having both an environmental organization and a youth kewang, both spearheaded by
traditional leaders.  Village governments varied in that the LMD was more or less functional
and incorporated adat leaders to different degrees.  These differences were related to the
legitimacy of the village head.  Nolloth’s leader, being a respected raja, was highly legitimate.
In Haruku, conflict between the village head and kewang over mining reduced the leader’s
legitimacy.  People even disputed whether he was properly from the raja line or not.  The
leaders of Haruku, Hulaliu and Tuhaha all have residences in Ambon and frequent absences
from their villages cause political problems.  Hulaliu’s village head also faces serious problems
from a contra group that actively seeks to undermine his position.  In Hutumuri, the village
head is not from the raja line and is considered to be an outsider with no legitimacy. The
dusun head in Toisapu is, however, considered legitimate.  Seri is similar in that the dusun
head is of the raja clan but the village (desa) head is not.  Traditional leaders in Seri are seeking
to change their status from a dusun to a desa.
There were several important differences among villages in their external attributes (Table
16.4).  Tourism is only a feature in Haruku, and this is largely restricted to visitors who come
to the annual sasi ceremony.  Haruku is also unique in having mining exploration activity in
the watershed.  Hutumuri suffers environmental impacts from external development, i.e.,
fish and plywood factories polluting Baguala Bay.  None of the villages had significant
interaction with provincial or national agencies.
Table 16.1. Biological and technical attributes: comparative view of case study sites. Y=yes, N=no,
L=limited, M=moderate, H=abundant, intense or highly applicable; nd=no data available.
Marine sasi Sasi being revived No sasi
BIOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
(Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Dusun) (Desa) and
 Toisapu
 (Dusun)
Coastal village on small island Y Y Y Y Y Y
Two seasonal monsoons Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tropical climate with adequate rain Y Y Y Y Y Y
Level of marine stock exploitation H H H M H M
Fishery resources Y Y Y Y Y Y
Top shell and sea cucumber resources M nd nd nd L L
Wave-exposed shore H M M M H H
Coral reef in village territory H M M H H H
Sea grass bed in village territory L H H M N L
Fishers target reef fish 40% 56% 60% 90% 45% 60%
Fishers target pelagic fish 93% 86% 97% 67% 66% 78%
TECHNICAL ATTRIBUTES
Fishers with no gears nor boats <30% <25% <30% <30% <25% 0
Fishers with small boats without motors 63% 53% 63% 70% 79% 78%
Fishers with motorboats 7% 27% 7% 3% 0 11%
Number of hand liners and net fishers H H H H H H
Presence of lift net and FAD owners N N L L M H
in village
Territory dominated by large-scale N N M M H H
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Table 16.3. Comparison of institutional and organizational attributes of case study villages. Y=yes, N=no,
L=limited, M=moderate, H=abundant, intense or highly applicable; nd=no data available.
Marine sasi Sasi being revived No sasi
COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONAL AND Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Dusun) (Desa) and
Toisapu
(Dusun)
Presence and activity of government H M H M H M
development groups
Presence and activity of church groups H H M M H H
Organized fisher group(s) Y N N Y Y N
Environmental organization N Y N N N N
Adat organization (kewang) Y Y N N (+1998) N N
Kewang group for youths N Y N N N N
LMD functional (1997) H Y Y Y H N
Village leader from traditional raja clan Y Y Y Y N (desa)N  ( desa)
Y (dusun)Y  ( dusun)
Integration of adat leaders into the LMD H H Y Y Y (dusun)N
Village leader has legitimacy for H N Y N Y (dusun)N  ( desa)
majority of villagers Y (dusun)
Table 16.2. Comparison of socio-economic and market attributes in case study villages. Y=yes, N=no,
L=limited, M=moderate, H=abundant, intense or highly applicable; nd=no data available. * Also see
Tables 16.6 and 16.7.
Marine sasi Sasi being revived No sasi
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
(Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Dusun) (Desa)and
Toisapu
(Dusun)
Settled by Seram islanders Y Y Y Y Y Y
Founding families moved down from the Y Y Y Y nd nd
hills during Dutch occupation
Large land territory Y Y Y Y Y Y
Marine territory to edge of fringing reef Y Y N Y N Y
Marine territory extends into Tuhaha Bay N N Y N N N
Marine territory extends out to sea N N N N Y N
Village population between 1,500 and 3,500 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Percentage of population Christian, Ambonese H H M H M M
Fishers of Butonese origin at work in village N N Y N Y Y
Fishers related to traditional leaders 47% 73% 33% 53% 21% 7%
Most villagers fisher-farmers Y Y Y Y Y Y
Telephone link N N N N N Y
MARKET ATTRIBUTES
% Income from fishing* 81% 66% 75% 56% 65% 64%
% Fishers serving on-island markets 89% 88% 86% 97% 97% 93%
% Fishers oriented to off-island or 11% 12% 14% 3% 3% 7%
national markets
Large-scale commercial fishery M N M N H H
Local fish trade dominated by female H H H H M M
retailers (papalele)
Artisanal and small-scale fish catch M L M L H H
marketed through boroks (fish traders)
Direct road or regular boat access to L M L N H H
Ambon city market216        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
16.3 Comparative Analysis of Institutional Arrangements for Fisheries
Management
Every village is subject to national fisheries law, but because of poor communication from the
national level, few villagers are aware of the content of these laws. For instance, the national
regulation on the mesh size of lift nets is universally ignored.  Many village leaders at least
profess to support the ban on blast fishing and use of poisons, although only in Haruku and
Nolloth are there written village regulations.  Other types of formal and informal fisheries
rules are mostly found in the sasi villages. Sasi institutions in every case are said to have the
aim of protecting resources, but in three out of four cases, a key aspect of the institution is
provision of resource rents to the government. Only in Haruku are catches directly shared
out among community members (Table 16.5).
The church plays a role in supporting compliance to fisheries rules in Nolloth. In Nolloth,
Haruku, Tuhaha and Hulaliu, the church controls village sasi on coconuts. In Seri, individuals
may also ask the church to put sasi on individual trees or gardens.
Hutumuri, in particular, is totally open access, the only “rule” being in the form of a desire to
collect fees from lift nets, in the absence of a collection mechanism.  Management in Seri is
similarly largely restricted to the collection of access fees from outsiders wishing to use nets
or deploy lift nets and FADs in Seri waters.  Tuhaha is unique in having areas of marine
territory that are auctioned out and then patrolled and harvested by the auction winner.
Depending on sasi status and proximity to a police station, enforcement is carried out by the
kewang, village government, police or some combination.  In no case is there proactive
patrolling of village territories by police, navy or the Fisheries Agency, nor is there interaction
with outside agencies with respect to fisheries management. Fisheries management is also
never a major issue, largely because, with the exception of a few leaders in sasi villages who
have been exposed to NGO ideas, villagers do not know what fisheries management might
entail.
Table 16.4.  External attributes of case study villages. Y=yes, N=no, L=limited, M=moderate, H=abundant,
intense or highly applicable; nd=no data available.
Marine sasi Sasi being revived No sasi
EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTES Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
(Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Dusun) (Desa) and
 Toisapu
 (Dusun)
Minimal in- and out-migration Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tourism N L N N N N
Village involved in national Y Y Y Y Y Y
development programs
Mining exploration N Y N N N N
Factory pollution in inshore waters N N N N N Y
Active interaction with provincial and N N N N N N
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Table 16.5. Village by village comparison of marine resource management attributes. Brackets are
used where proposed if sasi is revived. Y=yes, N=no, L=limited, M=moderate, H=abundant, intense
or highly applicable; nd=no data available.
Marine sasi Sasi being revived No sasi
SASI ATTRIBUTES Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
(current or proposed) (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Dusun) (Desa) and
 Toisapu
(Dusun)
Sasi status H H L L N N
Sasi area on coral reef Y N N (Y) n/a n/a
Sasi area on sea grass N Y (Y) (Y) n/a n/a
Sasi on top shells and sea cucumbers Y N (Y) (Y) n/a n/a
Sasi on pelagic fish N Y (Y) N n/a n/a
Village head/raja active in sasi H Y H H n/a n/a
(practice or revival)
Tuan negeri, ketua adat active in sasi ) H Y Y Y n/a n/a
(practice or revival)
Stated objective sasi laut Y Y Y Y n/a n/a
(current or future) to protect resources
Sasi aims to share benefits equally Y H N N n/a n/a
Sasi to provide village government income Y N Y Y n/a n/a
Sasi provides direct benefits for all villagers N Y N N n/a n/a
Sasi area boundary clear, undisputed Y Y Y N n/a n/a
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ATTRIBUTES
Village subject to national laws Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fisheries agency in contact with village N N Y Y N N
Blast fishing and use of poisons Y Y N N N N
formally banned by village rule
Blast fishing and use of poisons N N N Y Y N
informally banned
Lelang (auction) of harvest rights Y N Y Y N N
Collection of other access fees or Y N Y Y Y Y
“voluntary contributions”  (attempted)
Formal (written) village restriction Y Y N N N N
on use of nets, traps, mesh size
Proactive patrols by police, N N N N N N
navy, fisheries agency
Enforcement by village head Y N Y (Y) N N
Enforcement by kewang Y Y N (Y) N N
Enforcement by lelang owners N N Y N N N
Enforcement with police assistance Y N Y Y N N
as requested
Church support promotes compliance H Y N N N N
to fisheries rules
Non-compliance for political reasons N Y N Y N N
Awareness of fisheries management Y (only Y (only N N N N
activities, issues village head)  kewang)
Active exchange of information N N N N N N
with  official fisheries
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16.4 Comparison of Profiles and Job Satisfaction Among Fishers
16.4.1 Profile of fishers
The age of the respondents in Haruku and Tuhaha was significantly higher than in Seri
(ANOVA and Duncan’s test, p<0.05). As a result, Seri fishers had the least experience in fishing,
i.e., 19 years, compared to averages of 25-34 years in other villages (Table 16.6).
There are significant differences among the six villages in the percentage of catch eaten and
also in the proportion of income derived from fishing. Nolloth fishers eat significantly less of
their fish than fishers in Tuhaha, Hulaliu and Haruku (Duncan’s test, p<0.05), and also gain the
largest percentage of their income from fishing (Table 16.2). Hulaliu fishers get significantly
less of their income from fish compared to fishers in Tuhaha and Nolloth (Duncan’s test, p<0.05).
Most villages target the same set of species (see Appendix 3). In Nolloth, 60% of fishers target
exclusively pelagic fish, while only 7% target only reef fish (Table 16.7). In Seri, a similar number
targets pelagic fish, but a relatively large number of fishers (24%) targets reef fishes exclusively.
This is possibly correlated with the relatively good state of the reefs in Southern Ambon.
Fishers in Nolloth and Tuhaha fished significantly (Duncan’s test, p=0.03) longer hours per
day compared to those in Hulaliu. Hutumuri fishers also fished significantly less than Tuhaha
fishers.  Nolloth and Tuhaha are highly dependent on the fishery. Hulaliu, in contrast, has
productive lands and is agriculture-oriented. In both Nolloth and Haruku, there has been a
shift from farming to fishing due to increasing fish prices and the reduced price for cloves.
16.4.2 Economic status
On the overall economic score, Hutumuri scores significantly higher than Nolloth and Haruku,
the sasi villages (Duncan’s test, p=0.05). The differences among the other villages are not
statistically significant. Also if we consider accommodation, the sasi villages have poorer
housing. Housing in Ambon is relatively good. The best housing is in Hulaliu (land-rich) and
Seri (fish-rich).  More fishers in Hulaliu and Haruku have an external income compared to
those in Seri (Duncan’s test, p<0.05).  However, the average amount of money annually
transferred to Hulaliu and Haruku is relatively low (Table 16.8).
Table 16.7. Percentage of fishers targeting inshore reef fish, offshore pelagic fish or both, in each village.
Target species Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
Reef fish only 7% 13% 3% 33% 24% 47%
Pelagic fish only 60% 43% 40% 10% 55% 40%
Both reef and pelagic fish 33% 43% 57% 57% 21% 17%
Table 16.6. Fishers’ profile in case study villages.
Fishers’ profile Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
Average years of education 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.6 7.1 7.2
Average age 47 50 53 47 42 47
Average years of experience in fishery 27 30 34 25 19 28
Average hours/day fishing 8.6 7.9 9.6 5.8 7.9 7.2
% of all recorded lift net owners 0% 0% 21% 21% 8% 50%
% catch eaten 13% 26% 23% 26% 22% 21%Comparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        219
Possible explanations for the lower economic score of the sasi villages include the limited access
that fishers have over the resources, which reduces individual benefits. This is the case where
the benefits from sasi are spent for village development in general (Nolloth) or re-distributed
among all villagers (Haruku). Besides, the sasi villages have no large-scale fishing gears (lift
nets and FADs) which provide high individual benefits but are intensive and generally seen as
destructive. On the other hand, the difference may have more to do with access to markets
(distance, infrastructure) or the relatively advanced age of the sasi village fishers (Table 16.2).
Hutumuri has no restrictions on the fishery at all. Our fishers’ sample in Hutumuri included
approximately half of all the lift net/FAD owners interviewed and this could explain why the
average economic score is high.
16.4.3 Job satisfaction
In all villages, most fishers are highly satisfied with their jobs. The general positive answers
included “I like my job”, “It is in my blood” and “It is my hobby”. Most fishers (87%) in the
sample from the six villages report that they would still become fishers if they had their life
to live over. However, most fishers acknowledged the dangers and insecurity associated with
fishing. When asked if they would change occupations if an alternative were available, 36%
said “yes”. This varies a great deal across the villages, however, from a low of 20% in Hutumuri
and Nolloth to a high of 54% in Seri (Table 16.9). The most likely reason to change was if they
could find something more profitable. The differences between the six villages are statistically
significant (p<0.02).
Table 16.9. Job satisfaction in case study villages.
Job satisfaction
(in % of fishers’ sample) Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
Are satisfied with their job 86 83 97 80 86 89
Would change job if they could 20 43 31 50 54 20
Want job for children: in fishery 18 7 7 10 4 8
as government official 61 68 73 72 75 28
Table 16.8. Economic status of fishers in case study villages. Economic score=adding land ownership,
house, boat, type of gears and TV (see Section 2.5.3). Minimal housing=made of light materials
such as sago palm thatch; Low=made of light materials plus wood or lumber; Medium=combination
of lumber and concrete with thatch roofing; High=made of concrete and metal roof.
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
Average Economic score 8.47 8.70 9.27 9.10 8.81 10.35
Standard deviation 2.22 2.47 2.12 2.22 1.64 2.59
% of sample with external income 26.7 33.3 26.7 36.7 6.9 13.8
Average external income/year (in Rp) 263,750 343,500 596,250 485,730 775,000 1,585,000
Average external income/year 10,550 13,740 23,850 19,429 31,000 63,400
(in USD, early 1997 exchange rate)
Housing (% of fishers in each category)
Minimal 20% 17% 7% 3% 0% 3%
Low 20% 23% 7% 13% 7% 24%
Medium 13% 30% 30% 7% 21% 14%
High 47% 30% 56% 77% 72% 59%220        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Finally, when asked what kind of job respondents would like for their children (Table 16.9),
only 9% chose fishing, the majority (63%) selecting a “government job”.  This finding is not
surprising given the fact that most parents would like their children’s position to improve.
What parents want for their child, however, may differ from what the child desires. Nolloth
and Hutumuri fishers have the highest score for job satisfaction and the lowest tendency to
change. However, most Hutumuri fishers do not want their children to enter the fishery, while
many do in Nolloth. In Hutumuri, fishers mentioned various alternatives for their children
e.g., trader, craftsman.  That is the reason why the percentage who chose the option
“government official” is relatively low. This reflects the key contextual difference between
Hutumuri and the other villages: proximity to Ambon with its markets, jobs, and infrastructure.
16.5 Comparative Analysis of Fishers’ Attitudes Towards Fisheries Management
In every village, the majority of fishers said sasi is important but in Seri and Hutumuri, there
was a sizeable minority who thought it unimportant (Figure 16.1).  In every case, the majority
of fishers disagreed with the sale of resource harvest rights to outsiders, and fishers in Hulaliu
and Haruku were particularly firm. The majority of fishers in each village considered decision-
making in their village to represent the wishes of all or a majority of people, although there
were no mechanisms in practice for public consultation.  In Tuhaha and Hulaliu, a relatively
large number of fishers (i.e., respectively 40% and 37%) did think that decision-making was
dominated by the interests of the village head and his LMD.  It was clear in every village that
participation of all stakeholders in decision-making was seen as desirable, but fishers also
clearly perceived that women were marginalized, especially in the villages on Saparua and
Haruku Islands.  Perception of the relative roles of government and communities also varied,
with more Ambon Island fishers, especially those in Seri, perceiving the community’s role as
relatively important (Table 16.10).
Table 16.10. Village by village comparison of fishers’ attitudes towards marine resource management.
Marine sasi Sasi being revived No sasi
FISHERS’ ATTITUDES TO Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
MARINE RESOURCE (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Desa) (Dusun) (Desa) and
MANAGEMENT  Toisapu
(Dusun)
% fishers who agree with sale 43% 10% 24% 7% 41% 18%
of marine harvest rights
% who see decision-making in 78% 62% 60% 63% 69% 74%
village as being agreed by all
or majority
% fishers who strongly agree 72% 77% 83% 83% 40% 48%
that all stakeholders should
have a role in decision-making
% who perceive female 33% 13% 10% 7% 24% 26%
involvement in all
decision-making
% who collaborate with fishers 10% 3% 14% 13% 21% 17%
from outside the village
% who see the government as 60% 57% 64% 77% 34% 67%
having a dominant role in
management
% who see the community as 7% 0% 3% 0% 59% 30%
having a dominant role
in managementComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        221
16.6 Significant Differences in Performance Indicators and Correlations
between Indicators and Other Factors
16.6.1 Equity
Role of fishers in management
Perceptions of fishers in the six villages varied significantly in some ways when analyzed by
ANOVA (Table 16.11).  Compared to the past, the role of the fishers in management has
significantly increased in the sasi villages (Haruku and Nolloth), while in the other villages
their role has decreased.  This is a more dramatic difference than was detected in the
comparison of sasi and non-sasi villages in the larger performance analysis (Chapter 8).  Decline
in the role of fishers is especially the case in Hulaliu. The role of fishers in management is
perceived to be greater by fishers who are unwilling to change their job (Table 16.12).  Other
related factors are the fishers’ attitudes towards changing the fisheries rules and bending the
rules; fishers who are happy with the current rules and who feel comfortable asking for a
dispensation to bend rules, feel they have a greater role in management.  Finally, the perception
on the role of fishers in management is positively related to the possession of more expensive
gears, and negatively related to an elitist style of decision-making in the village.
Nolloth and Haruku fishers are generally more positive about their role in management,
whereas Hulaliu and Hutumuri fishers are most negative (Table 16.11). Job satisfaction plays
no role in the Nolloth score (Appendix 3), but Hulaliu fishers do have a greater tendency to
change their job so this helps explain their low score. Neither Nolloth nor Haruku fishers
possess expensive gear types; therefore, this does not explain their high scores. However, in
interviews, fishers stated that richer fishers have more influence in decision-making, and this
seems to be confirmed by this correlation between gear type and the way fishers perceive
their role in management (Table 16.12).
Fishers who are happy with the existing rules have a more positive perception on their role in
management. This holds true for Nolloth fishers of whom 57% do not want to change the
rules. Their rules are sasi, so there is a linkage here. In Hulaliu, on the other hand, many
fishers do want to change the rules (63%). These two villages are at the two opposite ends of
the scale in terms of decision-making styles. Nolloth fishers have one of the highest proportions
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of fishers who think the style of decision-making is an egalitarian process. Hulaliu fishers
feel more dominated by the elite.
Hulaliu is the village where fishers also feel that issues are not openly discussed in the village
(Table 16.25). The open discussion of village issues is correlated with the role of fishers in
management (Pearson’s correlation, p<0.01). Apparently, there is a serious lack of transparency,
which has increased over the years, because Hulaliu fishers scored high for the role of fishers
in management 15 years ago.
Rule benders are more positive about their role in management.  In Nolloth, it was asked if
they could seek a dispensation to fish in the sasi area. The pragmatic sasi fishers in Nolloth
feel that they could do so and also feel that they have a bigger role in management. In
Hutumuri, fishers have the opposite opinion. They strongly object to bending the rules,
probably because they feel threatened by rule breakers who exploit their resources. Essentially,
Hutumuri fishers want strictly enforced rules and good compliance. However, the village
government is weak and unresponsive to demands from fishers to develop rules, so the fishers
feel powerless in management.
Nolloth has the highest score for the present condition. Haruku fishers had a low score in the
past, but are positive for the future. Nolloth fishers are also positive about the involvement of
fishers in the future. The expected increase in Haruku and Nolloth is significantly higher
than that of Hulaliu. It is possible that the negative prospects of Hulaliu fishers are linked to
the ongoing process of revitalization of sasi from which fishers feel largely excluded, and
which, it is feared, will seriously affect the access of fishers to certain fishing grounds.
Table 16.11. Differences among six villages in performance indicator “Role of fishers in management”
as determined by ANOVA.  Duncan’s test indicates ranking of the six villages (average descending
from left to right).  Lines connect villages that are not significantly different from one another.
Hl=Hulaliu, Ht=Hutumuri, Tu=Tuhaha, Se=Seri, Ha=Haruku, No=Nolloth.
Role of fishers Average for the Anova F Probability Duncan’spost-hoc test
in management six villages
Change over past 15 years -0.08 3.369 0.006 Hl  Ht  Tu  Se  Ha  No
Expected change (Prob.) -0.22 3.990 0.002 Hl  Tu  Se  Ht  No  Ha
Past condition 6.44 1.853 0.105 Ha  Ht  No  Se  Tu  Hl
Present condition 6.35 6.215 <0.001 Ht  Hl  Ha  Tu  Se  No
Future condition 6.13 5.213 <0.001 Hl  Ht  Tu  Se  Ha  NoComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        223
Access to marine resources
As was true for the larger sample of 28 villages (Chapter 8), the changes in the degree of access
through time are negative (Table 16.13), and not significantly different from village to village.
However, the scores of the individual villages for the degree of access in the past, present and
future are significantly different (Table 16.13). In the past, Hutumuri and Seri had a high level
of access to resources (open-access regime), while Hulaliu had the most restricted access followed
by Tuhaha and Nolloth. At that time, all these villages had sasi. These three villages still perceive
a low degree of access in comparison with Seri and Hutumuri. In Hulaliu and Tuhaha, there is
no sasi, but access is limited for certain parts of the sea that are rented out. In the future, fishers
in both Tuhaha and Hulaliu expect restricted access to resources and this coincides with the
plans to revitalize sasi, which will include new access rules.
A relatively positive perception of access is correlated with having an external income and being
in a village that does not have much communal fishing activity (as in Seri and Hutumuri).  Fishers
who think their access is relatively greater also tend to have a rigid belief that rules should not be
bent, as is commonly felt in Hutumuri.  They also share a perception that village decision-making
is dominated by leaders, as is the case in Haruku. Fishers with more access to resources also tend
to have the feeling that decision-making does not necessarily need to be inclusive of all stakeholders
(Table 16.12).  Fishers holding this opinion were found in Seri, Hutumuri, Haruku and Tuhaha.
Having more expensive gears is, interestingly, not positively correlated with perceived access.
The difference in current condition between Nolloth and Haruku, both sasi villages, is revealing.
In Nolloth, where the rights to harvest are auctioned out, sasi is apparently perceived as a restriction.
In Haruku, on the other hand, fishers do not see sasi as a major restriction, because they get to
harvest directly.  The harvest is communal and distributed amongst all villagers but this dilution
of their access is not resented.  In Seri and Hutumuri, access is also perceived to be relatively high.
This conforms to the reality; there are few or no regulations in practice that limit access.
Table 16.12. Pearson’s correlation coefficient for correlations between contextual variables and fishers’
attitudes or performance indicators.  Statistically significant correlations are marked by  *=p<0.05;
**=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.
Equity Indicators Member Positive Village has Villagers Acceptable Elitist
(change over past 15 years) of fisher opinion  communal  want to bend decision-
group of sasi  fishing fisheries the rules  making style
rules in village
 changed
Role of fishers in management -.001 +.015 +.138 -.243** +293** -.169*
Access to marine resources +.033 +.005 -.153* +.064 -.194** .203**
Fair distribution of fishing gears +.094 -.139 +.287** -.181* +.151* -.235**
Economic equality among villagers +.156*  -.221** -.182 -.036 +.068 -.185*
Equity Indicators Villagers Job Villagers Villagers % income Villagers
want satis- willing to own  from  have
stakeholder faction change expensive fishing  external
 involvement is high  jobs gears income
in decision-
making
Role of fishers in management +.087 +.144 -.168* +.161* +.065 -.023
Access to marine resources -.153* +.059 +.069 -.064 -.009 +.190*
Fair distribution of fishing gears +.050 +.270** -.140 +.327** -.042 -.322**
Economic equality among villagers -.025 +.119 -.101 +.158* -.016 -.010224        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Distribution of fishing gears
The perceptions about the distribution of fishing gears through time are positive and not
significantly different between the six villages (Table 16.14).  This is the same result as was seen in
the analysis of the larger database of 28 villages. The perception of the distribution of gears is
more positive in fishers having higher job satisfaction, relatively expensive gear types, and who
are happy with the fisheries rules (Table 16.12). It is also more positive in villages with communal
fishing activities. The perception is more negative where fishers have an external income.  Fishers
who are in favor of bending rules have a more positive perception of the equity in the distribution
of gears as do fishers who say that in their village, decision-making is by the majority.
Currently, the distribution is significantly fairer in Seri than in the other villages and they
expect it to be even more so in the future.  In this village, there has been a recent rapid expansion
of the lift net and seiner baitfishery and associated infrastructure. Larger numbers of modern
Table 16.13. Significant differences among villages in perception of access to marine resources as
determined by ANOVA.  Duncan’s test indicates ranking of the six villages (average descending from
left to right).  Lines connect villages that are not significantly different from one another.  Hl=Hulaliu,
Ht=Hutumuri, Tu=Tuhaha, Se=Seri, Ha=Haruku, No=Nolloth.
Access Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -1.34 0.921 0.469 Tu  No  Se  Ha  Hl  Ht
Expected change -1.00 1.201 0.311 Tu  Se  Hl  Ht  No  Ha
Past condition 8.50 4.496 0.001 Hl  Tu  No  Ha  Se  Ht
Present condition 7.16 6.528 <0.001 Tu  Hl  No  Ha  Se  Ht
Future condition 6.16 3.807 0.003 Tu  Hl  No  Se  Ha  Ht
Table 16.14. Differences among villages in perception of fairness of distribution of fishing gears, as
determined by ANOVA.  Duncan’s test indicates ranking of the six villages (average descending from
left to right).  Lines connect villages that are not significantly different from one another.  Hl=Hulaliu,
Ht=Hutumuri, Tu=Tuhaha, Se=Seri, Ha=Haruku, No=Nolloth.
Distribution of gears Average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years 2.08 0.860 0.509 No  Ht  Ha  Tu  Hl  Se
Expected change 0.63 0.922 0.468 Ha  No  Tu  Hl  Se  Ht
Past condition 5.37 0.937 0.459 Hl  Tu  Ha  Ht  Se  No
Present condition 7.45 3.499 0.005 Ha  Ht  Tu  Hl  No  Se
Future condition 8.08 2.493 0.033 Ha  Tu  Hl  Ht  No  SeComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        225
gears, increased fishing efforts, and general improvement of people’s income were reported
by fishers. Seri fishers also have highest scores both for current income and degree of family
well-being (Tables 16.21 and 16.23).
Economic equality
Disparities in income are not significantly different between the villages except for future
expectations and future conditions (Table 16.15).  As with the larger sample of 28 villages,
there is no consistent relationship with sasi status. A perception of equality is higher amongst
fishers who are members of a fishers’ group (i.e., mostly IDT or KEP groups), fishers who
have more expensive gear types, fishers who do not think sasi is important (mostly young
fishers in Seri and Hutumuri), and fishers who believe that decision-making in their village is
a process of majority or total agreement (Table 16.12). Village to village differences on opinion
of sasi can be found in Figure 16.1.
Expected change is towards more equality in Hutumuri and Seri. In contrast, Tuhaha and Haruku
expect decline. Currently, fishers in Haruku perceive the greatest disparity.  Haruku has few
fishers organized into groups and they do not own expensive gears (i.e., lift nets or FADs).
16.6.2 Efficiency
Communal decision-making
Compared to 15 years ago, partnership in fisheries rule design has decreased in Nolloth and
Hulaliu; it remained static everywhere else (Table 16.16). As with the larger performance
analysis, there is no clear division between the sasi and non-sasi villages.  A higher level of
communal decision-making is correlated with a high economic score, more expensive gear
types and satisfaction with fishing rules as they are. The perception that decision-making is
by elites is held more strongly by those experiencing a low level of communal decision-making
(Table 16.17).
Table 16.15. Differences among villages in terms of perception of economic equality among villagers, as
determined by ANOVA.  Duncan’s test indicates ranking of the six villages (average descending from
left to right).  Lines connect villages that are not significantly different from one another.  Hl=Hulaliu,
Ht=Hutumuri, Tu=Tuhaha, Se=Seri, Ha=Haruku, No=Nolloth.
Economic equality Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -0.01 1.763 0.123 Ha  No  Tu  Ht  Hl  Se
Expected change -0.28 2.642 0.026 Tu  Ha  No  Hl  Se  Ht
Past condition 6.59 1.625 0.156 Hu  Ht  Se  Tu  No  Ha
Present condition 6.57 1.624 0.156 Ha  Tu  Ht  Hu  No  Se
Future condition 6.29 2.611 0.026 Ha  Tu  No  Hl  Ht   Se226        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Since Hutumuri has the highest economic score and the largest level of ownership of expensive
gears, this may help explain their high score relative to the other villages. Hulaliu fishers are
particularly dissatisfied with fishing rules and this appears to influence their perception on
decision-making. The significant decrease Hulaliu fishers experienced may also be related to
the decline of sasi and the implementation of the new village structure and elected leaders.
Hutumuri fishers also believe that decision-making in their village is by majority or total
agreement.  On the other hand, Hulaliu fishers think that decision-making is dominated by
the elite. The only explanation for the relatively high score in Haruku is that it is a sasi village;
none of the other factors can explain their positive perception!  Hulaliu and Nolloth scored
highest in the past. Currently, the situation in all villages is not significantly different and
neither are future expectations.
Ease of entry
There are no significant differences between the villages in the ease of entry into the fishery.
All fishers perceive that fishing is getting more difficult to get into because of rising costs e.g.,
taxes, the need for better and more expensive gears, higher fuel costs related to the longer
distances to good fishing-grounds, etc. This is consistent with the analysis performed on 28
villages.  Fishers who are members of village development groups perceive more negative
changes in the ease of entry, perhaps because they are older. Muslim fishers perceive entry
into the fishery to be particularly difficult, whereas fishers with an external income perceive
it to be less difficult (Table 16.17). A positive perception is correlated with a desire to change
fisheries rules. The fishers who find it harder to enter (or stay in) the fishery are those who
are less willing to bend the rules. Fishers who see entry into the fishery as being relatively
easy also think that decision-making is elitist.
Table 16.16.  Perceived differences among villages in terms of ability in collective decision-making,
as determined by ANOVA.  Duncan’s test indicates ranking of the six villages (average descending
from left to right).  Lines connect villages that are not significantly different from one another.
Hl=Hulaliu, Ht=Hutumuri, Tu=Tuhaha, Se=Seri, Ha=Haruku, No=Nolloth.
Decision-making Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years - 0.41 2.987 0.013 Hl  No  Se  Tu  Ha  Ht
Expected change -0.32 2.148 0.062 Hl  No  Se  Tu  Ha  Ht
Past condition 6.99 3.762 0.003 Ht  Ha  Se  Tu  No  Hl
Present condition 6.58 0.985 0.428 Hl  Ht  Se  Ha  No  Tu
Future condition 6.26 1.463 0.204 Hl  No  Se  Ht  Tu  HaComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        227
Currently, Hulaliu fishers perceive costs to be highest and Nolloth fishers, the lowest (Table
16.18). Nolloth fishers are generally happy with their fishery rules compared to Hulaliu fishers.
Control over the fishery
Control of fishers over access to the fishery compared to 15 years ago increased significantly
in Nolloth and Haruku, whilst in other villages it remained static (Table 16.19). In the past,
the degree of control over the fishery was comparable for all villages. In Haruku and Nolloth,
where fishers felt the increase in the control over resources, the kewang is controlling the
resource.  There was no significant difference amongst the villages.
Perceptions on control over access were related to gear type in that fishers with more expensive
gears were more positive (Table 16.17). Fishers in villages having communal fishing activities
are also more positive, whereas fishers seeking change in fisheries rules have more negative
Table 16.17.  continued
Efficiency Indicators Elitist decision- Villagers want Economic Villagers Villagers
making style stakeholder  score own more  have
in village  involvement in expensive external
decision-making gear  type income
Communal decision-making -.182* +.012 +.210** +.194** +.035
Ease of entry into the fishery +.312** -.034 -.096 -.127 +.190*
Control over access to fishery -.183* +.171* +.068 +.151* -.099
Compliance with fishery rules +.154* -.294** -.055 +.010 +.029
Table 16.17.  Coefficients for correlations between contextual attributes, fishers’ attitudes and performance
indicators for efficiency.  Significant correlations indicated with asterisks.
Efficiency Indicators Member Religion Village has Villagers Acceptable Acceptable
of village communal want  to bend to sell
 dev’t group   fishing   fisheries  rules  harvest
 rules  rights
changed
Communal decision-making +.096 -.067 -.038 -.152* +.070 +.087
Ease of entry into the fishery -.200** .153* -.027 +.302** -.325** +.120
Control over access to fishery +.108 .+027 +.197** -.330** +.401** -.026
Compliance with rules +.095 +.091 -.029 +.199** -.001 +.231**
Table 16.18.  Inter-village differences in perception of ease of entry into the fishery (i.e., negative change
indicates increased costs and more difficult entry).
Ease of entry Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -1.14 1.130 0.346 Ht  Hl  Se  Ha  Tu  No
Expected change -1.69 0.860 0.510 Se  Hl  Ha  Ht  No  Tu
Past condition 8.35 0.899 0.483 Hl  Se  No  Tu  Ht  Ha
Present condition 6.66 1.813 1.113 Hl  Ht  Se  Tu  Ha  No
Future condition 5.52 1.359 0.242 Se  Hl  Ht  Tu  Ha  No228        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
perceptions of control. Fishers who perceived the most negative change in the level of control
were those most adamant about not bending rules, those who felt that decision-making was
by the majority and those who wanted inclusive decision-making.
The current situation in Hutumuri is significantly different from Haruku and Seri where fishers
feel there is control over the fishery, i.e., rules and regulations. However, in Seri there is no
enforcement agent, making these replies curious. The sasi villages and Seri are most optimistic
about the future and perceive an increase in control over the fishery by the government. In
Haruku, fishers talked about the strong role of the kewang that enforces the rules, while in
Seri, fishers referred to the village government. Fishers in the other villages, and especially in
Hutumuri, complained about the village government and lack of both regulations and
enforcers. In our eyes, an open-access system may seem favorable for the individual fishers,
but apparently, the fishers think government control is important for the protection of the
resources against outsiders1.
In the future, Hulaliu fishers expect to lose control over access to resources. Apparently, fishers
have little faith in the planned re-installation of sasi. This future expectation differs significantly
from that of Seri, Nolloth and Haruku fishers who are relatively positive about the degree of
control over the fishery. The fishers seem to relate their degree of control directly to the ability
of the village government or kewang to enforce the regulations. In other words, the fishers feel
that these institutions represent their interests. The finding of greater perceived control in the
two sasi villages mirrors the result of the performance analysis performed in 28 villages.
Compliance
Compared to the past, Hulaliu, Tuhaha, Hutumuri and Haruku all perceive reductions in
compliance, while Nolloth and Seri perceived compliance to be stable (Table 16.20). Perception
1 According to Hardin (1968), on the short-term, fishers would have a natural preference for open access because
it allows them to obtain maximum benefits from the resource. To avoid the tragedy of the commons, state or
government, interference (i.e., rules, regulations and enforcement) is necessary to safeguard long-term benefits.
Strikingly, in Maluku, open access is not valued by the fisher population and merely rated as a sign of a weak
government which is unable to protect the resources against either over-exploitation, destruction, or outside
fishers.
Table 16.19. Village to village differences in perception of control over marine resources.
Control over fishery Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years 0.53 1.876 0.101 Ht  Hl  Tu  Se  No  Ha
Expected change -0.03 2.878 0.016 Hl  Tu  Ht  Ha  Se  No
Past condition 6.46 0.364 0.873 No  Ha  Tu  Se  Hl  Ht
Present condition 6.99 2.361 0.042 Ht Tu  Hu  No  Ha  Se
Future condition 6.96 3.479 0.005 Hl  Tu  Ht  Ha  No  SeComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        229
on the change in compliance was related to a fisher’s desire to change rules (Table 16.17).
Oddly, fishers who perceived the change in compliance to be least negative were those who
wanted the rules to change. Another factor was the attitude towards the sale of harvest rights.
Fishers with a negative perception of the change in compliance were those who most strongly
disagreed with the sale of harvest rights to outsiders. Fishers recording the greatest reduction
in compliance also tended to see decision-making as being by consensus or the majority, and
also believed that all stakeholders should be involved in decision-making.
Over 40% of both Nolloth and Seri fishers favor selling harvest rights, while in Hulaliu 90%
are against it. There is no apparent difference in the decision-making process that could explain
their high scores, neither is there a difference amongst the villages in terms of the desirability
of involvement in decision-making of all stakeholders. We are left with the fact that, in Nolloth,
the key factor could be sasi.  This conclusion is supported by the finding of greater compliance
in sasi villages in the 28 village survey results.
In the past, compliance was highest in Hutumuri, Tuhaha, and Hulaliu (score >8), which are
the villages where it has reduced most. The greatest reductions are in the villages where sasi
was lost, i.e., Hulaliu and Tuhaha. In Hulaliu, compliance is also low because people neglect
the regulations on blast fishing to express their dissatisfaction with the current village head.
In Tuhaha, economic pressure or the lack of enforcement, or both, caused compliance to decline.
In Nolloth and Seri, where compliance is stable, the situation is different. Seri fishers explained that
Seri has tighter rules, sanctions and control and the government plays an active role. In Nolloth,
compliance was lower during the time of the former village head who is said to have used sasi for his
personal benefits. But now with the new village head, the sanctions are severe and enforcement strict.
In Haruku, the current decline in compliance is influenced by conflicts between the village
head and the kewang. Here also, the fishers who are against the current village head purposely
neglect the rules. In the future, all villages expect compliance to decline, but Haruku, Nolloth
and Seri fishers expect the least decline. In the sasi villages, an incentive for compliance is
adat and enforcement.  In Seri, the relative wealth could play a role.
Table 16.20.  Differences in perception of compliance to fisheries rules.
Compliance Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -0.96 7.283 <0.001 Hl  Tu  Ht  Ha  No  Se
Expected change -0.89 3.437 0.005 Tu  Ht  Hl  Ha  No  Se
Past condition 7.70 3.097 0.011 Se  No  Ha  Hu  Tu  Ht
Present condition 6.75 6.329 <0.001 Hl  Tu  Ht  Ha  No  Se
Future condition 5.86 6.472 <0.001 Hl  Tu  Ht  Ha  No  Se230        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
All in all, the sasi villages (scoring 6-7 in the past) have remained most stable. In the future,
all villages expect reduced compliance, but the villages that scored highest (Tuhaha, Hutumuri
and Hulaliu) now score lowest and expect a further decrease in compliance. Nolloth, Seri
and, to a lesser extent, Haruku fishers are most positive. Compliance, we can conclude, is
directly linked to the presence of enforcement mechanisms and the appreciation that people
have for the person in command of the village.
16.6.3 Social sustainability
Family well-being
In Hutumuri, Haruku, and Nolloth, family well-being has remained stable over the past 15
years, while in the other villages, well-being has increased (Table 16.21). As was true in the
larger database, there is no clear-cut relationship with the presence or absence of sasi. The
perception of family well-being was related to job satisfaction (Table 16.22). Fishers who were
happy with their job thought their well-being had increased. Those involved with village
development groups were also more positive. Interestingly, family well-being was not positively
correlated with ownership of a motorboat, but it was related to the possession of expensive
gears. The change in family well-being was more positive in villages which had communal
fishing activities. Fishers who were willing to bend the rules perceived a greater increase.
Tuhaha, the village where fishers perceived the largest increase in family well-being, has also
the highest score for the level of job satisfaction. Tuhaha has the largest number of fishers with
no gear at all, while those in both Seri and Hulaliu have the largest number of hand liners. Seri
and Hulaliu have the largest number of people who are members of a village organization.
Hutumuri is significantly different from Tuhaha, Seri, and Hulaliu. It should be noted that
Hutumuri had the highest score on family well-being in the past (score 7) which also makes the
decline more apparent. In Hutumuri, there is the least communal fishing activity. Contrary to
the general trend, it appears that the ownership of lift nets and other expensive gear has not
contributed to their feeling of well-being. Hutumuri fishers are most adamantly against bending
the rules, while the Hulaliu, Nolloth, and Tuhaha fishers are the most relaxed.
Table 16.21. Comparison of family well-being in case study villages.
Family well-being Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years 0.80 2.724 0.021 Ht  Ha  No  Hl  Se  Tu
Expected change 0.15 1.949 0.089 Ht  No  Se  Hl  Tu  Ha
Past condition 6.17 1.547 0.178 Tu  Ha  Hl  Se  No  Ht
Present condition 6.98 4.084 0.002 Ht  Ha  Tu  No  Hl  Se
Future condition 7.13 2.907 0.015 Ht  No  Ha  Tu  Hl  SeComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        231
Currently, Hulaliu and Seri perceive the highest level of family well-being (resp. 7.43 and
7.59) while Hutumuri and Haruku score significantly lower (score 6.20; p=<0.002). Generally,
well-being is expected to increase (in Haruku) or remain stable, but Hutumuri fishers are
most pessimistic.
Income
The changes in income over time are all significant (Table 16.23). Perception on change in income
was positively related to job satisfaction and membership in organizations (Table 16.22). Fishers
happy in their job and belonging to groups had a more positive perception. Where change in
income was more negative, fishers were more likely to be receiving external income, believed
strongly in the importance of sasi, and were less willing to bend rules. Fishers who were positive
about change in income perceived decision-making in their village to be by consensus or by
majority. They were also most likely to consider villagers as having the key responsibility in
fisheries management. This last correlation helps to explain why Seri fishers have such a positive
perception of income. Seri was the only village where more than half the fishers held this opinion,
while in Haruku, no fishers shared this view. Nolloth was one of the three villages where fishers
believed that the government held most or all management responsibility. It is difficult to imagine
why these attitudes are related to perceived income.
Seri and Hutumuri fishers were least likely to receive external income. However, In terms of the amount
of external income received per year, the two villages were on an average higher. Hutumuri fishers, as
we know, are the least willing to bend the rules, but again, the relationship to income is obscure.
Table 16.22. continued
Social sustainability Community Positive Village Villagers Member of Age Education
 has  opinion has want village
 management  of sasi communal fisheries organization
 responsibility fishing rules
  changed
Tradition of collective -.032 +.155* +.049 -.177* -.047 .072 -.075
action
Family well-being -.081 +.039 +.252** -.082 +.219** .018 -.018
Income .206** -.187* +.123 -.059 +.175* -.116 .108
Comm’ty harmony -.137 +.157* -.058 +.060 -.078 -.117 .173*
Discussion of village -.008 +.163* +.085 -.198** +.061 .164* -.112
Table 16.22.  Factors correlated with social sustainability indicators. Significant correlations indicated
with asterisks.
Social sustainability Villagers Villagers Villagers Years High job Acceptable  Elitist
have boats own more have  fishing  satisfaction to bend decision-
and motors expensive external  the rules  making
 gears    income  style
Tradition of collective -.011 .+029 -.008 +062 +.230** +.082 .002
 action
Family well-being -.183* +.163* -.039 -.067 +.183* +.288** -.103
Income -.111 +.043 -.177* -.143 +.180* +.162* -.184*
Community harmony -.038 -.041 +.026 -.053 -.063 -.037 .106
Discussion of village -.034 +.168* +.029 +.184* +.090 +.095 -.094
 issues232        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Compared to the past, the average income declined in Haruku and was static in Nolloth, Tuhaha,
and Hulaliu. This is not surprising regarding the fact that the sasi villages did have a relatively
high score in the past (7.2). In Hutumuri and Seri, where fishers noted an increase in income,
the past score was lowest (5.6). The largest significant difference in changes in income is between
the sasi villages and Seri. The difference with Hutumuri, Hulaliu, and Tuhaha is, although smaller,
still significant. The decrease in the sasi villages also noted in the larger performance study
(Chapter 8), may also be related to the collapse in clove prices or the fishers’ ages.
At the moment, Seri fishers perceive the highest income (7.7) and, together with Hutumuri,
they expect a further increase in the future. The sasi villages, together with Tuhaha and Hulaliu,
are more negative about the future and expect no increase in income.
Tradition of collective action
All villages had a relatively high score for communal activities in the past (Table 16.24), and
all villages, except Nolloth, perceived a decline. The difference between the villages is not
significant. Change in the tradition of collective action was related to job satisfaction and
opinion of sasi, in that fishers who were happy in their work and those who believed that sasi
was important, had a more positive outlook (Table 16.22). This last correlation helps explain
why the difference between sasi and non-sasi villages is significant in the larger (28 villages)
performance study. Fishers who want a change in fisheries rules were the most negative
regarding collective action.
With respect to the current level of communal activities Nolloth fishers score significantly higher
(Duncan’s test, p=<0.020) than those of Haruku, Hutumuri, and Seri and this trend is prolonged
in the future. Haruku scores lowest (6.30), which reflects the political stress in the village. Financial
interests, leadership, and loss of customs were mentioned as the main causes for decline.
Table 16.23.  Perceived differences in income in six villages.
Income Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years 0.37 6.761 <0.001 Ha  No  Tu  Hl  Ht  Se
Expected change 0.12 4.293 0.001 Tu  No  Ha  Hl  Ht  Se
Past condition 6.36 4.548 0.001 No  Ha Tu  Hl  Se  Hu
Present condition 6.73 5.806 <0.001 Ha  No  Hl  Ht  Tu  Se
Future condition 6.85 6.233 <0.001 Ha  No  Tu  Hl  Ht  SeComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        233
All the villages, except Nolloth, expect a further decline. Seri fishers are significantly more negative
(Duncan’s test, p=<0.013) than Nolloth and Hulaliu fishers. The fishers noted modernization,
individualism and competition as the main causes for the decline in communal action.
Discussion of village issues
Older fishers and fishers with longer experience in the fishery, and fishers who thought sasi
was important, had a less negative perception of change (Table 16.22).  Perceptions were also
more positive when fishers had more expensive gears. Fishers wanting changes to fisheries
rules had a more negative perception. Compared to the past, Nolloth and Hutumuri fishers
noted no change in the discussion of village issues but all the other villages noted a decline,
especially in Hulaliu (Table 16.25).
At the moment, Hulaliu and Haruku have the lowest score on discussion of village issues;
Nolloth has the highest score. In Nolloth, most traditional structures are in practice through
which the common villagers are represented and village issues discussed. Nolloth fishers are
also happy with sasi and the existing rules, and they are older. Nolloth is politically the most
stable village of the six. This allows the village leader to be more transparent compared to, for
example, Hulaliu, where the village leader and his government have to operate carefully in
order not to provoke the opposite parties in the village. This is also the case in Haruku. The
only correlation from Table 16.22 that helps to explain the relatively negative perceptions of
Hulaliu fishers, is that the Hulaliu fishers particularly want to change their fisheries rules.
Together with Nolloth and Hutumuri, Haruku fishers are optimistic about the future and they
expect an improvement of open discussion in the village, which indicates that they perceive
their political problems to be temporary. In all other villages, fishers expect a further decline.
These results support the general conclusions of the larger performance analysis, i.e., that sasi
villages have greater levels of discussion, at least in the absence of severe political stress.
Village harmony
All villages have a negative change in village harmony, except for Nolloth where it is stable
(Table 16.26). The greatest decrease (most conflicts) is in Seri. The differences between the
villages are significant in the Duncan’s test, but not in the Anova. A negative perception of
Table 16.24. Differences in tradition of collective action in case study villages.
Collective action Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -1.56 0.992 0.424 Se  Ha  Hl  Ht  Tu  No
Expected change -0.96 1.671 0.144 Se  Ht  Tu  Ha  Hl  No
Past condition 8.38 1.238 0.293 Ht  Ha  Tu  No  Se  Hl
Present condition 6.82 2.756 0.020 Ha  Ht  Se  Tu  Hl  No
Future condition 5.86 2.981 0.013 Se  Ht  Ha  Tu  Hl  No234        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
change in harmony is related to a low level of formal education (Table 16.22). Education,
however, does not explain the inter-village differences. Fishers who believe sasi is important
are more positive about the change in community harmony. The main difference between
Seri and Nolloth is in their opinion on sasi and, of course, in the very existence of the sasi
institution. These results support the conclusion of the larger performance analysis, that
harmony is greater in sasi villages.
Currently, Seri has the highest occurrence of conflicts and Nolloth the least. The present
occurrence of conflicts in Hulaliu and Haruku is linked to political instability and the
legitimacy of authority. In Seri, the drinking habits of the younger generation were mentioned
as the main cause for conflicts. In Haruku, and especially in Seri and Hutumuri, nearly all
respondents made comments on alcohol abuse. In the other villages, this was less of a problem
and in Nolloth, it was hardly ever mentioned. Nolloth fishers are also most positive about the
future. They expect no changes, while all other villages expect a further decline.
Table 16.26. Differences among villages in terms of harmony.
Village harmony Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -2.19 1.580 0.168 Se  Tu  Ha  Ht  Hl  No
Expected change -1.06 1.321 0.257 Tu  Se  Ht  Ha  Hl  No
Past condition 7.88 1.085 0.370 No  Hl  Ht  Se  Ha  Tu
Present condition 5.69 1.665 0.145 Se  Hl  Ht  Ha  Tu  No
Future condition 4.63 1.720 0.132 Se  Tu  Ht  Ha  Hl  No
Table 16.25.  Differences among villages in terms of discussion of village issues.
Discussion village issues Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -1.04 6.869 <0.001 Hl  Ha  Se  Tu  Ht  No
Expected change -0.50 4.611 0.001 Hl  Tu  Se  Ht  No  Ha
Past condition 7.95 2.021 0.078 No  Tu  Ht  Ha  Hl  Se
Present condition 6.91 6.133 <0.001 Hl  Ha  Tu  Se  Ht  No
Future condition 6.40 6.660 <0.001 Hl  Tu  Se  Ha  Ht NoComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        235
16.6.4 Biological  Sustainability
Marine resource health
In all villages, a significant (paired t-test, p=<0.001) decline in the state of the resource was
noted (Table 16.27). However, Seri was least affected by the decline and here fishers perceive a
higher score for the state of the resource than all other villages (Duncan’s test, p=<0.001). Fishers
willing to change their job, and those who want to change fisheries rules perceive the decline to
be less serious than other fishers.  A perception of more serious decline was expressed by fishers
who did not think inclusiveness an important feature of decision-making (Table 16.28).
Seri fishers are the most likely to change their job and they are among the three villages with
the highest tendency to change rules. They also have a less rosy picture of the state of resources
in early days, possibly because they were significantly younger (ANOVA, p=<0.05) and less
experienced.
Opposite to this are the Hutumuri fishers who perceive the state of the resource as significantly
worse than the fishers in Seri. In this village, fishers complain of pollution from nearby factories
and intense exploitation by lift net operators. They are also significantly more pessimistic
about the future whereas the Seri fishers are the most optimistic. Apparently, the high economic
score of Hutumuri does not influence the fishers’ perception on the state of the resource.
Table 16.28. Factors significantly correlated with indicators of biological sustainability.  Significant
correlations are indicated by asterisks.
Biological Villagers Elitist Villagers Villagers
sustainability willing to decision-making want want
(change over past 15 years) change job style invillage involvement of fisheries
 stakeholders in  rules changed
 decision-making
Resource health +.178* +.069 -.152* +.205**
Fish catch +.103 +.185* -.103 +.298**
Table 16.27. Inter-village differences in perception of the health of the marine environment.
Resource health Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over the past 15 years -3.20 6.195 <0.001 Ht  Hl  No  Tu  Ha  Se
Expected change -1.84 1.154 0.334 Ht  Hl  Tu  No  Se  Ha
Past condition 8.88 1.627 0.155 Se  Ha  Ht  No  Hu  Tu
Present condition 5.69 5.290 <0.001 Ht  Hl  No  Ha  Tu  Se
Future condition 3.85 4.813 <0.001 Ht  Hl  No  Tu  Ha  Se236        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
As was seen in the larger performance analysis (Chapter 8), there is a correlation between
perceived biological sustainability in the larger fishery and the existence of a sasi institution.
However, this correlation may be indirect, i.e., the result of the relatively greater experience
and age of the sasi fishers.
Fish catches
All villages perceived reduced fish catches compared to 15 years ago (Table 16.29). Again,
Seri fishers perceived significantly less decline than Tuhaha, Hulaliu, Hutumuri and Nolloth
fishers. The fishers who are willing to change jobs, who want to change fisheries rules, and
who think decision-making is elitist in their villages perceive conditions to be relatively better.
Seri fishers are relatively less pessimistic as they have significantly higher current catches
than in most other villages.
As with the current perceived state of the resource, the explanation for the perception of Seri
fishers is probably the age of the respondents. Older fishers can remember the days of
abundance before the appearance of modern gears and intensification of the fishery. Also, it
may be related to Seri’s situation beside an upwelling area that is rich in nutrients and fish.
Hutumuri’s waters, by contrast, are polluted and over-fished.
In all villages, significant future decline is expected. Tuhaha fishers, however, are most negative
about the future (but had a high score of 9.13 in the past), followed by Hutumuri and Nolloth.
Seri fishers are least pessimistic about the future.
16.7 Village Summaries
16.7.1 Villages with sasi
Nolloth is the village with the strongest sasi system. Sasi is strong and commercially-oriented,
and vigorously enforced to generate income for the village government. In Nolloth, the village
institutions which are important with regard to sasi or resource management in general, are
present and functional, i.e., the government (including traditional leaders), kewang, church and
KUD. Adat structures have melted into the new village structure, and Nolloth is the one village
Table 16.29. Differences among villages in perception of fish catches.
Fish catches Overall average Anova F Prob. Duncan’s post-hoc test
Change over past 15 years -2.80 2.643 0.025 No  Ht  Hl  Tu  Ha  Se
Expected change -1.74 2.397 0.041 Tu  Ht  No  Ha  Hl  Se
Past condition 8.68 0.633 0.675 Se  Ha  Ht  Hl  No  Tu
Present condition 5.88 3.101 0.001 No  Ht  Hl  Ha  Tu  Se
Future condition 4.15 4.395 0.010 Ht  No  Tu  Hl  Ha  SeComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        237
that has been politically stable over time. Common villagers feel part of the system and perceive
the centralized management as representing their interests. Although economically the situation
is rather bleak compared to most villages – people have to work long hours and fish catches are
declining – there is little intrusion in the sasi area and compliance with regulations is high.
Nolloth still has resources under sasi which are fished elsewhere, i.e., top shells (Trochus niloticus)
and sea cucumbers. Performance indicators on which Nolloth scores high in terms of equity
and efficiency are the role of fishers in management, control over the fishery and compliance.
Scores on social sustainability are high for collective action, discussion of village issues and
village harmony. Although Nolloth fishers perceive serious restrictions in access and involvement
in decision-making, they perceive the management system to be legitimate.
Haruku shows how sasi can evolve to be a management and conservation strategy that stimulates
social equity. The kewang plays a major role in resource management. The village government,
however, is in the process of re-organizing itself after the problematic election of the current
village leader. Fishers perceive higher access to resources than Nolloth fishers (but less than the
open-access fishery in Seri and Hutumuri) and they feel control over the resources is high. At
the moment, Haruku scores low in communal activities, discussion of village issues, communal
decision-making, and they note a decline in the role of fishers in management. Most low scores
on these social variables may be related to the political stress in the village. Haruku fishers
perceive a large decline in income, while family well-being has also decreased compared to the
past. Even though sasi has a redistributive character, economic equality in the village scores
low. Most other scores are average. The fact that, for many indicators, Haruku fishers are positive
about the future (e.g., discussion of village issues and their involvement in fisheries management
and partnership), indicates that most of the low scores are more likely to be related to political
instability than with the general village structure and/or the presence of sasi.
16.7.2 Villages that are in the process of revitalizing sasi
Tuhaha is a village that is going through a period of political confusion. Adat leaders are trying
to establish a position in the village government while trying to re-institutionalize their
traditional authority. Through the revitalization of sasi, the village leader tries to secure a
functional village government and generate revenues for the village. Possibly related to the
change from open-access resources to government property rights and the general political
instability, Tuhaha scores low on all equity indicators and compliance. Their future prospects
are also rather negative. Fishers are very negative about their income. The economic score of
Tuhaha is medium, but Tuhaha is highly dependent on fishing, and the generally older fishers
we interviewed spent long hours at sea while the state of the resource and fish catches have
declined. On most indicators for social sustainability, scores are average compared to the other
villages, but all are declining except for family well-being which has increased strongly over
the years. However, compared to the other villages, the current score is likewise medium. The
relation between the fishers and the village government seems distant: fishers perceive
partnership to be low as well as their role in management. Future prospects are generally
negative. The re-establishment of sasi may have positive impacts, but currently, perhaps because
most fishers are not aware of or included in the process of revitalization, expectations are low.
Hulaliu is politically in the same position as Haruku, i.e., politically divided. The village,
however, is also in the process of revitalizing sasi. Hulaliu has an average economic score, while
housing is good. The score of fishers for current well-being is highest (together with Seri), while
their income has remained the same. Fishing is not that important in providing income, as
people are farming-oriented and fishers spend less than six hours at sea each day. A large part
of the catch is consumed and not sold. Indicators for social sustainability score rather low. It is238        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
interesting to see the government’s approach towards revitalization. Discussion of village issues,
and the role of fishers in management currently score lowest of all villages. Fishers feel excluded
from decision-making. Although more than 90% of the fishers feel that sasi is important, they
expect a severe decline in access to resources. Together with the fact that the fishers interviewed
preferred a communal harvest of sasi products over an auctioned one, it is not surprising that
compliance, which is already very low, will decrease further in the future.
16.7.3 Villages with no sasi
The Hutumuri fishery is not regulated. Respect from the people for the village government in
Hutumuri is low. Even though Hutumuri fishers have the highest level of education, the
highest economic score, an average dependence on fishing and relatively short hours at sea,
their perceptions are relatively negative and for many other indicators, they gave a low (or
lowest) score. The fishers’ assessment of the natural resources (state of resource and fish
catches) is very negative and they expect further decrease in the future. Their family well-
being score went from the highest to the lowest score. Their income, however, has not
drastically declined and it is expected that this has to do with the fact that the fishery is an
open-access system and control over the resources by the government is minimal. Large
numbers of lift nets block the entrance to Baguala Bay and factories pollute the near shore
waters. The lack of a management structure or strong government causes the fishers to feel
powerless. Although there are few conflicts in the village and generally, scores for communal
decision-making and discussion of village issues are good, it seems that aversion towards the
village government causes negative assessments. Significant declines in the role of fishers in
management, communal decision-making, and compliance underline this idea.
Seri is also an open-access regime and, in many respects, comparable to Hutumuri. Their
assessment, in general, for most performance indicators is positive. Seri fishers have a high
economic score, the highest income and their family well-being and future prospects are bright.
They rate, for example, the state of the resource and fish catches as least in decline. The reason,
however, is that respondents are relatively young and have the least numbers of years’
experience in fishing. Also, these fishers had a less rosy picture of the past. In contrast to all
other villages, the catches of some Seri fishers have increased, but this is a possible indicator
that many of the fishers in our sample have no gear of their own and work on lift nets or
seiners. Seri also lies close to rich fishing grounds. The fishers are also positive about the
distribution of means of production in the village and economic equality. Fishers feel that
government control is high and so is compliance. This all seems very positive. However, on
the social level, village life is deteriorating. There is a significant decline in collective action,
discussion of village issues, and the occurrence of conflicts is highest of all villages. Alcohol
abuse is a major problem. Seri, in the proximity of Ambon, has to deal with increasing
individualism, competition, and modernization, which have positive economic effects, but
also cause social decline.
16.8 Conclusions
16.8.1 Socio-economic variables having an impact on local fisheries management
The socio-economic variables that have the strongest relationship with perceptions of fisheries
management are the style of decision-making in their village and the fishers’ own desire to be
included in fisheries decision-making, the willingness of fishers to change jobs, the opinion
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the rules, and selling harvest rights.  Fishers are also influenced by the type of gears they
own, external income, and economic score (see Section 16.4.2), and whether or not they are
part of village groups and/or are involved in communal fishing.  Religious affiliation is related
to the perception of ease of entry into the fishery. Fishers who are happy in their work and
reluctant to change jobs are more positive about their role in management, gear distribution,
collective action in the village, family well-being, and income levels.
Fishers who wanted rules to change felt it was difficult to enter the fishery, and gears were
not fairly distributed.  Further, they believed that decision-making was neither inclusive nor
easy, that the tradition of collective action and discussion of village issues were fading and
that control over the fishery was not tight enough.  However, they did not perceive drastic
reductions in compliance, nor were they particularly alarmed about the decline in resource
health and fish catches.
Where control was least apparent, fishers were most adamant about not bending the rules.  In
contrast, fishers in Nolloth, for example, where control is high, felt comfortable approaching
their local sasi institution to ask for permission to bend the rules. Nolloth fishers feel that
they have a relatively greater role in fisheries management and are secure in the feeling that
this will continue into the future.  Potential rule benders felt the greatest restriction in access
to resources and most difficulty in entering the fishery but, because they often had expensive
gear types, they were content with their distribution.  Their income and family well-being
were relatively high.
The type of gears plays a role in the assessment of family well-being, economic equity, gear
distribution, and role in management. Fishers with more expensive gears are the richer and
more influential people in the village. It is natural that they feel that fishing gears are better
distributed and economic equality high. Perhaps because they tend to get their way, they see
decision-making as a relatively easy process, discussion of village issues as active and control
over the fishery to be good.  Fishers receiving external income had relatively lower total
incomes.  They perceived their access to resources as being good, and because of being largely
artisanal and not faced with licensing fees, they thought that the fishery was still relatively
easy to get into, but that the distribution of gears was unfair.
The existence of fishers’ groups has positive effects in terms of the perception of economic
equality, whereas members of community groups, who are also older fishers, perceive the
cost of fishing to have risen dramatically.  However, these fishers also have high scores for
increased family well-being and income.  Where a village has communal fishing activities,
there are more positive perceptions of the distribution of gears, control over the fishery and
family well-being.
A positive influence of the sasi institution on social sustainability is suggested by correlations
between the positive opinion of sasi, which is strongly held by sasi fishers, and positive
perceptions of economic equality, tradition of collective action, community harmony and
discussion of village issues.  Age was a factor in this in that older and more experienced
fishers had the most positive perceptions regarding discussion of village issues, and these
elderly fishers were usually from sasi villages.  In Maluku, age commands respect, so these
fishers may be relatively influential in decision-making processes in traditional communities.
Fishers find it important that the decisions in the village are made by the majority or by
consensus, that all stakeholders are represented, and that fisheries benefits are directly shared.
Where this is not the case, fishers felt less involved in management, and found the distribution240        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
of gears and economic wealth to be inequitable. These fishers had lower incomes. They also
noted the poor decision-making process and poor control over access to the fishery.  In other
words, for them, the current management system is seen to be inequitable and inefficient. In
villages where the village head makes the decisions in isolation or with a few other leaders,
this is accepted only if it is felt that the village head is representing the common good.  This is
only where a village head is strong and trustworthy, as in Nolloth.
For a management system to work, it is thus imperative that the decision-making process is
one where people feel involved and which is inclusive. Where this is not the case, for example
in Hulaliu and Tuhaha, fishers score low on their input in fisheries management, as well as
control over the fishery, compliance, and communal decision-making. In these villages, which
are both in the process of revitalizing sasi, the village government lacks full legitimacy and
there is resistance to the idea of using sasi to collect government revenue.
16.8.2 Positive and negative aspects of sasi
Sasi is positively correlated with the number and type of local fisheries-related rules in practice,
and other management-related attributes such as the input of fishers in fisheries management,
control over the fishery, and compliance. The direct participation of fishers in decision-making
is low, but in both sasi villages, the village leaders are legitimately making the decisions. The
process is valued as one that is based on majority agreement, and generally, fishers who feel
that decision-making is based on consensus have more positive scores on all performance
indicators.
Where sasi benefits are generated to the village government without apparent or direct benefits
to the larger community, fishers are made to feel that they have limited access to resources.
As a result, compliance to fisheries regulations suffers.
People who appreciate sasi most are the villagers living in the sasi villages. These fishers also
felt that there was a strong tradition of collective action. In this sense, sasi is important. Several
indicators of social sustainability are highest in Nolloth, the most stable of the sasi villages.
Discussion of village issues is higher in sasi villages, and the sasi villages are relatively
harmonious, even though Haruku is under political stress.
Political instability is linked to a weaker tradition of collective action and less open discussion
of village issues. In both Haruku and Hulaliu, there is a large degree of mistrust between the
villagers and the village government. However, whereas in Hulaliu this leads to neglect of
existing fisheries rules, in Haruku the activities of the kewang temper potential offenders.
A comparison of the sasi institutions of Nolloth and Haruku shows that they are different.
Each, however, offers attributes for local resource management. In Nolloth where formal and
traditional structures collaborate closely, and where leadership is highly legitimate, there is a
stronger support base to enforce rules vigorously. Haruku demonstrates that a strong
enforcement agent can function independently from the government and still play an
important role in resource management. The Haruku sasi system also shows the appreciation
by the people for a system which is redistributive and communal.
16.8.3 Relevance of sasi in non-sasi villages
Seri and Hutumuri-Toisapu are open-access regimes with little local government control over
the fishery, which is dominated by commercial large-scale fishers. Hutumuri is an example ofComparative Analysis of Case Study Villages        241
a village where the installation of a strict resource management system has increased the
well-being of the fishers who want control and exclusive rights over their resources. The
inability of the village government to enforce the rules and lack of a local enforcement agent,
however, demands assistance from formal enforcers or the establishment of an institution
similar to the kewang. Large villages such as Seri and Hutumuri, affected by urbanization,
modernization, competition, and a large-scale fishery, demand a different management system.
Traditional sasi has little meaning for a relatively heterogeneous, young fishing population.
In such cases, fisheries management has to be executed by modern village institutions.
However, these institutions still have to be based on, or include, elements that we find are
important to the success of sasi e.g., a transparent and inclusive decision-making process,
mechanisms to change and enforce rules, direct benefits for the fisher-managers, extra income
(which could be generated by village organizations), and a stable management construction
that includes, but is not dependent on, the village government.242        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Section E  –   Resilience and Applicability of Sasi in Fisheries Management
Chapter 17
Institutional Resilience: Loss and Revival of Sasi
Sasi is an important institution in the Lease Islands in Ambon Indonesia. Even though sasi
has survived over approximately 400 years, it is in the process of dying out in various parts of
the Moluccan Province. In a number of villages on Saparua, Haruku, Nusa Laut, Seram and
to a lesser extent Ambon, sasi is still practiced. In many others, the institution is no longer
active. This chapter tries to analyze when sasi, or aspects of sasi, disappeared and what factors
cause its decline or contribute to its resilience.
17.1 Institutional Resilience Defined
According to Kloos (1981), an institution is an acknowledged set of actions with regard to an
object of social value in a particular society. The structural-functionalist theories describe a
social institution as consisting of all the structural components of a society (patterns of
behavior) through which the main concerns and activities are organized and social needs are
met (Goddijn et al. 1980; Marshall 1994). Sasi, as such, is an institution that regulates natural
resources in order to meet the needs of the local population.
Resilience is an important characteristic of a management system. “Resilience is the ability of the
system to cope with change without collapsing” or “The ability of a system to absorb perturbations
by actively adapting to an ever changing environment” (Folke and Berkes 1995). Pollnac (1994)
adds that the degree of adaptability depends on the specific circumstances of a system. The
reduction in resilience means that vulnerability increases, with the risk that the system reaches a
threshold and collapses (Folke and Berkes 1995). Change is inherent to institutions. Community
management institutions should be understood as dynamic, social interventions, shaped by local
experience and influenced by external factors (Bailey and Zerner 1992). Yet, if adaptability to
changing conditions is insufficient, institutions can break down, leaving the fishery unregulated.
In studying institutional resilience, it is important to distinguish the formal and informal constraints,
enforcement characteristics (see Section 7.4), the different levels of rules and whether they function
on the formal or informal level, and the objective or function of the management system.
17.2  Institutional Resilience Operationalized
The resilience study is based on information from the inventory, the comparative case study
including demographic information, and the contextual attributes (political, economic and socio-
cultural). Additional key informant interviews covered questions on 1) the objective of sasi, 2)
the rules and regulations, 3) the role of the village government and traditional authorities, 4)
leadership, 5) boundaries, 6) compliance and enforcement, and 7) external factors having an
impact on the management institution. Detailed information on each of these aspects is described
in the individual case studies. The data from the inventory show the process of decline while
the additional information was used to explain the mechanism behind this process.Institutional Resilience : Loss and Revival of Sasi        243
17.3  Patterns of Loss of Sasi since the 1940s
17.3.1 Loss of the entire sasi institution
Of the 63 villages studied, in 19 villages the entire sasi institution was lost (see Table 17.1).
Most losses occurred in the 1990s and on Ambon and Saparua. On Haruku Island, by contrast,
some form of sasi has survived in every village.
Losses have been steady in both Muslim and Christian villages (Table 17.2), but there is a
distinct difference when village population is considered (Class 1=≤1,000; Class 2=1,001-2,000;
Class 3=2,001-3,000; and Class 4=>3,000 people). As can be read in the table, losses have been
greatest in the Class 4 size and much less in the Class 3 size. Apparently, there is an optimum
size for villages with regard to sasi.
17.3.2 Loss of adat sasi
Where some form of sasi persists, there has often been a partial loss or a change in the type of
institution.  For instance, sasi dominated by adat leaders (adat sasi) may be transformed into a
church-dominated institution, or even privatized.  Out of 48 recorded losses of adat sasi, over
half occurred before the 1960s (Table 17.3). Losses were moderate in the 1970s and 1980s but
have become more severe in the 1990s. The differences among islands are not significant.
Recent losses, i.e., in the 1990s, of adat sasi have occurred in both Muslim and Christian villages
(Table 17.4), but concentrated in villages of Class 2 sizes (1,000-2,000) on Saparua and Haruku.
Since Law No. 5, 1979 was passed to restructure the village level administration, small villages
were given the status of a dusun (sub-village) without an independent village government to
execute sasi. This played a role in the loss of adat sasi, for instance, in Seri and Airlow.
Table 17.1. Attrition of sasi institution (i.e., total loss of all forms) on each island. Note one village in
Ambon never had sasi.
Sasi Seram Ambon Haruku Saparua Nusa Laut Total
institution (n=1) (n=11) (n=0) (n=6) (n=1) (n=19)
lost (n=19)
Lost in 1990s 5% 16% 0% 16% 5% 42%
Lost in 1980s 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 11%
Lost in 1970s 0% 16% 0% 5% 0% 21%
Lost earlier 0% 16% 0% 10% 0% 26%
Total lost 5% 58% 0% 32% 5% 100%
Table 17.2 . Attrition of entire sasi institution in villages of various sizes and religion. Note the village
that never had sasi is a village of Butonese immigrants, sizes Class 4.
Sasi Class1 Class2 Class3 Class4 Muslim Christian
institution (n=5) (n=6) (n=7) (n=8) (n=9) (n=10)
lost (n=19)
Lost in 1990s 11% 16% 5% 11% 21% 21%
Lost in 1980s 5% 5% 0% 0% 5% 5%
Lost in 1970s 5% 0% 0% 16% 5% 16%
Lost earlier 5% 5% 0% 16% 16% 11%
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The 1940-70s saw losses of adat sasi focused on large villages (Class 4) on Ambon Island.
Population statistics from that period are, unfortunately, not available but it is possible that
Ambonese villages started to reach some critical threshold of population during those decades.
Adat sasi persists mostly in intermediate-sized villages.
17.3.3 The erosion and loss of marine sasi
Active marine sasi institutions are difficult to detect. Out of 63 villages inventoried, only 17
have some form of marine sasi. Before, marine sasi was much more prevalent.  We documented
18 villages where officials described marine sasi being lost in living memory (Tables 17.5 and
17.6), meaning that at one time, at least 35 villages (i.e., 56%) had this institution.  In four
more villages (Seith, Ouw, Seri, Rutah), one or more fishers interviewed thought sasi was
either in force or had been practiced at one time.  In the other 24 villages, either marine sasi
never existed or it has been totally forgotten.
In over half the cases where marine sasi has been lost, the loss occurred prior to 1970 (Table
17.6).  Since then, marine sasi has been relatively stable compared to other forms of sasi.  Most
losses in the 1970s to 1990s have been in either the smallest (Class 1) or largest (Class 4)
villages, and in the 1990s, the only recorded loss was on Ambon Island.
17.3.4 Factors influencing activity of sasi
The level of activity of land sasi was measured using indicators for presence, closures,
consistency of application, and local effort (see Section 2.2.3).  Similarly, marine sasi was scored
using indicators for presence, closed areas, written rules, and monitoring. We assume that
less active sasi is in decline.
Table 17.3. Loss of adat sasi. Note one village in Ambon never had adat sasi.
Adat Sasi Seram Ambon Haruku Saparua Nusa Laut Total
lost (n=48) (n=5) (n=19) (n=7) (n=11) (n=6)
Lost in 1990s 2% 2% 6% 13% 0% 23%
1980s 0% 4% 3% 0% 4% 11%
1970s 0% 4% 0% 4% 2% 10%
1940-1970 or 8% 30% 6% 6% 6% 56%
uncertain
Total lost 10% 40% 15% 23% 12% 100%
Table 17.4.  Patterns of loss of adat sasi in villages of different sizes and religion. Note the one village
that never had adat sasi is in Class 4.
Adat Sasi Class 1 Class2 Class3 Class4 Muslim Christian
lost (n=48) (≤1,000) (≤1,001-2,000) (2,001-3,000) (>3,000) (n=16) (n=32)
(n=11) (n=13) (n=9) (n=15)
Lost in 1990s 2% 13% 4% 4% 8% 15%
1980s 6% 2% 2% 0% 2% 8%
1970s 4% 2% 0% 4% 2% 8%
1940-1970 or 11% 10% 13% 23% 21% 36%
uncertain
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The persistence of marine sasi is linked to the fate of land sasi, in that villages with marine sasi
usually have relatively active land sasi.  Land sasi is significantly more active in Class 3 villages
(ANOVA, p=0.01), which helps explain the resilience of marine sasi in this size class.  Where
marine sasi has been lost for some reason, the land sasi institution that is left behind is also
weak (Table 17.7).
In Maluku, fishing villages are most often overwhelmingly Christian or Muslim. The seven
villages where marine sasi was most active (score 10-12, see Table 17.8) were all homogeneous
i.e., with at least 95% of the population being of the dominant religion.  Out of 17 cases of
marine sasi, three were effectively dormant (score=3) and another three were weak (score 6-
7).  One of the cases of dormant marine sasi occurred in a relatively non-homogeneous village
and a second case was in a Christian dusun attached to a predominantly Muslim village.
Cultural homogeneity can thus be important to the resilience of this traditional institution.
Resilience of marine sasi is also linked to the interplay among governing authorities.  Sasi has
been stable in the Muslim villages where the institution is neither adat nor church (Table
17.9).  In a number of cases, sasi on marine resources was abandoned (e.g., Akoon, Ameth,
Leinitu) or weakened  (e.g., Haria, Ulath) when adat sasi was taken over by the church.
Compared to marine sasi that is of the adat or “other” type, marine sasi in villages with church
sasi is significantly less active (p<0.05).  Where adat sasi has survived, losses of marine sasi are
fewer compared to losses in villages where only church sasi remains (Table 17.9).
Table 17.7. Relation between marine sasi status and activity of land sasi. Land sasi score (average ± S.E.).
Village status Average land sasi score
Village with marine sasi 12.2 ± 1.02
Village that never had marine sasi 10.8 ± 0.73
Village where marine sasi has been lost 8.3 ± 0.87
Table 17.5. Attrition and persistence of marine sasi in relation to village size and religion.
Marine Sasi lost Class 1 Class 2 Class3 Class4 Muslim Christian Total
1990s 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
1980s 3 0 0 0 0 3 3
1970s 2 1 0 1 0 4 4
Lost earlier 2 4 1 3 3 7 10
Sub Total: lost 7 5 1 5 4 14 18
Number still 0 4 10 3 5 12 17
Existing
Never had marine 6 7 6 9 11 17 28
sasi
Total 13 16 17 17 20 43 63
Table 17.6. Attrition of marine sasi per island.
Marine Sasi Seram Ambon Haruku Saparua Nusa Laut Total
lost (n=18) (n=1) (n=6) (n=2) (n=4) (n=5)
1990s 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 6%
1980s 0% 11% 0% 0% 6% 17%
1970s 0% 5% 0% 11% 6% 21%
Earlier 6% 11% 11% 11% 17% 56%
Total lost 6% 33% 11% 22% 28% 100%246        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
17.4 Reasons for Loss of Sasi Between 1940 and 1997
During the inventory, we asked whether our informants could remember when some aspect of sasi
changed or was lost, and why this had happened. Explanations were often quite explicit and included
contextual information pertaining to the evolution of socio-political systems in Maluku (see Appendix
4 for details). The comments  (Table 17.10) came from villages where sasi was actually lost or
transformed. The numbers represent the number of comments, not the number of villages.
Weak leadership and conflicts are key elements in the erosion of sasi. In the opinion of villagers,
conflicts within the village government, between the village chief and adat authorities, among
churches, and over land, all resulted in partial or complete loss of the institution. Conflict
between adat leaders and village government leading to the erosion of sasi was reported only
in Christian villages and never on Nusa Laut.
Table 17.9. Type of sasi in villages that have or had or never had, marine sasi.
Current status Adat sasi village Church sasi village Muslim sasi village
of village (n=15) with no adat sasi (n=6)
(n=21)
Has marine sasi to date 10 (67%) 4 (19%) 3 (50%)
Lost marine sasi in living memory 2 (13%) 7 (33%) 0 (0%)
Historical occurrence of 12 (80%) 11 (52%) 3 (50%)
marine sasi (had existed)
Never had marine sasi 3 (20%) 10 (48%) 3 (50%)
Percentage of loss in relation to 17% 64% 0%
occurrence
Table 17.8. Factors related to activity of marine sasi in central Maluku. Homogeneity status: 1: 95-
100% is of dominant religion; 2: 60-80% is of dominant religion. Size Class 1=population≤1,000;
Class 2=1,001-2,000; Class 3=2,001-3,000; Class 4=>3,000. For an explanation of the activity scores
see Chapter 2. * Sasi moved to church in 1992; ** Sasi moved to church in 1995.
Village Dominant Homo- Administrative Size Class Activity score for sasi
religion geneity Status
Land Marine
Nolloth Christian 1 Desa 31 2 1 2
Haruku Christian 1 Desa 31 1 1 2
Pelau Muslim 1 Desa 41 2 1 2
Siri Sori Muslim 1 Desa 3 n.a. 12
Morela Muslim 1 Desa 31 1 1 2
Itawaka Christian 1 Desa 31 1 1 0
Amahai Christian 1 Desa 31 2 1 0
Kabau Muslim 1 Desa 3 n.a. 9
Ihamahu Christian 1 Desa 21 2 9
Tengah-Tengah Muslim 1 Desa 31 2 9
Hatusua Christian 2 Desa 29 9
Porto Christian 1 Desa 41 0 7
Paperu Christian 1 Desa 39 6
Ulath Christian 1 Desa 26 * 6 *
Makariki Christian 2 Desa 21 2 3
Rohua Christian 1 Dusun in a 3 12 3
Muslim desa
Haria Christian 1 Desa 4 8** 3**Institutional Resilience : Loss and Revival of Sasi        247
Confusion over land rights was, in some cases, due to changes in government unit boundaries.
Changes in administrative boundaries and the effects of World War II were most prevalent on
Ambon and Nusa Laut. Pressure from worsening economic conditions, for instance, the
collapse of the clove price in the early 1990s, crop failures, and decline of resources were also
mentioned as causing sasi to collapse.
The lack of effective enforcement, in combination with economic needs, political turmoil, and
urbanization provided the incentives for people to non-comply. Compliance and enforcement
problems seem more prevalent in Christian villages, and particularly on Ambon Island. The
village government often delegated the authority over sasi to the church, and in many cases,
sasi adat and marine sasi declined at the same time. As of 1997, political or religious conflicts
were documented as affecting 13 of the remaining sasi villages. In other words, in about a
quarter of remaining sasi villages, the institution is under strain.
17.5 Results of the Comparative Case Study
The findings, from the in-depth interviews conducted as part of the case studies in the six
villages, underscore the link between the different components (objectives, rules), the players,
and the external context of the sasi institution, and illustrate the interactions among these
through time.
Although both the Nolloth and Haruku villages having a strong sasi institution, the cases are
distinct. Whereas Nolloth can be described as a system designed primarily to provide resource
rent for the village government, Haruku’s sasi has more to do with the fair distribution of fish
resources and conservation. Nolloth is a stable village, with legitimate leadership and the
strong representation of traditional authorities. The kewang is functional and, together with
the village head, serious in the prosecution of offenders. The harvest rights of sasi are reserved
for the village cooperative (KUD) and income accrues to the village government and the
harvesters. Other villagers benefit indirectly through village development. In Haruku, a more
important role is ascribed to the kewang and relatively less to the village head, except when
he is also a raja. Kewang members feel a strong responsibility towards sasi. The harvest is
communal and distributed among the villagers. Recently, the villagers in Haruku have become
divided as a result of the installation of a new village head. This leader, elected with a slender
majority, supports sasi but also favors mining development that threatens the resources under
sasi. This has led to confusion and a dysfunctional village government, a situation that in
turn poses a threat to sasi.
Table 17.10. Reasons causing sasi to become (partly or completely) non-functional.
Cause of decline of sasi No. of Comments
Take-over of adat sasi by church 13
Poor leadership led to decline in enforcement and compliance 11
Economic pressures led to non-compliance 4
Conflict over leadership (adat  and formal government) 3
Change in administrative boundaries 3
Conflict between church and adat or between churches 2
Conflicts over land rights caused compliance problem 1
Urbanization and degradation of resources 1
Collapse of clove prices increased fishing pressure 1
Others (moral disintegration, outsider interference, more 4
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In Hulaliu, conflicts between the village head and kewang, and, in particular, problems with
accountability for the use of resource rents in the past, lie at the root of the decline of sasi. The
current leader is trying to revitalize sasi but his position is unstable because he lacks the
support of a large part of the village population. The revitalization process is thereby
threatened. In Tuhaha, there have been problems in the past between formal and traditional
authorities. There is also a tendency to revitalize sasi, but the relationship between the village
government and traditional authorities first needs to be restored. The village government,
which is only partly functional, has to be reorganized before a kewang can be installed.
In Toisapu-Hutumuri and Seri, sasi is lost and fisheries management is minimal or lacking.
Traditional village structures are, to a large extent, replaced by formal structures at the desa
level, although less so at the dusun (sub-village) level. Artisanal fishers have to compete directly
with large-scale fishers. Both villages are located on Ambon and close to regional markets
and hence are more in contact with modernization and urban processes.
In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the various elements of sasi and provide an
analysis of how sasi functions and persists under different conditions.
17.5.1 Objective of sasi
The general objective of sasi, as articulated by villagers, is to protect resources from theft and
destruction. Theft is prevented through active monitoring and enforcement. To maximize
yields, immature shellfish and fish are protected, and to ensure sustainable yields, there are
access and harvest restrictions. In Nolloth for example, there are lengthy closed seasons and
a minimum legal size for top shells (Trochus niloticus). In Haruku, destructive and overly
efficient gear types are banned. Thus in these cases, sasi does have a conservation objective.
In addition, Haruku kewang leaders expressly identify the equitable distribution of fish,
particularly the support of village poor, to be an objective of their revitalized sasi institution.
In a 1995 study, von Benda-Beckman et al. wrote: “Throughout history the objectives of sasi
have changed from limiting access and the regulation of power, to defining social conduct
and the increase of economic benefits.”  The use of sasi for economic purposes, which has a
long history in Maluku (von Benda Beckmann et al. 1995), is also illustrated by Nolloth. Top
shells were formerly important as a food source. When in the 1960s the shells became
commercially interesting, the village government of Nolloth replaced the communal harvest
with a system that allowed the village government to auction the harvest rights. This was to
the dismay of some villagers who saw their personal direct benefits decrease.
A shift from communal harvests to the sale of marine harvest rights occurs in most villages
where sasi is revitalized by a local government with commercial interests. Although in most
villages the principle of sasi is valued and sasi is perceived as a “good thing”, a majority of
fishers we interviewed object to the auctioning of marine sasi harvest rights, especially to
outsiders.  Both Tuhaha and Hulaliu village heads plan to auction the harvest rights and use
sasi revenues for village development. Yet, fishers declared that they would respect sasi only
if they would get direct benefits from a communal harvest. Villagers may be kept satisfied
with village development projects, but there may also be problems because village income
and expenditures are not transparent. For example, at one point in the 1980s, when profits
appeared to be being used for the village head’s personal benefit rather than the public good,
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17.5.2 Rules and regulations
In order to regulate the harvest, certain rules have to be practiced. Nolloth, Haruku, and
Hulaliu have written sasi regulations (see Appendix 6 for Nolloth rules). The operational
rules specify the products and marine species under sasi, gear restrictions, the timing of the
harvest, etc. These operational rules are the base on which the fishers make their day-to-day
decisions over compliance. The operational rules are nested in a set of collective rules which
define the decision-making process regarding the opening and closing of seasons, how to
regulate access, how enforcement is arranged etc. On the third level – the constitutional level
– the structure of the sasi institution is defined through adat. Adat prescribes who are involved
in the process and what their roles are, e.g., which clans and persons are responsible for
decision-making, conflict resolution, execution of ceremonies and enforcement (also see
Ostrom 1990).
The process of decline involves non-compliance to operational rules but this in turn is directly
dependent on the effectiveness of the collective-choice rules.  In Hulaliu, a conflict between
the village head and kewang in which the kewang’s rights were neglected, i.e., a collective-
choice level problem, was the root cause for sasi to decline. Subsequent problems with
compliance (operational level) were secondary, i.e., the result of lack of kewang enforcement.
Adat as part of the village culture, however, persisted, and thus the constitutional rules
remained intact.
Over the last decades, operational rules have been modified.  Boundaries of sasi areas,
frequency of open and closed seasons, division of benefits, restrictions on gear use, etc. all
may and do change. In practical management terms, this affects the function of sasi but does
not threaten its continued existence. On the other hand, where the constitutional rules were
challenged, e.g., a shift of authority from the kewang to the church, the loss of the kewang, the
introduction of police as enforcers, the promulgation of national fisheries legislation, the
structure or legal basis of the sasi institution then changed and this can lead to the
disappearance of part or all of a local sasi institution. Adaptation of constitutional rules may
also, however, strengthen sasi.  For example, in Haruku where sasi on marine resources is
enforced by the kewang, there is also sasi on coconuts and cloves that is enforced by the church.
The reason why these commodities are under church sasi, is because the people asked the
church to become involved at a period when theft was significant. Since then, the church has
had a role that is distinct from, but supportive of, that of the kewang.
Because operational and collective rules may be lost more easily, they as particular entities
are less resilient than constitutional rules. However, the fact that operational rules and to a
lesser extent, the collective-choice rules, can be changed or abandoned and then revived, is
an important feature contributing to adaptiveness and resilience of the larger institution.
Some sasi operational rules overlap and support national fisheries law on destructive gear
types. In Haruku and Nolloth, formal regulations on mesh size, and the use of poisons, blast
fishing and lift nets are included in the sasi rules. As is typical of non-sasi villages, Seri has
only a few informal rules, while Toisapu-Hutumuri has no local fisheries regulations at all. A
lack of effectively enforced government rules has provided an incentive for fishers in Hutumuri
to push for local management that can protect their fishing grounds against outsiders. Under
national law, local adat institutions and village governments are allowed to pass local rules as
long as they do not contradict national or provincial law.  What is lacking is the motivation
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17.5.3 Role of traditional institutions
Restructuring of local government through Law No. 5, 1979 is expected to have caused
confusion in the village.  In fact, in the perception of ordinary villagers, it had no dramatic
and immediate impact. The fact that the traditional village structure was no longer
acknowledged posed the village government with a dilemma as to how to meet the demands
from Jakarta without violating the traditional social structure. Apparently, the requirements
of the law, i.e., replacement of the traditional government structure by a formal one, were
often implemented at a pace and in a manner suited to the local situation. In most cases, the
local government basically incorporated the traditional structure into the formal one, and
thus change was not clearly visible.
Some villages have been rather successful in melding the formal and traditional government
structures.  In Nolloth, for example, the LMD is nearly fully overlapping with the traditional
saniri negeri.  The village head is also elected according to traditional guidelines. In other
villages, the introduction was less smooth and was a cause for conflicts. Traditional authorities
became marginalized in Tuhaha. Where newcomers entered the village government through
elections, villages became politically unstable. In all villages, there is some degree of overlap
between formal and traditional authorities, but the way in which the traditional authorities
are represented varies.
Our study shows that the degree of overlap is decisive for the continuation and stability of
sasi. In Nolloth, where the traditional authorities function within the new system, the sasi
institution is strong. The villages where sasi ceased to function had problems with village
leaders who did not successfully collaborate with traditional authorities. In Tuhaha, where
the traditional authorities were not acknowledged but had to modify their role according to
the new structure, sasi has disappeared. Now the new village leader has to honor the traditional
authorities and enable them to take a place in the village government before sasi can be
revitalized. In Hulaliu, the village government neglected the kewang’s rights and caused sasi
to decline, and now has to reconcile their differences in order to reintroduce sasi. Haruku is a
different case. The introduction of the new government structure took place in a period when
sasi were just about to be re-institutionalized.  The revival and reconstruction of sasi was an
initiative of the kewang, with support from the village head at the time, Om Bertie Ririmasse,
who was also a raja.
Knowledge of sasi, or rather the body of knowledge, is passed on from father to son within
certain lineages and persons, i.e., kepala kewang, kepala adat. The rituals and knowledge are
secret and involve an almost extinct indigenous language (bahasa tana). In order to preserve
traditional sasi, the process of passing down of knowledge must be perpetuated.  However,
as the younger generations leave to study in the city of Ambon where adat is regarded as a
superstitious belief, many youngsters lose interest in sasi. This is true even in villages where
sasi is strong (i.e., Nolloth). There is a risk that when the older generation or “the keepers of
sasi knowledge” die, they will take their knowledge with them.
The support and participation of the younger generation is, however, necessary for the success
of sasi as a viable management institution (Figure 17.1). Especially in the villages where sasi is
weak or has ceased to function, the inability to preserve the knowledge of sasi is a threat to its
continuation. Of all the case study villages, Haruku is the only one where knowledge of sasi
is actively communicated to the new generation through the mini-kewang where they learn
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17.5.4 Leadership
In some cases, LMD members appointed as section heads lack the appropriate knowledge
and skills to carry out their tasks. In other cases, village officials appeared poorly informed
about village issues and the activities and programs of village organizations. In such cases,
government decision-making may rest almost exclusively with the village head. Thus, the
modern village head may hold a very powerful and authoritarian position. As such, he is a
key decision-maker in the sasi institution.
Before 1979, the position of village leader was hereditary through the royal raja line.
Nowadays, the village head is elected by the people and, in theory, the elections are open to
anyone. Yet Nolloth is a fine example of a situation where the village head was selected because
he is the raja. He was inaugurated by both the village government and the adat leaders, and
thus assumed the sacred function of kepala adat. This allows him to lead the formal village
government as well as also be fully and legitimately involved in traditional ceremonies.
Our results support those of Riedel (1886) and Volker (1921) who maintained that compliance
to sasi rules depended largely on strong and tactful leadership. The village head must be
honest and respected or sasi is undermined.  This was illustrated by stories from Hulaliu and
Nolloth where former leaders confiscated sasi profits and so caused sasi to weaken. Local
legitimacy of the village head is extremely important and still stems largely from his being
part of the raja family. Thus in some villages, formally elected leaders are not legitimate because
they are not from the right family. Yet, even in cases where the village head is from the right
family, legitimacy can be undermined if people think a different member of the raja line would
be more competent or more attuned to the villagers’ aspirations. In Hulaliu, the initiative of
the village head to revive sasi is hampered by a lack of legitimacy apparent from the level of
local political opposition. In Haruku, the formally elected leader is said to be of the raja line,
while others doubt his descent. He is not a long-term village resident and is said to represent
Figure 17.1. Are these young
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the interests of the pro-mining lobby. Hence, he lacks the local legitimacy to play a guiding
role in sasi. This situation, wherein the village head and the kewang each represent the two
opponent groups in the village, seriously undermines the sasi institution.
Under the Indonesian system, all candidates for local elections must be screened and approved
by the government. Hence, elections can be manipulated either in favor of or against traditional
leaders. Popular candidates may be disqualified at this stage, or some votes may simply be
neglected during the election process. On one hand, lingering adat structures may make
nonsense of the concept of democratic elections. On the other hand, traditional leaders with
broad popular support may also be vulnerable. Cases from Haruku and Hutumuri show that
external interests may influence the election of a village head and thus the functioning of sasi.
17.5.5 The boundaries
Marine sasi is generally applied to shallow inshore areas. Outside the sasi area, other parts of
the village territory, including the deep waters beyond the fringing reef, may also be rented
(as in Tuhaha and Hulaliu). Generally, the boundaries of the sasi and other rented areas are
clearly defined, and have remained largely the same over the years. The boundaries are
generally accepted. Even though fishers may accept such restricted access without complaint,
they often have reservations. In Tuhaha, a lack of legitimacy is compensated by a strong
enforcement mechanism. Acceptance of boundaries of restricted areas requires legitimacy of
the leaders, direct benefits for the excluded users, and/or a strong enforcement mechanism.
17.5.6 Enforcement and compliance
Enforcement of sasi regulations is carried out by the kewang, the police, and/or village
government. In both Nolloth and Haruku, the kewang is strong and plays an important role in
the enforcement of regulations. In coastal villages, there is still a firm belief that ancestral
spirits and God guard the sasi regulations. Even in cases where the village government is
responsible for enforcement, traditional sanctions can still play a role. “The offender can be
lucky and escape from the kewang or police, but he still may get sick,” explained Abraham
Pattypelu, a fisher in Tuhaha. “Before long, he will seek either the church minister or tuan
negeri (in more traditional villages) to confess his mischief because only a prayer or ceremony
can relieve him from his burden.”
The traditional kewang is highly legitimate and not in the least because it enforces the law
without showing favoritism. Police personnel have the formal authority to implement the
rules, but act arbitrarily and are not trusted by the people. Their effectiveness is also hampered
by the fact that they reside far from the village and when they are needed, they take too long
to arrive. In villages that have no active kewang, as in Tuhaha and Hulaliu, enforcement is,
therefore, difficult.
In villages where sasi is gone and/or where the kewang has been abolished, authority has
shifted from the traditional enforcers to the formal village government. In Christian villages,
the government may have enforcement support from the church.  In Haruku, Hulaliu, and
Tuhaha, the church is only involved in sasi on coconuts, while in Nolloth, the church minister
closely collaborates with the village head and the kewang and is present at adat ceremonies,
including those of marine sasi. In non-sasi villages, the church has not been seen to play a role
in supporting enforcement of fisheries rules although it may, as in Seri, be called upon to
bless fishers and their boats. The church is only directly involved in land sasi and not in
marine sasi. This is because fishing is economically too important and people will alwaysInstitutional Resilience : Loss and Revival of Sasi        253
violate the rules if they need to. If the church is involved in marine sasi, the offenders would
not only risk punishment by the village authorities, but also from God, and that would be too
severe. Therefore, the church does not want to be responsible for marine enforcement.
Where sasi is functional, compliance with fishing rules in general (both sasi and other
regulations) is higher than in non-sasi villages.  Non-compliance by local villagers is not usually
a threat to the sasi institution, but is a sign of decline which is likely based in problems at the
collective-choice or constitutional levels. Non-compliance may also be directed at an authority
figure rather than at the sasi institution per se. In Hulaliu, the use of destructive fishing
techniques by a contra group was meant to undermine the authority of the village leader.
Non-compliance by either locals or outsiders which threatens the very existence of local
resources and is not effectively controlled by the kewang is, however, a threat to sasi because it
is an incentive for people to abandon local management. Usually, however, intrusion in sasi
areas is low (an offender is caught two to three times a year). Yet, in times of economic and
political stress, the rate of non-compliance can increase.
17.5.7 Externalities
The minimal levels of in- and out-migration and tourism have no impact on village
demography and, so far, appear to pose no threat to traditional institutions. Tourism in Haruku,
stimulated by sasi ceremonies, may even help support the institution. Compared to Ambon,
the infrastructure, communication, and transportation links on the islands of Haruku and
Saparua are limited. Seri and Hutumuri on Ambon Island are heavily influenced by their
proximity to the city. Apparently, the greater involvement of people in the process of
modernization and globalization affects their appreciation for sasi and traditional structures.
In the non-sasi villages, only 70% of fishers thought sasi was important (see Section 17.6). It is
here that the loss of adat ideology and tradition is largest. The tradition of collective action
and other indicators of social sustainability are also relatively weak. This is an important
aspect to take into account when re-institutionalizing sasi or developing a comparable
management institution that must be widely applicable.
Pollution and resource degradation resulting from modern development also pose a challenge
to local resource management. The villages on Ambon see their resources decline due to
pollution from fish and plywood factories. The environmental impacts of these operations
are such that they would be beyond the control and influence of a traditional style village
kewang.  Revitalized local institutions require information management, networking and
lobbying skills, and links to government departments having jurisdiction in environmental
protection.
A related issue is that of the impact of large-scale development. Haruku is the one village that
is influenced by mining exploration for copper and other base metals, as well as silver and
gold. This enterprise seriously affects the political stability in the village and also emphasizes
the limits of a village-based management institution that is not linked to higher levels of
government. The sasi institution does not offer villagers the ability to intervene in regional
development planning and licensing of mining operations. The kewang is powerless to prevent
pollution from mining activities affecting sasi resources, and there is no provincial or national
management body to which the villagers can appeal.
National laws and programs are implemented through the provincial, district and sub-district
government offices but information on fisheries and environmental law rarely reaches the
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regulations are poorly implemented. There are no government patrol boats in the area, and
where it comes to protection of fishing rights, the villages are left to their own devices. This
may motivate people to work together in defense of local resources. On the other hand, if sasi
as an institution remains disconnected from governmental power centers, people may give
up local operational rules because they are ineffective against externalities.
17.6 The Revival of Sasi in Central Maluku
At this moment, fisheries management is not yet a burning issue in most villages because
reduced catches are compensated by high fish prices. Few village respondents have any clear
idea of what fisheries management would entail, and rather think that the answer to declining
catches is to upgrade their boats and gears. Nevertheless, in sasi villages, all fishers said that
sasi is useful and important, as did 90% of fishers in villages where sasi is being revived and
70% of fishers in non-sasi villages. In 14 villages, respondents expressed their desire to
reintroduce sasi (land, marine or both), or strengthen existing sasi practices. Plans for
revitalization were found in villages of all sizes and on every island (Tables 17.11, 17.12). In
some cases, definite plans with timelines had already been developed; in other cases, the
indication to revitalize sasi was based on wishful thinking. Most of the villages interested in
revitalization were Christian (Table 17.12).
The tendency to revitalize sasi is fed by the appreciation of sasi by the people, not just as a
management system but also as a cultural phenomenon. In Nolloth and Haruku, where sasi is
still alive, people explained: “Sasi has a spirit, and everybody carries it because it is adat and
part of our culture.” The constitutional rules of sasi are based on, and are part of adat, and
because they cannot be separated from the local culture, it is at this level that sasi as an
institution has its strongest resilience.  This explains why sasi is still spiritually and
ideologically significant, even where the practical execution of sasi has vanished.
Two villages that are seriously attempting to revitalize sasi are Hulaliu and Tuhaha. In both
cases, it is not fishers but village elites (government staff with partial involvement of adat
leaders) who are pushing the process forward.  The reason for revitalizing sasi has less to do
with its spiritual significance than with the possibility of controlling common property
resources to generate government income. In considering revitalization processes, it is
rewarding to look back to what caused the loss of operational sasi in the first place.
Table 17.11. Occurrence of plans to revive sasi in villages of different sizes. In some cases revival of
both land and marine sasi is planned in the same village; thus numbers add up to more than 14.
Village Size Village Size Village Size Village Size Total
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Land sasi revival 1 2 1 2 6
Marine sasi revival 4 2 3 3 12
Table 17.12. Occurrence of plans to revive sasi in each island.
Ambon Seram Haruku Saparua Nusa Laut Muslim Christian
Land sasi revival 1 2 1 2 0 1 5
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The main reasons for the collapse of sasi in both Tuhaha and Hulaliu were political problems,
lack of trust among village leaders, and the subsequent withdrawal of the kewang. The practical
execution of sasi was abolished, but sasi remained part of the village ideology. The process of
revitalization builds on this cultural base and re-establishment means re-installation of the
traditional authorities and re-activation of collective-choice and operational rules. Kewang
members have to be chosen and inaugurated, tasks delegated between the formal and
traditional authorities, and operational rules designed.  To be successful, the proponents of
sasi renewal will have to pay attention to history and be careful to avoid past practices that
led to breakdown.
In recent years local NGOs, such as Yayasan Hualopu, have been working in the Lease Islands.
They provide villagers with information on sustainable fisheries development and encourage
local leaders to embark on the management of village territorial waters. Yayasan Hualopu,
for example, is currently engaged in a program of mapping village marine territories and
facilitating the development of local management plans. Here, they hope to capitalize on the
basis that sasi provides by encouraging the re-installation of kewangs and the revival of the
island-level institutions (latupati) with an emphasis on conflict resolution and management
planning.  In this work, they are supported by a number of academics from Ambon-based
universities, some Fisheries Agency staff, and others from the government research institute
LIPI, based in Ambon. Legal experts affiliated with both Pattimura University and the
government planning office (BAPPEDA) are also involved. The general plan is to promote
development of a new law at the provincial level (Perda or Peraturan Daerah) which will give
legal recognition to the right of villages to enter into marine resource management and erect
kewang-style management organizations. The aim of these supporters of sasi is clearly resource
management and conservation.
Thus, in the process of revitalization, there are three streams of thought that must be reconciled:
the wish of the village fishers to preserve adat culture and share in the benefits from fisheries
resources while protecting their territories from outsiders; the desire of local governments to
extract resource rents; and the push by academics, environmentalists and managers to develop
viable local fisheries conservation and management.
17.7 Synthesis
As can be concluded from the inventory, before the 1970s, a large number of villages lost sasi
due to post-World War II social, administrative and economic change, internal village conflicts
and other reasons that were difficult to trace. The more recent breakdown of sasi has occurred
in two distinct periods and villagers are able to articulate reasons for decline in their village.
The 1970s witnessed the introduction of the new formal government structure; it was a period
of decline for sasi. This decade was one of rapid economic growth, poverty alleviation programs
in the villages, and social change. A fundamental factor in the loss of sasi was confusion or
conflict in the village or between village authorities, which undermined the legitimacy of the
village leader or the institution itself. Political instability and/or a dysfunctional kewang invited
non-compliance and led to the abandonment of operational rules. Sasi being taken over by
the church, either because of such conflicts or in an attempt to improve compliance, was a
common scenario. The church, interested only in land sasi on coconuts, did not get involved
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The 1980s was a period of relative stability. Villages where sasi was alive and functioning
remained stable. In some villages, there was a tendency to revitalize sasi. The 1990s is a period
of the further decline of sasi. The period between the 1970s and 1990s covers one generation.
Modernization and commercialization, as a result of improved communication infrastructure
and education and the expansion of market relations, have influenced the local culture and
especially the younger generations. The generational change, together with the rapid rate of
social, economic and political change in Maluku in the 1990s, is most likely the reason why
sasi is currently suffering such relatively rapid losses.
The case studies underscore the inventory evidence that contemporary decline of sasi often
stems from conflicts. Conflicts can in some cases be related to the social change that resulted
from the introduction of the new village structure by the national government. Also, the
election system has opened up possibilities for opportunists with vested interests to resume
the position of village leader. On the other hand, where traditional authorities (saniri negeri)
merged into the new government (LMD), adat and sasi have remained a significant aspect of
village life. Overlap between the traditional and formal government proved to be essential in
the prolongation of sasi.
The continuing presence of sasi is affected by village size and proximity to a large urban
center. This is clearly illustrated by the early and rapid losses of sasi recorded on Ambon
Island, which historically has been the government center and most densely populated island
in the study area. Ostrom (1990) writes that the likelihood of users designing successful
common property institutions will be improved if the group is relatively small and stable,
and if it is relatively homogeneous. Our research confirms this, for sasi is most resilient in
homogeneous villages of fewer than 3,000 people. Villages close to the capital, where sasi no
longer functions, have exceeded a critical size, become heterogeneous and shifted from
subsistence fishing and farming to large-scale fishing and urban employment.
Of all the forms of sasi, marine sasi, though less generally prevalent, appears to be relatively
robust.  Whereas sasi has generally suffered severe losses in recent years, marine sasi has been
relatively stable and even shows signs of revitalization in the 1990s. This revival comes basically
out of the heartfelt attachment of people to adat, in general, and sasi, in particular, but also the
commercial value of marine products such as Trochus niloticus, other shellfish and sea
cucumbers for foreign markets is an important incentive to keep or re-institutionalize sasi.
The process is further being facilitated and reinforced by intervening NGOs, government,
and academic supporters who see the potential value of sasi as a resource management system.
Where the people do not expect to benefit directly, they do not seem interested in the
revitalization of sasi. A lack of transparency in distribution of benefits further hampers the
process. There is a risk that in villages where sasi is being used as a tool to extract resource
rents that sasi then turns into “a government thing” controlled by local elites. This is a
disincentive for fishers to follow the new sasi rules.
Church sasi is the most common type of land sasi in Christian villages. The church also has
the potential to play an important role in marine sasi. Church sasi derives its strength from
the strong religious beliefs of rural villagers. The church is more stable than the ever-changing
village governments. Church sasi, currently applied only to coconuts, provides direct
individual benefits to the people and so is valued. Past shifts of authority over land sasi from
adat to the church helped to increase the effectiveness of the institution when the kewang lost
its enforcement capacity. In many cases, villagers believe that the threat of sanction by God is
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inventory, where sasi is taken over by the church, adat sasi as well as marine sasi may be lost.
However, Haruku and Nolloth provide examples where introduction of church sasi actually
strengthened the local institution. Therefore, in sasi systems that are being revitalized, the
church can play an important supporting role.
In some Muslim villages, sasi has evolved away from adat. Ceremonies and inherited positions
have been abandoned, and religious leaders have also not developed a direct role in the
institution. Sasi has become more of a commercial transaction between the village government
and whoever wins the auction for resource harvesting rights. Nevertheless, this also appears
to be a stable and resilient institution. The benefits and drawbacks of this form of sasi require
further investigation, but our performance analysis did show that this type of arrangement
leads to problems in compliance when local fishers see benefits accruing only to elites.
It was clear that sasi flourishes where the village leader is legitimate (kepala adat) and where
he collaborates harmoniously and honestly with adat leaders and the church. Ostrom (1990)
mentions reciprocity and trust as important conditions for successful common property
institutions. From our study, we would add legitimacy as another key factor for success.
Apparently, the discrepancy between the theory of formal administrative structure and the de
facto power structure that involves traditional authorities, makes village politics susceptible
to manipulation and instability.  Amendment of the law on village government (No. 5, 1979)
may be required to accommodate the need for legitimate adat authority figures in rural villages
and increase the stability of the local government.
Because the constitutional rules are part of adat, and “adat is something that cannot be changed”
as village officials in Nolloth stated, the process of revival concerns the re-establishment and
adaptation of operational rules (harvest regulations, access rules) and collective-level
arrangements (re-establishment of the kewang). Adat still forms the basis of sasi, but a
redefinition of responsibilities and involvement of non-adat institutions, i.e., the church, the
police and higher government levels, is possible. Such adaptation of the constitutional rules
carries certain risks and must be advanced with care and tact.
17.8 Conclusions
Berkes and Folke (1998) claim that institutional resilience is a built-in mechanism to react to
external influences. Various social-ecological practices they mention are found in sasi, e.g.,
the temporal restrictions of harvest, inter-generational knowledge, the role of stewards, taboos
and regulations, sanctions, and ceremonies etc. However, our study shows that these are not
the mechanisms, but the components of the institution itself and, as a consequence, apt to
change. What makes the institution, including all these components, strong (and thus resilient)
is that which links these components i.e., legitimacy, trust, collaboration, transparency, etc.
Relations between those who benefit from the institution and those who manage it must be
sincere and transparent. A shared notion of the relevance of the institution stimulates a common
objective to maintain it, in spite of external influences and in a situation where the temptation
to abuse the system for personal benefits is strong.
The extent to which external factors affect the social structure in the village depends on the
feedback mechanisms, i.e., the degree to which the local institution itself can mitigate the
effects of external perturbations. Holling (in Berkes and Folke 1998) speaks in this context of
adaptive management. Sasi has already outlived repeated predictions of imminent demise
(Volker 1925, Cooley 1962) and is clearly both adaptive and resilient.  There is, therefore,258        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
hope of rebuilding the institution in the form of a modern element in co-management, in
which the needs and aspirations of the various proponents (fishers, local governments, adat
leaders, environmentalists, fisheries managers) can be successfully accommodated.
From our study, we identified the following factors (components and linkages) that contribute
positively to the resilience of sasi as a local institution and, therefore, should be considered
during the process of revitalizing and modernizing the institution.
1. If the village head descends from the raja line and if he is kepala adat, his position is
more legitimate than in villages where this is not the case. This legitimacy contributes
positively to the execution of his authority with regard to sasi.
2. Where the village head is elected with only a small majority, this results in fragile
leadership and subsequent political instability. This seriously hampers sasi as well as
any revitalization process.
3. A large overlap between the traditional and formal authorities in the village
government (LMD) is a strong indicator that sasi, as part of the traditional structures,
will be prolonged.
4. Vital for the process of revitalization is acknowledgement of the traditional village
authorities within the local government.
5. Where traditional institutions such as the kewang and tuan negeri are acknowledged,
the enforcement of sasi regulations is more effective. If collaboration with the police
or other formal institutions is required, a clear definition of rights and mandates should
be developed and approved by higher government levels.
6. It is important that the formal and traditional institutions collaborate closely with
religious institutions, which are generally stable and not involved in village politics.
Where there are strong bonds among these institutions, sasi is highly resilient.
7. It is necessary to define the sasi structures, powers, and responsibilities within the
framework of provincial and national legislation, to provide local institutions with
more capacity to deal with external threats and enable them to become involved in
development planning, execution, and evaluation.
8. In newly to be installed sasi systems, sasi regulations are considered more legitimate
if the villagers profit directly. In villages where sasi rights are auctioned and people
have no control over the revenues, there is no incentive to comply with the sasi
regulations and the institution lacks resilience.
9. Collaboration requires a shared value system, in this case, adat. Where through
modernization the younger generation develops new values, the institution
must adapt. The support and participation of the younger generation is necessary
for the survival and effective operation of sasi.
10. Collaboration, trust and legitimacy are a function of a village size and homogeneity.
When the population exceeds 3,000 people and/or the village becomes heterogeneous,
the cohesive mechanisms break down. In these villages, another type of management
institution, i.e., not traditional sasi, must be established.
11. While revamping the institution to increase functionality in resource management, it
will be useful to retain traditional titles and structures as well as elements of ceremony,
to provide a strong spiritual and cultural basis. However, care must be taken not to
alienate new generations of fishers.
In order to perpetuate the cultural core of sasi, the sacred knowledge and rituals in the
indigenous language must be passed down before they are forgotten.  Loss of interest among
younger generations and the subsequent loss of sasi knowledge linked to adat are threats to
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management structure. Berkes and Folke (1998) mention TEK (traditional ecological
knowledge) as the basis of management practices. Sasi, although it limits resource use, is in
most cases not explicitly a management system i.e., a conscious effort to manage and conserve
the resource.  Detailed knowledge of the resource base and related natural systems are lacking,
whereas non-scientific and magical explanations for resource decline are still current. Although
villagers do have a notion of over-exploitation, harvest restrictions are mainly based on
tradition and aim to maximize yields. In this case, it is the loss of traditional knowledge
concerning sasi ritual, not local loss of ecological knowledge, that is a threat to the resilience
of the sasi institution.
The trend towards the loss of adat-related knowledge was already clear decades ago when
Cooley (1962) wrote: “Christianity and education were the primary forces which caused the
local language to die out.  The loss of the language was a direct blow ... to adat for two reasons.
First, it is widely held that to be valid adat must be performed in the indigenous language.”
Secondly, he maintained, without the language, “it is already doomed for even though it may
be continued for a time, the ceremonies are devoid of content and seem purposeless”. Cooley
concluded that sasi “as part of the adat system ... seems completely doomed in the very near
future”.  It is interesting that 35 years later, we are witnessing not just stability but resurgence
in at least one form of adat institution: marine sasi.
This raises the question: just how important are language and ritual, and how much needs to
be incorporated into a revitalized institution? If proponents insist on returning to traditional
style and ceremony, this could strike a patriotic chord in these times of national turmoil replete
with calls for regional autonomy if not outright secession.  On the other hand, too much
emphasis on adat could alienate younger generations of fishers and inhibit the introduction
of science-based management tools.
The 1990s appear to be a critical decade, i.e., sasi must adapt to modern society or it may, at
the operational level, cease to function. According to Ostrom (1990), well-functioning local
management systems are dependent on the enforcement, protection, and legal recognition of
local rights by higher levels of government.  As a village organization active in enforcement,
the kewang is more functional than the police. However, the kewang has never obtained formal
enforcement powers. In cases where the kewang is being revitalized, its mandate has to be
formalized, and the kewang and police have to collaborate within a legal construction under
provincial law. One possible model is that of Itawaka, where as a result of a village
proclamation in 1995, the kewang became part of the official government. On the other hand,
an arm’s length relationship with the local government also has certain advantages. Various
models need further investigation.  Wherever the local institution is placed, it will still require
legal recognition and support from higher government levels.260        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Chapter 18
Overall Discussion and Conclusions
18.1 Adat and the Definition of Access Rights in Inshore Waters
In the Maluku province, certain marine tenure rights and management responsibilities are a
part of culturally-embedded institutions and traditions known as adat.  Coastal villages
typically claim de facto rights of access and withdrawal over fairly extensive areas of both
land and sea, collectively called the petuanan negeri (village territory).  Whereas some or all of
the land territory is divided among local clans, the marine area is communally owned.  Marine
territories abut the land territories.  In the Lease Islands, they usually extend out to the edge
of the reef slope but in southern Maluku’s Kei Islands, the marine village territory, in some
cases, extends out to the farthest limits from which the land can still be discerned.  Access
and withdrawal rights in the marine territory are usually restricted to and shared among
community residents i.e., the resources are common property.  However, exclusive rights of
access and withdrawal for particular areas or species may also be sold or auctioned by the
village government to individuals or companies, i.e., converted from common property to
private goods.  Control over the marine village territory is, in some cases, vested in an
organization called the kewang, which is part of a traditional institution known as sasi.
Even where the marine territory extends only to the reef slope, the area beyond this but still
within sight of land may also be under a degree of local control.  For instance, lift net operators
wanting to catch fish offshore of a village on Ambon Island usually have to pay a fee to the
village government.  These fees are not official, nor are they legally enforceable, but they are
usually paid because the lift net operator knows that local fishers will vandalize his nets and
craft if he does not pay (J. Sohouwat, Toisapu, pers. comm. 1997; H. Wattimena, village head
Seri, pers. comm. 1998).  In this case, the fish caught by the lift nets are a type of toll goods.
A third level of de facto fishing rights may extend far out to sea, where several villages on one
or more islands have recognized fishing grounds.  These constitute common pool goods that
may or may not be entirely open access.  Fishers who exploit the fishing grounds may be
subsistence fishers in sail-powered outrigger canoes, or commercial fishers in larger motorboats
with a crew.  The small sailing canoes (perahu) travel surprising distances, and may fish side
by side with industrial vessels.  Vessels over five GT are in theory restricted to waters three
miles or more from shore.  However, they are also known to enter and exploit inshore waters
traditionally claimed by coastal communities.  Indeed, villages may lay claim to waters more
than three miles offshore.  In other words, the boundaries of inshore and offshore areas are
not clearly evident or agreed upon by either the small-scale or industrial fishing fleets.
18.2 Need for Better Marine Resources Management in Maluku
The sasi institution is in decline and in many villages has disappeared, but the need for local
management is more urgent than ever.  The majority of villagers are still directly or indirectly
dependent on the fishery.  In the study area, there is an overall decline in social interaction
and cooperation, compliance to fisheries rules, fish catches, and environmental health.  Because
of bleak prospects, fishers do not urge their children to be fishers, putting at risk the fishing
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out to sea.  Their fishing grounds now overlap the area utilized by commercial and industrial
fishers and future conflict between the sectors is inevitable if management and conflict
resolution arrangements are not set in place.  Recent research indicates that several key
commercial stocks are being over-fished and the region is losing productive and diverse coral
reefs because of destructive fishing practices.
NGO and academic researchers, noting these trends, have begun to push the government to
look for ways to revive or establish local management, with sasi as the basis.  At the village
level, the incentive for considering local management is most often the potential for the village
government to collect resource rents, which is already an established feature of sasi as currently
practiced in Maluku.  For fishers themselves, the incentives are more linked to culture than to
a consciousness of the need for management.  In what ways is sasi a suitable model or basis
for future fisheries management arrangements?
18.3 Sasi as a Management Institution in Maluku: Patterns of Interaction
Management institutions have commonly been discussed in the literature in terms of a game
that has defined players, constitutional rules, collective-choice rules and operational rules
(Gardner and Ostrom 1991). Patterns of interaction among stakeholders of the resource under
management can be discussed in terms of the institution as operationalized in its cultural,
physical, biological, and economic contexts.  Stakeholders will be motivated to comply or
cooperate with the institution according to the incentives and options inherent in their
situation.  The outcome of these interactions can be assessed in terms of the contribution to
social and biological sustainability, and the efficiency and equitability of management.
18.3.1 Constitutional rules
The constitutional rules of the sasi institution stem directly from adat and are, therefore, rather
complex and philosophical as compared to, for instance, a scientifically-based modern
management institution.  Adat defines the sasi institution and lays down the basic ethics and
codes of conduct.  The constitutional rules thus form an intrinsic part of Maluku culture. They
are generally known by the populace, but are not written down. One example is the concept of
the unity of man with nature and the belief that to destroy nature is to invite the wrath of the
ancestors.  Others include such things as the inheritance of leader status through the male raja
line, the responsibility of the tuan negeri and ketua adat to preserve sacred words and knowledge
for use in ceremonies, and the names of founding families who have the right to hold certain
positions such as tuan tanah, tuan negeri, kepala kewang, marinyo, etc.  The status of the village
territory as the common property of village residents, where outsiders must obtain permission
for access and withdrawal rights, is also a constitutional rule embedded in adat.
18.3.2 Collective-choice rules
Collective-choice rules define how the players in sasi work together.  For instance, they include
the rules which define how clan leaders, kewang members and other traditional leaders are
selected, and also how they subsequently perform tasks such as the amendment of existing
operational rules.  In strong adat villages, these collective-choice rules are dictated by adat
tradition.  One such rule is that decision-making should be by consensus.  Nowadays, such
collective-choice rules may be written down together with sasi’s operational rules.262        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
In some villages, modern innovations intermingle with tradition.  For instance, there are
villages where kewang members are chosen on the basis of residence in recently invented
administrative units instead of on the basis of clan affiliation (Lokollo et al. 1996).  Also,
because of the central role of the village head (kepala desa) in modern sasi, rules for selection of
the village head must also be listed as collective-choice rules for sasi as an institution.  Closer
to the operational end are the rules which state when and how often the kewang will meet,
how decisions regarding the opening and closing of sasi will be made, and how sasi rules can
be reviewed and revised or new rules adopted.  The smaller the village, the less formalized
the structure.  In a small village having only church sasi on coconuts and no kewang, there
may be no written collective-choice rules but there are persons with authority to call meetings
etc. as they see fit.
A basic principle involved in the resource management aspect of sasi is one of closed and
open seasons.  Areas of land and sea, particular crops or marine species are placed under a
harvest prohibition for varying lengths of time (Ellen 1978; Kriekhoff 1991; Bailey and Zerner
1992).  While “under sasi”, these areas or resources may not be harvested without the express
permission of the kewang and the village head.  The kewang does grant exemptions, usually in
cases of dire economic need or to provide resources to support a local cultural or religious
celebration. How and when exemptions may be granted is another example of a collective-
choice rule.
Resource exploitation rights in the village territory are based on residency status and clan,
which is an example of an unwritten collective-choice rule.  In some cases, the village
government, either alone or with the kewang, defines rights of access and withdrawal that
may be purchased by payment to the village government.  This form of sasi (sasi lelang) has a
long history of application to land resources but may be a relatively recent innovation (i.e., in
the past 20-40 years) in terms of controlling marine resources (Zerner and Thorburn,
forthcoming).  Collective-choice rules concerning sale of harvest rights are usually written
down.  Time-limited access and withdrawal rights are either sold for a set price or auctioned.
The sale or auction may be open only to residents or also to outsiders.  Funds raised go into
village government coffers (e.g., Pelauw, Kabauw, Nolloth, and the Itawaka village) and may
be shared with the kewang, church and/or mosque.  The degree of accountability and
transparency surrounding the deal and the level of benefits distributed among community
members is highly dependent on the character of one key figure: the village head.
18.3.3 Operational rules
The operational rules of marine sasi specifically regulate day-to-day activities in the marine
village territory and/or that part of the village territory designated as the sasi area.  The
timing of the imposition and removal of the harvest prohibition are operational rules that
may be determined by the village head alone, especially in cases where resource rights are
sold to provide money for village administration.  In other cases, other village leaders (kepala
kewang, tuan negeri, church leaders and representatives of other village institutions) take part.
Areas under sasi may be marked using physical markers such as wooden stakes crowned
with coconut leaves and driven into the sea bed to demarcate a fishing area.  The other common
way of advertising the imposition of operational rules is the public pronouncement of rules
during ceremonies to open and close sasi.  Nowadays, in many cases where rules are rather
elaborate and have been modernized, they are written down.  Operational rules define, for
example, the boundaries of the sasi area and species under protection, the type of fishing
gears that are prohibited, prohibitions on cutting trees on the river bank etc.  These operational
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from national legislation is the prohibition on blast fishing and use of poisons. People often
refer to the national gear ban as a sasi rule even though it is not formally written down in the
sasi rules.  In other villages (e.g., Porto, Itawaka), operational rules under sasi have been
adopted as formal village law.  Operational rules are also subject to revision to respond to
changes in technology and new social problems, as seen in Haruku (Kissya 1994).
18.3.4 The players in sasi
People having a decision-making role in marine sasi include adat leaders, kewang members,
the village head and, to a lesser extent, religious leaders.  The role of fishers themselves is
often passive in terms of decision-making but they are key players in that their willingness to
comply with or break sasi rules has a direct impact on the institution.  Women and, to a large
extent, youths, are not involved except as indirect supporters.
In many cases, the character and legitimacy of the village head are the key to the successful function
of marine sasi.  Under modern government structure, the village head has great power and this
often results in decision-making that is highly centralized and efficient.  LMD members appointed
as section heads may lack appropriate skills or be poorly informed about village issues and the
activities and programs of village organizations.  In such cases, government decision-making may
rest almost exclusively with the village head.  Thus, the modern village head may hold a much
more powerful and authoritarian position than the raja of former times, who was obliged to take
counsel from his constituency.  Officially, the people elect the village head and, in theory, anyone
could be elected.  However, Nolloth is a fine example of a situation where the village head was
selected as the legitimate village leader because of his lineage, i.e., he is the raja.  His LMD members
are also all traditional authorities.  In sasi villages, the village head has to be of the royal (raja) line in
order to be fully acknowledged.  If this is the case, he will be inaugurated not only by the village
government but also by the adat leaders, and will assume the sacred function of kepala adat. This
allows the village head to be involved in both formal village programs and traditional ceremonies.
External interests may influence the election of a village head, as was reported in Haruku and
also in Hutumuri.  Elections can be manipulated either in favor of or against traditional leaders.
Under the Indonesian system, all candidates must be screened and approved by the
government.  Popular candidates may be disqualified at this stage, or some votes may simply
be neglected during the election process.  On one hand, lingering adat structures may make
nonsense of the concept of democratic elections.  On the other hand, even traditional leaders
with broad popular support may be vulnerable.
The other key players in sasi are the kewang members, who patrol sasi areas, and catch and
prosecute rule breakers.  In one village, there may be one or more kewangs, divided along the
lines of family affiliation (see the Nolloth case study) or an area of jurisdiction i.e., land or
sea, as in Haruku.  Kewang members, aside from the head of the kewang who inherits his
position, may be selected in a variety of ways.  For instance, there may be one kewang member
per founding family, or one for each subdivision of the village land, or one per village
administrative unit, etc. (Lokollo et al. 1996).  The number of members in a traditional village
kewang varies but often exceeds 20 people.  In villages where sasi has evolved into an almost
purely commercial transaction stripped of adat ceremony, the kewangs are no longer traditional-
style village police, but the hired hands of the person who has purchased resource extraction
rights (see Kabauw and Pelauw villages, Appendix 7).264        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
18.3.5 Enforcement
All community residents have the duty to report violations of sasi to the kewang or village
head.  The rules are regularly publicized through kewang rituals as well as through the church.
In the past, compliance depended on local beliefs that the rituals around opening and closing
harvesting areas are witnessed by ancestral spirits.  These witnesses were believed to punish
those who violate sasi prohibitions by inflicting illness or even death (Bailey and Zerner 1992).
The introduction of modern religions has influenced sasi practices.  For instance, traditional
sasi rituals are often followed by prayers in the church.  This is done to ask the protection of
God, and to reinforce the concept that people who do not obey the rules will be punished not
only by the kewang, but also by God.
The kewang meets at intervals to consider cases of rule violations, and interrogates the accused
before deciding on sanctions.  Sanctions in the past often involved public shaming; today,
they can be monetary. In Itawaka, if family members of the kewang are found disobeying the
law, the sanctions are doubled.  Sasi regulations apply not only to local community members
but also to outsiders; however, enforcement is much more difficult if outsiders are the rule
breakers, because the kewang has no legal powers of enforcement.
Other enforcers who may be involved in marine sasi are the police. Their role has increased
since the 1979 law on village government left the kewang outside of the formal government
structure.  However in most cases, the police are too distant to be of assistance.  They usually
get involved only when asked by a village head to take away someone apprehended by the
kewang.  Police involvement is only appropriate in cases where the sasi regulation coincides
with a formal village, provincial or national law.  The navy also have jurisdiction in such
cases (for instance, in enforcing a blast fishing ban) but we never heard of any instance where
the navy personnel were sighted in a village territory.  In general, villagers have much more
respect for the kewang than for the police.  The kewang has greater legitimacy and is seen as
being more fair and reliable.
18.3.6 Revision of rules
Sasi rules are not static.  Both the rules and the reasons for applying them have changed
through time (Zerner 1992).  In Haruku, for example, sasi rules were formally revised in 1985,
in part to move sasi more in the direction of resource conservation (Kissya 1995).  The rules
were drawn up during a meeting of the customary council (dewan adat), which is equivalent
to the traditional saniri of clan chiefs.  The rules were then made official when they were
signed by the raja, the head of the land kewang, and the head of the sea kewang.  At that time,
the raja was also the village head.
Sasi rules have also been formally written down, with or without revision, in Ihamahu (in
1995), Nolloth (in 1990), and Itawaka (1995) (Appendix 6).  In both of the latter cases, the
village government played a prominent role, whereas in Ihamahu and Haruku, the process
was more kewang-driven.
18.3.7 Revitalization
Because the constitutional rules are embedded in adat, sasi never really “dies”.  However,
operational and collective-choice rules can and do cease to function.  Revitalization of a local
institution therefore mainly involves re-installing the collective-choice decision-making bodies
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power shift from adat leaders to the church or government, adjustment of constitutional
elements also occurs.
18.3.8 Compliance
In the eyes of fishers, compliance to fisheries rules is significantly better in villages with
marine sasi.  Although written records of violations are not kept at the village level, verbal
testimonies by village leaders indicated that intrusions into guarded sasi areas were not
common.  When they did occur, they were usually attributed to outsiders rather than locals
and in many cases, fishers from particular non-sasi villages were named as the likely or known
perpetrators.  Where the sasi area was not guarded or the enforcers not respected, intrusions
were reputedly more common.  In general, fishers are expected to comply with, or violate
fisheries rules, depending on the set of incentives and options available to them.
18.4 Incentives to Cooperate and Comply
To influence the success or failure of local fisheries management is to influence the perception
of fishers regarding the management system, for fishers either comply and cooperate with
management or do not, based on their perceived reality.  When fishers choose not to comply
with rules, there is no effective management.  In the course of interactions among marine resource
stakeholders within the historical, cultural, and economic context of Maluku, incentives and
disincentives to cooperate and comply with resource management have developed.
18.4.1 Incentives related to enforcement of sasi
Enforcement power
Enforcement capacity is very limited whether one considers sasi practitioners (kewang) or
government authorities (police and navy).  Kewang members are generally well motivated
but lack equipment such as speedboats, communication devices, etc.  The police may be useful
as a backup for an active kewang but are rarely on the spot to patrol or arrest offenders.  Neither
police nor navy are well-equipped to deal with the vast expanse of sea in Maluku, and their
managers have little motivation to improve the situation.
Fear of retribution from God or of being socially outcast does appear to constitute a powerful
incentive for fishers to comply with local rules within their village territories.  Even so, sasi
fishers are pragmatic.  In times of need, they reserve the right to apply for exemption to the
rules and expect leniency in enforcement because “we have to eat fish”.  This pragmatism is
also exhibited in the form of resistance to the idea of placing any essential food or commercial
fish under sasi and especially under church sasi, where sanctions can include sickness and death.
The risk of being caught by kewang or police, or punished by God, often does not deter outside
fishers from using illegal gear types or stealing sasi products.  The kewang has no legal right to
impose the kind of large fines or jail terms that might discourage those less spiritual members
of society such as the blast fishers and non-Mollucans.
Legitimacy of enforcers
There are times when the enforcement efforts of the kewangs fail, in which case they may
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Because of their impartiality, the kewang members are respected enforcers. Police, on the other
hand, are commonly perceived as more distant, less legitimate and less trustworthy. A fisher’s
personal perspective on the legitimacy of the enforcer influences the rate of compliance.  For
instance, we noted in Hulaliu that fisheries rules were broken as a form of political statement
against the local “enforcer”, the village head.
18.4.2 Incentives related to feedback loops between the sasi institution and the
community
Spirit of sasi
Sasi is based on adat and in traditional villages, it is indissolubly connected with the ancestral
spirits and conventional codes of behavior.  In both Nolloth and Haruku, for instance, people
explained: “Sasi has a spirit, and everyone carries it because it is adat and part of our culture”.
In other villages, the spiritual significance was rarely mentioned but people denied that sasi
had died.  The church tends to take over the spiritual role in sasi but it can never completely
replace adat.  Sasi may have different shapes and practices, and rules may even cease to be
applied, but the basic principles are still retained in village consciousness.  Thus, sasi is
appreciated in sasi and non-sasi villages alike.
The importance of ceremony
For strong adat communities, the physical acts of adat ceremony attached to sasi are important
to village self-image and pride, and help reinforce the institution.  In more modern societies,
however, there is less willingness to spend time on such physical manifestations of local culture.
Transformation of ceremony into a tourism product, such as the public festival around sasi in
Haruku, provides economic incentives to uphold the institution.
Property rights
Village tenure over a defined area of both land and sea is strongly entrenched in the culture
and recognized as legitimate by fishers even though it is not formally supported by law. This
legitimacy of traditional tenure is an incentive to cooperation and compliance within sasi if it
is accompanied by a degree of security of access or guaranteed benefits for local people.  Tenure
under adat law is, however, insufficient.  A comprehensive management system that sought
(among other things) to ensure equitable access for local needs would require legal recognition
of community access and withdrawal rights.
Leadership and legitimacy
Respect for adat and elders plays a large role in the legitimacy and popularity of sasi.  It is,
therefore, an incentive to comply with sasi rules, as long as the village government has either
incorporated or acknowledged traditional leaders.  Village leaders who are from the raja line
have a powerful incentive to cooperate and participate in sasi because of the social prestige
and legitimacy factor.  A village head from outside of the “royal family” can also benefit from
the legitimacy conferred by association with adat authority, through incorporation of traditional
leaders into his LMD and LKMD.  In fact, not paying attention to traditional structures can
lead to a paralyzed government (see the Hutumuri case study).  Participation in sasi ritual or
showing interest in reviving sasi is also very good for the image, and can be used as a tool to
stabilize leadership (the Hulaliu case study).  The church also seeks to increase its role in sasi,
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adat leaders, enhances its own positive image as a useful, practical player interested in
improving the community well-being through sasi.
Social approbation
The enhanced status granted to kewang members is clearly an incentive for them to continue
to volunteer their time to management tasks.  Along with this, these men also have a sense of
responsibility rooted in adat.  Whether this will continue to be an incentive for the next
generation is a topic of discussion among current traditional authorities.  Only in Haruku has
the kewang taken positive steps to groom village youth for taking their place in the institution
by devising a youth kewang group.
Flexibility and local adaptation
“Sasi is not a collection of rigid adat regulations. It will continue to be dynamic, responsive to
the changing times, as long as its spirit, soul or life is maintained and does not change” (Kissya,
1994). The fact that sasi rules are developed locally is an incentive for local fishers to support
sasi compared to an institution controlled from some distant urban center.  In every village,
the rules are different.  In some cases, respect for adat or traditional mores, is very strong; in
other cases, it is the church or the village government that plays a leading role.  Resources
subject to kewang rules or seasonal closures may be harvested by individual fishers living in
the community (e.g., Ihamahu), by the whole community in a single communal harvest (e.g.,
Haruku), or by individuals from within or outside the community who have paid for the
privilege of access and withdrawal (e.g., Nolloth, Pelauw, Kabauw).  Different species are
regulated in different villages, depending on the available resources, market price and fishers’
preferences.  Sasi has the potential to provide management that is closely tailored to local
needs and priorities.
The negative side to this flexibility is that there is no common minimum standard of resource
management nor any recognized standard of conservation associated with management rules.
In some cases even where there is sasi, management is virtually absent.  Sasi rules may or may
not be written down and the kewang and other players may be active or dormant.  In Seram,
for instance, we found a nominal form of sasi under which the closed area applied only to
outsiders, while local residents had unlimited access to the resource.
Clarity of objectives
The diversity of sasi as applied in Maluku is at once its strength and a weakness.  When
asked, people can rarely elucidate any coherent or compelling reason for supporting sasi.
Sasi simply “is”, and “sasi is good”.  There are no clearly defined and widely recognized
resource conservation and management function that are directly related to identified needs.
Thus, sasi as an institution is unlikely to mobilize strong support for resource management or
conservation in the face of, for example, economic distress or political chaos.  In other words,
it is easy to generate lip service to sasi’s cultural value but more difficult to stimulate active
participation, because people lack a strong shared vision of sasi as a relevant and action-
oriented institution.
Social benefits
Sasi is generally perceived to be useful and beneficial, even in villages that no longer have the
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and social harmony.  This perception that sasi is a good thing for society, in general, is an
incentive to compliance.
Source of government revenue
Village governments have an incentive to develop and support sasi as a way of collecting
resource rents.  However, as seen in Nolloth and Hulaliu, this must be approached with some
sensitivity as a majority of fishers strongly object to the sale of access and withdrawal rights
to outsiders or to village elites.  There is also resistance to any scheme that replaces direct
benefits to harvesters with indirect benefits provided through local government.  To be
successful, this type of sasi must be directed by a highly respected and legitimate leader.
Environmental benefits
There is some evidence that sea cucumbers and top shells (Trochus niloticus) are protected by
sasi, and sasi areas patrolled by kewang may, in some cases, be relatively protected from the
use of destructive gear types. There is also evidence that the protected marine mammal, the
dugong, is also largely restricted to the marine territories of sasi villages  (de Iongh pers.
comm. 1998).  Lack of general recognition of such environmental benefits probably means that
they do not as yet constitute incentives, except in particular cases such as Nolloth (see the
Nolloth case study).   However, the value of sasi in resource conservation is not lost on NGOs
and academics (Yayasan Hualopu 1996, Evans et al. 1997), who use the example of sasi’s time-
limited “no-take” reserves for top shells as a reason to promote revitalization of the institution
for management and conservation.
There is evidence that people in Maluku are beginning to become aware of environmental
issues and this could lead to environmental concern being an incentive in future.  For example,
fishers in these small villages often pointed to water pollution, garbage, modern fishing gears
and blast fishing as contributors to a generally perceived decline in environmental health
and fish catches in the region.  As yet, there are no signs of people acting to deal with
environmental threats except in the case of the environmental NGO and village environment
projects (mangrove planting, endangered bird program) started by kewang members in Haruku.
Elsewhere, environmental consciousness tends to be limited to sweeping litter up from roads
and yards – litter that often is disposed of in a river or the sea.
18.4.3  Incentives related to biophysical, political and social context
Dependence on fisheries
Villagers in Maluku are very much dependent on fisheries for primary and secondary
employment.  When land crops fail or prices slump, the fishery is the employer of the last resort
which non-fishers depend upon as a form of insurance.  For instance, the intensity of use of
marine resources increased in the aftermath of the 1990-91 collapse of clove prices in Indonesia.
Before, a large part of the village income was derived from the spice trade, and the Lease Islands
and Ambon were prosperous.  Between 1991 and the price revival in 1998, many people who
formerly harvested cloves for a living turned to the sea as a source of income.
This dependence and the basic love of fishing expressed by villagers are incentives to cooperate
in management and/or conservation efforts if/when fishers recognize a clear and immediate
threat to their fishery and also appreciate that management options are available.  This can be
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the local government in developing a management strategy to protect their interests in the
face of competition from large-scale operators.
For artisanal fishers, lack of education seriously limits their job prospects, making the fishery
even more crucial to their survival.  Our results reveal that where fishers feel pressured to use
destructive gears or break rules because of economic need and a lack of alternatives, this
incentive is more powerful than the rather empty threat of being caught and punished.
Recognition of resource depletion and management options
We found that fishers clearly recognize that inshore and pelagic fisheries resources in Maluku
are in decline and their livelihoods are threatened.  Few would encourage their children to
enter the fishery even though they themselves find it to be a fulfilling occupation.  However,
the realization of declining resources cannot as yet be considered an incentive to cooperate in
management because fishers, in general, do not perceive that management options are available
to redress the situation.  They still consider ocean resources to be unlimited, even though
local resources may be depleted.  Their solution lies in increasing their fishing power (bigger
boats and motors).  In this, they are supported by the Fisheries Agency, national development
initiatives, and various community development programs.
Trust
Rural Maluku fishers have a very low opinion of the police and little regard for local
government which does not have legitimacy conferred by association with adat.  They also
feel cut off from higher levels of government and the Fisheries Agency.  While these are
incentives to cooperate with sasi at the village level, they are disincentives to involvement
with any higher level of management institution.
Social structure
The social classes are clearly defined and separate in these Maluku villages.  Fishers are usually
among the poorer class and outside of the sasi power structure.  This class structure is a
disincentive for poorer fishers to participate in management.  However, because non-
participation and obedience to authority is the cultural norm, fishers rarely perceive this to
be a problem.  This may change as Indonesia works through the current political and economic
crisis, but change will not come quickly to these conservative sasi communities.
The individualism of fishers and the predominance of family-centered culture in Maluku are
strong disincentives to cooperation with outsiders within a resource management framework.
Because of their inferior position in areas of public policy and community decision-making, women
fail to participate in resource management, even though they are very active in the fishery.
Political support
Enlightened staff in regional government offices and in the Fisheries Agency have for years
recognized the benefits of local management rules.  While not entrenched in formal law, sasi
is often allowed and encouraged to flourish because of the recognition that official means of
enforcement of fisheries law are not sufficient to control Maluku’s huge marine territory.  Local
kewangs provide a service to government without cost, have intimate knowledge of the local
area and the character of the fishers being regulated, and live next to the resource being
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effective arrangement.  In addition, the fact that many regional officials were born in island
villages provides them with a sentimental attachment to adat tradition.  However, problems
arise when there is a power struggle or turf dispute between the kewang and the police.
Centralization and Pancasila
The government-promoted national ethic of non-questioning obedience to central authority
is a powerful disincentive to village leaders who otherwise might institute reforms or introduce
new village-level management structures.  When all actors down a hierarchical chain wait for
some higher authority to take responsibility for decisions, very little gets done outside of the
official, centrally programmed activities.  A second disincentive arising from the centralized
national policy is the complete lack of approval for any non-governmental, grassroots fishers’
organization.  In the post-Suharto era of reformation, this may change.
Political instability or dissatisfaction
Non-compliance to sasi and other fisheries rules may constitute a political protest.  Political
turmoil at the village level is, therefore, a negative incentive.
18.4.4 Incentives related to the structure of the fishery and its markets
Infrastructure development
It was pointed out that improved transportation links to city markets in Nolloth and Seri
spurred an explosion in the number of fish traders as well as an increase in fishing efforts.  In
Nolloth, this was in turn connected to local inshore resource depletion.  The strong urge to
take advantage of any new market opportunities is a disincentive to participation in
management where compliance with regulations demands a reduction in fishing pressure.
Resource conflicts
One of the more commonly reported resource conflicts involved intrusion by outsiders into
sasi areas. Loyalty to the village territory is an incentive to report and deal with intrusions
from outside.  In our study area, there have been instances of spontaneous vigilante groups
traveling to other villages to punish fishers seen stealing sasi products.
Competition in the larger fishery leads to conflicts between the artisanal sector and commercial
enterprises with seiners, FADs, lift nets and compressor divers using poisons.  In the future,
conflict among sectors may well be a critical point in encouraging the artisanal fishers to
organize themselves and demand clear access and withdrawal rights on pelagic fishing
grounds.  This is an issue that, unlike intrusion into sasi areas, directly affects family incomes.
Currently, national law theoretically restricts access of larger vessels to inshore waters.  In
practice however, large boats do operate close to shore and there is no institution to which
artisanal fishers can successfully appeal for relief or compensation.
Profit sharing in the fishery
Where fishers work together such as in the small-scale net fishery, lift net fishery, purse seiners
and the pole and line boat crew, there are financial incentives built into the profit-sharing
mechanisms that encourage maximal exploitation.  At the same time, there are no effective
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may be long-standing traditional agreements among fishers and have widespread legitimacy,
constitute disincentives for cooperation with any management regulation limiting catches.
Market structure and competition
The great majority of fishers work alone or in family groups.  Many service only local markets
where the price givers are predominantly female small traders.  These traders, often fisher’s
wives who trade in both fish and agricultural products, in turn operate within price ranges
determined by the powerful fish brokers running the city markets.  Fishers hired as crew on
larger vessels are in an even weaker market position.  They receive very small proportions of
the catch value.  Neither they nor their more wealthy masters have much economic power
relative to the fish brokers and fish companies who determine prices.  This leaves fishers and
small traders operating in a climate of intense competition and makes collaboration in
management of the wider fishery more difficult.
18.4.5 Incentives related to relationships with external agents
NGO and university intervention
The attention of researchers and NGOs is a source of pride to sasi villagers and an incentive to
retain the institution.
Interaction with sub-district, district and provincial fisheries management bodies
The government is preoccupied with intensification of the fishery and, therefore, provides no
incentives or direct support for conservation or other management tasks.  Enforcement by
higher levels is patchy or non-existent at the village level and communication among the
various departments and between them and the village is also limited.
18.5 Outcomes
Outcomes are measured in terms of equity, efficiency, social sustainability, and biological
sustainability.
18.5.1 Equity and efficiency of management
Equity in terms of access to resources regulated under sasi is not a major issue because sasi
covers few species and small areas, while fishers freely exploit the larger pelagic fishery.  Sasi
has also no effect on the distribution of fishing gears or economic disparities.  However, fishers
are not neutral about equity issues in cases where harvest rights are sold or auctioned (either
sasi lelang or lelang that occurs outside of sasi).  Fishers prefer a system where direct benefits
are shared and they find the sale of harvest rights to people outside the village to be particularly
objectionable.  The degree of accountability and transparency surrounding resource rental
(lelang), and the level of benefits distributed among community members, is highly dependent
on the character of one key figure: the village head.  If benefits are not seen to be fairly
distributed or if they accrue to outsiders, this can lead to non-compliance.  On the other hand,
where the decision-makers are respected, this arrangement can be very efficient and also
reasonably equitable in that the profits are used for the benefit of all through community
development (the Nolloth case study).  Where marine resources under sasi are harvested as a
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lompa fishery), fishers accept this as fair and do not complain about restrictions to their
individual rights of withdrawal.  Control over resource management is perceived by fishers
to be tighter in sasi villages, and compliance to fisheries rules is greater.  The communal
decision-making process is also stronger and more stable.  The level of bureaucracy in the sasi
institution is minimal, making it potentially very efficient.
Although decisions affecting the marine village territory, for instance, gear type restrictions,
are said to be made “by the community”, the voices of fishers may or may not be heeded, and
women are excluded from decision-making.  Sasi is, therefore, not equitable in this sense.
However, the hierarchical structure makes decision-making very efficient.  The level of
democracy and representation of interest groups varies from village to village.  Our research
reveals sasi to be fundamentally male-dominated and paternalistic, with the general populace
in most cases not questioning that all is being arranged for the greater public good and
according to traditional law and culture.
18.5.2 Social sustainability
Sasi has significant positive impacts on social sustainability.  Sasi villages have higher levels of
interaction around community issues, a stronger tradition of collective action, and less conflict.
Fishers in villages practicing sasi enjoy the same standard of living as fishers in other villages.  There
is no demonstrable economic benefit to them but neither do they suffer economically from sasi.
18.5.3 Biological sustainability
Sasi rules that restrict access and limit harvest times clearly have the potential to provide
ecological as well as social and economic benefits.  It is clear in the case of top shells (Trochus),
that this specific species, currently on Indonesia’s endangered species list, could easily be
extinct in Maluku were it not for sasi.  When several Trochus habitats were surveyed, the
shellfish were only found inside or close to the Nolloth sasi area where they are under local
protection.  None were found in the suitable habitats in non-sasi villages, where, according to
local informants, there had been a commercially exploited resource in the past.  Likewise, sea
cucumbers, also protected under sasi, had the same pattern of distribution.
Biological surveys in northern Saparua Island suggest that where the marine village territory
is rented out and therefore guarded, there may be some protection of coral reefs from blast
fishing.  However, blast fishing is a problem even in villages where the kewang tries to enforce
the prohibition, as in Haruku and Ihamahu.  Protection efforts are hampered by the kewang’s
lack of legal status, equipment and financial support.
The possible impact of sasi on the broader (pelagic) fisheries resource is not clear. In seeking
to document the impact of the sasi institution on fisheries, one significant problem is the
general lack of “fit” between the sasi institution and the modern fishery that is geared to
deep-water pelagic fish.  The fishers’ perceptions of declining stocks pertain to the impact of
all forms of resource management as it exists in Maluku and not specifically to sasi.  Fish
catches of artisanal and small-scale fishers are in decline throughout the study area, signaling
the failure of centralized fisheries management regulations, such as they are, to conserve
resources and fairly allocate resource withdrawal rights in Maluku.
It is unlikely that, through protecting small areas of coral reefs and sea grass beds, the sasi
institution provides even an incremental and indirect benefit to the larger fishery, unless these
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the ethic underlying adat and sasi, and the example of management provided by functional
marine sasi, may well have positive psychological impacts on fishers.  Through their familiarity
with sasi, fishers of all kinds are introduced to fundamental and important management
concepts packaged in a culturally acceptable way.
18.6 The Potential of Sasi as a Model for Local Management in a
Co-Management Structure
As fisheries were developed over the last four decades, most countries increased the role of
the national government in managing fisheries. National governments, however, typically
failed to develop an adequate substitute for, or complement to, traditional, local resource
management regimes. In many cases, what is needed now is a more dynamic partnership
using the capacities and interests of the local fishers and community, complemented by the
ability of the state to provide enabling legislation, enforcement, and other assistance (Pomeroy
and Williams 1994).  This includes a renewed appreciation for locally-developed sea tenure
practices (Ruddle and Johannes 1985; Manghanas 1994). This approach to fisheries
management will require a shift away from a centralized, “top-down” form of management
to a new strategy in which the fisheries managers and the fishers jointly manage the fisheries.
This sharing of responsibilities and/or authority between the government and local resource
users to manage the fishery or resource (e.g., coral reef, mangrove shoreline habitat) is called
“co-management” (Pomeroy and Williams 1994).
18.6.1 Co-management in a centralized society
The organizational structure in Indonesia is centralized (Dauvergne 1997).  Through the
government structures, village organizations are directed and controlled.  Development
planning as well as development of fisheries law and policy, is largely controlled from the
center.  Ordinances and decrees are passed through provincial, district and sub-district levels
to the villages.  Communication from the villages back to higher political levels is difficult.
Development schemes focus on intensification of resource exploitation.  If a village wanted
to consider sustainable development options, for instance, the possibilities for adapting a
national program could be limited.  If we talk about co-management, we have to take these
structures into account.
Within the village, the situation is similar.  The centralized structure discourages input from
the general population.  In most cases, the people passively trust the village head to do what
is best.  It is difficult in this context for a village government to develop resource management
and conservation programs tailored to local needs and aspirations.  The village leader has a
relatively powerful role and management of the fisheries depends for a great deal on whether
he has the motivation and dedication to be proactive.
There is also strong segregation and poor communication between the rich and poor and
between men and women.  There are no formal structures that allow ordinary people to
participate in political matters, but even if they were encouraged to, they are not used to
expressing an opinion.  Issues of concern are discussed informally within families.  If necessary,
people contact a village elder or official they trust to express their needs, but their chosen
representative may have little influence on village matters.
How can we achieve functional and stable cooperation within the village and between the
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political levels that a problem in fisheries exists.  Secondly, policy concerning fisheries
management, where it exists, is not communicated to village level, let alone implemented.
The centralized political and social structure obstructs co-management efforts in the region
and also hinders effective participation of all the stakeholders.
Obviously, co-management efforts should be adapted to the local situation.  Instead of trying
to change local structures, we have to find a way to use them, keeping in mind the various
incentives at work in the region.  Existing or revitalized institutions, such as sasi and the
Latupati, could be tools to promote exchange of information among the various levels of
management.  To combat the lack of awareness of fisheries and management issues requires
extension work and discussions on all levels.  Here, NGOs and universities as well as
government departments have important roles to play.  Once there is agreement on the need
to manage the resources, it could still be difficult to unite the fishers and other villagers for
collective action and participation in management.  There are no village structures that allow
a high level of participation.
One option would be to play it according to current norms and that would mean that the
village head plays a key role.  The risk is that with re-elections or political instability, the
quality and consistency of management would be adversely affected.  A second approach
would be to base the institution on a more stable authority, such as the church or an adat
institution such as sasi, or some amalgam of the two.  In such cases, leadership would remain
stable regardless of election terms of the village government.  The management institution
could either be formally nested in the village government, as has already been instituted in
the village of Itawaka, or be more autonomous and strongly adat-based, as in Haruku.  If kept
truly at arm’s length from the village government, the institution would require independent
legal standing and authority.  Otherwise, turf disputes with the village government and other
enforcement agencies could jeopardize its function.
18.6.2 Legal basis
Legal researchers have pointed out that, under various national laws, the village head has a
responsibility to ensure that local resources are managed to provide an optimal level of income
for his community.  Sasi, an institution that combines the authority of the village head with
the legitimacy and ethics of adat, is seen (Lokollo et al. 1996; Brouwer, forthcoming) to be the
logical institution for the management and conservation of inshore coral reefs that lie within
village territories.
Our results show that the villages, and in particular villages with a sasi institution, already
perform many management functions (Table 5.2), including, in some cases, the collection of
resource rents. This key role is, however, not acknowledged through any explicit legal right
of tenure or management. Formal recognition and support of local community rights and
responsibilities would help to ensure a solid base for building more competent local resource
management institutions.
There are various options for providing a legal basis for local management bodies, including
decrees by the Governor, Bupati or Kotamadya and promulgation of a provincial law (Perda).
Another option, previously discussed by Zerner (1992), is through the amendment of the
national Fisheries Act No. 9, 1985 together with an amendment of Law No. 5, 1979 on the
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Once provided with a defined legal mandate, villages could formally delegate management
duties to a local sasi institution and kewang.  The perpetuation of sasi  (as opposed to the
introduction of a totally new institution) would be an asset in that compliance would be
encouraged.  Participation of religious leaders would also be an asset.  With a local institution
involving respected traditional and religious leaders, resource users would feel secure.  Some
mechanism to encourage participation of all stakeholders would have to be developed so
that control would not rest entirely in the hands of local elites, as this is unlikely to be acceptable
to new generations of Mollucans.  The management of inshore resources would be even more
effective if local institutions were involved not only in local monitoring and enforcement but
also as partners in development planning and implementation, stock assessment and
allocation, licensing etc.  This would lead to a situation in which inshore marine resources
were managed under a system of co-management.
18.6.3 Strengths of sasi
Basic management concepts
Although taking many forms, the sasi institution does typically involve concepts and structures
that are important in any management regime, including many that have positive implications
for conservation.  This accepted set of norms provides an efficient base for the development
of a modernized co-management system.  Concepts and activities central to sasi include:
1. The concept of open and closed areas/open and closed seasons.
2. The concept of community tenure rights over a marine area.
3. The concept of limiting access to resources.
4. Controlled harvest and distribution of benefits.
5. Locally developed and agreed-upon regulations. These may be specific to the village,
(limitation of gear types, size of fish or shellfish harvestable) or may reinforce national
laws (prohibition of blast fishing, poisons).
6. Local wardens or enforcers (the kewang) who have defined rules of process as well as
prescribed sanctions to impose.
7. A responsibility shared by all residents to report violations of sasi rules.
8. Methods in place for advising all residents at regular intervals of the substance of sasi
rules.
9. An overall goal of improving or maintaining community welfare which, being rooted
in adat or the concept of the unity of man with nature, is consistent with modern
concepts of sustainable use.
10. A hierarchical institutional structure wherein various tasks are divided among clearly
defined bodies (i.e., the village government, kewang besar, marine kewang, land kewang,
a kewang for land dispute settlement, etc.)
11. Low or no financial cost to the formal government i.e., kewang members and church
leaders involved are not paid, and local government offices may, in fact, receive income
from the controlled harvest and sale of communal resources.
12. Resiliency and the ability to evolve.
Efficiency and legitimacy
Sasi based on adat provides an efficient base on which to build co-management because
important management concepts are already in the minds of the people and have cultural
validity.  Also, there are demonstrable social and environmental benefits to sasi as a local
management institution, and a clearly identified need to reinforce inadequate centralized
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Pressure from religious leaders (the church and to a lesser extent, the mosque) plays an
important role in compliance to sasi rules, reducing enforcement costs.  Religious leaders
should not be left out of future management institutions as they are important supporters.
Traditional enforcers (kewang) are respected and have more legitimacy in the eyes of villagers
than do the police, who may be seen as arbitrary and distant. However, it is important that a
local enforcement body (kewang) be able to act independent of the village head (i.e., hold
positions that do not change with each new leader). Its members also need appropriate tools/
infrastructure and access to training to allow them to do their job.
The role of the village head is the key to the success of sasi as well as other local marine
management efforts.  However, he must be a true choice of the people, respected and trusted.
His power must also be balanced by a management institution that has some independence.
Otherwise, our evidence suggests that compliance will suffer and management will not
succeed.  The local government should be formally allowed and encouraged to incorporate
traditional structures (including, but not necessarily limited to, the kewang).
If there is a collective fishing effort, it works as long as the benefits are shared among the
participants according to accepted tradition.  Similarly, the harvesting of collective village
resources under sasi works as long as the benefits are seen to be shared or used for the common
good.  If not, the regulations are undermined.  In the Indonesian context, the power of a
respected village head to command and use resource rents is often accepted because he is
assumed to be working for the general good.  However, because in some cases the village
head lacks legitimacy, his power must always be balanced by transparency in financial
management and development planning.  Under the right conditions, sasi offers a model for
income generation for the local government.
Resilience
Sasi has declined through time since at least the 1940s.  Losses of part or all of the institution
in individual villages were related to a wide range of contextual factors.  When confusion,
uncertainty, or conflict weakened the leadership, problems with enforcement and compliance
often followed and the people abandoned sasi.  It went through a critical period of challenge
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when village government structures were, in theory, separated
from traditional adat leadership.  The fact that many villages succeeded in integrating
traditional and modern styles of leadership allowed adat leaders and their institutions to thrive
in some quarters.  However, the 1990s appear to hold another serious challenge: a general
decline in social cohesion and the passing away of the generation of elders that holds the
sacred knowledge base of sasi.  This valuable institution could be seriously impaired but sasi,
like adat, will never die.  It is firmly entrenched in the hearts and minds of Moluccan islanders.
Both in those villages where it is actually practiced as well as in some villages that have had
no sasi institution in living memory, sasi was perceived as a positive and helpful element for
increasing income and security.  No newly developed institution erected on modern
management principles could ever attain the spiritual dimension that gives sasi its essential
resilience.  It is, therefore, important that determined and well co-ordinated efforts are made
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18.6.4  Weaknesses of sasi
The drawbacks of flexibility
It must be remembered that, as Zerner (1992) asserts, “Attempts to create or strengthen such
institutions (i.e., sasi) must be based upon a realistic assessment of the motives, ethics, interest,
and cultural conceptions which drive local actors”.  On one hand, co-management
arrangements developed in future should, like sasi, be adaptive and flexible so as to increase
resilience.  On the other hand, there are increasing demands for income, both by individuals
and governments, and the temptations of emerging international markets.  In this context,
the flexibility of sasi can be seen as risky. The resources could end up being efficiently, or even
ruthlessly exploited for the benefit of local or outside elites.  For that reason, flexibility must
be counterbalanced by introducing some minimum standards so that all villages enjoy some
reasonable level of resource protection and management.
Lack of financial resources
One problem facing sasi as an institution is lack of funding to support kewang work.  Kewang
members are volunteers whose incentives are social standing and a sense of responsibility.
While this is good in terms of sustainability of the institution, the problem arises when the
kewang tries to do its job.  Rarely does the group own any enforcement equipment.  Members
do receive the proceeds from fines and may be granted occasional sums of money from the
village to facilitate meetings.  However, they have no access to support for training and
networking, except when their village is involved in some NGO or government project.
Limited access to new information and alternative technologies
The lack of communication along formal fisheries management channels, weak or non-existent
environmental education, lack of access to new technologies and technical information, and
dearth of valid catch statistics and stock assessment data all inhibit progress toward fisheries
co-management both within and outside of sasi.
Limited scope
Sasi is currently applied only to a few species and positive effects in terms of habitat protection
are often accidental rather than planned.  Sasi has also disappeared from many villages.  The
question remains whether sasi can be successfully built upon and extended to cover more
species and perhaps even entire fishing grounds, and be workable regardless of the size,
economic condition, heterogeneity or religion of the fishing community.
Management of the pelagic fishery, which is the key fishery for most villages, requires a
management institution that is much broader in scope than sasi currently is.  Sasi applies only
to the village territory, or inshore waters.  The deep-water fishery involves not only villagers
but also a range of stakeholders that does not have ties to local fishing villages.  The village
level institution requires a place in negotiating access and withdrawal rights for artisanal
fishers in offshore waters, but to date, no sasi practitioners have ventured into this area.  If/
when they do, they will need to engage or be nested in a larger institution operating on
regional, provincial and higher levels.  Presently, there is no identifiable lead agency dedicated
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The influence of urbanization, population growth and modernization
Possibly the least effective and most eroded forms of marine sasi can be seen on Ambon Island,
close to the largest regional urban center and a rapidly developing consumer culture.  Here,
out of 22 villages checked, we documented only two villages with marine sasi.  Evans et al.
(1997) gathered information from a further five villages, and from these five, there was only
one incidence of marine sasi in one dusun of the town of Tulehu.  Thus the known incidence of
marine sasi on rural Ambon Island (not more than 11%) is much lower than on the Lease
Islands, and would be even less if the urban satellite villages were included in the computation.
Towns and satellites of urban centers are more likely to have lost the institution compared to
small rural villages.  There also seems to be a correlation between the persistence of sasi and
the size of population, with sasi being most prevalent and active where village population is
between 2,000 and 3,000 persons.
People in the suburbs of Ambon, where there is no marine sasi, are no longer primarily occupied
by farming and fishing.  Farmland has been built up and the inner Ambon Harbor, formerly
a rich fishery, is now degraded and polluted to the point that fishers are rarely seen on its
waters.  Whereas the isolated coastal villages of Lease Islands are typically dominated by
either Christian or Muslim inhabitants and by a small number of founding clans, the urban
suburbs and satellite villages around the inner harbor are highly mixed in terms of religion
and cultural heritage.  It seems that an adat-based institution such as sasi, with its structure
linked to hereditary family lines, cannot survive under such heterogeneous urban conditions.
The impact of urbanization as seen in patterns of loss of sasi seems to have set in early on
Ambon Island, which has historically been the seat of government.
Powerful externalities affect fishers and their resources over time, including new world-market
demands for marine resources, collapsing clove prices, monetary and political instability, and
climate change.  Such conditions have lured or driven Maluku people to increase pressure on
marine resources in the past.  Thus there are incentives to over-fishing and destructive fishing
which are direct challenges to sasi or any other management institution.  Increasing
consumerism has followed the introduction of electricity and mass media to the villages.
Changing values and priorities of the younger generation are seen by sasi practitioners and
villagers, in general, as a threat to social stability and in particular, to adat institutions.
Vulnerability of sasi to externalities
The turbulent cultural and social history of Maluku and the impact of national development
policy (i.e., industrial fisheries expansion, mineral exploitation on small islands) add further
layers of complexity.  Because it has no basis in law, sasi is very vulnerable to these externalities.
However, because of its resilience, the institution has so far withstood the pressures.
A major development such as base metal and gold mining proposed for the Lease Islands is
the type of external threat that has the potential to destroy sasi.  For example, Haruku is one
of the best examples of active and evolving community-based environmental management.
Here the lompa fish resource, normally protected under sasi rules, is under threat from mining
exploration in the upper watershed.  Even though the villagers claim the land is being explored,
they have no power whatsoever to control the exploration.  If the mine goes ahead, the villagers
will probably have to be moved and the traditional culture and institutions will be gravely
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18.6.5 Relevance of sasi in the context of Maluku’s changing demography
In our sample of 508 Maluku fishers, we noted that the profile of fishers is changing.  Older
generations are predominantly Christian: the younger generation includes more Muslims,
often Butonese immigrants, with no links to the traditional power structure of Maluku villages
and, therefore, lacking the incentive to comply with sasi on the basis of its association with
adat tradition.  Sasi has survived in a larger proportion of Christian villages, but where it still
exists, marine sasi in Muslim villages is strong and often functions as a mechanism to retrieve
resource rents from the village territory.  The question is whether a management institution
designed for the future, but based on marine sasi, can be made relevant to the increasing
numbers of immigrants entering the fishery.
18.7 Applicability of Sasi
Co-management is defined as a sharing of responsibility and/or authority between the
government and the resource users at local levels, in order to manage a certain kind of resource.
Co-management should not be considered as the only strategy for resolving all conflicts and
issues of fishery management, but rather as one set of management alternatives that may be
suitable for a certain region and certain conditions.  Considering the history and relative success
over time of sasi in Maluku, as well as the reality of the jurisdictional rights of the national
government, co-management with a strong local component seems to be particularly suitable
for those fisheries resources currently claimed under adat law (hak ulayat) by coastal communities.
In other words, sasi seems best suited for its current role, which is management of resources
within the marine village territory i.e., inside the boundaries of the coral reef slope.  Of particular
interest are the monitoring and enforcement functions that are currently beyond the ability of
police, navy and the Fisheries Service to provide.  Devolution of appropriate formal powers to
the village level would greatly increase the effectiveness and efficiency of these aspects of fisheries
management in Maluku.  This devolution would have to be a gradual process involving trials
at pilot sites because there is not yet local capacity for habitat monitoring, stock assessment or
effective enforcement, nor is there a general appreciation for management or conservation efforts
as options to redress issues of resource decline and sectoral conflict.
In seeking to apply sasi to a broader range of species, practitioners will have to confront
resistance to any move that restricts access to essential food fish.  Fishers of central Maluku
are heavily dependent on marine resources for their livelihood, and have a pragmatic attitude
towards rules.  Therefore, if the need arises, they expect rules to be bent to allow them to
survive.  To be acceptable, a management system must, like sasi, allow applications for
exemptions to harvest bans.  Otherwise, fishers will simply non-comply and the system will
break down in times of economic stress.
Higher-level institutions, that have research capacity and access to scientific information,
need encouragement to serve the communities as well as national needs.  In addition, a clear
lead agency for fisheries management is needed. Community participation in co-management
of offshore reefs and fishing grounds that are important to local food security requires
facilitation.  Higher-level bodies could support village institutions, coordinate local
enforcement efforts and facilitate decision-making among villages and between sectors.
However, to gain respect and cooperation from artisanal fishers, any such higher institution
must acknowledge sasi and adat leaders.  One strategy would be to look for ways to build on
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We have noted that the traditional sasi style of resource management, involving ceremony,
volunteerism and inherited status, works best in homogeneous villages in the 1,000-3,000
population range.  Larger and more culturally mixed municipal units probably require a
different management approach, although this could still be developed under the sasi “banner”.
Practitioners seeking to revitalize or re-invent sasi must pay attention to the demographic
shift in fishing communities and the different cultural ethos of new generations.
18.7.1 Support for revitalization of sasi as an element in co-management
The recent evolution of sasi in the direction of marine resource conservation, such as
implementation of gear restrictions in Haruku and Ihamahu, can be linked to interventions
from Pattimura University and Ambon-based environmental NGOs (particularly Yayasan
Hualopu) active in marine conservation work in Maluku.  Recently, a government program
(COREMAP) has also begun several projects aimed at conserving coral reefs through local
level management strategies.  These outsiders enter villages with external funding and
stimulate debate and change through research, mapping, and public education.
NGO efforts to support and revitalize local level resource management are still limited in
scope and effect. Because of the general suspicion of NGO activities in many government
circles, NGO interventions must be very careful not to alienate government staff.  In eastern
Indonesia, NGOs are few in number, their level of regional, national and international
networking is still limited, and advocacy in government circles has only just begun.  Advocacy
by NGOs has always been difficult in the political climate of Indonesia but this may change if
the current push for democratization and decentralization is successful.
18.7.2 Recommendations for government support of sasi
A recent document prepared by policy and law specialists (Sopacua et al. 1998) recommends
that the government acknowledges existing sasi systems and revitalizes sasi where it has been
lost, or establishes new co-management systems.  Specifically, the recommendations are:
• Recognize and formalize sasi and kewang as components in a national co-management
structure. Sasi should not be limited to a few commercial species, but should be
extended to maintain the biodiversity of resources,  especially indigenous, endemic
species and key habitats (i.e., mangroves, sea grass and coral reefs).
• Provide local/traditional institutions with knowledge and skills to improve their
capacities and increase networking for information exchange.  Workshops and training
that cover technical, management, scientific and technological aspects could be
facilitated by government agencies, research institutions and NGOs.
• Development of the co-management concept is a collective responsibility. The
government should support the community in managing resources by providing
infrastructure and technical capacity. NGOs should also support the process
by offering their technical assistance, knowledge and skills as needed.
• Together with villagers, establish zoning of marine areas (open access, limited use
and protected zones) for management and conservation purposes.
• Define and control fishing zones for both large-scale and traditional fishers, and renew
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• Regional spatial planning concepts should be developed with an integrated socio-
economic, cultural, geographical and ecological approach.  Sasi, as an adat institution
and component of co-management, already encompasses these factors.
• To develop and promote the concept of co-management, involve communities in
biophysical monitoring, for instance, through recording fish catches, use of other
resources, and sea water quality.  The data collected could be used to develop and
modify local fishery regulations which are consistent with the higher regulations at
provincial and national levels.
• Replace the “top-down” approach which has been used by the government in
implementing development projects with a process of dialogue which places the
community at the center of the objectives of the development projects.
• In all planning and management of development, local institutions should be
empowered to collaborate effectively with other institutions through the sharing of
roles and responsibilities.
• Take steps to increase the ability of local institutions to deal with exogenous factors
such as mining on small islands, or the escalation of national large-scale fishing fleets.
This is an important consideration when drafting the legal framework for allocation
of rights and responsibilities to various levels.  In the absence of adequate local power,
such exogenous pressures can nullify local management efforts.
18.8 Lessons from Sasi that can be Applied Outside of Maluku
What have we learned from sasi that could help in the design of local management systems
elsewhere in Southeast Asia?  Sasi is an institution embedded in local culture and therefore
not transferable as a unit to other cultural contexts.  However, it provides a valuable example
for the development of local management systems.  Sasi has proven that local rules pertaining
to gear types, access, closed areas, seasons, etc. can be successfully developed and applied at
the local level by villagers who have relatively low levels of formal education.  In fact, these
villagers also have only a hazy concept of resource management per se.  In the absence of a
science-based rationale for management, there has nevertheless evolved a resilient and, within
its narrow scope of application, a demonstrably effective institution.  This has resulted from
an ethic of working together for the benefit of the community, attachment to a cultural tradition,
and the tendency to comply with sanctions based in religious beliefs. New generations of
Mollucans may require more modern and materialistic rationales for participating in the
institution.  For this and other reasons, flexibility and the power to tailor operational rules to
local needs and priorities are essential.  In developing modern systems, it seems that an optimal
population size for a local management unit could be in the order of 1,000-3,000 people.
Sasi also provides an alternative to the western idea that local management must be highly
democratic and inclusive.  In a culture such as Indonesia’s, highly participatory democratic
structures are unknown and untested.  Fisheries stakeholders are passive but not uncritical.
They accept a centralized, male-dominated and elitist decision-making body only if it has
credibility and is seen to function for the general good.  This paternalistic model is potentially
very efficient and cost-effective, putting little demand on the time of busy fishers, farmers and
women, and is also culturally acceptable.  People usually resist change and are more likely to
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current elites by allowing the system to become inflexible and non-transparent.  Should
democratic ideals one day become the norm in Asian coastal villages, the management institution
must be able to evolve to accommodate increased need for participation by stakeholders.
18.8.1 Recommendations for future research
The sasi institution has sufficient benefits that can and should be used as the basis for building
local level management institutions. Sasi, however, takes many forms and it requires further
study to determine the optimal configuration. Issues to be addressed include:
• The relative costs and benefits of lelang (auction or sale of resource extraction rights)
as opposed to communal or individual harvesting.
• The position of kewang relative to village government and religious leaders.
• Optimizing collaboration among enforcement bodies (kewang, village head, church,
police, navy).
• Potential for local monitoring and evaluation of resource health and management
performance.
• Pros and cons of hereditary versus selected or elected leadership in different situations.
• Optimal level of ceremony and adat tradition.
• Developing collaborative structures with higher government levels.
• Raising consciousness and knowledge levels both among villagers and government
staff with respect to resource management principles and options.
Pilot projects to test a number of alternative models for such local co-management institutions
are needed.  Before starting a pilot project, additional information would be useful, as there
may well be indigenous management practices not yet documented which could be usefully
incorporated into a revitalized marine sasi institution.  To date, only limited portions of Maluku
have been investigated.   Extension of the inventory to cover all of Ambon, Seram, Buru and the
Banda Islands, followed by investigation of the Maluku Islands to the north and south, would
provide a better picture of how widespread sasi and other village-level management efforts are.
During this study, it was noted that blast fishing is almost always blamed on “outsiders”.  It
would be instructive to see who blast fishers are and explore their motivations since this
activity is an immediate threat to fisheries resources.  It would be interesting to look at the
degree of overlap of blast fishers and sasi villages.
More detailed biological assessments inside and outside of guarded sasi areas would be
extremely useful in quantifying the impact of different forms of sasi.  Is a habitat better
protected by private guards (lelang situation) or by the kewang?  Which fisheries rules directly
or indirectly protect fisheries habitats and to what degree?  Biological research should also be
performed, comparing sasi areas of different sizes to investigate impacts on fish numbers and
diversity.  Is there an optimal size for a protected area?  Would “no-take” zones located in or
near sasi areas increase productivity?
In this study, we focused on Christian villages but there is evidence that sasi as practiced in
Muslim villages is different.  Case studies to clarify the role of adat and religious leaders, to
identify key contextual factors and incentives, and to study resilience in Muslim villages, are
needed.  This is particularly important in the light of the changing demography  (i.e., increasing
proportion of non-indigenous Muslims) of central Maluku.
There is also a need to follow up on progress of revitalization in Hulaliu, Tuhaha, and other
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Once more information is available, a small number of alternative sasi-based institutions could
be devised, combining what appear to be the best attributes of the wide range of forms of sasi
practiced currently.  These alternatives could then be tested at pilot sites and the results be
used as a guide in the formulation of fisheries policy and legal reform.284        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
 Glossary
Adat Customary law and ritual practices
Anak Kewang The persons employed by the kepala kewang
Akar tuba Poisonous plant (used to make poison for fishing)
Bagan Lift net
Borok Fish broker, middleman
Buka Open
Dagang Trade
Dusun Literally garden; also subdivision of village (traditional hamlet)
Jaring Fishing net
Kampung Village
Kapitan Traditional war leader
Kebun Forest gardens
Kelapa Coconuts
Kepala soa Traditional clan leader
Kepala desa (kades) Village head
Kepala kewang Head of the kewang
Kepala soa Hereditary clan leader
Ketua adat Chief adat authority
Kewang Traditional law enforcers in the village
Latupati General assembly for village leaders
Lelang Auction
Lola Top shell (Trochus niloticus)
LMD Formal village council
LKMD Implementing organization of the LMD
Matakau Curse or sign that something is placed under a taboo
Marga Family name









Raja Village leader descending from the “royal” clan
Rumpon Fish aggregating device (floating)
Saniri besar Legislative village council
Saniri negeri Traditional village government (executive body)
Sasi Sets of rules which regulate resource use and social behavior
Sasi lelang Auctioned sasi (harvest rights)
Sasi darat Sasi on land (terrestrial resources)
Sasi gereja Church sasi
Sasi adat Village sasi
Sasi laut Sasi in the sea and rivers (marine resources)
Sewa labuhan Rented harvesting rights
Soa Clan
Tohor Juncture of coral reef and drop-off
Tuan Negeri Adat leader (literally lords of the land)
Tuan Tanah Clan leader from one of the founding families
Teripang Sea cucumber
Tutup Closed
Uku Tribal groupReferences        285
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Appendix 1: Manta tow survey data
Appendix 1A: Survey of Nolloth village marine territory, 14 October 1997, from south to north.*
Tow Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb Note
 # corals hard corals craters
corals
1 3 3 4 - + + yes Wailesi Bay, at south edge of sasi area.
2 2 3 3 — - + yes Wailesi Bay.
3 2 3 3 - + + no Reef crest about 200 m out from rocky beach.
4 2 3 3 + + + no In front of sandy beach near Tanjung Wailalone.
5 2 3 3 - — + no Some sandy bottom between corals.
6 2 3 3 - — + no Wailalone at kewang guard house. Mixed corals
and sand; beach sandy.
7 - 8 No data: sharp drop to deep water. North of
Wailalone.
9 3 3 2 - - + no Start of the best trochus harvesting area.
10 1 4 1 — — + no Tinauw, part of best trochus harvesting area,
at guard house.
11 3 3 2 — 0 + yes Tinauw, near Tanjung Hatiwan.  Mixed sand/
coral bottom.  Part of best harvesting area.
12 3 2 2 — — + no Reef edge 300 - 400 m off beach.  Lots of sandy
bottom. Good trochus area.
13 3 3 2 + + + yes Hatiwan area. Mixed bottom.  End of best
harvesting area.
14 2 3 2 ++ — + no Hatiwan/Batu Goyang. Large sandy bottom.
15 1 4 1 — — + no Hatiwan. Diverse corals; 2 - 4 m deep.
16 2 3 1 - - + no Hatiwan, wide exposed reef shelf, few trochus.
17 0 0 0 +++ 0 - no Sandy bottom; no coral reef.
18 2 3 1 ++ ++ + yes Last tow in sasi area.
19 1 3 1 ++ - + no Non-sasi area at Umisini, reef slope close to shore.
20 2 3 2 + + + no From Hatule kaslekano to Hatusun; narrow reef
close to shore.
21 2 3 3 — + - no From Hatusun to Asal.
22 1 3 3 — — - no Asal area. North of here are rocks and dead
intertidal reef flats, no living coral reef. Rocky
 shore with cobbles.
* Numbers refer to coral cover categories, i.e., 0 = no hard bottom for corals, 1 = <10% living cover on hard bottom, 2
= 11 - 30%, 3 = 31 - 50%, 4 = 51 - 75%, 5 = 76 - 100%.  Abundance indicators: 0 = absent, — = rare, - = uncommon, + =
common, ++ = abundant, +++ = superabundant.
Appendix 1B: Manta tow data from Ihamahu territory, south of Nolloth sasi area.*
Tow Deadcorals Live hard corals Soft corals  Sand Rubble Fish Bomb craters
13 3 1 - + + + Y e s
2 4 3 1 - ++ n.d. Yes
3 4 3 1 - ++ n.d. Yes
* Numbers refer to coral cover categories, i.e., 0 = no hard bottom for corals, 1 = <10% living cover on hard bottom, 2
= 11 - 30%, 3 = 31 - 50%, 4 = 51 - 75%, 5 = 76 - 100%.  Abundance indicators: 0 = absent, — = rare, - = uncommon, + =
common, ++ = abundant, +++ = superabundant.Appendices        289
Appendix 1D: Survey results for Toisapu to Hutumuri.*
Area Tow Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb Notes
#  corals  hard corals craters
corals
Toisapu 1 3 3 2 +++ + + yes Start on south edge of Toisapu cove.
2 2 3 1 ++ - + yes Sand between rocks and corals;
2 - 4 m deep.
3 1 3 1 + - - no Rocky bottom with sand patches;
few corals; no beach.
4 1 2 1 +++ - - no Hard bottom.
Lapaut 5 1 3 2 - - ++ no Cliff shore. Depth 2 - 3 m.
6 1 3 2 - - + no Rocky bottom, 3 - 5 m deep,
sand patches. Sandy beach.
7 1 3 2 - - ++ no Sandy bottom, then rocks.
8 1 2 3 - - + no 4 - 8 m deep.
Hutumuri 9 3 2 1 - - + no Depth 5 - 10 m. Bottom hard with
Head land sand patches.
10 3 2 1 - - - no Mostly rocky bottom.
11 3 2 1 - - - no Hutumuri Bay. Mostly hard bottom.
12 3 3 1 - + + yes Water more shallow.  Rock with
sandy strips.
Hutumuri 13 2 3 2 - + + yes Mostly hard bottom.
Village
14 2 3 2 ++ - + no 1 - 3 m deep.
15 2 2 3 - - + no Bottom rocky.   5 m deep.
16 3 2 2 - - + no Rock with sand patches.
End in middle of Bay.
* Numbers refer to coral cover categories, i.e., 0 = no hard bottom for corals, 1 = <10%, 2 = 11 - 30%, 3 = 31 - 50%, 4 =
51 - 75%, 5 = 76 - 100%. Abundance indicators: 0 = absent, — = rare, - = uncommon, + = common, ++ = abundant, +++
= superabundant.
Appendix 1C: Survey data from marine territories of Haruku and Sameth.*
Tow Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb Notes
corals hard corals craters
corals
1 3-4 3 1-2 - +++ + yes Start at north end of Sameth petuanan.
2 3-4 3 2 - ++ ++ yes
3 3-4 1-2 1 ++ ++ - no
4 4 2 1-2 - ++ - yes Site of butterfly fish count.
5 4 2 3-4 ++ ++ - yes Off a rocky point.
6 3 1 4 + + - no Facing sandy beach.
7   3,then  1then 4 then +  - - no Bottom sandy. No survey over sand to
none 0 0 then south of here.
+++
8 0 0 0 ++ - - no In front of Sameth graveyard.
9 0 0 0 +++ - - no Haruku territory, seaward of rock groin.
10 2 1 1 +++ - - no Sea grass bed.
11 1 1 1 + - - no Sasi area, sand and sea grass.
12 1 1 1 +++ - - no Sasi area in front of kewang house, almost at river.
13 3 1 1 ++ - - no River mouth; corals covered in sediment. A few
porites, fire corals and soft corals are alive.
* Numbers refer to coral cover categories, i.e., 0 = no hard bottom for corals, 1 = <10% living cover on hard bottom, 2
= 11 - 30%, 3 = 31 - 50%, 4 = 51 - 75%, 5 = 76 - 100%.  Abundance indicators: 0 = absent, — = rare, - = uncommon, + =
common, ++ = abundant, +++ = superabundant.290        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Appendix 1F: Seri cove survey data from boundary with Wemi to Tanjung Vanahu.*
Tow Dead Live Soft Sand Rubble Fish Bomb Notes
 # corals hard corals  craters
corals
1 2 2 3 — - + no Depth 4 m.   Bottom mixed rocks and sand,
with corals.
2 3 2 2 - - - no Depth 4 - 5 m. Mostly hard bottom.
3 4 1 3 - - — no In front of main path/road into village.
4 4 1 3 - - — no Half way point along the intertidal flat.
5 2 2 2 - - + no Deep water off cliff face at end of transect,
with depth over 10 m.
6 3 1 3 - - + no Depth 5 - 10 m; hard bottom.
7 3 2 3 - - - no Depth 5 - 10 m, hard bottom, corals few.
Narrow fringe of boulders along shore.
8 2 3 2 - - + no Cliff steep into deep water.  Over 10 m deep,
less than 25 m from shore.  Narrow boulder beach.
Bottom hard, boulders.
9 2 2 1 - - - no Bedrock beach.  Depth 5 - 10 m, 25 m from shore.
10 1 1 1 - - - no Steep bedrock shore plunging to 10 m.
Hard bottom.
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 no Cobble and sand beach.
(rocks) Deep water 10 m from shore.
12 2 2 1 — - - no Depth 2-4 m.  Rocky bottom.
13 2 2 3 - - — no As above.
* Numbers refer to coral cover categories, i.e., 0 = no hard bottom for corals, 1 = <10%, 2 = 11 - 30%, 3 = 31 - 50%, 4 =
51 - 75%, 5 = 76 - 100%. Abundance indicators: 0 = absent, — = rare, - = uncommon, + = common, ++ = abundant, +++
= superabundant.
Appendix 1E: Survey results for Dusun Airlow in front of Kampung Wemi.*
Tow Dead Live Soft  Sand Rubble Fish Bomb Notes
 # corals hard corals craters
corals
12 2 3—— +no Pintu Kota area. Steep cliff with fringe of
barnacles and seaweed drops to 10 m depth.
Rocky bottom.
2 3 2 3 — — + no Cliff with a narrow intertidal strip.
Bottom mixed rocks and sand.  5 - 10 m deep.
3 3 2 3 - — - no Bottom mixed sand and rocks.  4 - 5 m deep.
4 2 3 1 - - + no Bottom rocks, sand and massive corals.
5 2 3 1 - - + no Intertidal flat more extensive.
Corals more varied.
62 3 1 - -+n o
* Numbers refer to coral cover categories, i.e., 0 = no hard bottom for corals, 1 = <10%, 2 = 11 - 30%, 3 = 31 - 50%, 4 =
51 - 75%, 5 = 76 - 100%. Abundance indicators: 0 = absent, — = rare, - = uncommon, + = common, ++ = abundant, +++
= superabundant.Appendices        291
Appendix 2: Overview of 28 villages in performance study
Village Economic Sasi any Marine Dominant Average Average
score * kind sasi religion age years of
status education
Nolloth Mean 8.1000 yes yes Christian 47.47 6.20
N3 03 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
Std. Deviation 1.9001 11.80 .76
Haruku Mean 8.3333 yes yes Christian 50.47 7.10
N3 03 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
Std. Deviation 2.3391 11.33 2.29
Kabau Mean 8.8182 yes yes Muslim 52.00 6.00
N1 11 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.4008 10.97 3.00
Pelauw Mean 7.9167 yes yes Muslim 48.38 5.81
N1 21 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
Std. Deviation 2.0207 14.23 3.37
Makariki Mean 8.9231 yes yes Christian 50.27 6.40
N1 31 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.1394 .26 14.17 1.06
Ihamahu Mean 8.2667 yes yes Christian 54.13 6.20
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.4044 8.88 .77
Siri-Sori Islam Mean 9.2143 yes yes Muslim 45.73 8.40
N1 41 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 1.8472 7.68 2.03
Itawaka Mean 8.3333 yes yes Christian 51.20 6.60
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.4398 13.47 1.68
Paperu Mean 8.1333 yes yes Christian 46.67 8.13
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.0307 12.12 2.72
Porto Mean 8.5333 yes yes Christian 51.20 7.40
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.0999 12.23 2.23
Morela Mean 9.2000 yes yes Muslim 42.93 7.47
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 1.6125 9.92 2.72
Seith Mean 7.2000 yes no Muslim 37.47 6.20
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 1.9712 11.58 .77
Tengah-Tengah Mean 8.2667 yes yes Muslim 64.80 6.40
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 1.5337 5.57 1.06
Rutah Mean 9.5385 no no Muslim 46.36 6.79
N1 31 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4
Std. Deviation 2.0662 10.95 2.22
Soahuku Mean 9.6364 yes lost Muslim 40.86 8.14
N1 11 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4
Std. Deviation 1.5015 .43 13.81 2.74
Batu dua Mean 8.4000 no no Muslim 46.40 6.40
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 1.2984 12.43 1.06
Hitu Mean 8.5385 no no Muslim 39.93 7.80
N1 31 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.3315 9.22 2.73
Tiow Mean 7.4667 no lost Muslim 40.80 7.20
N1 51 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.3563 .35 9.37 2.21292        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Village Economic Sasi any Marine Dominant Average Average
score * kind sasi religion age years of
status education
Eri Mean 9.2500 no no Muslim 41.47 7.00
N 1 2 1 5 1 5 1 51 51 5
Std. Deviation 1.5448 .26 10.99 2.17
Seilale Mean yes no Muslim 45.80 6.80
N1 5 1 5 1 1 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation .50 9.01 3.84
Iha Mean 7.7143 no lost Muslim 44.53 8.40
N1 41 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 1.7728 13.33 2.59
Ouw Mean 9.4545 no no Christian 45.60 6.40
N1 11 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 1.5076 7.91 1.55
Booi Mean 8.2308 no no Christian 41.93 6.40
N1 31 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.0064 11.83 1.06
Saparua kota Mean 8.1538 no lost Christian 45.93 8.87
N1 31 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
Std. Deviation 2.4099 11.16 3.04
Tuhaha Mean 8.7333 yes lost Christian 52.87 7.17
N3 03 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
Std. Deviation 1.9989 11.06 2.20
Hulaliu Mean 8.7000 no lost Christian 47.27 7.60
N3 03 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
Std. Deviation 2.1034 13.50 2.19
Seri Mean 8.6429 no lost Christian 42.41 7.14
N2 82 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9
Std. Deviation 1.4198 9.18 3.25
Hutumuri Mean 9.7407 no no Christian 47.23 7.20
N2 73 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
Std. Deviation 2.2633 .50 13.14 2.31
Total Mean 8.5696 47.08 7.06
N 460 508 508 504 508 508
Std. Deviation 2.0478 12.20 2.35
* = Considering boat, gear, house and land ownershipAppendices        293
Appendix 3: Comparative information/ statistics of
six case study villages
Appendix 3A: Types of fish most commonly caught in each case study village.
Fish type Local name Latin name Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
Coral Balobo Hemiramphus japonicus X
Batu-Batu Apogon niger XX X
Bobara Caranx melampygas XX XX X X
Bulana Mugil cephalus X
Gaca Lutjanus sp XX X
Garopa Epinephanus merra XX XX X X
Gora Holocentrus sp XX
Gorara Lutjanus basmira XX X
Gotana Acanthurus sp X
Hiu Carcharinus spp X
Kapas-kapas Gerres macrosoma XX
Lalosi Caesio spp XX
Mata Bulan Taractes sp X
Merah/kakap Lutjanus spp XX X X
Piskada Sphyraena spp X
Salmameti Upeneus spp XX X
Samandar Siganus fuscescens XX X X
Sikuda Lethrinus spp XX
Tatu Balistapus spp X
Pelagic Bae Etelis carbunculus X
Cakalang Katsuwonus pelamis XX XX X X
Julung Hemiramphus sajori XX
Kawalinya Selar cryonenopthalmus XX X X
Komu Auxis tharsard XX XX X X
Layar Histiophorus sp X
Lema Rastrelliger kanagurta XX X
Lompa Thryssa baelama XX
Make Sardinella sp XX X X
Momar Decaptherus macrosoma XX X X X
Puri / pura-pura Stolephorus  sp XX
Saku Albennes anastomella X
Sardencis/ Amblygaster sirm XX X
Sardinya
Silapa Pristipomoides sieboldi XX
Tatihu Thunnus corrdyla XX X X
Tenggiri Gymnosarda unicolor X
Tongkol Thunnus tonggol XX X
Tola/patola Caranx leptolepis XX
Tuing-tuing/
terbang Cypselurus sp XX X
Tuna Tuna sp XX
Bia Duri babi Acanthopleura spinosa X
Bia Makii Conus sp X
Bia Mata Bulan Turbo chrysostroma XX
Bia Mika Tridacna gigas X
Bia Warna Putih Cypraea sp X
Gurita Octopus sp X
Moluska Mollusca X
Sontong Sepia spp XX X
Udang Panulirus sp X
Note:  ikan terbang = tuing-tuing; kakap = merah.294        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Appendix 3B: Demographic information for case study villages.
Indicator Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri
(Toisapu)
Inhabitants 2546 2122 2202 2122 1991 3285 (1400)
Households 530 480 417 359 425 692 (264)
Avg. members 5 6 5 5 4 - 5 5
Christian pop. 100% 95% 90% 94% 90% 95%
Muslim pop 0 5% 10% 6% 10% 5%
Fishers* 40% 150 200 18 75 <15
Farmers n.d. 295 * 797 150 85%
Traders (toko) 18 16 few 24 20 45
Artisans few 89 incl.
laborers n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Laborers few 2 34 n.d. > 50
Government staff 44 42 >50 79 160 10%
Migration no data 70/year 25/year n.d. none n.d.
Tourism yes yes none none few few
Primary school 3 1 2 2 1 1
Junior high school none 1 — 1 none 1 (-)
Senior high school none 1 —- none none 1 (-)
Gas station 2 no no No
Food market 1 no — — no No
Drug store 2 no no no no No
Bank yes no no no no yes (no)
Health center no yes no yes no yes (no)
Water provision private and fresh, fresh, water public public
public pipe  pipe pumps water water
 wells supply supply
Septic tank yes yes yes yes (95) yes yes
Transportation bus, boat boat bus, mini-bus, bus, bus,
motorcycle speed boat  motorcycle motorcycle
Communication radio mail walky-talky mail telephone mail
telephone
Electricity yes yes yes yes yes yes
* Most people combine fishing and farming. In  Nolloth 30% fish part-time; of the registered fishers in Haruku,
only 20 fish full-time; in Tuhaha, most villagers fishing and farming.Appendices        295
Fishers related to ruling elite (soa besar)
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
46.7% 73.3% 33.3% 53.3% 20.7% 6.9% 39.3%
Religion of respondents
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Islam 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 7%
Protestant 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 60% 93%
% Fishers who are members of fishing organization / group
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
10% 3.3% 3.4% 20.0% 10.3% 0% 7.9%
% Fishers who are members of church/government groups
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
20.0% 20.0% 0% 33.3% 41.4% 23.3% 23.0%
Appendix 3C: Socio-economic data for case study villages.
Average age of respondents
Village Average years ± Std. Deviation (n)
Nolloth 47.47 ± 11.80 (30)
Haruku 50.47 ± 11.33 (30)
Tuhaha 52.87 ± 11.06 (30)
Hulaliu 47.27 ± 13.50 (30)
Seri 42.4 ± 9.18 (29)
Hutumuri 47.23 ± 13.14 (30)
Total 47.98 ± 12.04 (179)
Average years of education of respondents
Village Average years of education ± Std. Deviation (n)
Nolloth 6.20 ± .76 (30)
Haruku 7.10 ± 2.29 (30)
Tuhaha 7.17 ± 2.20 (30)
Hulaliu 7.60 ± 2.19 (30)
Seri 7.14 ± 3.25 (29)
Hutumuri 7.20 ± 2.31 (30)
Total 7.07 ± 2.29 (179)296        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Fishers’ opinion of sasi
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Important 100% 100% 90.0% 93.3% 46.4% 66.7% 83.1%
Useful 0% 0% 3.3% 3.3% 10.7% 6.7% 3.9%
Neutral 0% 0% 0% 3.3% 7.1% 3.3% 2.2%
Not very useful 0% 0% 6.7% 0% 10.7% 10.0% 4.5%
Not important 0% 0% 0% 0% 25.0% 13.3% 6.2%
% Respondents satisfied to be a fisher
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
86.2% 83.3% 96.7% 80.0% 86.2% 89.3% 86.9%
% Fishers who would change job if possible
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
20.0% 43.3% 31.0% 50.0% 53.6% 20.0% 36.6%
Job desired for children
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Fishery 17.9% 7.1% 6.7% 10.3% 3.6% 8.0% 8.9%
Farming 10.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.8%
Trade 0% 3.6% 3.3% 0% 0% 4.0% 1.8%
Civil service 61% 68% 73% 72% 75% 25% 64%
Wage labor 10.7% 0% 6.7% 6.9% 0% 16.0% 6.5%
Others 0% 21.4% 10.0% 10.3% 21.4% 44.0% 17.3%
% Fishers who collaborate with outsiders in fishing activities
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
10.0% 3.3% 13.8% 13.3% 20.7% 20.7% 13.6%
% Fishers owning a boat
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
None 30.0% 20.0% 30.0% 26.7% 21.4% 10.0% 23.0%
Outrigger canoe 63.3% 53.3% 63.3% 70.0% 78.6% 73.3% 66.9%
Motor boat 6.7% 26.7% 6.7% 3.3% 0% 16.7% 10.1%Appendices        297
% Fishers owning each gear type
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
None 23.3% 23.3% 26.7% 23.3% 17.9% 3.6% 19.9%
Hand line / spear 33.3% 30.0% 33.3% 40.0% 57.1% 32.1% 37.5%
Trap / cast net 0% 0% 0% 3.3% 0% 3.6% 1.1%
Set net 43.3% 46.7% 30.0% 23.3% 21.4% 35.7% 33.5%
Lift net / FAD 0% 0% 10.0% 10.0% 3.6% 25.0% 8.0%
Who buys fish and from what % of respondents?
Buyer Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Consumer 73.3% 70.0% 73.3% 96.6% 51.7% 46.7% 68.5%
Large trader / borok 3.3% 3.3% 0% 3.4% 0% 26.7% 6.2%
Retailer 16.7% 3.3% 23.3% 0% 44.8% 20.0% 18.0%
Wholesaler 6.7% 20.0% 3.3% 0% 0% 0% 5.1%
Others 0% 3.3% 0% 0% 3.4% 6.7% 2.2%
Where are fish sold?
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Local market 72.4% 76.7% 65.5% 96.6% 3.4% 17.2% 55.4%
Town market 17.2% 10.0% 20.7% 0% 93.1% 82.8% 37.1%
Regional market 3.4% 10.0% 3.4% 0% 3.4% 0% 3.4%
Foreign market 0% 0% 0% 3.4% 0% 0% .6%
Others 6.9% 3.3% 10.3% 0% 0% 0% 3.4%
Average external income per year (thousand Rp)
Village # respondents with external income Average external income Std. error
Nolloth 8 264 76.27
Haruku 10 344 88.60
Tuhaha 8 596 230.31
Hulaliu 11 486 296.57
Seri 2 775 725.00
Hutumuri 4 1585 1473.17
Overall average 43 548 160.12298        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Primary source of respondents’ income
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Fishing 83.3% 70.0% 80.0% 53.3% 86.2% 73.3% 74.3%
Farming 13.3% 30.0% 3.3% 26.7% 6.9% 10.0% 15.1%
Forestry 0% 0% 3.3% 0% 0% 0% .6%
Civil service 0% 0% 6.7% 10.0% 3.4% 3.3% 3.9%
Wage labor 0% 0% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 0% 1.7%
Handcrafts 0% 0% 0% 3.3% 0% 6.7% 1.7%
Trade 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3.3% .6%
Others 3.3% 0% 3.3% 3.3% 0% 3.3% 2.2%
Secondary source of income
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Fishing 22.7% 27.6% 21.1% 46.2% 10.7% 23.1% 25.3%
Farming 45.5% 51.7% 63.2% 34.6% 71.4% 61.5% 54.7%
Livestock 0% 0% 5.3% 0% 7.1% 11.5% 4.0%
Forestry 0% 6.9% 0% 0% 0% 3.8% 2.0%
Civil service 0% 0% 0% 3.8% 0% 0% .7%
Handcrafts 0% 0% 0% 3.8% 0% 0% .7%
Trade 9.1% 6.9% 5.3% 3.8% 3.6% 0% 4.7%
Others 22.7% 6.9% 5.3% 7.7% 7.1% 0% 8.0%
Tertiary source of income
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Fishing 20.0% 16.7% 15.4% 10.0% 18.2% 13.5%
Farming 28.6% 40.0% 16.7% 7.7% 10.0% 9.1% 15.4%
Livestock 14.3% 20.0% 0% 23.1% 80.0% 45.5% 34.6%
% Fishers engaging in communal fishing activities
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
80.0% 66.7% 73.3% 80.0% 48.3% 33.3% 63.7%Appendices        299
% Fishers opinion on need to change fisheries rules
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Strongly agree 30.0% 10.0% 21.4% 33.3% 17.2% 20.0% 22.0%
Agree 3.3% 40.0% 17.9% 30.0% 34.5% 16.7% 23.7%
Neutral 10.0% 20.0% 10.7% 10.0% 10.3% 16.7% 13.0%
Disagree 26.7% 6.7% 10.7% 0% 34.5% 30.0% 18.1%
Strongly disagree 30.0% 23.3% 39.3% 26.7% 3.4% 16.7% 23.2%
% Fishers who feel that all stakeholders should be involved in decision-making
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Strongly agree 72.4% 76.7% 82.8% 83.3% 37.9% 56.7% 68.4%
Agree 27.6% 20.0% 13.8% 16.7% 55.2% 36.7% 28.2%
Neutral 0% 3.3% 3.4% 0% 0% 0% 1.1%
Disagree 0% 0% 0% 0% 6.9% 6.7% 2.3%
% Who believe it acceptable to bend rules or ask for dispensation of sasi rules
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Strongly agree 33.3% 20.0% 34.5% 31.0% 6.9% 6.7% 22.0%
Agree 20.0% 20.0% 10.3% 24.1% 24.1% 6.7% 17.5%
Neutral 0% 3.3% 3.4% 0% 13.8% 10.0% 5.1%
Disagree 20.0% 30.0% 27.6% 17.2% 31.0% 50.0% 29.4%
Strongly disagree 26.7% 26.7% 24.1% 27.6% 24.1% 26.7% 26.0%
% Who believe it acceptable to sell harvest rights
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Strongly agree 23.3% 0% 16.7% 0% 6.9% 0% 7.9%
Agree 20.0% 10.0% 6.7% 6.7% 34.5% 13.8% 15.2%
Perceptions of village decision-making style
Decision- Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
making style
All agree 53.3% 44.8% 50.0% 43.3% 55.2% 58.6% 50.8%
Majority agree 23.3% 17.2% 10.0% 20.0% 13.8% 20.7% 17.5%
Head man decides 0% 0% 16.7% 10.0% 6.9% 3.4% 6.2%
Village gov’t decides 23.3% 37.9% 23.3% 26.7% 24.1% 17.2% 25.4%300        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Respondents’ perception of involvement of local groups in village decision-making
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Always 73.3% 53.3% 60.0% 62.1% 34.5% 43.3% 54.5%
Sometimes 16.7% 20.0% 23.3% 20.7% 58.6% 43.3% 30.3%
Never 10.0% 26.7% 16.7% 17.2% 6.9% 13.3% 15.2%
Respondents’ perception of involvement of outsiders in village decision-making
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Always 0% 0% 0% 3.3% 0% 0% .6%
Sometimes 13.3% 16.7% 23.3% 13.3% 31.0% 17.2% 19.1%
Never 86.7% 83.3% 76.7% 83.3% 69.0% 82.8% 80.3%
% Respondents who agree that women are involved in decision-making
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Always 33.3% 13.3% 10.0% 6.7% 24.1% 20.0% 17.9%
Sometimes 56.7% 56.7% 66.7% 70.0% 72.4% 63.3% 64.2%
Never 10.0% 30.0% 23.3% 23.3% 3.4% 16.7% 17.9%
Perceptions of who has responsibility for fisheries management
Nolloth Haruku Tuhaha Hulaliu Seri Hutumuri Total
Govt. (all) 33.3% 26.7% 36.7% 30.0% 3.4% 10.0% 23.5%
Govt. (most) 26.7% 30.0% 26.7% 46.7% 31.0% 43.3% 34.1%
Shared equally 33.3% 43.3% 33.3% 23.3% 6.9% 16.7% 26.3%
Mostly community 6.7% 0% 3.3% 0% 58.6% 30.0% 16.2%
Economic factors in each village
Economic score** % income from fishing % having external income Years’ fishing experience
Nolloth 8.47 80.57 70.33 27.07
Haruku 8.70 66.04 114.50 29.77
Tuhaha 9.27 74.58 159.00 33.90
Hulaliu 9.10 56.45 178.10 25.47
Seri 8.81 65.00 53.45 19.07
Hutumuri 10.35 64.26 211.33 28.00
Total 9.09 67.56 131.55 27.30
** = Boat, gear, house, land + TV ownershipAppendices        301
Appendix  4: Reasons for loss of Sasi between 1940 and 1997
Village Type of sasi lost Reasons given by local Comments (from local
or modified respondents (not respondents) necessarily the whole story)
2 Institution lost Reasons not given at this Rules rewritten in 1930s in the
Haruku twice and time (for full information original language (bahasa daerah).
revitalized in 1930s please see case study). Renewed and rewritten in
then again in 1979. Indonesian in 1979.
3 Land sasi lost in 1990s. Compliance problems Clan territories mixed up with
Kabauw rooted in conflict over land claimed by Rohomini clans.
land rights.
9L a n d   sasi lost in 1970s. Lack of compliance caused Marine resource rules were re-
Paperu Marine sasi no longer sasi to be abandoned. introduced as village government
functional by 1994 - 95. regulations (still called sasi) in 1996.
10 Marine sasi almost non- Increased pressure on fishery, More people entered fishery after
Porto existent by 1994. intense competition among clove price collapsed in 1990-91.
fishers and moral Land and sea sasi being revived.
disintegration.
13 Village sasi non No reason given.
Tengah-tengah -functional.
14 Land sasi  lost in 1991. Compliance dropped when Sasi worked well from at least 1967
Rutah enforcement lapsed due to till 1989. Coconuts now harvested
political strife in village and sold when green; dry coconuts
(pro and contra raja; difficult to find in village.
government unstable). Revitalization of sasi is planned.
15 Marine sasi  lost Theft by outsiders who Marine sasi lost, some fishers still
Soahuku by 1956. have no sasi in their village. believe there is sasi on various
All villages should have resources.
the same rules.
17 Land sasi lost in 1940s. Confusion over change in Village split into two desas but land
Hitu Lama administrative boundaries. owned by clans in each new desa
was still mixed together.
18 Sasi lost in 1950s. Conflict between church Sasi knowledge has died with the
Tiouw and adat. elders. Fishery now dominated by
newcomers (Butonese).
19 Land sasi  lost before Poor leadership i.e., lack of
Eri 1970s. coordination and poor
sharing of information,
led to compliance problems.
20 Sasi adat lost. Sasi taken over by the church.
Seilale
21 Sasi lost sometime Rules never written down, now
Iha  in 1900s. lost because elders with
knowledge have died.
22 Land sasi  lost in 1996. Lack of interest by kepala desa, Uncontrolled theft followed lapse
Ouw who is often absent and does in enforcement.
not work together with adat
leaders.
23 Land sasi  lost in 1990s. Price of sasi product
Booi (cloves) collapsed.
24 Marine and land sasi Urbanization caused Sasi abandoned at time of declining
Saparua lost in 1970s. farmland to disappear, harvests on land and sea.  Marine
water to become polluted. rules were written down but are
now lost.
25 Marine sasi adat lost Raja position taken by Land and marine sasi now
Tuhaha in 1977. unsuitable person : conflict being revived.
with adat leaders. (For
fuller information please
 see case study).302        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Village Type of sasi lost Reasons given by local Comments (from local
or modified respondents (not respondents) necessarily the whole story)
26 Marine sasi adat  lost Kewang stepped down during Land and marine sasi
Hulaliu in  1992. dispute with kepala desa.  being revitalised.
(For fuller information,
please see case study).
27 Village sasi  lost Village is dusun of larger desa; Some people continue to say there is
Seri in 1940s.  Church  sasi jurisdiction with respect to church sasi for individuals.  Kewang
on land gradually adat law unclear and kepala persists but its job unclear.
disappeared in 1996. desa not on site.
28 Sasi adat (land and Sasi adat taken over
Hutumuri village) lost in 1960s.  by church.
Church sasi  lost 1989.
29 Sasi adat lost 1993. Sasi adat taken over by Marine sasi  never existed because
Kariu church. marine territory very limited.
30 Marine sasi lost. Gradual evolution into Old marine sasi was rental system.
Kailolo  commercial system Rental still goes on but not called
lacking adat ritual.  sasi anymore.
31 Wants to start marine sasi.
Rohomoni
32 Sasi adat (land) Village sasi (adat) and Kewang present but non-functional.
Oma modified over time. church sasi now combined
to implement wishes of
church leaders (jemaat).
33 Sasi adat (land) Sasi taken over by church. Kewang present but non-functional.
Wassu modified over time. People now unsure whether to call
their sasi adat or not.
34 Sasi adat (land) lost Sasi taken over by church. Adat ceremonies have ceased.
Aboru 1979 - early 80s. Kewang present but non-functional.
35 Plans to strengthen marine sasi as
Sepa part of adat heritage.
37 The population is mixed with
Waisamu Butonese newcomers for whom sasi
(gereja) is less relevant.
38 Marine sasi revived in 1990.
Amahai
40 Sasi adat lost in 1950s. Regulations not clear. Church sasi survived amalgamation
Airlow Village has only dusun of this dusun with desa Nusaniwe
status. because church and government are
separate.
41 Land sasi and laut Poor leadership : raja’s Plans to revitalize marine sasi.
Amahusu lost in 1970s. rules not clear. Kewang already reinstalled in 1994.
42 1986 - 87 marine sasi Saniri negri accommodated in
Rutang was tried. LKMD.
43 Sasi adat (village and Sasi moved to the church. Had written rules in past. Plans
Leahari marine) lost after 1979. to revive marine sasi.
44 Sasi under pressure because of
Latuhalat  poor economy.
45 Land sasi (church) Some say church sasi still functional.
Hila lost in 1990s.
47 Sasi adat lost in 1995. Sasi taken over by church. Marine sasi inactive: revitalization
Haria is planned.
48 Land sasi (resource Theft of coconuts not
Wakal rental system) in place controlled i.e., lack of
1993 - 1994; abandoned enforcement mechanism.
in  1995.Appendices        303
Village Type of sasi lost Reasons given by local Comments (from local
or modified respondents (notrespondents) necessarily the whole story)
49 Sasi adat lost in 1992. Conflict between kepala Marine sasi at risk due to sale of
Ulath desa and kewang caused access rights to outsiders
kewang to give up sasi to (Madurese).
the church.
50 Land sasi lost in 1990s. Crop failure. No process in place for
Kulur reintroducing sasi to the younger
generation.  Sasi is cherished only
by the elderly.
51 Sasi adat and marine Village leader not respected Rules not written down.
Akoon sasi lost in 1970s. no sanctions, rules not
clear, low compliance.
Sasi moved to the church
because people were more
afraid of religious sanctions.
52 Marine sasi lost Marine sasi lost during war.
Ameth in 1940s.  Sasi adat Sasi adat moved to the church.
lost in 1987.
53 Marine sasi lost
Abubu in 1980s.
54 Marine sasi lost in No kewang to enforce rules of
Leinitu between 1940 and marine sasi.  Sasi adat moved
1960. Sasi adat (village) to the church.
lost 1983.304        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Appendix 5: Gover
nment Aagencies involved in fisheries management in Maluku  pr
ovince.
Results of interviews with various agencies involved in marine r
esour
c
e management and development in Maluku.  Management functions as follows: 1) information
gathering and pr
ovision, 2) pr
oject planning, 3) pr
oject implementation, 4) evaluation of pr
ojects (physical and legal aspects), 5) enfor
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Appendix 6: Translated Sasi rules from three villages
(Nolloth, Ihamahu, and Itawaka)
Appendix 6A: Nolloth Village Sasi Rules
POSITION, DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NOLLOTH’S KEWANG
In accordance to its role among the village community, also as an institution that developed from the community’s
awareness, and as assistance to the village government, the Kewang holds the following position, duties and
functions:
1. The Kewang or the Forest Police holds a position as an organization in the village, which in this
case has to do the following tasks:
a. To look after, maintain or develop all of the properties (forest or sea)
belonging to the  community and the village within the  village territory.
b. To perform as instructed by the Kepala Desa (Village Chief) in order to
keep the continuation of the environment and to defend it.
2. In order to perform the above mentioned tasks, the Kewang or Polisi Hutan has the function to
carry out  all kind of activities that bring happiness and welfare to the community through the
environment with an approval and monitored by the Kepala Desa.
RIGHTS, AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION OF THE KEWANG
I. RIGHTS
1. Every Kewang member has the right to give ideas in the Kewang meeting.
2. Every Kewang member has the right to wear the Kewang uniform/clothing.
3. Every Kewang member has the right to accept sasi harvested coconuts shared among the Kewang
members and coconuts of their own effort.
4. Every Kewang member who is on duty at the time when certain conflicts occur within the
community and therefore need to resolve it, has the right to receive transportation fee.
II. AUTHORITY
1. Controlling for safety within  the village territory (forest and sea).
2. Decide on  every barrier that brings disadvantages to the community.
3. Review  on all of the accomplishment and make effort for improvement.
4. Giving advice/suggestions to the Kepala Desa according to their duties.
III. OBLIGATIONS
1. Attend the Kewang meetings.
2. To keep the meeting under control and functioning smoothly/politely.
3. Maintain the Kewang privacy.
4. Support every village governmental policy.
5. To accept and decide on every trespassing of the sasi regulation.
6. Rejecting any conflicts that occur due to civil cases or criminal cases.
7. To keep actively in touch with all governmental components and congregational servants.
8. To report to the Kepala Desa all conflicts and development that occur within the village which
are related to the Kewang’s tasks.
Stated in: N o l l o t h
On: January 1, 1990
Kepala DesaAppendices        307




1. As of January 1, 1990, the territory of covers an area of 125,000 m_ starting along the 2.5 km long
coastal line, from Umisin beach (Batu Berlubang) to Wailessy beach (border with Ihamahu) and further
to the sea, to a depth of 25 m.
2. No one, either the Nolloth community nor any other villagers is allowed to do any activities at all
within the sasi territorial waters, i.e.,
a. The hauling of fish nets if swimming is required to do so,
b. Diving for hunting fish,
c. Swimming, except for tourists who have a permit from the Kepala Desa.




d. Sea cucumbers of any species,
e. Corals.
4. For those who intend to take stones, sands or gravel for private use, they should ask for a permit
from the Kepala Desa, and this should be ackowledged by the Pakter or Kewang Besar or the Kewang’s
Secretary.
5. It is forbidden to sell stones, sand and gravel to any other villagers.
6. It is forbidden for anyone at all to fish using toxic matters, including traditional medicines such as
“tuba” roots etc.
CHAPTER II
L A N D
Section 1: Wood
1. Any community member is forbidden to take wood for fuel from other people’s property/farmland.
2. Wood for household purposes can be taken from other people’s farm property if permitted by the
owner.
3. The community  are not allowed to cut off:
a. Langsat offspring to make spears/weapons, etc.,
b. Manggis offspring to make spears/weapons  etc.,
c. Durian offspring to make sailing masts etc.
4. All kinds of manggis stems are not allowed to be peeled off.
5. The community members are not allowed to climb and take young durian fruit from the tree.
Section 2: Coconuts
1. No one is allowed  to pick up any fallen off coconuts if these do not belong to them.
2. Those who do not have a house within their farm property (dusun), are not allowed to bring home his
coconuts by passing through other people’s farm property.
3. Those who are taking their coconuts from their farm property home at the same time when sasi closes,
should have a permit from the Pakter or Kewang Besar.
4. Coconut owners who intend to make coconut oil within the coconut plantation, may only do so
when sasi is opened.
5. When sasi is closed, it is forbidden for anyone at all to collect and eat young coconuts, even if it is
from his own plantation.
6. When sasi is closed, it is not allowed to take home coconut oil from the plantation.
7. Those who have picked and collected  their  coconuts during the time when sasi is opened but did not
have enough time to take all of them during that time, must report to the Pakter or Kewang Besar to
get permission to take the coconuts home during the time when sasi is already closed. If not, the
coconuts cannot be taken home.
8. Every community member who intends to cut down a coconut tree for housing purposes, should
have a permit from the Pakter or Kewang Besar. They also have an obligation to plant or exchange one
tree for every tree cut down.
9. No one is allowed take young coconut leaves when sasi is closed, except when it is for public/
congregation use, through deliberation with community leaders.
10.Every head of the family that takes a coconut fruit during the time when sasi is opened, must bring in
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Section 3: Sago
1. Anyone who cuts down the sago tree for processing must not leave the stem to stick out for more
than 30 cm long.
2. Before cutting down the sago tree, the cutter must first have cleaned the area around the sago tree
within a minimum radius of twice the length of the sago stem.
3. Besides cleaning down the area around the sago tree, the edges of the tree should be cut down first,
so that the other plants around the sago tree will not be destroyed when the sago tree is cut down.
4. When cutting off sago palms for roofing or for “tumang”, the process of cutting should be the same
as the process when cutting down the sago tree.
5. When cutting off sago leaves from a tree, the leaves should not be cut off from more than one branch.
6. Cutting off sago leaves should be done at one’s own plantation and if done at others, then the cutter
should have a permit from the plantation owner.
7. Sago leaves for “tumang” use, should only be taken from one stem and notmore than that.
8. Anyone who processes sago in the area of Seram is not allowed to cut sago leaves from trees within
the territory of Nolloth.
Section 4: Sugar Palm
1. When sasi is closed, no one is allowed to cut off the stem to make brooms (sapu lidi).
2. When sasi is opened, no one is allowed to cut/take sugar palm from other people’s plantation, except
if permitted by the owner.
3. It is forbidden to cut off “gemutu” at other people’s plantation, unless permitted by the owner.
Section 5: Areca Nut (Pinang)
1. No one is allowed to take young areca nuts except when permitted by the Pakter/Kewang Besar.
2. The stem of the areca nut is also not allowed to be cut off, except when permitted by the Kewang
Besar/Pakter.
Section 6: Pineapples
1. No one is allowed to take a young pineapple fruit.
2. It is also forbidden to have other people’s pets or cows eat or destroy the pineapple plants.
3. Cow owners are not allowed to feed either old or young pineapples to their cows.
Section 7: Bananas
1. No one is allowed to cut down young banana trees.
2. Only one stem per tree is allowed to be taken for use.
Section 8: Jackfruit/Cempedak
1. No one is allowed to take young cempedak fruits.




1. No one is allowed to open or break the “salele/etang” that has been put on acertain thing without
permission from the one who puts it there i.e.,
a. “Salele/etang” in front of houses’ doors,
b. “Salele/etang” at trees or plants,
c. “Salele/etang” at “goti”, etc.
Section 2: Foreigners
1. Every newcomer/foreigner is not allowed to enter the village territory without first having a
permission from the Kepala Desa, Pakter and Kewang Besar.
2. The foreigner who has already obtained a permit must obey all of the regulations within the village
territory.
3. Foreigners who arrive with boats/vessels are not allowed to leave their boats along the territorial
coastline.Appendices        309
Section 3: Identification marks
1. No one – either the community member or foreigners – are allowed to wear clothes or attributes that
belong to the Kewang.
2. No one is allowed to use the sound instrument usually used by the Kewang (shell).
Section 4: Problems/Difficulties
1. No community member is to take justice into his own hands when he is still within the village
territory.
2. No one is allowed to do things that may bring uneasiness to others.
3. When a problem arises that needs resolving by the Kewang, the one involved should pay the
costs for:
a. Getting people to come or be present or keeping them away,
b. Keeping the cloves safe at harvest time,
c. The plantation commission,
d. Counting the plants/trees and deciding on the borders.
Section 5: Others
1. When sasi is closed, no one is allowed to wear a hat, white towel, white shirt and use an umbrella.
2. When sasi is closed during the months February to August, no one is allowed to turn on the gasoline
light, “lobe” or torch within the forest at night, unless permitted by the Pakter and Kewang Besar.
3. Sounds from chain saws, tape recorders, drums, etc. are also not allowed.
Section 6: Additions
1. These sasi regulations are adapted to Kewang regulations.
2. Anyone who breaks these regulations will have to pay a certain fee as stated hereafter.
3. If sometime in the future there seems to be any error or mistake in these regulations, it will be corrected.
4. The sasi regulations are valid from the day they are decreed.
Decreed in: N o l l o t h
On: January 1, 1990
Acknowledged/ Legalized:                             1. Pakter310        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia





2. a. b. c. - Pay a fine of Rp25,000 per person
3. Pay a fine of:
a. Rp7,500 per individual big/small
b. Rp25,000 per individual big/small
c. Rp2,500 per individual big/small
d. Rp1,000 per individual big/small
e. Rp5,000 per plant big/small
4. Pay a fine of: Rp5,000 for rocks per m_
Rp7,500 for sand per m_
Rp10,000 for gravel per m_
5. Pay a fine of: Rp10,000 for rocks per m_
Rp12,500 for sand per m_
Rp15,000 for gravel per m_




Section 1:  Wood
1. Pay a fine of Rp5,000
2. Pay a fine of Rp10,000
3. Pay a fine of Rp12,500
4. Pay a fine of Rp25,000
5. Pay a fine of Rp1,000 for each fruit
Section 2: Coconuts
1. Pay a fine of Rp500 for each fruit
2. Pay a fine of Rp250 for each fruit
3. Pay a fine of Rp500 for each fruit
4. Pay a fine of Rp250 for each fruit
5. Pay a fine of Rp500 for each fruit
6. Pay a fine of Rp2,500 for each bottle of oil
7. Pay a fine of Rp250 for each coconut
8. Pay a fine of Rp10,000 for each tree
9. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 for each coconut “tumbak”
10.Pay a fine of Rp5,000 / family or remove weeds from the lawn appointed by the Kewang with an
approvalfrom the Kepala Desa
Section 3. Sago
1. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 for each tree
2. Pay a fine of Rp10,000 for each tree
3. Pay a fine of Rp10,000 for each tree
4. Pay a fine of Rp10,000 for each tree
5. Pay a fine of Rp2,500 for each branch
6. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 for each plantation
7. Pay a fine of Rp2,500 for each stem
8. Pay a fine of Rp10,000
Section 4: Sugar Palm
1. Pay a fine of Rp500 for each stem
2. Pay a fine of Rp250 for each stem
3. Pay a fine of Rp1,000 for each “lirang”Appendices        311
Section 5: Areca Nut
1. Pay a fine of Rp1,000 for each tree
2. Pay a fine of Rp2,500 for each tree
Section 6: Pineapples
1. Pay a fine of Rp1,000 for each fruit
2. The cow owner has to pay a fine of Rp1,500 for each fruit
3. Pay a fine of Rp1,000 for each tree
Section 7: Bananas
1. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 for each tree
2. Pay a fine of Rp500 for each stem
Section 8: Jackfruit/Cempedak
1. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 for each fruit








1. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 per person
2. Pay a fine of Rp2,500 per person
3. Pay a fine of Rp10,000 per boat
Section 3: Identfication marks
1. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 per person or clean the streets within the village, as appointed by the
Kewang after having reported to the Kepala Desa
2. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 per person or the same as 3.1
Section 4: Problems/Difficulties
1. They are sentenced to gather and carry 25 baskets of sand after reporting to the Kepala Desa
2. They are sentenced to gather and carry 20 baskets of sand after reporting to the Kepala Desa
3. The cost that they have to pay are as follows:
a. Each Kewang member gets Rp1,000
b. Each Kewang member gets Rp2,500
c. Each Kewang member gets Rp1,500
d. Each Kewang member gets Rp1,500
Section 5: Others
1. Pay a fine of Rp2,500 per person
2. Pay a fine of Rp2,500 per person or pulling out weeds at places as appointed by the Kewang
after reporting to the Kepala Desa
3. Pay a fine of Rp5,000 per person or the same as point 5.2 above
Section 6: Addition
Points 1-4 are quite clear
Decreed in: N o l l o t h
Acknowledged/Legalized:
On: January 1, 1990312        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Appendix 6C: Ihamahu Village Sasi Rules
Ihamahu’s Kewang Board
Consultant : Bapak Raja (Upu Latu/Ketua Adat)
  M.R. Lilipaly
Chairman : Mr. Justhinus Siauta
Vice Chairman : Mr. Daniel Pattinaya
Secretary : Mr. Zefnath Nendissa
Treasurer : Mr. Selwanus Hitipeuw
The board also contains the following  divisions:
Funding : Mr. Fredy Sopacua
Security : Mr. Petrus Leatemia
Reforestation : Mr. Jermias Pattinaya
Adat Law : Mr. Onesimus Sahetapy
Public Relations : Mr. Jusuf Paliama
Ihamahu’s Kewang Regulations
Ever since the Ihamahu Kewang Corps (Korp Kewang Ihamahu) made their comeback and started functioning
again, the previous regulations are re-established along with other, new regulations which are considered
necessary, such as regulations related to the Environmental Concept of the National Development. All the
regulations are still maintained and upheld. The community also lives by and acknowledges them.
Those regulations are as follows:
1. Before cutting down a sago tree, one must climb the tree and cut down the branches first.
2. The cutting down of a sago tree should not bring about destruction to other sago trees.
3. When squeezing the sago debris (ela) to get the extract, the waste water (air goti) should not flow into
the river.
4. The stem and mid-rib (sahani) used for getting the extract (goti), should be taken from the sago tree to
be cut down, and not from other sago trees.
5. When cutting sago leaves for the purpose of making a roof, at least five whole branches should be
left on each tree and should not be cut off.
6. Women are prohibited to do the washing at the upper course of the river when someone is extracting
sago at the lower course.
7. When cutting down the tree to get wood for household purposes, the branches should be cut down
first before the tree itself. This intention should be reported to the Kewang Chief (Kepala Kewang) or
the Vice Chief two days before the activity takes place.
8. Other villagers from outside Ihamahu who wish to enter the sago woods to work on getting sago
extract or getting wood for household purposes, must report to the Kewang Chief and must possess a
Work Permit as well as receive guidance and  pay a certain amount of fee to the Village Treasury or
Kewang before they are allowed to enter the woods.
9. Those who enter the woods at the time when the trees are budding and blooming should  not make
any noise.
10.Walking in the woods with an open umbrella is prohibited.
11. Throwing at the durian tree bearing fruits is prohibited.
12.Climbing a durian tree when the fruits are still unripe is prohibited.
13.Taking the mangrove’s bark for reinforcement of fishing nets is prohibited, unless  permitted by the
Kewang.
14.Taking the young mangroves for any ceremonial purposes at all is prohibited unless permitted by
the Kewang.
15.Picking unripe fruits from the trees is prohibited.
16.Using explosives for fishing is prohibited.
17.Destruction or harvest of coral reefs, sea cucumbers, trochus, tridacna for certain purposes or export
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18.Other villagers are prohibited to take sand or stones from areas within the Ihamahu territory unless
permitted by the Kewang or the Land Owner (Tuan Dusun).
19.Other villagers are prohibited to take “tali kamatol” from areas within the territory of Ihamahu
unless  permitted by the Kewang.
20.Roofs (gaba-gaba) are not to be sold to other villages.
21.Sago plantation owners who wish to put their plantation for lease should report to the Kewang
2 x 24 hours beforehand in order to arrange for the Kewang to supervise the leasing.
22.Land owners who wish to open up their piece of land for plantation use such  as corn plantations,
should first report to the Kewang. The Kewang will then consider whether this is feasible (in terms of
fertility and environmental/natural resources maintenance perpetuation).
23.Embedded “bagan” which destroys coral reefs is prohibited.
24.Fishing using small mesh size nets is prohibited.
25.Fishing with nets during the day is prohibited, except for schooling.
26.Littering along the coastal area is prohibited.
27.Destroying/cutting off mangroves is prohibited.
Special Regulations about Sasi
Sasi is an effective way of managing or preserving natural resources, which has basically been put into practice
by the previous generations until now. Some of the sasi regulations are also confirmed by the Kewang regulations.
Those regulations are as follows:
1. When sasi is closed, taking coconuts either from the tree or the ones fallen from  the tree is prohibited.
2. When sasi is closed, taking coconut shoots for any purpose at all is prohibited.
3. Taking dry coconut trunks for fuel wood is prohibited unless permitted by the Kewang.
4. Cutting down coconut trees for household purposes is prohibited unless permitted by the Kewang.
5. Taking palm leaves for making brooms is prohibited unless sasi is opened or announced so by the
Kewang.
6. When the sasi is opened, all the coconut plantations should be cleaned of undergrowth.
7. Before the sasi is closed, every coconut plantation owner should give some of their harvest to the
Kewang members and non-native governmental officials who work for the village, including the
priest.
8. The processes of taking palm leaves are also arranged with sasi. Two or three days after sasi on coconuts
is opened, sasi for taking the palm leaves is also opened.
9. Sasi kelapa for coconuts in the trees is opened once every three months for the people to climb the
trees. However, if many coconuts have fallen off the trees, sasi for fallen-off coconuts is also opened
for three days.
Sasi is a traditional (adat) way of management that should be perpetuated. The closing and opening of sasi is
done with a special ceremony according to the adat. However, the church is also involved and through its prayers,
it supports all the crops which we believe are the Almighty’s gift for us.
Any transgressions are resolved according to the adat, followed by paying a fine which depends on the type of
transgression made by the community member. When the transgression made is minor, it can be resolved by
giving guidance and counseling only.314        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
Types of Transgressions and the Penalties
In the 1960s, anyone who practiced a transgression towards the Kewang regulations had to pay a penalty/fine.
The types of penalty/fine that they had to pay are as follows:
Table 1. Concerning sago wood
No. Types of Transgressions Fine
1. Cutting down the sago tree without first sweeping the lawn. Rp1.000
2. Cutting down the sago branches, only leaving four whole branches. Rp5.000
3. Cutting off sago branches for roofing purposes without sweeping the lawn. Rp1.000
4. Cutting down the sago tree without first cutting down its branches. Rp1.000
5. Destructing young sago trees when cutting down a sago tree. Rp5.000
6. Cutting down a young sago tree. Rp5.000
7. Taking/cutting off sago leaves to make sago extract (tumang) without
using a sickle. Rp1.000
8. Cutting off young sago branches to make a fence. Rp1.000
9. Stealing one unripe durian. Rp5.000
10. Stealing one unripe coconut. Rp5.000
11. Stealing one unripe pineapple. Rp5.000
12. Stealing or cutting off unripe bananas. Rp5.000
Table 2. Concerning coconut wood
No. Types of Transgressions Fine
1. Cutting of coconut shoots. Rp1.000
2. Taking coconuts when sasi is closed. Rp5.000
3. Stealing one unripe coconut. Rp5.000
4. Taking coconut branches when sasi is closed. Rp1.000
5. Cutting down coconut trees that bear fruits. Rp5.000
6. Cutting down the woods. Rp10.000





8. Burning down forests especially parts containing clean water sources. - As above
9. Destroying coral reefs, stealing sea cucumbers and trochus and any other
marine biotas. - As aboveAppendices        315
Appendix 6C: Itawaka Village Sasi Rules
THE GOVERNMENT OF ITAWAKA
KECAMATAN SAPARUA
THE KEWANG ORGANIZATION OF ITAWAKA
THE STATUTE AND BYLAWS
A. Base
1. The Itawaka’s LMD Decree dated March 14, 1995 about the establishment of the Itawaka’s Kewang
statute and bylaws.
2. The Itawaka Kewang members’ resolution for the establishment of the statute and bylaws,
 dated May 22, 1995.
B. Home Affairs
1. Aim and objective
The aim and objective of the Itawaka’s Kewang  statute and bylaws establishment is to provide work
guidelines for implementing the tasks carried out by the LMD in a responsible useful and successful
way.
2. The  duties and responsibilities of the Kewang
a. The duties and responsibilities of the Kewang are to monitor over all the land and marine
resources that are sources of income to the village, within the territory of Itawaka.
b. To monitor over the area and borders of  the Itawaka territory.
3. The Kewang Organization  structure of  Itawaka
Chief - Nikodemus Papilaya
Vice Chief - Paulus Sakalessy (Pakter)
Secretary - Izac Papilaya
Treasurer - David Sopacua
Public Relations - Abraham Sahetapy
- Matheos Sopacua
Kewang chief for the forests - Pieter Papillae
Kewang chief for the Tanah Iha - Alfaris Siahaya
Advisors/Patron - The head  and staff of the LMD
4. The Kewang’s regulations
a. On land, during the sasi period:
1. It is prohibited to climb the coconut trees.
2. It is prohibited to pick up coconuts that have fallen on the ground.
3. It is prohibited to pick/cut off young coconuts.
4. It is prohibited to take/cut off young coconut leaves (daun ketupat).
5. It is prohibited to cook coconut oil within the plantation area.
6. It is prohibited to bring in young coconut leaves (daun ketupat) from other villages.
7. Villagers who are not members of the Kewang body, are not allowed to wear the red
handkerchief (lenso berang) when entering the plantation area.
8. It is prohibited to cut off/chop down young wood and bamboo (loleba) within the territory of
the Iha land (tanah Iha).
9. During the period when sasi is closed, at least after 40 days, there is a possibility for the
community to pick/gather coconuts when required, by asking for a permit letter from the
Kewang chief (Kepala Kewang/Pakter) and by paying an administration fee of Rp2,000
(two thousand rupiahs).
10. Those who own ornamental coconut trees within the territory of Itawaka do not have to have
sasi applied to their coconuts, unless the ownerhimself proposed to do so.
11. Those who own coconut plantations within the territory of Paperu, must ask for a permit
from the Kewang when intending to pick/gather their coconuts to bring back to Itawaka.
Those who break this regulation must pay a fine of Rp1,500 (one thousand and five hundred
rupiahs).
b. At sea, during the sasi period:
1. It is prohibited to dive for marine resources such as trochus, sea cucumbers and others within
the territorial waters of Itawaka.
2. People from outside the village are prohibited to catch fish at sea using nets.316        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia
3. It is prohibited to catch and sell ornamental fish in a way that can disadvantage the village.
c. At the closing and opening time of sasi:
1. It is prohibited to cut off leaves for roofing at other people’s plantations without permission
from the owner.
2. It is prohibited to take the manggis skin without permission from the owner.
3. It is prohibited to let cows enter into other people’s plantations without permission from the
owner.
4. It is prohibited to make ketupat for sale.
5. The Itawaka and other villagers are prohibited to catch fish using explosives or other
destructive materials.
6. It is prohibited to chop down sago trees before first cutting off the branches.
7. It is prohibited to destruct young sago palms. Those who break this regulation must pay a
fine of  Rp25,000 (twenty-five thousand rupiahs).
8. People from outside the Itawaka village are not allowed to take gravel and rocks (batu itam)
along the coasts within the Itawaka territory without  having a permit to do so. A fine of
Rp50,000 (fifty thousand rupiahs)must be paid by those who break this regulation.
Itawaka villagers themselves who intentionally take gravel or batu itam besar to sell to people
outside the village without carrying a permit, should pay a fine of Rp10,000 (ten thousand
rupiahs).
9. People from outside Itawaka who used wood for housing purposes and other purposes by
using sensorial machinery within the territory of Itawaka without carrying a permit must
pay a fine of Rp10,000 (ten thousand rupiah).
10. People from out of the Itawaka village who enter the village to work, must carry a permit and
pay the following charges:
10.1 To process sugar palms Rp25,000
10.2 To pick cloves Rp10,000
10.3 To pick nutmegs Rp5,000
10.4 To cut wood to make a boat Rp2,500
10.5 To chop down fuel wood Rp1,000
d. On land, during the sasi opening period:
The community members are allowed to pick/gather substantive young coconuts.
e. At sea, during the sasi opening period:
The opening ceremony for sasi on marine resources, such as trochus and sea cucumbers, is
performed by  the Pakter/Kepala Kewang, and then reported to the LMD for auctioning to the
Itawaka community and people from outside the village.
f. Other matters that are not included in the Kewang’s regulations will be studied further and later
added on as part of the statute and bylaws.
5. The obligations and responsibilities of the Kewang
1. The obligation of the Kewang is to monitor the land and marine resources of the village which
are sources of income for the village and to process them so that they become money. The Kewang
deposits the money to the treasurer with an acknowledgment from the Head of the LMD/Village
Head (Kepala Desa) along with a receipt from the Kewang’s treasurer.
2. The income from the village’s land and marine resources are fully used for carrying out the
governmental job in supporting the development program of the village, according to the
community’s desires/aspirations.
6. The work period of the Kewang board
1. Each Kewang board has a work period of 8 (eight) years, as decreed through the Kewang meeting
and approved by the LMD.
2. When the work period of the Kewang board is over, the Pakter holds a meeting to end the work
period of the board and elect new personnel for the new board of the Kewang. Members of the
former board can be re-elected as members of the new board; those who are not re-elected will
function as regular members of the Kewang.
7. The Kewang job division
a. Since there are 26 members of the Kewang (not including the Kewang board), it has been
decided to have four to five members of the Kewang to be on duty each month. This
was decided by considering the condition and the total area of the Itawaka territory.
8. Rules for the Kewang
This statute and bylaws include the following rules for the Kewang to be obeyed:
a. A Kewang member who intentionally or unintentionally neglects his duty without a reasonable
excuse during his month of work, will be taken action against by the board during the KewangAppendices        317
meeting.
b. During his month of work, if community members or people from outside the village  who
intentionally or unintentionally break the regulations stated in the statute and by laws, during
the closing or opening period of sasi, the particular Kewang member who is in charge at the time
must report directly to the Kepala Kewang and to have action taken against the rule breaker,
without any discriminatory feelings.
c. If the Kewang member or LMD member himself breaks the regulations stated in the statute and
bylaws, then he must pay a fine twice as much as what a normal community member or other
villager pays.
d. All Kewang members must attend the Kewang meetings unless they are sick, or for family reasons
or any other hindrances such as being out of the village.
e. Every member who attends the Kewang meeting must sign the attendance list.
f. The Kewang members are those who are Itawaka villagers living in the village.
g. The members of the Itawaka’s Kewang are those who are not involved in any political organizations
forbidden by the government.
9.   Juridical sanctions
Those who intentionally or unintentionally  break the Kewang’s regulations mentioned above,
have to undergo the  following sanctions:
a. The community members who climb old or young coconut trees, cut off young coconut leaves,
chop down wood and bamboo within the territory of tanah Iha, catch trochus and sea cucumber,
and cook coconut oil within the plantation area, must pay a fine of Rp25,000 (twenty-five thousand
rupiahs).
b. The community members who does the following without carrying a permit:
cut off other people’s roofing, peeling off manggis skin, taking fruits, allowing cows enter other
people’s plantations, must pay thefollowing:
1.  A fine of Rp5,000 (five thousand rupiahs) to the Kewang.
2.  Compensation to the owner according to the disadvantages he has caused.
c. If those who break the regulations do not comply with the sanctions applied to them, they are
taken to the LMD for further action.
10. The obligations of the Kewang (special notes)
1. Each Kewang member must have a red uniform and  a red handkerchief (lenso berang).
2. At the opening and closing ceremony of the sasi, the Kewang members must wear their uniform
and the lenso berang.
3. Every  Kewang member, when carrying out his monthly work within the plantation area, must
carry along with him the lenso berang and the work instruction letter signed by the Pakter/Kepala
Kewang, as a trademark, to prevent other community members from intentionally acting as Kewang
members.
4. The Itawaka’s Kewang has a special Kewang stamp for organizational use.
C.  Closing
This statute and bylaws of the Itawaka’s Kewang are established to provide working guidelines for the
Kewang to carry out its job, assist the Itawaka village government in maintaining and monitoring the
area and borders  of the Itawaka village as well as its land and marine resources which are sources of
income for the village in supporting the development of this loveable Itawaka village.
Therefore, we would ask for the goodwill of the Itawaka village head (kepala desa) as the head  of the LMD to
examine it, and if approved, to please endorse it.
Itawaka, May 22,
1995318        An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia




Pakter Kewang Chief of the forest
_____________________ _____________________
SAKALESSY P. PAPILAYA
Kewang Chief of Tanah Iha
_____________________
A.SIAHAYA
Browsed and approved by
Itawaka Village Head (Kepala Desa)
_____________________
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AmalatuAppendices        327
V
a
lue  in rupiah
Appendix 8: Exchange rate Rupiah/USD (1996-1998)
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